Post-mortem rituals and party reform: Australian Labor debates, 1963-1981 by O'Connell, Declan
POST-MORTEM RITUALS AND PARTY REFORM
(Australian Labor Debates, 1963-1981)
DECLAN O'CONNELL
(A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University)
April 1990
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Tables vii
Abstract ix
Acknowledgements xi
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1A Post-Mortem Politics 1
IB Post-Mortems, Internal Processes and 10
the 'Public Face' of Parties 
1C 'Social Change' and Change within 20
Parties: Three Models
ID Change in the ALP, 1963-1981: 34
'Adaptation'? 'Revolution'?
PART I (1963-67)
2 A PARTY IN CONFUSION: LABOR ENTERS THE '60s 52
2A Calwell and Whitlam Differ on 'Wooing 52
the White Collars', March-June 1960 
2B Establishing the Federal Secretariat: 58
Trials and Tribulations, 1958-64 
2C Research and Reorganisation: National 64
Organising Committee, 1960-61 
2D Winding Up the NOC: Lessons for Party 68
Reformers
3 PICKING UP THE PIECES: LABOR AFTER 72
30 NOVEMBER 1963
3A Seventh Successive Defeat 72
3B Debates in the States 78
4 FULL-SCALE INQUIRY: NEW SOUTH WALES 85
4A Establishing the Inquiry: The Officers' 85
Rationale
4B FECs and Labor Reconstruction 93
4C 'Anti-Communist Blitz': FECs in Conflict 99
4D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': 105
The Whitlam Line
iv
Page
5 NEW SOUTH WALES INQUIRY: REPORT AND 112
REPERCUSSIONS
5A Drawing the Threads Together: 112
Official Report
5B State Conference: Another Arena 117
5C 'Morbid Self-Analysis' Rejected: 122
Western Australia and Victoria 
5D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': 127
The Victorian Debate
6 THE WYNDHAM REPORT: CONTEXT 136
6A After the State Debates: Federal 136
Executive Commissions Inquiry 
6B Cyril Wyndham: Party Professional, 138
Symbolic Appointment
6C Factions, Patrons and the Federal 143
Secretary
6D Blaming the Electorate: Labor Temptation 151
7 THE WYNDHAM REPORT: CONTENT AND RESPONSES 156
7A Labor Amateurism: The Wyndham Diagnosis 156
7B Party Democracy Sub-Text 162
7C Commentary 167
7D After the Report: Manoeuvres 171
8 POST-MORTEM POLITICS AGAIN: 'ADAPTATION' 187
AND 'DISLOYALTY'
8A Crises in 1966 187
8B 'Disloyalty' and 'Adaptation' Rhetorics 193
8C Calwell's Confidential Report 198
8D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': 203
Once Again
9 COMPROMISE ON PARTY REFORM: ADELAIDE, 211
AUGUST 1967
9A Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, 211
Phase I
9B Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, 218
Phase II: Around the State Conference
Circuit
9C Oiling the 'Old Machine'? 230
9D Adelaide Compromise: Institutions and 234
Interpretations
VPART II (1977-81)
Page
10 NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY: ESTABLISHMENT 246
10A Looking Back 246
10B Responses to 1977 Defeat 252
10C Dramatis Personae 261
11 NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY: PROCESS 274
11A Submissions: 'Garbage Can' Smorgasbord 274
1IB Agenda: NCI Autonomy from 'Chiefs' 289
and 'Masses'
12 PARTY RENEWAL: NCI RHETORIC 298
12A 'Rank-and-File Alienation': Problems 298
and Solutions
12B CPS 4: Ironic 'Lesson of 1975' 306
12C 'Grass'Roots' Revitalisation: 315
'Legitimation' versus Manageability,
NCI Dilemma
12D Conference Reform; 'Pseudo-Legitimation' 320
13 PARTY RENEWAL: NATIONAL CONFERENCE REALPOLITIK 328
13A National Conference Reform: The Calculus 328
of Factional Advantage
13B Beyond a 'Who Gets What' Analysis 338
13C But Who Did Get What? (Case Study) 346
13D Still No Place for the 'Rank-and-File'? 351
13E The Haphazard Politics of Party Reform 357
14 THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A CASE 364
STUDY IN LABOR/'NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT' RELATIONS
14A Transforming the Party? 364
14B No Place for Women in a 'Working Man's 368
Party'?
14C Putting Affirmative Action into the 378
Rule-Book
vi
Page
15 'MAKING SOCIALISM IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY'? 389
15A Socialism, Economic Policy and the NCI 389
15B Reformulating the 'Socialisation 398
Obj ective'
15C 'Capitalist Crisis' or 'Winning the 405
Next Election': The Great Non-Debate
CONCLUSION
16 Post-Mortem Rituals and Change in the ALP 417
NOTES 449
APPENDICES 543
I The Wyndham Report: Full Text 543
II What's New? 568
III 'Socialisation Objective': Formulations 577
BIBLIOGRAPHY 588
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
CHAPTER 1
1 Patterns of Post-Mortem Debate: The ALP, 5
1963-67 and 1977-81
2 Models of the Relationship between 'Social 21
Change' and Party Activity
3 Conceptualisations of Changes in Australian 38
Politics and Society
4 ALP Strategies: 'Ideal Types' 45
CHAPTER 4
1 Labor Votes and Seats, by State, House of 85
Representatives 1958-63
CHAPTER 9
1 Special Conference 1967: Acceptance of 233
Wyndham Recommendations
CHAPTER 11
1 NCI Submissions 274
2 Party Unit NCI Submissions 276
3 Major Themes Submitted by Party Units 277
4 Major Themes Submitted from within Party 278
5 'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology' 281
Submissions: Further Analysis
6 'Organisational Housekeeping' and 283
'Campaign Comments': Individual Member
Submissions
7 Reasons to DPs 1-4 and 6 - Origins 294
CHAPTER 12
1 Labor 'Community Presence Strategies' 303
2 NCI Conference Reform Formula 325
viii
Page
CHAPTER 13
1 Conference Reform Proposals: Percentage 332
Comparison with 1981 status quo
2 How the Branches Would Fare under the 336
Different Proposals
3 Cost-Benefit Analysis for Branches of 347
Basing Increase on Membership rather than 
Federal Electorates
4 Distribution of Delegates, 1965 and 1979-82 352
5 Parliamentary and 'Lay' Delegates, 353
1955-1984
6 Occupational Background, 'Rank-and-File' 355
Delegates, 1981-82
7 'Rank-and-File' Delegates to National 356
Conference, 1979-82
8 Union Officials at National Conference, 357
1979-82
9 National Conference Delegates, 1979-82 358
CHAPTER 14
1 Pro-Feminist and Pro-Environmentalist 370
Submissions from Party Units
2 1982 National Conference Uranium Debate: 386
Voting and Speakers
CHAPTER 15
1 Speakers and Federal Politicans in General 408
'Socialisation Objective' Debate
ix
ABSTRACT
After election defeats, parties usually engage in 
post-mortem rituals. These can take a wide variety of 
forms. Committees of inquiry may be established. 'Rank- 
and-file' members may be given opportunities to have their 
say about 'what went wrong'. Parliamentary leaders may 
attempt to convince voters that the party has mended its 
ways. Within the party, matters of organisational 
structure, programme and ideology may be debated, although 
post-mortems are often effectively confined to a narrow 
range of topics. Post-mortem ritual talk generally includes 
reference to more effective campaigning, intra-party 
democracy and 'adaptation' to 'social change'. 'Managerial' 
discourses, emphasising electoral success, efficiency and 
party professionalism jostle with the 'participatory' 
discourses embodying activists' aspirations (emphasising the 
party's mission, 'rank-and-file' rights and 'educating' the 
electorate). Commentators often dismiss these rituals as 
meaningless exercises, interesting only insofar as they 
provide a backdrop for vealpolit-ik power plays about who is 
to be 'blamed' for the defeat. However, if we analyse post­
mortem rituals seriously, we have a useful vantage point for 
examining what goes on within political parties. Both 
'managerial' and 'participatory' forms of 'rationalistic 
idealism' may be little more than camouflage for realpolitik 
manoeuvre and machination. However, party reform involves 
the crystallisation of new meanings as well as factional 
struggles. 'Rationalistic idealism' may help new meanings
Xto crystallise and a new self-understanding to emerge within 
a party. Of course, the connections between post-mortem 
rituals and party reform are contingent. Post-mortems may, 
or may not, lead to party reform. They take place at a time 
when party leaders have suffered a loss of confidence. The 
study of post-mortem rituals allows us to examine intra­
party processes when, at least potentially, they are in a 
state of flux.
By comparing different post-mortems in the same 
party over time, we can also address the vexed question of 
'social change' and party 'response'. The literature on 
parties abounds with generalisations about the 'effects' of 
'social change'. Such generalisations often rely on little 
more than hunches about what goes on within parties. This 
thesis explores post-mortem rituals in the Australian Labor 
Party in two periods, 1963-67 and 1977-81. In each of these 
periods, there were some connections between the post­
mortems and attempts at party reform. Comparison of the two 
cases can help us appreciate some of the complexities 
involved in the relationship between changes in Australian 
society and changes in the ALP. In contrast with previous 
arguments about the 'middle-classing' of the ALP in a 
'middle-class' society, distinctions are drawn between the 
emergence of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 as a model 
for 'new' Labor practice in the 1960s and the conflicts 
between Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 and Labor 
Managerialism in 1977-81. Changes in ALP practice cannot 
simply be derived from changes in Australian society. They 
require analysis in their own right.
xi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1A Post-Mortem Politics
Parties which lose elections often become 
introspective. There may be challenges to prevailing ways 
of doing things as well as recriminations and factional 
manoeuvres, as parties examine 'what went wrong'. 
Introspection may be facilitated by such devices as official 
committees of inquiry, commissioned reports and special 
meetings (at 'rank-and-file' as well as executive level).
How much introspection occurs, whether it leads to change 
and what questions remain taboo are all matters of dispute. 
Post-mortem rituals do not have pre-ordained outcomes. They 
offer an interesting route to the study of change within 
parties. Generalisations about the 'effects' of 'social 
change' on parties often pay little heed to how parties 
themselves attempt to 'set about adapting to changing 
circumstances' (Mair, 1983:429).'*' Party reform blueprints 
may be trumpeted as appropriate responses to 'social 
change'. Whether they are adopted or not will depend on 
more than their accuracy in diagnosing relevant dimensions 
of 'social change'. Ambiguity and competing interpretations 
make for a complex relationship between 'social change' and 
party 'response'.
Post-mortem rituals and party reform are only 
contingently related. Recommendations from duly constituted 
post-mortem bodies (committees, reports, meetings) sometimes 
lead to changes in party practices but they are often 
disregarded, if not forgotten. Reforms that do eventuate
1
are often a far cry from what was envisaged. Reform blue­
prints become embroiled in ongoing intra-party conflicts. 
Organisational issues become inextricably intertwined with 
other issues and other dramas.
The Australian Labor Party suffered a significant 
federal defeat in December 1977. It failed to recover the 
ground it had lost in the very polarised election of 1975 
following Australia's greatest political controversy, the 
sacking of the Whitlam Government by the Governor-General. 
Whitlam had led Labor to government in 1972 for the first 
time since 1949, on the slogan 'It's Time'. The long period 
in opposition was one of considerable turmoil, particularly 
around the time of the split, which led to the formation of 
the right-wing Democratic Labor Party in 1955. This 
distracted Labor from party reform projects. Increased 
confidence following a near-win in 1961, and the role played 
by denunciations of Labor's '36 faceless men' (its Federal 
Conference delegates) in the 1963 defeat, helped open up the 
issue of party reform. Part I examines party reform 
politics in the period 1963-67, a time when Gough Whitlam 
often argued for ALP 'modernisation' to remain 'relevant' in 
a changing Australia. On organisational matters, Whitlam 
championed the recommendations of federal secretary Cyril 
Wyndham. In a delayed response to the 1963 defeat, the 
Federal Executive commissioned Wyndham to report on party 
structure (Wyndham, 1965; reprinted as Appendix I) and then 
largely disregarded his recommendations. Whitlam succeeded 
Arthur Calwell as Federal Parliamentary Labor Party leader in 
1967. He tried to resurrect the Wyndham Report. He demanded a
2
committee of inquiry on party structure. This was killed 
off at the 1967 Federal Conference in Adelaide, which did 
accept parliamentary representation at Federal Conference 
and on the Federal Executive. Part I shows a range of party 
reform debates, with different approaches and different 
conflicts in the various state Branches.
Chapter 2 lays out the prehistory of the 1963-67 
period, including the complicated background to the 
establishment of the Federal Secretariat. It also documents 
the unfortunate fate of the short-lived National Organising 
Committee, disbanded in 1961 for apparently flirting with 
ALP/DLP rapprochement, a classic case of a vague party 
reform blueprint being derailed for offending powerful party 
forces. Reorganisation committees often use a 'rationalistic 
idealist' language which assumes a party has common goals 
and then asks how it can be made more effective or more 
democratic. Proposals for change, however, will impinge on 
the distribution of power, the fortunes of factions and such 
matters (the realpolitik of who gets what within the party), 
concerns which are difficult to express in 'rationalistic 
idealist' discourse. This clash between 'rationalistic 
idealist' proposals and intra-party realpolitik consider­
ations recurs in post-mortems.
The 1963 defeat and post-mortems in some states 
are examined in Chapter 3; the official inquiry in NSW in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The right-wing NSW Branch leaders went 
along with criticisms of the 'faceless men'. In Victoria 
and Western Australia, which supported the dominant group on 
the Federal Executive, 'irrational hysteria', the 'post­
mortem stampede' and 'morbid self-analysis' were
3
vociferously rejected (see Chapter 5). The background to 
the Wyndham Report, its text and its intersection with 
factional conflicts in NSW are examined in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 8 looks at the post-mortem following the debacle on 
30 November 1966. Chapter 9 examines Whitlam's party reform 
crusade and analyses his compromise with the party 'machine' 
at the Adelaide Conference.
The changes agreed on at the Adelaide Conference 
fell short of Whitlam's pre-Conference rhetoric, but the 
addition of the parliamentary leaders to the party's federal 
bodies marked the end of his concern with comprehensive 
reorganisation. The restructuring of the Victorian and NSW 
Branches, through federal intervention in 1970-71, replaced 
old winnter-take-all practices with proportional 
representation. In other ways too, Labor 'modernised' 
itself under Whitlam, albeit in ways that had not been 
canvassed in 1967. For many, success in 1972 vindicated 
Whitlam's 'modernisation' project.
Party reform then went into hibernation. After
the 1975 defeat Labor fulminated about the dismissal and the
Governor-General's 'betrayal of Australian democracy'. The
1977 defeat led to a more comprehensive post-mortem exercise
than anything that had occurred in the 1960s. Whitlam stood
down as leader. The party had changed considerably since
1967, but now seemed seriously out of touch with the
electorate. In January 1978, the National Executive
approved new leader Bill Hayden's motion for a far-reaching
2National Committee of Inquiry. Part II looks at the 
intersection between the NCI and related debates on party
4
renewal, liaison with 'new social movements' up to the 1981 
Special Conference in Melbourne.
There are interesting symmetries in the two periods 
of Labor self-analysis (see Table 1). Each began with a sig­
nificant defeat and lasted about four years. In both cases, 
the changes approved by Special Conferences fell short of 
the preceding official 'party reform' recommendations.
Table 1
Patterns of Post-Mortem Debate: 
The ALP, 1963-67 and 1977-81
1963-67 1977-81
Significant
election
defeat
November 1963 December 1977
Official response Varied from state 
to state (official 
inquiry in NSW). 
August 1964: 
Federal secretary 
commissioned to 
write report
January 1978: National 
Executive established 
National Committee of 
Inquiry
' Post-mortem' 
report initially 
ignored
Consideration of 
Wyndham Report 
(May 1965) post­
poned by Federal 
Conference 
(August 1965)
Consideration of NCI 
Report postponed by 
National Conference 
(July 1979)
Further electoral 
defeat
November 1966 
(by huge margin)
October 1980 (with 
some Labor recovery)
'Party reform' 
(well short of 
'post-mortem' 
report
recommendations)
Special Conference 
(August 1965) adds 
FPLP leaders to 
Federal Conference 
and Federal 
Executive but 
countenances no 
further inquiry
Special Conference 
(July 1981) enlarges 
National Conference 
and makes provision 
for affirmative action. 
Also reformulates 
Labor 'socialist' 
objective
5
In 1967, however, Whitlam could not get any 
committee of inquiry. His plans to open the party's doors 
to 'intellectuals' did not always win ready acceptance 
either. In 1978, the National Executive gave the NCI a 
broad brief and threw the party structure as well as 
'responses' to 'social change' open to the gaze of social 
scientists, albeit carefully selected and sympathetic ones. 
Under Whitlam, policy committees drew on social-scientific 
knowledge, but, in organisational matters, the party 
remained wedded to tried and true ways of doing things.3 
The NCI was charged with facilitating more 
membership involvement and better communication with 
voters. Post-mortem exercises often try to boost 
membership enthusiasm and regain lost votes at the same 
time. Demands for 'intra-party democracy' may conflict 
with calls for more 'professional' electioneering. A party 
can revive itself electorally without 'renewing' itself as 
a campaigning organisation responsive to its members. 
Reorganisation is often presented as some sort of recipe 
for electoral recovery, but there are many reasons why 
change is sought within parties. The relationship between 
the NCI and changing priorities and practices in the ALP 
exemplifies March and Olsen's (1976) argument that official 
attempts by institutions to reorganise themselves involve 
characteristically 'garbage can' decision-making
4processes. Such processes allow a range of concerns
within an organisation to surface, with old 'solutions', 
grafted on to new 'problems', scores settled, careers 
advanced etc. Rational party reform blueprints are easy to
6
draw on paper, but post-mortems become an arena for 
registering a host of ongoing intra-party matters. David 
Stephens (1979) has used the March and Olsen approach to 
good effect in an earlier analysis of the ALP. He sees the 
garbage can metaphor as being unfortunate in some ways:
It is not meant to convey that problems and solutions 
are thrown away or that garbage cans are somehow 
collected by some organisational garbologist. The 
metaphor is meant to give the idea of jumbling 
together, tangling, complexity and confusion - the 
things that happen, say, in a refuse container used 
by many people in a large apartment block 
(D. Stephens, 1987:163).
This approach yields interesting insights into the ways in
5which parties 'make' 'decisions'. Certain features of 
post-mortem rituals and party reform projects make 
'garbage can' analysis particularly apposite (Olsen, 
1976:314). Their focus is particularly ambiguous. They 
are often disproportionately attractive to otherwise 
unoccupied participants, who are not tightly integrated 
into party routines.
Chapter 10 looks at the establishment of the NCI 
and surveys the ideas of some key committee members.
Chapter 11 draws on 'garbage can' analysis (especially 
March and Olsen, 1983) to make sense of the concerns 
thrown up in the submissions to the NCI and the committee's 
processes more generally. The NCI attracted symbolic 
issues, was strongly influenced by 'short-run happenstance' 
and was characterised by an 'attention vacuum', whereby 
powerful party figures took their committee duties lightly 
while out-groups registered their grievances.
7
The picture of a 'what went wrong' committee 
embroiled in a 'garbage can' of issues undermines 
'rationalistic idealist' expectations. Such committees 
cannot provide a disembodied vantage point for an 
'objective' analysis of what 'actually' went wrong and 
what can be done about it. Reports do not summarise and 
eliminate data on logical and empirical grounds alone 
(Lehman, 1977:76):
... but on the basis of the interests, theories, 
assumptions and prejudices of those through whose 
hands a report passes.
We may be tempted to go in the opposite direction. With 
our eyes firmly fixed on power asymmetries, we may see 
'what went wrong' committees as tools for the maintenance # 
of party rulers' positions, perhaps a harmless outlet for 
'rank-and-file' grumbling, but providing little 
possibility of transforming party practices. Chapter 11 
notes problems with this notion, documenting the NCI's 
autonomy from party 'chiefs' (partly because of 'attention 
vacuum') as well as the party 'masses'.
Chapter 12 looks at the NCI's favoured
'solution' to the 'problem' of 'rank-and-file alienation':
National Conference reform and a local branch 'community
presence strategy'. Chapter 13 examines the rather
different concerns of Special Conference delegates. The
NCI had noted the dilemma between party 'manageability'
and membership 'legitimation' (in the sense of improved
intra-party democracy mechanisms and thoroughgoing party 
£renewal). Pressure for 'professionalisation' often 
clashes with pressure for 'democratisation' in post-mortem
8
debates. The NCI explored party renewal more extensively
than Wyndham had in the 1960s (although Wyndham did not
ignore such questions). 1Democratisation' pressures in
7the ALP had increased in the meantime. At the Special 
Conference, however, Conference reform was seen as a 
matter of adjusting factional representation and 'who gets 
what'; easy to analyse in realpolitik terms.
One is tempted to contrast post-mortem 
'rationalistic idealist' talk of party reform with 
Conference delegates' realpolitik priorities. For 
Michels, the latter in some sense contained the real key 
to how parties operated and the former was irrelevant, 
misleading and superficial. One could expect little from 
'summary reports' and 'occasional special committees of 
inquiry' (Michels, 1962:71-2). Yet developments in 
relatively transient arenas within a party, like a 
reorganisation committee, create precedents and develop a 
logic of argument that can reorient some party practices 
(see March and Olsen, 1983). Party practices are 
circumscribed by available forms of political calculation 
and evaluation (Hindess, 1984:272). These can be altered 
in the course of reorganisation efforts.
The NCI promoted affirmative action for ALP 
women and served as an arena for debate on Labor 
'socialism'. Chapter 14 looks at affirmative action, a 
form of which was endorsed by the 1981 Special Conference, 
as a case study of the sort of liaison with 'new social 
movements' sought in some sections of the party. Chapter 
15 looks at Labor 'socialism'. The Conclusion (Chapter
9
16) asks what the two post-mortem periods show us about 
the process of change within the ALP and within political 
parties more generally.
IB Post-Mortems, Internal Processes and the 'Public Face' 
of Parties
There are many sociological generalisations 
about how parties 'respond' to 'social change'. Detailed 
analyses of how parties themselves perceive their place in 
'society' are less common. Such questions emerge at times 
of organisational self-doubt, for instance, after serious 
electoral losses. Post-mortems often involve predictable 
and 'ritualistic' genuflections towards membership 
consultation, better communication and finding out what 
voters 'really' want, but they can help reorient partygpractices. They offer an arena for challenges by party 
insurgents. Interestingly, this was stressed by Otto 
Kircheimer, whom we shall come across in the next section 
as the author of one of the most widely-quoted sociological 
generalisations about party change. This 'catch-all' 
thesis has often been taken up by those who suggest that 
change within parties can be read off from changes in 
society. In 1957, Kircheimer (1969a:297) took a different 
tack, ruminating on the temptation for opposition 
leaders to minimise differences with government:
If this should happen, the opposition that exists 
within every opposition is what becomes the moving 
force of the country's political machinery. The 
irregulars rather than the official leadership will 
strive to inquire into the deeper reasons for the 
party's last defeat, clamour for the overdue great 
inquest, shout for reformulation of principles and
10
goals and to redraw the battle lines between 
government and opposition. The local party worker 
may be uninformed, the voter inarticulate, yet such 
gadflies may force on the recalitrant party 
leadership a sharper differentiation between official 
opposition and government policies.
Once the deeper reasons for defeat had been examined in 
the overdue great inquest, a recalcitrant party leadership 
could be moved away from 'convergence' politics.
This perspective allows us to see post-mortem 
rituals as political processes in their own right rather 
than defining them in terms of the 'functions' they serve. 
Those who focus on 'who gets what' and those who insist on 
explaining politics by its social context leave little
room for myth, symbol and ritual (March and Olsen,
91984:735). Even those who do bring in myth, symbol and 
ritual often do so dismissively.
Lukes (1975:304) sees elections as 'the most 
important form of political ritual' in liberal democracies. 
They legitimise, stabilise and mystify the prevailing 
'mobilisation of bias' (Lukes, 1975:305).^ Australian 
social commentator Donald Horne (1981:26-7) argues that if 
anthropologists from outer space arrived during the 1980 
federal election campaign, they would have seen what 
seemed to be 'a great drama' in progress:
Being anthropologists, the outer space visitors would 
decide that the true function of all this was bound 
to be different from what those who were doing it 
thought they were doing. Putting slips of paper into 
ballot boxes didn't really mean that Australians were 
choosing a government that would 'represent' them; 
what they were really doing was engaging in a ritual 
legitimising the power of the state. 11
The ritual does not end on polling day. Losing
11
parties and their supporters try to make sense of what has 
just happened. Sympathisers of the defeated party may 
even write books in the process (e.g. Horne, 1981). 
Suggestions by functionalist anthropologists (from outer 
space or wherever) that the 'real' purpose of such public 
breast-beating and expiation to various gods was to 
maintain solidarity and cohesion among the defeated, in 
a manner acceptable to their leadership, would not help 
us understand post-mortem politics.
Not every election defeat leads to an elaborate 
post-mortem process, with official inquiries and party 
reforms that are vaguely related to at least the rhetoric 
of such inquiries. The great inquest, however 
established, is an unusual occurrence, even in parties 
well used to defeat. In the case of the ALP, which lost 
eleven of the thirteen federal elections between 1949 and 
1980, only two defeats (1963 and 1977) led to party reform 
attempts.
Perhaps electoral post-mortems are rather 
special political rituals. We should be wary of the 
tendency to conceive ritual as 'a sort of all-purpose 
glue' (Turner, 1982:82; quoted Herzog, 1987:567) auto­
matically reinforcing group solidarity, social integration, 
the prevailing 'mobilisation of bias' and the power of the 
state. Rituals involve struggles about and negotiation 
over 'meanings' as well as their reproduction (Kertzler, 
1988). Elections can be 'models of' society, reproducing 
the status quo:
But at the same time, they may act as a 'model for'
society, thereby introducing new meanings and
12
symbols ... they are an active arena for the 
creation of a political symbolic world through 
negotiation over its meaning (Herzog, 1987:569). 12
Election campaigns involve a certain suspension of disbelief. 
Small and large parties present their programmes as if 
they were equally powerful. 'Models for' new symbols and 
practices may emerge, alongside 'models of' old ones:
The empirical question, then, is which 'forest of 
symbols' ... germinated, flourished, withered or 
expired in the 'cultural' meaning of a given 
election campaign, by whom and how (Herzog,
1987 :571) .
v
13Post-mortems offer a similar active arena.
Here, too, there is a suspension of disbelief. For a 
short while, intra-party hierarchies seem to dissolve.
Leaders suffer a temporary loss of confidence. The views 
of a local branch member at a special meeting, or sending 
a submission to a committee of inquiry, may be formally 
accorded the same respect as the pronouncements of a 
parliamentary leader. Post-mortems can involve the formal 
reconstitution of 'arenas of equality', which cut across 
ingrained intra-organisational inequalities (Pizzorno, 
1970:42-3). Against the Michelsian picture of a unilinear 
fall from grace and descent into oligarchy, Pizzorno 
(1970:43) notes the possibility of at least occasional 
participation revivals, facilitated by 'major 
reorganisations'.
Political parties are coherent institutions, 
which can present a united public face. They have 
identifiable means of making decisions and acting on some 
of them, thus meeting Hindess' (1986) definition of a
13
'social actor'.14 Like other 'social actors', they make 
decisions in complicated ways:
... at various points within the organisation ... 
through a variety of ... processes (Hindess, 1988:67).
'Garbage can' analysis helps us understand this sort of 
dispersed and dis-aggregated decision-making. When 
'decisions' are being 'made' in organisations, other 
things are also happening (March and Olsen, 1976). 
Technologies are often unclear. Preferences change. 
Temporal coincidence brings 'problems', 'solutions', 
'decisions' and 'choice opportunities' together. In this 
way 'choice opportunities' become 'garbage cans'. The use 
of particular specialised techniques and institutionalised 
routines can make some 'choice opportunities' relatively 
immune from 'garbage can' contingencies. Overall, it is 
difficult to envisage how a party would 'decide' on its 
'response' to 'social change'.
The coherent public face of parties coexists 
with endemically chaotic internal processes:
All the political parties have two faces - a public 
face turned towards the media, the voters and the 
rest of the world and an inward-looking face reserved 
for the initiated, activists, electoral 
representatives and leaders, who have access to their 
secret gardens - two faces and two publics in which 
the dividing lines pass between the sympathisers and 
activists of each party (Chariot, 1989:361).
15For Chariot, all parties are thus 'dual parties'.
However, students of parties often present them as unitary 
actors. Chariot (1989:359) quotes his fellow French 
political scientist Michel Offerle:
14
A party does not act, properly speaking. Behind the 
reassuring appearance of this collective actor 
which is supposed to act according to rational ends 
(party strategy) or to fulfil certain functions 
vital to itself or its environment (party functions) 
hides a multitude of interactions between 
individuals who ... use this immaterial body called 
a party in very different ways.
Offerle points to serious shortcomings in models 
of parties as bodies which can be subsumed under the 
'functions' they are supposed to fulfil or the 'strategies' 
their leaders adopt. However, a party is not a completely 
'immaterial' entity. In certain circumstances, it does 
'act, properly speaking'. Conference delegates deciding 
on a policy are not simply another group of individuals 
making use of the 'immaterial body'. Nor are shadow 
ministers making election speeches. Their positions are 
governed by the party's identifiable means of making 
decisions. 'Garbage can' processes are not completely 
random. Indeed, Offerle concedes that certain ''ways of 
doing things' give a party 'a sort of objective existence' 
(Chariot, 1989:359). These include 'methods of 
organization, codewords, traditions, emblems, logos and 
symbols'. Ultimately, however, the focus on transactions 
between individual members also fails to capture the 
complexity of 'dual' parties (Chariot, 1989:360-1). The 
reference to certain 'ways of doing things' (see also 
Lagroye, 1989:368-9) raises interesting questions, but 
seems too vague to account for the ways in which dispersed 
and dis-aggregated processes can yield publicly 
identifiable party decisions.
15
The promise of focussing on post-mortem rituals
is that we can look at the 'secret garden' (really, more
16of a semi-secret garden) and the public face, at a time 
when both are potentially in flux. Attempting to 
understand what makes parties tick has exasperated many 
political scientists:
Party organizations are the leprechauns of the 
political forest, legendary creatures who avoid 
being seen. Because no one has ever photographed 
a party organization, descriptions vary widely, 
and many scholars do not take them seriously 
enough to investigate their being (Janda,
1983:319). 17
This is an overstatement. Scholars who have looked at 
party organisation have come up with certain cumulative 
pictures. Pictures of the ALP have been provided by 
Overacker (1949 and 1968), Rawson (1954 and 1966a), Crisp
(1978) , Jupp (1963 and 1964), Houseman (1971), D. Stephens
(1979) and Parkin and Warhurst (1983). We have good 
information on conferences, executives and union 
affiliations and on the relationship between the party's 
organisational and parliamentary wings. The local 
branches are less studied (although see Ward, 1983 and 
1987). Post-mortems offer opportunities to study some 
intra-party processes that may otherwise remain obscure.^ 
Submissions to a committee of inquiry connect 'grass­
roots ' debate to more public conflicts amongst the party 
elite. Ascertaining which 'forest of symbols' emerges 
from a post-mortem, we can study a party examining its 
previously accepted 'ways of doing things'. Methods of 
organisation are under review, although some may remain
16
taboo. We may find new symbols and codewords emerging and 
party 'traditions' being reconstructed.
Political scientists have categorised parties in 
various ways. The duality that Chariot emphasised, as 
parties always turn inward (to members) and outward (to 
voters) simultaneously, is partly reflected in the 
categories put forward. In an interesting survey of such 
generalisations, W.E. Wright (1971) contrasted the 
'rational-efficient' model of party favoured in much US 
political science with a 'party democracy' model that 
harked back to sophisticated European party structures. 
'Rational-efficient' parties are vote-gathering machines, 
teams of candidates striving to win public office. The 
second model places greater emphasis on the 'goals' parties 
project for 'society', policy, ideology and internal 
arrangements. Some 'rational-efficient' theorists suggest 
changes in 'society' and electoral technology are making 
all parties more like American-style candidate-centred 
ones. Leon Epstein (1967a) argues that widespread 'middle- 
class' lifestyles, increased formal education and the 
changing role of the media in election campaigns constitute 
an organisational 'contagion from the right'. Leaders who 
can communicate directly with voters would only need loose, 
skeletal parties.
Epstein's thesis contrasts with Duverger's (1954)
earlier view that the mass 'working-class' party, with its
elaborate structures, represented the wave of the future.
Whereas Epstein focussed on the public face of parties,
Duverger's array of typologies tried to make sense of their
19internal processes. 'Party democracy' theorists do not
17
take parties' democratic pretensions at face value. From
Michels on, oligarchical patterns have been noted in 'party
democracy' analyses. However, such analyses take internal
struggles, including struggles over intra-party democracy,
seriously. The party is seen as a political system in its
own right as well as a machine for contesting elections.
The 'rational-efficient' approach assumes that electoral
competition inevitably overshadows all other dimensions of
party activity (see Schlesinger, 1984).
'Rational-efficient' and 'party democracy' models
share a focus on the 'functions' fulfilled by parties.
Some 'rational-efficient' analysts do eschew the language
of functions, preferring 'rational choice' economics to
sociological forms of analysis (e.g. Schlesinger,
1984:374). However, as we shall see, economic and
sociological versions of the 'rational-efficient' model
20share common problematic features. Sociological versions
of the 'rational-efficient' model stress party fulfilment
of the functions of elite recruitment and interest
aggregation whereas 'party democracy' writers emphasise
21goal formulation and mobilisation/socialisation. Both 
models tend to treat parties as unitary actors, thereby 
falling into:
... the error of considering a party as a being 
thinking and acting, according to a more or less 
preconceived project or according to some 
functional necessity of social organization and 
political regime (Chariot, 1989:359; see also 
Lagroye, 1989:364).
Party decision-making processes are -dispersed and 
dis-aggregated. To an extent, this is recognised by some
18
who speak in the language of functions and roles; by- 
Richard Rose (1964:33) for example:
The most salient characteristics of the entities 
called 'parties' shift as their functions change 
and attempts are made to reconcile the 
conflicting pressures arising from the bundle 
of roles, individuals and institutions generally 
lumped together under one omnibus heading.
More recently, Raschke (1983:110) has argued parties must
be perceived as complexes of competing functions. This
recognition of internal complexity is marred by Raschke's
fondness for functionalist modes of explanation, despite
22his self-professed 'critical-dialectical' stance.
Raschke sees party programmes and policies
primarily determined by 'systematic functional
imperatives'; social control and the maintenance of mass
loyalty to the socio-economic system and the prevailing
2 3political institutions. Orthodox political scientists 
examine a check-list of party functions in relation to 
electoral and internal concerns. Neo-marxist writers often 
leave the analysis of political parties to their mainstream 
colleagues and seek out more distinctively neo-marxist 
topics, like the 'capitalist state'. However, such writers 
sometimes stress the role played by parties in class 
disorganisation. Macpherson (1978:24) calls this their 
'obfuscation function'. Parties reconcile 'universal equal 
franchise with the maintenance of an unequal society' 
(Macpherson, 1977:69). For Offe (1972:83) the competitive 
political party functions as a filter, ensuring social 
needs incompatible with prevailing socio-economic 
arrangements remain unexpressed in the formal political
19
arena. 4^ There are intriguing parallels between the
sociological version of the 'rational-efficient' model and
such neo-marxist analysis. Both define parties by their 
25'functions'. These functions in turn are derived from 
extra-political social logics (aggregating interests or 
disorganising the masses).
There are overlaps between the sociological and 
economic versions of the 'rational-efficient' model. Both 
focus on 'adaptation' to extra-party realities; the 
'social structure' in general in the sociological account, 
voter preference in the economic 'rational choice' 
approach. Thus they share an 'adaptation' model of the 
relationship between 'social change' and party activity.
The 'party democracy' approach could yield a model of party 
change being due to 'strategic' behaviour. The next 
section looks at these models of change within political 
parties and their difficulties in coping with dispersed and 
'garbage can' decision-making.
1C 'Social Change' and Change within Parties: Three
Models
'Adaptation' models see changes in their 
environment as the key to how parties change. But if 
parties are 'strategic actors', there is scope for 
autonomous 'elite manipulation' rather than exogenous 
'social cleavages' to affect political divisions (see 
Sartori, 1976; Zuckerman, 1975). If politics is a contest 
between rival elites, outcomes can be seen as the result of 
the clash between competing 'strategies', rather than as a
20
registration of social forces or political preferences. 
Images of parties as 'strategic actors' usually assume 
elite control is unproblematic. Formulations such as the 
iron law of oligarchy dispense with detailed analysis of 
dispersed decision-making. We may need a third model, of 
parties as 'complex arenas'. Table 2 summarises the three 
models.
Table 2
Models of the Relationship between 'Social Change'
and Party Activity
'Adaptation' model 'Social change'----» party response
'Strategy' model 'Social change'----> leadership
choice----- * party strategy
'Complex arena' 'Social change'----» leadership
choice constrained by available forms
of calculation and evaluation------ >
party strategy
Economic and sociological approaches can be
reconciled in the argument that the competitive candidate-
centred 'rational-efficient' party is a consequence of
2 6social evolution. Parties may have been something else 
in the past (elaborately organised, ideological, etc.), but 
changing social trends have made them adopt the 'rational- 
efficient' form. This is the gist of Epstein's 'contagion 
from the right' hypothesis. 'Contagion' is spread by 
'social change' and electoral technology. An even more 
frequently cited formulation is Kircheimer's (1966:198) 
analysis, whereby 'social change' and electoral competition 
force parties to adopt similar 'catch-all' styles and play
21
down distinctive clienteles and ideologies in the search 
for votes. Kircheimer focussed on diminished social and 
economic polarisation, the increased weight of the 'middle 
class' and secularisation. Parties would no longer be able 
to rely on traditional social constituencies. 'Adaptation' 
to the 'law of the electoral market' would become their 
raison d ' etre.
Kircheimer's 'catch-all' analysis flows from his 
analysis of changing social trends, although, as early as 
1954, he also emphasised changing electoral technology.
The need to reach as many voters as possible with 
increasingly sophisticated campaign technologies made 
parties more alike:
The resulting forms of competition dominate the 
structure and organisational principles of 
parties (Kircheimer, 1969b:246. See also Herz 
and Hula, 1969:xxviii).
This 1954 essay foreshadowed Kircheimer's later 'catch-all'
argument. His 1957 comments on post-mortems (Kircheimer,
2 71969a:297) suggested a different approach. Sociologism
is an approach which derives political phenomena from more
basic 'social forces' and changes in social structure.
Such an approach is built into the language of 'adaptation',
2 8derived as it is from evolutionary biology. 'Social
change' (sometimes mediated by technological change) 
becomes a given pre-political datum. Parties must 'adapt' 
or 'perish'.
Panebianco (1988:235,264) sees the increasing 
'professionalisation' of parties as a crucial but under­
emphasised implication of the 'catch-all' thesis. As
22
parties become more voter-centred, they move from a 'mass-
bureaucratic' to an 'electoral-professional' style.
'Experts' with extra-party and extra-political skills
become more prized. These 'experts' are 'professionals' in
the sense used in the sociology of the professions
(Panebianco, 1988:221). Their prominence is seen as a
consequence of the increasingly technical nature of
political decisions (Panebianco, 1988:222). Parties need
'professional' advice in various policy fields, as well as
in advertising, opinion polling and such matters. With
more of this 'professional' input, parties lose some of
their distinctiveness vis-a-vis other organisations
29(Panebianco, 1988:229).
Here we could note arguments about 'social
change' and a general trend from 'parochial' to
'cosmopolitan' organisational styles (Gabriel, 1981). For
Gabriel, the 'parochial' organisation's modus operandi is
based on internal criteria, drawn from its own experience,
whereas 'cosmopolitan' organisations value external,
30'professional' criteria. 'Parochial' organisations
socialise their members into tried and trusted ways of 
doing things. 'Expert' and 'professional' advice is not 
sought. In 'cosmopolitan' organisations, 'professionals' 
are encouraged to draw on 'rational' criteria of social- 
science-derived 'knowledge'.
More and more organisations in a complex, modern 
society are 'cosmopolitan' (Gabriel, 1981); relying on 
'professional' input to pursue their goals 'rationally'. 
Success in 'adaptation' seems to depend on the quality of 
'professional' advice. If 'crisis' leads to 'rational'
23
diagnosis of 'problems' and remedial action, all will be 
well (Gabriel, 1981:281). This view, like the sociological 
argument for a 'rational-efficient' party, assumes it is 
easy for organisations to 'read' changes in their 
environment (at least with appropriate 'professional' 
advice) and then change their practices accordingly. The 
ambiguity of 'social change', dispersed decision-making and 
conflicts over organisational 'goals' are all glossed over.
Downs' (1957) theory of party competition is
based on economic axioms rather than analysis of 'social
structure'. Like the sociological writers, he sees parties
as unitary actors, whose behaviour is only explicable as a
'response' to more fundamental forces. For Downs, the laws
of the electoral market shape party behaviour directly. In
the sociological story, 'interests derived from the 'social
structure' come first. Parties try to 'aggregate' them.
As the 'social structure' changes, so do the 'interests'
to be 'aggregated'. In the economic story, you have a
market and a distribution of voter preferences, which
31parties try to reflect. They battle for the 'middle 
ground'. Post-mortems seem hardly worth studying.
Electoral market logic invariably overrides internal 
party preoccupations:
Political parties tend to maintain ideological 
positions that are consistent over time, unless 
they suffer drastic defeats, in which case 
they change their ideologies to resemble that 
of the party which defeated them (Downs, 1957:300).
Downs assumes party policies cluster around the 
preferences of the marginal voter, in a manner analogous to 
firms seeking profits by satisfying consumer preferences.
24
There are problems with such assumptions in their original
economic context and in their application to political
parties. The idea that enterprises can be driven by an
overriding goal is problematic (see Thompson, 1982). The
notion of 'profit-maximisation' depends on organisational
patterns and accounting practices within firms (Tomlinson,
1984:598). Sub-units within firms have their own goals.
There is no one, royal road to profit-maximisation. The a
priori attribution of the 'goal' of vote-maximisation to
parties amounts to a 'teleological prejudice' (Panebianco,
1988:4), which leaves the complicated relationship between
32organisational 'goals' and practices unexamined. Party 
sub-units have more autonomy than sub-units in firms. 
Routines are less developed (see Sharansky, 1970). There 
is much spare-time participation (see Eldersveld, 1964). 
Even with increased 'professionalism', the application of 
specialised techniques is more controversial. Disagree­
ment on 'goals' is institutionalised.
Galbraith (1972:xviii) suggests major firms focus 
on their 'whole complex of organisational interests' and 
harmonising their goals with those of 'the larger community 
and the state' rather than just profit-maximisation. If we 
applied such an analysis to party competition, we would 
stress the peculiarly oligopolistic nature of the electoral 
market (Ware, 1979: Ch 3; Clegg et al., 1986:273-4). The
suppliers do not just have to 'adapt' to voter 
33preferences.
Parties may try to protect their whole complex of 
organisational interests. Observers, however, cannot
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define such 'interests' by fiat. They emerge in the course 
of intra-organisational conflict. Downs (1957:111) allows 
some space for such conflicts, but what he gives with one 
hand, he takes away with the other, leaving us with the 
dictates of extra-party electoral-market rationality:
Different groups within the party use varying 
shades of the dominant party ideology as weapons 
against each other. In their struggle for 
power, each tries to convince influential 
members that it is the bearer of ideas most 
likely to win votes ... Party members choose an 
ideology which will win votes, not one they 
believe in, since their objective is the 
acquisition of office, not the creation of 
a better society.
Putative electoral benefits are often invoked in party 
debates, but such debates involve more than competing 
recipes for electoral success, proffered by power-seeking 
groups. For Downs, post-mortems might offer an ideal 
setting for different groups to present recipes for 
ideologies resembling those of the victorious party.
The 'strategic actor' model of party change (see 
Table 2) allows for a broader conception of intra-party 
concerns. However, this model tends to assume that if 
parties operate as 'strategic actors', they can be seen as 
unitary actors, bound together by the 'strategy' propounded 
by the leadership. As Lagroye (1989:369) reminds us:
... the identifiable changes in the way the 
political party game is played are too often 
perceived as simple changes of strategy due 
to the astuteness of leaders.
Rationalistic reconstruction can exaggerate leaders' 
control of the strategic agenda.
26
Przeworski's (1985) discussion of social 
democratic dilemmas is an interesting 'strategy' model, 
although it is also bound up with certain marxist 
assumptions about class. Party strategies are constrained 
by the strategies of other social forces:
The strategies which party leaders choose today 
produce the conditions under which they are 
forced to decide at the next election. The 
irrelevance of Downs' theory ... is due to the 
assumption that parties encounter an exogenous 
public at each election (Przeworski, 1985:119). 34
If the constraints of other social forces and 
past strategic choices are noted, Przeworski has little to 
say about how strategies emerge within parties, although he 
recognises the importance of electoral post-mortems.
Parties decide what to say and whom to organise, settling 
on programmes, symbols and organisational efforts 
(Przeworski and Sprague, 1986:81). Party leaders reflect 
on electoral ups and downs:
... in the postmortems they often asked what 
went wrong with their strategies (Przeworski 
and Sprague, 1986:101-2).
The story of social democratic strategies is no steady 
retreat from 'class' and 'ideological' concerns. Given 
trade union connections and intra-party relations, it is 
'empty formalism' to suggest 'party leaders can simply pick 
whatever strategy they like' (Przeworski and Sprague,
1986 :120) .
However, Przeworski's 'strategy' analysis has its 
empty, formalist aspects. While he notes that parties may 
speak with more than one voice, offering 'a weighted and
27
ambiguous mix of appeals' (Przeworski, 1985:112), this is 
seen as a matter of deliberate and discernible leadership 
choice rather than as a consequence of complicated intra­
party processes. Social democratic strategic choices are 
unhelpfully pressed into a schematic 'class'/'non-class' 
dichotomy. He does not examine the specific forms of 
calculation and evaluation available to social democratic 
parties (Hindess, 1984:272).
Insofar as we can speak of a party as a whole
having a 'strategy', this is the resultant of internal
competition in a context of ambiguity. Przeworski allows
space for post-mortems in his analysis, but sees them
simply as opportunities for party leaders to weigh
competing claims of pre-defined 'class' and 'non-class'
35strategies. As we shall see in our analysis of the ALP, 
the claims of 'class' can conflict with arguments about 
winning votes in some post-mortems, but many other issues 
emerge as well.
Przeworski's specific 'class'/'supra-class' focus 
is not inherent in the 'strategy' model as such. However, 
the presentation of 'strategy' as a matter of leadership 
choice in a unitary party facing an unambiguous environment 
is common. Yet, if we look at competition within parties 
and note the ambiguity of a party's 'environment' for all 
its groupings, we may find the notion of parties as 
'strategic actors' in any simple sense problematic. The 
ambiguities inherent in reading 'social change' and the 
difficulties attendant on images of parties as unitary 
actors are addressed in our third model, of parties as 
'complex arenas' (see Table 2). This may help us to come
28
to grips with the sort of dispersed 'garbage can' decision­
making that seems common in parties.
'Social change' may indeed provide raw material 
for party debate, as different groupings read it in 
different, ways. 'Social changes' in themselves have no 
'essential' political meaning:
They are only endowed with particular meanings as far 
as they are effectively articulated through specific 
forms of political discourse and practice ... 
Relatively minor phenomena may be endowed with 
enormous significance, while major secular changes may 
be invested with no particular significance at all 
(Stedman Jones, 1983:23. See also Wolinetz, 1979:22; 
G. Smith, 1982:60). 36
The organisational and discursive complexities involved in
37specific party practices are often overlooked. We should 
heed Gallagher's (1981:233) warning:
Not all parties change during a period of social 
change, and not all of the changes in parties are a 
reaction to social change, they are adapting to their 
own interpretation of it; the impact of social 
change is refracted by each party's perception of the 
nature of the social change.
We could go further. In the 'complex arena'
model, perceptions of 'social change' within a party are
related to available modes of political calculation and
evaluation. 'Social conditions' external to the party
affect the forms of calculation and evaluation adopted.
They do so in a variety of ways, as the activities of other
social actors, including their direct competitors, impinge
38on parties (see Hindess, 1986). In 'adaptation' 
analysis, parties are undifferentiated, passive entities, 
subject to exogenous 'social structures'. In contrast, the
29
'complex arena' model sees change within the party as a 
result of diverse 'social conditions' intersecting with 
internal organisational and discursive processes.
As major secular changes may be invested with no
particular significance, while apparently minor changes
fuel political controversies, the most successful parties
often seem to 'adapt' the least (see Gallagher, 1981:282;
Garvin, 1982:22; Huntington, 1968:420-33). Australian
Liberal ideology under Menzies seemed to undergo little
formal 'adaptation' between 1944 and 1966. What has been
described as Australian 'Cold War liberalism' outlasted the
'Ming dynasty' by a few years, before being seriously
39challenged in the late 1960s (Simms, 1982:119ff).
Defeated parties are prone to anxious debates about 'social 
change' passing them by. They are likely to set up 
committees on such topics, but parties which talk a lot 
about 'modernisation' and 'reorganisation' may still change 
little. In many organisations, members discover that as 
'reorganisation' smoke and dust settle:
... nothing seriously interferes with their desire 
to go on doing just what they were doing (Kaufman,
1971 :58-9) .
However, reorganisation rituals can redistribute influence 
and emphasise new values (Kaufman, 1971:58-9; March and 
Olsen, 1983 ) .
Whether reorganisation attempts lead to change 
depends on the intersection between the temporary arena 
that emerges around a reorganisation attempt (a committee, 
a report, a set of special meetings or whatever) and more 
institutionalised party arenas. The 'complex arena' model
30
sees parties as loosely linked arenas of struggle. L. 
Johnston (1986:129) characterises the British Labour Party 
as 'a number of sites of conflict and pressure'
(Conference, NEC, PLP etc.):
... it makes no sense to talk about political 
organizations as if they were subjects with 
essential interests and means of adequately 
representing them.
How these arenas, or points of conflict and pressure, are
'articulated' depends on a number of factors, including
diverse 'social conditions' and internal struggles inside
40each arena (Hindess, 1982a:567-8). Permanent arenas 
include conferences, executives and parliamentary parties. 
Within such arenas, factions, groups and ideologies clash. 
Certain 'ways of doing things' crystallise. In temporary, 
less institutionalised arenas, basic party conflicts may 
simply be reproduced. On the other hand, 'models for' 
new practice may emerge in the temporary arena, which is 
very often 'loosely coupled' with the rest of the party. 
Post-mortem arenas have their own dynamic and their own 
discourses (about 'renewal', 'modernisation', 'intra­
party democracy' etc.).
Given the various sites of conflict and pressure 
and the ongoing conflicts in these sites, there will always 
be a disjuncture between 'rationalistic idealist' party 
reform blueprints from temporary arenas and subsequent 
party reform. Temporary reorganisation arenas encourage a 
'rationalistic idealist' discourse, envisaging the party as 
a unitary actor and discounting factional rivalry. There 
are different kinds of 'rationalistic idealist' recipes.
31
Some talk of 'professionalisation' and ways to win votes 
(in a way that would not surprise Downs). At other times, 
the talk is of 'democratisation' and party 'renewal'. We 
can get participatory recipes for 'party democracy' as well 
as managerial recipes for 'rational-efficiency'. The 
presentation of such recipes will be affected by developments 
in the more permanent arenas (including conflicts between 
different groupings). Further complications will come from 
'garbage can' coincidences, whereby very specific matters 
currently agitating individuals and groups in other arenas 
get registered in, say, reorganisation committees, simply 
because such committees happen to be around at the time. 
Rationalistic recipes bracket out such complexities.
Parties examining themselves are prone to the curse of 
over-simplification (Blondel, 1978:186):
A reorientation or reorganisation that looks rational 
from the leaders' point of view may be very difficult 
to implement, because it will affect the internal 
power structure, the relationship between different 
coalitions and change the reward and motivation system 
of the party (Seile and Svasand, 1983:217).
The 'adaptation' model assumes that parties can 
meet the 'demands' allegedly placed on them by their 
'environment' (whether general 'social structure', specific 
electoral 'market' or both) and ignores internal processes. 
The 'strategy' model acknowledges conflicts between intra­
party coalitions, but tends to assume that, given the iron 
law of oligarchy and all that (imposed on parties by the 
requirements of electoral competition according to 
Przeworski and Sprague, 1986:184), leadership 'strategy' 
generally carries the day. The 'complex arena' model
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operates with a more dis-aggregated conception of the 
party's 'environment' and pays detailed attention to intra­
party processes.
The models yield different approaches to post­
mortem rituals. Sociological 'adaptation' analysis could 
see such rituals in the context of organisational 'crises', 
enabling 'rational diagnosis' of 'problems' by 'experts'. 
The 'catch-all' party can be seen as a 'professional' party 
in two senses. Firstly, the role of 'experts' with extra­
party and extra-political skills becomes more important. 
Secondly, party energy is focussed on the 'professional' 
search for votes. Here the sociological view overlaps with 
economic models of party competition. Such models could 
see post-mortems as an arena for competition between 
groups, each offering recipes for electoral recovery. In 
sociological and economic 'adaptation' analysis, the 
subject matter of post-mortems is given in advance. The 
question is whether parties find the right formula for 
electoral recovery or not.
'Strategy' models pay some attention to the 
party's 'introverted' face, as well as its 'extroverted' 
face (see Rose and Mackie, 1988) or its semi-secret garden 
as well as its 'public face' (see Chariot, 1989), but 
unambiguous leadership control of the 'introverted' domain 
is assumed. Post-mortems allow 'strategies' to be adjusted 
with a relatively free hand. They are important if the 
leadership takes them seriously. Leaders' private post­
mortems may be more important than those conducted by 
special committees of inquiry and the like. As we have
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seen, Michels (1962:71-2) saw little scope for occasional 
special committees to deflect leaders from what they were 
going to do anyway. In the 'complex arena' model, post­
mortems are temporary arenas, which foster certain kinds of 
discourse (including 'professional' and 'democratic' party 
reform blueprints). Depending on the states of play within 
the more permanent arenas and an array of 'social 
conditions', post-mortems may lead to significant change in 
party practices. Party 'strategy' is a resultant of such 
factors, not something 'decided' by the party elite.
ID Change in the ALP, 1963-1981: 'Adaptation'?
'Revolution'?
Students of the ALP often point to complicated
internal processes, but generalisations about change in the
party often reach back to 'adaptation' and 'strategy'
arguments. Andrew Parkin (1983:15) notes 'a jumble of
levels, lines and linkages' associated with the ALP's
'organisational complexity'. He also sees the party's
recent history exemplifying Kircheimer's 'catch-all' thesis
(Parkin, 1983:27). Dean Jaensch (1983:201) specifically
endorses the claim that organisational 'contagion from the
right' has infected the ALP, especially from the mid-1960s 
41on. More recently (Jaensch, 1989), he has argued for a 
'revolution' in the ALP, as a former 'class' party becomes 
'catch-all'.^
Epstein (1977:14) has endorsed the application of 
his own 'contagion from the right' thesis to Australian 
parties, declining 'both in size and participatory
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decision-making'. ALP membership does seem to have
declined considerably since the 1950s (Warhurst, 1983:259).
The question of participatory decision-making requires
further analysis. The Australian electoral behaviour
literature also routinely endorses 'catch-all' arguments.
Kemp (1978) sees a 'post-industrial' society generating
changes in people's political 'interests'. Parties must
respond, although 'the response of the elite to social
change' is as important as change itself (Kemp, 1975:160).
However, 'there is no convenient measure of elite 
4 3response'. Aitkin (1977 and 1982) places less weight on
social trends, but intra-party processes remain a 'black 
44box'. Party systems 'have their own mechanisms for 
accommodating social change' (Aitkin, 1982:349), but these 
remain unanalysed.
Many commentators attribute changes in the ALP to
a 'middle-classing' of Australian society since the Second 
4 5World War. Such claims are sometimes made alongside 
detailed analyses of party structures. Overacker (1968) 
squeezes an interesting account of conflicts in the ALP in 
the 1960s into a clash between 'modern' forces trying to 
'adapt' the party to 'social change' and 'traditional' 
defenders of older practices. The assumption is that, 
unless obstructed by 'traditionalist' obduracy, changes in 
'society' must inevitably be reflected within parties.
Kemp (1975:148-9) sees Labor in 1972 still divided between 
'modernists' and 'traditionalists':
... over the necessity for new appeals to meet the 
results of social change, though the precis-e 
nature of this change remains ill-defined and 
controversial (Kemp, 1975:180). 46
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With 'social change' ill-defined, controversial and 
ambiguous, it becomes difficult to see intra-party conflict 
in terms of 'modernists' who want to 'adapt' and 
'traditionalists' who don't.
Jaensch (1989:3,22,37,155-7,176) traces the
genesis of Labor's 'revolution' to Whitlam's ascent to the
leadership in 1967. Before that, Labor's cumbersome
machinery reflected a 'working-class' ethos (Jaensch,
1989:61). Since the late 1960s, the old 'mass party' model
'has increasingly been questioned and tested' (Jaensch,
1989:20). 'Social change' is seen as forcing Labor to
'adapt' its ideological stances as well as its
4 7organisational arrangements. There is also a touch of 
'strategy' analysis in Jaensch's (1989:154) discussion of 
the role of 'Whitlam and his lieutenants' and the later 
'Hawke-Keating putsch'. If the story is one of continuous 
'adaptation' to an increasingly 'middle-class' electorate, 
it is also one of 'adaptation' prodded along by 'a 
determined party elite' and 'party leaders who, simply, 
were tired of losing' (Jaensch, 1989:156,159).
There are problems with the notion that the ALP, 
in its 'mass party' heyday, was both a 'syndical' party 
(for trade union 'interests') and 'socialist'. In one 
widespread view, ties between 'syndicates' and Australian 
parties gave the adjudication of 'interests' priority over 
the articulation of 'ideologies' (Miller, 1954; Davies, 
1958; Crisp, 1970; Emy, 1974 and 1978; for criticisms 
see Simms, 1982; O'Meagher, 1983a). With ties between 
parties and 'syndicates' loosening somewhat in the 1960s,
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parties might have had a chance to take up broader
'ideological' concerns. At the time, however, the more
common prognosis was that parties would 'converge' as
politics became more 'professional', more 'rational' and
4 8less tied to sectional interests.
Table 3 lists different conceptualisations of the
loosening of ties between 'syndicates' and parties. Alan
Davies (1958) insisted that a more 'professional' and
sophisticated approach made for duller politics (see also 
49Davies, 1972). Head and Patience (1979:7) take up 
Davies' analysis in their discussion of pressures towards 
'convergence', linking 'growing professionalization' to 
further ideological decline. Emy (1974) saw 'producer 
group' politics being replaced by more modern, aggregative 
styles. In 'producer group' politics, labour, business and 
the rural sector each had their own party and access to 
special sub-legislative arenas to advance their claims.
More 'aggregative' parties would have to demonstrate a 
'rational' focus on national policy formulation (and their 
possession of the relevant 'expertise'). Voters were more 
educated. Australia was becoming less isolated from the 
wider world.
As we shall see in greater detail in Chapter 10 
(because he was the NCI's sociologist), Sol Encel was 
interested in the ways in which changes in Australian state 
and society made for more 'professional' and 'rational' 
politics. As a political scientist by training, he 
investigated the peculiarities of the Australian state. As 
a sociologist, he noted changes in 'social structure'.
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Table 3
Conceptualisations of changes in Australian 
politics and society
Old
'Intimate'/'oral1 
politics of the 
'1930s' (with 
'primitive strength' 
and community 
identification with 
the protagonists).
New
'Mass'/'literate' 
politics of the 
'1950s' ('profess­
ional' and 'dull', 
with the life drained 
out of the old 
symbols).
Davies,
1958:
150-3
'Operative concept 
of the state'
(sectoralised, 
segmented, federal- 
ised, fragmented).
'Bureaucratic 
ascendancy'
(incorporating 
intellectuals). 
Intellectuals 
prominent in 
protest movements, 
however.
Encel*
'Producer group' 
politics ('diffusion' 
to legislative sub­
systems dominated 
by 'producer group' 
representatives.
Modern, aggregative 
politics (new 
emphasis on national 
policy-making 
skills).
Emy, 
1974
* as discussed Chapter 10C
His picture of the 'operative concept' of the Australian 
state, revolving around fragmented interest-group 
sectionalism, is similar to Emy on 'producer group' 
politics. Encel saw the older 'operative concept' 
challenged by an emphasis on national policy-making, 
during the stalled 'bureaucratic revolution' promoted by 
the wartime federal Labor governments.
This 'bureaucratic ascendancy' might be largely
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unaccountable, but the older 'operative concept' had
confined Labor to the pursuit of 'Ten Bob a Day'. In a
polity which had congealed in an array of administrative
and quasi-judicial agencies to accommodate sectionalist
pressures, Labor saw little point in 'socialist' and
'social democratic' projects and felt little need for
50advice from critical intellectuals. Changing state 
structures might make a new kind of Labor politics 
possible. Such possibilities may well not be taken up. 
Encel repeatedly stressed the capacity of the new 
'bureaucratic ascendancy' to absorb intellectuals and 
smother public debate. On the other hand, the emergence 
of protest movements, and the role of intellectuals 
within them, were signs of hope.
'End of ideology' arguments were popular in the 
early 1960s (see Bell, 1960; Lipset, 1960). They 
influenced Kircheimer's 'catch-all' thesis. They reflected 
a widespread mood at the time. Similar assumptions can be 
seen in Davies' discussion of 'dull', 'professional' 
politics; Emy's expectations about the 'aggregative' 
future of Australian parties and some of Encel's 
formulations (see Table 3). Encel was torn in different 
directions. 'Catch-all' and 'end of ideology' theorists 
saw an abandonment of socialist ideologies and 'working- 
class ' commitments by labour and social democratic parties
as classic examples of convergence politics (Lipset,
511960:406). If the ALP was going beyond 'producer group' 
politics, did that amount to a retreat from 'ideology'?
Epstein (1967b:144) is equivocal about -whether 
the ALP ever was a 'working-class', socialist, mass party.
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It qualified in terms of 'class consciousness', if not
'socialist ideology'. Affiliated unions make it one of the
world's small family of 'labour parties', defined by such
affiliations (Rawson, 1969). Labor was thoroughly enmeshed
in the utilitarian liberal assumptions that constituted
52Australia as a 'Benthamite society' (Collins, 1985). The 
ALP has always been:
... a creative arena with numerous ideological 
currents crossing through its membership:
Populism, Keynesianism, nationalism, racism, 
republicanism, reformism and Douglas Credit 
have all made their mark ... (Watts, 1989:185).
The prominence of populist (Love, 1984) and 
racist (McQueen, 1976) discourses raise questions about 
whether one can talk of the ALP as a social democratic 
party. We have seen how 'Ten Bob a Day' politics left 
little scope for a comprehensive 'social democratic' 
agenda. However, given its labour movement base and the 
prominence of some 'social democratic' themes in its 
history, there is a sense in which one can place the ALP 
within the social democratic fold (albeit uncomfortably, 
for a long time, perhaps). Przeworski (1985:3-4) defines 
'multi-class oriented, economically reformist parties' 
which organise workers as social democratic 'whether or not 
they wear the label' (see also Esping-Andersen, 1985 : 6ff; 
Paterson and Thomas, 1977:11).
If the ALP has always been social democratic in 
this broad sense, it took a long time to become interested 
in modern social democratic concepts like universalist 
welfare measures. The pursuit of 'Ten Bob a Day' in
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arbitrated labour markets led to different priorities 
(Castles, 1985:76 and 82):
If there ever was a distinctively Australian 
conception of social justice, it was the gender- 
based labourist ideal that flourished from the 
beginning of the [twentieth] century to 
somewhere past its midpoint (Macintyre, 1985:58).
This involved a 'family wage', tariffs and immigration 
controls ('White Australia').^  The Curtin and Chifley 
governments added Keynesian macro-economic techniques, 
without toppling the Laborist paradigm (Love, 1984:151). 
Welfare was still conceived in residual, safety net terms 
(Macintyre, 1985:83). The ALP only began to adopt the 
modern social democratic 'welfare state' agenda in the 
1960s (Macintyre, 1984).
On a fairly minimal definition, the ALP has 
always been a social democratic party, if a rather peculiar 
one. Part of its peculiarity stems from its early success; 
minority federal government in 1901, majority government in 
1910, well before other social democratic parties had made 
such breakthroughs. Early success, a stubborn sense of 
self-sufficiency and an attachment to institutions the 
party had a hand in establishing combined to make the ALP 
indifferent to many recognisably 'social democratic' 
concerns. In the 1960s, proponents of contemporary 'social 
democratic' themes clashed with those adhering to older 
Labor approaches. It would be misleading to see this as 
the 'middle-classing' of a once 'working-class' party. The 
early ALP breakthrough involved broad support (Childe, 1923 ; 
McQueen, 1976; Rawson, 1961a). The electoral dilemmas of 
labour movement parties facing electorates that do not
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furnish ready-made 'working-class' majorities emerged as
soon as such parties contested elections (Przeworski,
1980:40-1; Therborn, 1984:12). They did not suddenly
55emerge in the 1960s.
Some writers (e.g. Miliband, 1977:155-7; Giddens, 
1973:216) insist social democracy is irredeemably 
incorporated into the logic of capitalism. Others, drawing 
on an optimistic reading of Swedish experience suggest it
could embody a politics of transition (see Korpi, 1978;
5 6J. Stephens, 1979). Social democracy is often character­
ised by an internal tug-of-war between incorporated and 
transitional approaches. In this contest, incorporation 
has some permanent advantages, but its invulnerability 
cannot be guaranteed by theoretical fiat, as in 
functionalist arguments about politics in the 'capitalist 
state'.
Social democracy, then, can include attempts to 
transcend capitalism (see Esping-Andersen, 1985). The
social democratic parties that Przeworski (1985) looks at 
are not necessarily locked within his logic of choices, 
which makes such attempts structurally doomed. In the 
'catch-all' thesis and related arguments, social democracy 
becomes purely accommodative and fully incorporated in an 
era of the 'end of ideology' and the 'mixed economy'. 
Continuous economic growth and ongoing political 
tranquillity proved to be considerably more contingent than 
was assumed in the early 1960s. The heyday of social 
democratic accommodation occurred within 'a limited and 
unusual period' (Wolinetz, 1988:306). It was followed by a
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'crisis of manageability' (Hine, 1986) in many social 
democratic parties. New radicalisms emerged even before 
economic circumstances changed.
Within the ALP, attempts to distinguish
'democratic socialism' from 'social democracy' are
'57unhelpful (Beilharz, 1986a:218). Instead, we could ask 
what kind of social democratic party the ALP has been. We 
have noted the emergence of a modern social democratic 
agenda in the ALP in the 1960s is difficult to interpret in 
'end of ideology' terms, given the rough-hewn, pragmatic 
character of the older Australian Laborism (see Metin, 
1977). Exploration of 'social democracy' in the 1960s was 
not tantamount to abandonment of 'socialism', even if it 
occurred at a time when many argued social democracy had 
become accommodative and incorporated and lost its 
transformative dimension.
The ALP in the 1960s was, as the party had always 
been, a creative arena criss-crossed by a wide range of 
ideological currents (see Watts, 1989:185). The nature of 
the mix was changing. Some older themes (e.g. 'White 
Australia') were under challenge. New projects were being 
articulated. In a 'complex arena', competing projects can 
be discerned, presented by different groupings. New 
policies may be advocated in some arenas. Party reform 
plans may or may not be related to advocacy of new 
policies. Such projects can appear quite consistent on 
paper, enabling us to see them as the 'strategies' of 
particular groupings. However, such 'strategies' cannot 
escape being embroiled in 'garbage can' coincidences. 
Battles over them become enmeshed in other conflicts.
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Their fortune is also hostage to various 'social 
conditions'; the activities of other social actors, 
especially rival parties:
Changes of leadership teams, the strengthening or 
weakening of a faction, the adaptation of new themes 
and the creation of links which promote an image of 
underlying continuity all result as much from 
processes over which actors have little or no control 
as from strategies employed for reasons of rivalry 
within the party (Lagroye, 1989:170).
'Strategies' promoted by intra-party groupings, 
projects which emerge within a party, are not necessarily 
particularly coherent or easy to discern. In looking at 
change within the ALP between 1963 and 1981, we can discern 
three different 'ideal type' modern social democratic 
projects: Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1; Australian
Social Democracy, Mark 2 and Labor Managerialism (see Table 
4). For each project, as an ideal-type, I have traced 
consistent perspectives on (a) economic policy; (b) 
relations with 'new social movements'; and (c) intra-party 
democracy and party reform. Analysis of post-mortem 
rituals and party reform debates in the 1963-67 period 
shows a number of related proposals being put forward by 
self-styled Labor 'modernisers'. The 'modernisation' 
project, suggested in such proposals, involved new policies 
and new internal arrangements. In the period 1977-81, 
different projects were put forward. The area of economic 
policy and management of the 'mixed economy' is obviously 
central to modern, social democratic debates. 'New social 
movements' and Labor attitudes towards them are listed 
because of their challenge to the assumption that
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radicalism would fade with affluence. Internal
arrangements were a focal point of reorganisation
Table 4
ALP Strategies : 'Ideal Types'
Australian Social Australian Social
Democracy, Mark 1 Democracy, Mark 2
Economic
Programme
Expand caimunity 
services. Increase 
public expenditure 
within accepted 
'mixed economy' 
framework.
' Re-mix' the 
economy through 
new 'socialist' 
projects (such as 
strategic nation­
alisations or 
'economic 
democracy').
'New Social 
Movements'
Cautious support 
through legislation 
plus sane general 
sympathy.
Support through 
direct 'grass 
roots' liaison as 
well as legis­
lation. Call for 
Labor practices to 
be re-modelled on 
'new social 
movement' lines.
Party
Democracy/
Party
Reform
Combination of 
managerial and 
participatory 
approaches.
'Party reform' 
involving a 
better deal for 
'rank-and-file' 
branch members 
alongside more 
effective 
danination by 
parliament ary 
leadership. Gains 
in intra-party 
pluralism over 
Laborist practice 
(State Branch 
monoliths).
Participatory 
emphasis. Support 
for National 
Conference reform 
to enable greater 
'rank-and-file' 
input.
attempts.
Labor Managerialism
Sound economic 
management. Reforms 
repudiated insofar 
as they endanger 
fiscal respons­
ibility as defined 
in 'stagflation' 
context.
Support through 
legislation, 
where they 
demonstrate 
electoral 
clout.
Managerial 
emphasis. Party 
reform left to 
negotiation 
between 
factional 
managers.
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The concerns I have labelled Australian Social
Democracy, Mark 1 were articulated by Gough Whitlam and
other Labor 'modernisers' in the 1960s. The Whitlam policy
programme can be seen as an Antipodean version of
Crosland's (1956) welfare-oriented revisionism, focussed on
5 8improvements in the 'social wage'. It proposed
increasing social expenditure to reduce the imbalance
between 'private affluence' and 'public squalor'.
Galbraith (1958) provided the text for many a Labor sermon
at this time. Labor promised to clean up 'the seamier
results of the long boom' (Catley and McFarlane, 1981:174)
and catch up with levels of social provision in comparable
59countries (McLaren, 1972). There was sympathy for 'new 
social movements' then emerging in Australia as elsewhere, 
although Whitlam insisted on working within established, 
parliamentary, political channels. He kept his distance 
from broader 'liberationist' aspirations (Little, 1986). 
'Modernising' the party was an important first step in this 
project to 'modernise' Australian society.
As we shall see in Part 1, party 'modernisation' 
in this context had ambiguous implications for intra-party 
democracy. 'Modernising' the party involved challenging 
authoritarian winner-take-all state Branch practices and 
rallying 'rank-and-file talent'. It also involved strengthen­
ing the FPLP vis a vis the party organisation. For the 
'modernisers', new policies and a new party structure 
amounted to a coherent project, although there were different 
battles in different arenas. As we shall see, policies were 
easier to change than organisational arrangements.
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When we come to the 1977-1981 period, different 
'projects' can be reconstructed, drawing different 
'lessons' from the 1975 trauma. In some parts of the ALP, 
the events of 11 November 1975 led to a questioning of 
conventional parliamentary approaches, increased sympathy 
for 'new social movements' and a new concern with 'grass­
roots' politics. Economic policy was also being rethought. 
'Stagflation' in 1973-74 had played havoc with Australian 
Social Democracy Mark l's assumption of continued trouble- 
free economic growth. New Labor 'socialisms' began to be 
articulated. The issue of party democratisation was 
revived. If 'modernisation' was the key word for 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, 'participation' was 
the key word for Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2.
'Modernisation' in the 1960s was supported by 
FPLP leader Whitlam and he could gather support for much, 
but by no means all, of the project, in key party arenas. 
Enthusiasm for 'participation' after 1975, while widespread 
within the party's ranks, did not secure the same sort of 
official blessing. Concerns which emerge in a temporary 
arena are not always taken up in mainstream arenas.
Support for various components of Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 2 can be found in many NCI submissions and 
in the resolutions of Labor women's groups.
At leadership level, there was a reassessment of
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. This looked to
changing terms of economic debate and re-establishing
Labor's credentials for 'sound economic management' rather
* 6 0than 'participation' and new 'socialist' projects. In
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the post-mortem arena itself, this analysis was not
articulated very clearly. There, the talk tended to be
more about 'participation' and such matters. Slowly, but
surely, however, the mainstream arenas of the party took up
themes from this 'project' which I have called Labor
Managerialism, often without much explicit justification.61
The Whitlam Government's image of economic incompetence put
Labor on the defensive. Emerging canons of 'sound economic
management' in an era of recession and an ascendant 'new
6 2right' came to influence Labor debates. Eventually, 
through its Accord with the ACTU, which related carefully 
tailored 'social wage' improvements to 'money wage' 
restraint, Labor managed to demonstrate its 'economic 
responsibility', while providing a degree of 'social 
protection' acceptable to the ACTU. This combination 
underpinned Labor's electoral successes in the 1980s. 
Whereas Whitlam had plans to re-design a range of 
institutions, Labor Managerialism worked within existing 
institutional arrangements, eschewing grand designs for 
'reform'. This approach was extended to intra-party 
matters. Reliable ground rules for factional 
negotiation were valued above plans for new structures.
With an eye to electoral efficiency, 'discipline' and 
'professionalism' were valued above 'participation'.
Such an approach also informed Labor Managerialist 
attitudes to 'new social movements'.
The term managerialism has been used in a variety 
6 3of ways. Some writers have seen post-war social 
democracy in general characterised by a 'managerialist' 
approach to politics (see, for example, Pierson, 1986:185).
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In this view, social democrats are charged with reducing
politics to technical decisions about the 'means' of
'managing' the 'mixed economy' and handing such decisions
64over to technical 'experts'. In the process, broad
political debate is smothered and ideological traditions
are discarded. Thus Catley and McFarlane (1974) denounced
the ALP's exploration of contemporary social democratic
themes under Whitlam as a form of 'Technocratic 
6 5Laborism'. These 'managerialist' arguments fit closely
with arguments about 'catch-all' parties and the 'end of
ideology', seeing social democracy totally incorporated
within the parameters of 'advanced capitalism'. Applying
the argument to social democracy as a whole in the 1960s
and 1970s involves considerable over-simplification.
However, in many social democratic parties in the 1970s
and 1980s, 'managerialist' approaches seemed attractive
as economic difficulties led to dissatisfaction with
what had been seen as a distinctively social democratic
6 6approach (Paterson and Thomas, 1986:14).
The contemporary social democratic ALP is often 
distinguished from the earlier Laborist party, with Whitlam 
a key figure and 1967 a key date in this transition. 
However, there are different forms of modern social 
democracy. Just as the 'Laborist' ALP was criss-crossed by 
a range of ideologies, so is the modern 'social democratic' 
ALP. The party has always been rent by competing groups 
with a wide range of ideas (see Theophanus, 1980:253). 
Identifying 'strategies' and 'projects' helps us to make 
sense of the vortex of ideas put forward in party arenas as
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'solutions' to particular 'problems' by individuals and
groups. In a 'complex arena', such 'strategies' and
'projects' can re-jig the balance between criss-crossing
6 7ideological currents. The forms of political calculation 
and evaluation within a party are manifold, but they do 
crystallise into recognisable discourses. Mapping change 
within a party is partly a matter of mapping changes in its 
discourses. The 'ideal-types' are not meant to characterise 
the ALP as a whole, but particular 'projects' put forward 
by particular groupings within the party. Such 'projects' 
are often articulated during post-mortem rituals. The 
interaction between the 'projects' emerging in such arenas 
(or in more mainstream arenas) and changes in party 
practices and priorities is, as we shall see, a complicated 
business.
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PART I (1963-67)
CHAPTER 2
A PARTY IN CONFUSION : LABOR ENTERS THE '60s
I
2A Calwell and Whitlam Differ on 'Wooing the White Collars', 
March-June 1960
The 1950s had not been a happy decade for Labor, with 
a traumatic split (see Murray, 1970) and a run of electoral 
defeats. The Democratic Labor Party, which regrouped fiercely 
anti-Communist, mainly Catholic Labor supporters, was a thorn 
in Labor's side, particularly in Victoria. It directed its 
preferences to the Liberal-Country coalition and kept the 
'anti-Communist bogey' on the electoral agenda. As well as 
having to cope with the Cold War and the effects of the 1954-55 
Split, Labor was facing a changing Australian society. There 
was economic prosperity and Menzies had maintained the welfare 
provisions put in place by the Curtin and Chifley Labor 
Governments. There were tensions in the party over how to 
respond to changing circumstances. Overseas social democratic 
parties were also reassessing their traditions in the light of 
electoral reversals.
FPLP leader Arthur Calwell (elected March 1960) came 
to symbolise Labor 'traditionalism'. His deputy Gough Whitlam 
was identified with the view that Labor had to 'adapt' to a 
changing Australian society. 'Adaptation' was only one matter 
in dispute in a very divided and dispirited party. Both 
Whitlam's support for party 'modernisation' and Calwell's 
defence of Labor 'tradition' were predictable, given other 
ongoing disputes on matters such as:
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... foreign policy; State Aid to non-governmental 
schools; unity tickets in trade union elections; 
the role of trade unions in the party; the 
relation between Federal Conference, the Federal 
Executive, and parliamentary members; and party 
reconstruction ... (Overacker, 1968:260).
Policy conflicts were linked to clashes between champions of
the FPLP and champions of the party organisation:
On the one hand there seemed to be a growing 
demand for increased representation of 
parliamentarians on Executive and Conference. On 
the other a fear that the party's reverses were 
leading to a dangerous attack on the links between 
the industrial and political wings of the Labor 
movement (Hughes, 1964a:89).
Calwell tended to align himself with the latter position. The
conflicts were complex, although there were identifiable 'left'
and 'right' clusters of positions. K. C. Beazley (1983:37)
suggests that the 1960s Labor 'right':
... combined a commitment to enhancing the 
influence of the Parliamentary party, sensitivity 
to perceived electoral opinion, support for E.G.
Whitlam's leadership, and a concern to minimise 
the impact of opposition to the Vietnam commitment 
on support for the American alliance; those on 
the ALP 'left' tended to assert an educative role 
for the party where preferred policies clashed 
with public opinion, they opposed Whitlam's 
leadership and structural change in the party, and 
they were not convinced that the American alliance 
represented a solution to Australia's foreign 
policy problems. 1
Commitment to enhancing the influence of
parliamentarians and sensitivity to electoral opinion led some
to support party modernisation projects. Others saw such
projects as a capitulation to Labor's enemies. Jim Cairns
(1963:30) thought Labor should develop its socialist vision
rather than 'adapt' to prevailing winds. Like other advocates
of such a course, Cairns did not examine the existing 
2federalised ALP's capacity to 'educate the electorate'. The 
left was suspicious of threats to its strong position on the
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Federal Executive. Calwell became a champion of party 
'tradition', partly because he feared reorganisation might 
undermine his leadership.
Whitlam's clash with Calwell can be seen as a clash
between 'Paleo-Laborism' and 'Technocratic Laborism'.^ The
'Technocratic Laborists' argued:
Labor could no longer survive as the party of the 
underprivileged ... a dwindling minority 
surrounded by an affluent majority. While the 
continued neglect and suffering of the outcast 
groups is deplored, the emphasis shifted to 
professionalism and efficiency (Rowley, 1972:310).
While this shift in emphasis can be seen in Calwell (1963),
Whitlam appeared to be the 'Technocratic Laborist' par
excellence. Professionalism was a key word in his lexicon.
Rowley (1972:310) noted that the 'Technocratic Laborists' were:
... recruited primarily from the intelligentsia 
and professionals and direct their appeal 
primarily to the new sectors of the intermediate 
strata rather than to Labor's traditional base ...
Shortly after winning the deputy leadership, Whitlam
set out his path for Labor ('The Party's Policy : A New
Enunciation', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1960). Demands
for education, employment and community services would
increase. Young families and migrants would swing to Labor.
So would professionals, increasingly salaried rather than self-
employed ;
They were in a better position than most to 
realise the lop-sided and anti-social features 
which our economy and society have developed under 
the Menzies Government ... Australians with a 
conscience will look to the Labor Party in the 
1960s on New Guinea and aborigines.
The possession of washing machines, televisions and motor cars
would not transform traditional Labor supporters' "attitudes.
Whitlam signalled an electoral strategy aimed at white collar
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workers, combined with an ethical appeal to those in the 
professional sector who could diagnose the 'anti-social 
features' of the Menzies regime and 'Australians with a 
conscience' (possibly the same people, in Whitlam's eyes), who 
would respond to a new kind of 'issues politics' (on questions 
such as New Guinea and Aboriginal rights). An emphasis on 
professional altruism was integral to Whitlam's 'Technocratic 
Laborism'. In his 1957 Chifley Memorial Lecture ('The 
Constitution versus Labor'), he told Melbourne University staff 
and students:
You are better equipped than most of your fellow- 
citizens to understand the problem and to 
enlighten the public concerning it ... Your 
professional lives will be less circumscribed and 
stultified if the framework of our society is 
brought up to date (Whitlam, 1957:19. See also 
ACSPA/FCUSAA, 1959:99 and 101). 4
The call for Labor to open itself out to the emerging
Australian professional and intellectual stratum was not always
well received within the party.^
Whitlam's article was one of four contributions to a
Sydney Morning Herald symposium, 'Labor at the Crossroads'.
The other three were from Lloyd Ross ('Where Lies the Highway
to the Summit?', 16 March 1960); H.W. Arndt ('Social Patterns
Demand a New Radicalism', 17 March) and E.L. Wheelwright ('The
State Must Restore Social Priorities', 18 March). They echoed
Whitlam's call for Labor 'adaptation' to a changing Australia.
Both Arndt and Ross had been calling on the ALP to 'modernise'
itself for some time.
Ross, secretary of the Australian Railways Union, was
7an Australian Labor intellectual. He had been associated with 
the Communist Party in the 30s bur became a strong supporter of
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He thought Labor's divisions andthe Industrial Groups.  ^
difficulties were due to the vacuum the party found itself in 
following the failure of bank nationalisation and the defeat of 
Chifley:
There must be a great, simple, central theme 
branching into all the fields and subjects of 
debate, but in itself easily grasped, which runs 
through the words and actions of a successful 
opposition (Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1960).
Debate on Labor's purposes and priorities would not hinder
party unity. The vacuum in ideas led to organisational
differences. Attachment to outdated formulae hindered the ALP:
... while the public can be dismayed by the public 
controversies of a political party, the greater 
danger at the moment arises from a popular belief 
that Labor has stopped thinking on its aims and 
methods. A big debate would show the Labor Party 
to be not only alive, but also tolerant.
This call went largely unheeded, as did Whitlam's call for a
concerted ALP appeal to professionals and intellectuals.
9Heinz Arndt also took up the 'revisionist1 banner.
Labor had once been the driving force for change (Sydney
Morning Herald, 18 March 1960). Since 1950 it lacked 'clear
purpose'. This 'emptiness' allowed 'personal and sectarian
issues' to become disproportionately important.
Arndt believed 'affluence' meant the 'end of
i d e o l o g y ^  However there were still things to fight for.
Domestically, there was the Galbraithian paradox of public
squalor (in education, research, public health and arts
support) alongside private affluence (cars, washing machines,
televisions). Wheelwright took this up more stridently:
It is obvious to those not blinded ... by mass 
advertising that our social priorities are upßide 
down. We view television in our homes and then go 
outside to a privy in our unsewered areas; we 
take our children to over-crowded, antiquated,
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ill-equipped schools, yet purchase their clothes 
in smart up-to-date giant department stores 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1960).
Arndt also asked Labor to take up the issue of Third World
poverty and underdevelopment, whatever a 'hip-pocket nerve'
electorate might think (18 March 1960).
From the left of the party, John Burton (1958:13), 
after denouncing Arndt's 'revisionism' in 1956, went on to 
argue that Labor never was and never could be socialist.
Nor could it be a 'crisis' party any more. Its significance 
was no longer as a workers' party, but as 'a party which 
represents economic and social justice'; giving leadership on 
issues such as 'the problem of New Guinea'.
Whitlam's 'wooing the white collars' strategy was 
based on the expectation of increased demands to redress 
'public squalor', a common Labor theme at this time (see 
McFarlane, 1968:18), stressed by economists Arndt and 
Wheelwright. His ethical appeal to 'Australians with a 
conscience' was similar to that called for by Arndt and Burton.
A few months later, addressing the NSW conference, 
Calwell reaffirmed the 'socialisation objective'. The party 
would never be taken over by 'intellectuals and pseudo­
intellectuals' who advocated its abandonment ('Socialisation: 
ALP Aim Reaffirmed by Calwell', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 June 
1960). This call for loyalty to the 'socialisation objective' 
helped to forestall the sort of wide-ranging debate advocated 
by Ross. Calwell appealed to delegates, mostly affiliated 
unionists, to see the 'revisionist' calls as 'anti-Labor' 
suggestions, akin to what could be expected from#Communist 
Party and DLP fifth-columnists. Labor would remain close to
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the unions. 'White Australia' would stay. Clearly Calwell had 
little sympathy for the type of party 'modernisation' advocated 
by Whrtlam, particularly insofar as it included extending a 
welcoming hand to 'intellectuals'.11 Calwell's (1963:8) own 
political career path had been pursued entirely within the ALP. 
He became secretary of his local branch at 18. He did not go 
to a university.
2B Establishing the Federal Secretariat: Trials and
Tribulations, 1958-64
Following Calwell's outburst, the Sydney Morning 
Herald editorialised:
The party's need for a strong Federal Secretariat, 
staffed by precisely the type of Labor supporter 
Mr Calwell seems determined to drive away, has 
never been so apparent ('Mr Calwell Turns the 
Clock Back', 13 June 1960).
Labor was not to have a Federal Secretariat until 
January 1964. A proper Federal Secretariat, with a role in 
general publicity and membership education as well as 
campaigning was a long-standing, if rather half-heartedly 
pursued, Labor dream. It was also a handy panacea recommended 
by press commentators at electoral post-mortem time.
Enlisting 'modern thinkers' was often associated with 
advocacy of a Secretariat. If some saw a Secretariat as a 
think-tank, others saw it as a requirement of professional 
campaigning (see Crisp, 1978:96). Secretariat advocates 
stressed changes in the party's environment, especially the 
growth of 'the white collar professional, clerical and 
technical classes'. Such 'dreamers' often found it difficult to 
get the party to take their ideas seriously:
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Many Labor men viewed the emergence of a permanent 
Federal Secretariat with about as much enthusiasm 
on the one hand and suspicion on the other as they 
did the expansion of the permanent component of 
the Australian Army (Crisp, 1978:70).
In his 1954 NSW conference address, state president
Bill Colbourne called for a Federal Secretariat. It might help
integrate local branch members into the party:
If we give our Councils and Branches some 
practical work to do in propagating the great 
cause of Labor, we will put new life into the 
Party and eliminate the differences that exist 
today on petty and unimportant issues (NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/449/1166).
A few months later, in October 1954, the Labor Split erupted.
Not for the first or last time, 'rationalistic idealist' party
reorganisation aspirations ran aground on realpolitik rocks.
Serious moves to establish a Secretariat were put in
12train following Labor's 1958 defeat. Recommending a Federal
Secretariat, NSW campaign director Colbourne drew the lesson:
... that Labor propaganda, to be effective, must 
be issued in regulated doses over a long period 
and not forced on the elector in one or two big 
doses just prior to an election ... (NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 283/453/1178).
The NSW executive endorsed a motion for the 1959 Federal
Conference supporting the establishment of a Secretariat (NSW
ALP Branch Records ML Mss 2083/455/1179).
NSW Senator James Ormonde publicised the NSW
executive plan for a Federal Secretariat early in January 
131959. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial described the plan
... a natural and familiar result of ALP 
reflection following a heavy setback ... So far it 
has been frustrated by a deeply founded scepticism 
regarding the extent to which the Australian 
electorate would respond to such 'education', by a 
lack of sustained interest in political crusading 
and by the curious and often troublesome relations
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between the Federal ALP and the six State 
organisations ... ('A Brain for the Labor Party',
13 January 1960).
The secretariat idea was unpopular in important
sections of the party. Ormonde's high profile on the issue was
resented. During the 1958 election, he had been associated
with the move to appeal directly to Catholic voters on the
basis of differences between Sydney Archbishop Cardinal Norman
Gilroy and Melbourne Archbishop Daniel Mannix. Gilroy was
quoted to reassure Catholics that the Church was not anti-
Labor. Gilroy regretted the use of his name, but repeated his
view that only the Communist Party was beyond the pale (see
Murray, 1970:348). Mannix replied:
Every communist and every communist sympathiser in 
Australia wants a victory for the Evatt Party ...
(i.e. the ALP, quoted, Murray, 1970:348).
Eddie Ward and other prominent figures wanted party 
leader Evatt (who supported the move) and Ormonde to take 
responsibility for the failure of this tactic. Talk of a 
Federal Secretariat was seen as an evasion of such 
responsibility.
The WA Branch supported a Secretariat in
principle (C.E. Menagh, 'ALP May Establish Secretariat in
14Eastern States', West Australian, 5 May 1959). Victoria
opposed. The 1959 Federal Conference in Canberra:
... approved in principle the establishment of a 
federal secretariat ... The main object of the 
secretariat would be to provide a public relations 
department for the party. The secretariat would 
also conduct an educational campaign on such 
objects as democratic socialism ('Plan for Federal 
Secretariat', Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1959).
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Finance and other operational matters were left to be sorted 
out later (ALP, 1959:42-3).
The Secretariat had been under active consideration
since August 1958 (ALP, 1959:59). The extant federal machinery
was 'hopelessly inadequate'. A central office could redress
this without disturbing Executive authority:
Furthermore the Secretariat would be able to 
undertake research in all aspects of political 
theory and history and any required information 
should be readily available, to the Federal 
authorities and the State parties, such 
information being in strict accordance with Labor 
Policy and with official attitudes on any question 
(ALP, 1959:16).
The general income of the Federal Executive was little more 
than three thousand pounds. A Secretariat would require an 
income of twelve thousand pounds. Thus the Federal Executive 
insisted on increased state affiliation fees.
The Secretariat was not considered again by the
15Federal Executive until September 1960. Chamberlain was then 
asked to prepare 'a detailed proposal' (ALP, 1961:77). At this
I (Zstage, Chamberlain was also acting Federal Secretary.
Although some Branches were wary, 'influential ALP men' were 
convinced that the party needed a central Secretariat to match 
that of the Liberals ('ALP Plans for a Federal Secretariat',
Age, 7 September 1960).
17The December 1960 Federal Executive meeting 
considered Chamberlain's proposal (ALP, 1961:79). Chamberlain 
noted 'an acute awareness' in all Branches of the need to 
improve Labor's federal organisation (ALP, 1961:77). 'Grave 
organisational weaknesses' flowed from the lack of a 'real 
central administration'. Federal Conference met only 
biennially, Federal Executive only met twice a year and the
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federal secretaryship was a part-time position. Chamberlain 
looked at the crucial question of finance. If the party had 
forty thousand or fifty thousand pounds a year, it could 
easily:
... establish a national administrative centre 
consisting of a number of experts in 
administration, public relations, research, a 
librarian and all that goes with the modern 
requirements of a political organisation.
The Branches would not hand over that sort of money. However,
a fourfold increase in fees could finance an adequate
Secretariat.
E.L. Wheelwright (1962:12) emphasised Chamberlain's
argument on the under-funding of the federal ALP. The ALP as a
whole appeared to have an income of over ninety thousand pounds
but only about three percent of this accrued to the Federal
Executive. Wheelwright commended the Chamberlain report, but
maintained it did 'not go far enough. Its skeleton Secretariat,
'a bold proposal' in the ALP context, was not adequate. An
official inquiry into organisation and finance, along the lines
18of the Wilson Inquiry 'in the UK, was warranted.
The problems faced by British Labour were not
dissimilar to those faced by the ALP. British Labour had been
out of office since 1951. In both countries, it was- argued
that 'social change' and welfare capitalism had undermined
traditional support (see Jupp, 1958). The Wilson Inquiry was
set up after British Labour's 1955 defeat. It was conducted by
a National Executive committee (chaired by Harold Wilson MP).
It was 'deeply shocked' at Labour disorganisation:
... compared with our opponents we are still at 
the penny-farthing stage in a jet-propelled era 
and our machine, at that, is rusty and 
deteriorating with age (quoted McKenzie, 1956:94).
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In the British Labour Party, as in the ALP, there
were those who rejected such 'modernisation' rhetoric. Aneurin
Bevan MP dismissed the Wilson report:
They were going to increase the number of 
organisers, streamline the machinery and make the 
car go faster. He was not sure that he wanted to 
go faster, if he were going over a precipice. He 
wanted to have a more precise idea of where they 
were going (quoted, Hanham, 1956:378, note 8).
The insistence that 'modernisation' was a political question is
important.^
The notion that changing social circumstances required
a more professional approach was central to Wheelwright's
(1962:12) diagnosis. He linked professionalisation to
centralisation. Over-centralisation led to 'apoplexy at the
centre and anaemia at the extremities' but Labor's problem was:
... acute under-centralisation, a body without a 
head, the whole suffering from pernicious 
financial anaemia which results in lethargy and 
inability to fulfil essential functions.
Getting the States to pay up delayed the
establishment of the Secretariat. To get over the poverty of
some states a revised plan was presented at the January 1962
Federal Executive meeting ('Finance Trouble Hits ALP's
20Secretariat Plan', Advertiser, 12 January 1962). This plan
was for a Secretariat costing eleven thousand five hundred
21pounds, located in Canberra. At the time, commentators paid
more attention to the Executive's decision not to intervene in
22Victorian Branch, than to its new Secretariat plan.
23By the next Executive meeting all Branches were
24ready to pay up. The Secretariat could be set in motion.
This was seen as a triumph for Chamberlain (M.C. Uren,
'Successes for Chamberlain at ALP Meeting', West Australian,
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7 July 1962). The press welcomed the decision, suggesting
the Secretariat would enhance the quality of Australian
25political debate as well as assist the ALP. In May 1963, the
Federal Executive recommended then Victorian secretary (and
Federal Executive delegate), Cyril Wyndham, as full-time
2 6Federal Secretary.
2C Research and Reorganisation: National Organising
Committee, 1960-61
Alongside the complicated saga of the establishment 
of the Secretariat, there were other reorganisation attempts. 
The same Executive meeting that commissioned Chamberlain's 
feasibility study also:
... set up a 'political intelligence' committee to 
find the reasons for Labor defeats in recent years 
and to seek a formula for victory ('ALP Committee 
Seeks Reasons for Poll Defeats', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 September 1960).
It consisted of three Senators: Felix Dittmer (Qld), Pat
Kennelly (Vic) and 1959 Secretariat advocate James Ormonde 
(NSW).
The 'political intelligence' committee, formally
known as the National Organising Committee (NOC) had a broad
brief. It anticipated, in a part-time way, the sort of
services a professional Secretariat could provide. Ormonde
said the committee hoped:
... to set up and maintain the same kind of 
intimate contact with the general public that the 
ALP has with its branches and the trade unions. 
Developments in public relations technique make it 
essential for the Labor Party to extend its 
organizational activities beyond the unions and 
the party branches (quoted, Sydney Morning Herald,
12 September 1960). 27
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The Sydney Morning Herald saw the establishment of the NOC as
'a tempting subject for disrespectful comment', but conceded
that the 'three wise men' might come up with something for the
Secretariat to consider when it was eventually established
('Labor in Search of Intelligence', 12 September 1960).
But they would find it difficult to agree on the cause of
Labor's setbacks, let alone base a policy on their findings:
The present leadership despises 'intellectualism' 
in the party ... If the 'political intelligence' 
committee does its job thoroughly it may gather 
some startling views from electors from whom, a 
generation ago, Labor would have expected 
unfailing support.
The NOC would find itself confronted with:
... all the contradictions and improvisations that 
political flesh is heir to. A few men without 
party blinkers would probably tell the ALP as 
correctly as a million why it has been defeated in 
election after election.
The final suggestion ignores the inescapably political nature 
of discussions on party strategy, involving as they do all the 
contradictions and improvisations of political flesh. 
Necessarily.
The NOC soon fell foul of Chamberlain. Ormonde's 
recommendations of more openness to professional advice, the 
use of surveys and reaching out to business organisations 
paralleled British 'revisionist' organisational arguments (see 
Minkin, 1978:274-6; Hindess, 1971:112; Howell, 1976:281; 
Warde, 1982:55 and 72-3). This was not what disturbed the 
supposed arch-'traditionalist'. Rather, it was Ormonde's 
emphasis on researching DLP voting patterns that alarmed 
Chamberlain. He stressed Ormonde had no right to speak on 
behalf of the Federal Executive. The NOC had not been formally 
established and had nothing to do with policy ('Labor Senator
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Rebuked by Labor President', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 
September 1960).
Chamberlain appears to have agreed with the
'revisionist' emphasis on utilising professional and academic
advice. But there was no room for even thinking about a deal
with the DLP on his NOC agenda:
The Committee is to apply itself solely to 
organisational matters and shall provide a liaison 
between the Federal Executive and State Branches 
in relation to the next general Federal Election 
(Chamberlain statement, 30 September 1960, quoted,
Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, 2 March 
1961).
The committee was asked to co-opt the intellectual services of
2 8Brian Fitzpatrick and others.
Fitzpatrick dispensed friendly advice to the ALP from
29his idiosyncratic Newsletter. This won him some useful 
contacts in the FPLP and on the Federal Executive. He argued 
strongly for Labor adjustment to social change without 
compromising what radicalism it possessed (see Watson, 
1979:257). In 1960, Fitzpatrick's view was that the ALP had 
never been a socialist party, although 'its nominal commitment 
to socialism of a sort' had been 'an intangible support to the 
best people in the party' (quoted, Watson, 1979:264). But 
Labor had to win elections and swinging voters did not 'care 
tuppence' about the 'socialisation objective' (Brian 
Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, October 1958).
Fitzpatrick insisted that Labor had to overhaul its 
organisation to communicate with a changing electorate that 
took Keynesian prosperity for granted (see, for example, Brian 
Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, June 1958). He advocated a 
national Labor weekly, full-time organisers in marginal
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electorates and provincial towns as well as local research and 
the involvement of community leaders at the branch level (see 
also Jupp, 1959:13-4; Rawson, 1959:13). Labor could no longer 
present itself as 'the party of the underprivileged' but could 
forge a new, modernised, 'grass-roots', populist radicalism 
cultivating 'a sense of participation and identity with the 
Party and political affairs' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor 
Newsletter, December 1958. See also Turner, 1959:7).
Fitzpatrick's basic thesis was that Labor had to 
respond intelligently to the growth of the 'professional, 
technical and managerial class' (mostly without links to the 
ALP or the unions):
The young technologists can be taught, by an 
articulate, educating, crusading Labor Party, why 
they can find in the ALP their most congenial 
political party home. The professional and 
technical workers can be accommodated in unions.
But the problems posed are great and complex ...
Now, surely, is the time to take stock ...
('Capitalist Social Revolution Poses Problems for 
Labor', Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter,
February 195 9) .
There was a reluctance to initiate grand debates in the FPLP 
and the party 'machine', as Calwell demonstrated at the 1960 
NSW conference. Chamberlain's dressing-down of the NOC 
provided a further example. Chamberlain agreed with Fitz­
patrick on the usefulness of local branches organising their 
own research projects (see 'Report on Yarra: Lessons for
Labor', Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, March 1959). 
Indeed Fitzpatrick's advocacy influenced the Federal Executive 
in its establishment of the NOC in September 1960 (see letter 
from Chamberlain, Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, April 
1961).
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2D Winding Up the NOC : Lessons for Party Reformers
Conflict with Chamberlain meant the NOC was almost 
still-born. It was formally buried by the 1961 Federal 
Conference. Its rise and fall illustrates important aspects of 
the process whereby internal ALP conflicts and complexities cut 
across any simple 'adaptation' to social change.
In a political party like the ALP, vague proposals 
for 'reorganisation', 'modernisation' or 'professionalisation' 
are'particularly prone to derailment by apparently 'extraneous' 
factionalism, manoeuvring and intrigue (see D. Stephens, 
1979:402, note 82 and 1980:44). In any organisation, formal 
reorganisation projects call forth a host of loose 'solutions', 
'problems' and symbolic issues (Olsen, 1976:314-5). The NOC's 
interest in the taboo issue of ALP/DLP relations lost it the 
confidence of Chamberlain and the Federal Executive. Ormonde 
wanted this question to be taken up in NOC research. Then 
Senator Kennelly raised the issue of ALP/DLP rapprochement more 
concretely. The NOC's fate was sealed. The whole incident 
illustrates Encel's (1964:19) argument that obsession with the 
DLP, both on the part of those who wanted some sort of 
rapprochement and those who upheld the implacable 'spirit of 
Hobart' (from the crucial 1955 Federal Conference), cut across 
and confused Labor strategic thinking at this time.
The NOC's misfortune was that its appointment
coincided with talk of a 'deal' with the DLP. Kennelly's
response put him offside with the Federal Executive and with
Calwell. Chamberlain was particularly upset at the prospect of
prominent ALP members entering exploratory negotiations behind
30the backs of the party's official authorities.
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In December 1960 the Federal Executive repudiated
Kennelly, criticised his apparent willingness to talk with the
DLP and attacked the NOC. Kennelly was deemed to have exceeded
his authority as NOC chairman. Ormonde and Dittmer were
criticised for their complicity. Charges were made that the
NOC had failed to co-opt sympathetic academics. Some delegates
wanted the committee dissolved if it did not stick to its brief
('Rebuff for Senator Kennelly over DLP Peace Effort1, Sydney
Morning Herald, 9 December 1960).
The NOC had produced an interim report on 2 December
I960, indicating 14 seats lost in 1958 by DLP intervention and
14 more that could be won on a moderate swing to Labor (Brian
Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, 2 March 1961). It did not
begin contacting the experts recommended by the Executive until
23 December. A meeting ensued in Melbourne on 22 February 1961
between the NOC, Creighton Burns, Clyde Holding and
Fitzpatrick. This endorsed some of Fitzpatrick's suggestions.
Fitzpatrick argued that Chamberlain had six months 'to
revolutionise ALP organisation for research, policy-making and
public relations' in time for the 1961 federal elections. This
did not happen. The NOC was disbanded shortly afterwards but
the ALP still came within one seat of victory on 3 December 
311961
Before its burial, the NOC produced a report for the
1961 Federal Conference. This was not considered, but got
significant publicity. It called for modernised rules and
procedures to attract a more representative cross-section of
the community into the party ('Labor Senators Want New Look',
3 2Age, 13 April 1961). Fitzpatrick noted the parallels between
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the NOC's move away from 'workerism' and Labor's new economic 
policy. Both assumed traditional 'working class' families 
represented a minority of Australian voters. He approved of 
the direction the party was taking, although not all ALP 
advocates of party 'modernisation' articulated such a project 
with the cultivation of a new radical Labor populism in the way 
that he did. The NOC recommended the establishment of a Labor 
research team made up of advertising and market research 
experts, to analyse voter attitudes and devise a new 'image' 
for the party (Age, 13 April 1961).
On 13 April, Victorian delegate Cyril Wyndham noted 
statements about a Labor NOC in that morning's papers (ALP, 
1961:29 ). He asked whether any such report had been received 
by the Federal Executive. Chamberlain replied 'No'.
Conference asked the federal officers to contact NOC members 
about the press statements. The following day Wyndham moved a 
motion disbanding the NOC (ALP, 1961:38 ). Conference 
preferred an amendment leaving the Federal Executive to review 
the NOC. The NOC was never heard of again.
There were lessons for future committees. Such 
committees were sponsored by the Federal Executive. If their 
deliberations led them down stray paths, that the Executive 
disapproved of, their proposals could be marginalised. There 
were many obstacles to having grand organisational debates. 
However, inertia did not mean incremental change was 
impossible. The Federal Secretariat was eventually 
established, but it had been insulated from any broader debate 
on party 'reorganisation'. The doomed NOC had failed to link 
its proposals with the debate on the establishment of the
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Secretariat.33
It was ironic that Cyril Wyndham, who seemed so
anxious to wind up the NOC in 1961, would later find his own
report, commissioned by the Executive in 1964, getting some of
the same treatment. This was in spite of his care in steering
clear of controversy and his attempt to give his report (which
was much more comprehensive than the NOC report) a strongly
34technical-organisational focus. But no report can be purely
technical-organisational. Inevitably reorganisation proposals
have internal political implications and ramifications. As
Wyndham put it in 1968 (to the NSW Fabian Society):
When you start talking reorganisation, you don't 
get a rational debate - you get a power struggle, 
and when that happens the chances of reorganisation 
are practically doomed (quoted, 'Wyndham Urges Shake- 
Up in Labor Branches', Australian, 8 April 1968).
Reorganisation committees have a fondness for 
'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric and recommendations. Whether 
reorganisation recommendations are implemented, however, 
depends a lot on intra-party realpolitik factors which such 
rhetoric systematically ignores. Wyndham did not have to wait 
until he was Federal Secretary to find this out. Committees 
set up and reports commissioned by state executives follow the 
same organisational logic as those emanating from the Federal 
Executive. As Victorian secretary, Wyndham prepared a 
reorganisation report for that Branch in 1962. This post­
mortem on the 1961 state election loss was badly received by 
the Victorian executive. Few of its recommendations were 
taken up.
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CHAPTER 3
PICKING UP THE PIECES : LABOR AFTER 30 NOVEMBER 1963
3A Seventh Successive Defeat : Press tells Labor 'Adapt 
or Perish'
Labor's confidence made defeat in 1963 the more 
galling and it encouraged the search for reasons 
(D. Stephens, 1979:383).
From an academic point of view there is probably 
nothing more stimulating than a political 
postmortem because there are few subjects outside 
politics which lend themselves so readily to 
conjecture and debate. The very controversy 
inherent in politics defies conclusive reasoning 
and begets dogmatism and fallacy as sin begets sin 
(Allan Fraser MHR, 1964:16).
... The various groups will now blame each other, 
and the inevitable inquest into the Party's big 
election defeat could spark off renewed internal 
troubles. (S.W. Stephens, 'Party Due for Drastic 
Overhaul', Advertiser, 7 December 1963).
Labor's defeat on 30 November 1963 was particularly 
traumatic. Wide-ranging 'what went wrong' debates ensued.
They demonstrated deep divisions within the party. Certain 
questions were becoming increasingly difficult to avoid. This 
was the seventh successive such defeat. -The long and bitter - 
shadow thrown over the party by the 1954-55 Split enabled it to 
brush aside unwelcome evidence about its level of support.
This shadow was still clouding the situation in 1963, but 
Labor's expectations had been increased by its close run in 
1961. In a sense, 'what went wrong' debates are no more than 
ritual organisational gestures, routine responses to the 
internal problems associated with electoral defeat. Although 
post-mortems allowed various wounds and 'running sores' to be 
re-opened, their ritual quality also facilitated solemn 
incantations to the elusive spirit of party unity.^
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Denouncing the electorate was a constant temptation 
for disappointed Laborites. Certain hardy post-mortem 
perennials consolidated feuding groups around recurrent themes 
of press bias and the malevolent machinations of Labor's 
opponents. Press commentary and positions taken by Labor's 
opponents played a considerable part in shaping post-mortem 
debate. Internally, manoeuvring for factional advantage was a 
major factor.
The ritual nature of much Labor post-mortem debate
was sometimes used as a stick to beat the party with,
particularly in equally ritual forms of editorial sermonising
(see, for example, 'The New Labor Leader', Advertiser, 8 March
1960), which were usually resented by their supposed
recipients." Calwell (1963:58) preferred 'manly foes' to
posturing 'candid friends', who wanted Labor to improve its
'image' by changing its policies, loosening its union links and
2dropping the socialist plank in its platform.
The ritual quality of Labor post-mortems can be over­
stated. Each defeat had its own peculiarities. The degree of 
disappointment or desperation involved could alter the stakes 
in any particular debate. The 1963-64 debate illustrates the 
ideological and organisational condition of the ALP at a 
critical time. Internal debates influence how parties read 
change in the electorate:
While it is notoriously difficult to discover 
voters' motives, a politician's perception of 
reasons provides just as good a determinant of his 
future role as do objective data (D. Stephens,
1979 :201) .
Competing politicians' and party officials' perceptions of why 
elections were lost get thrashed out in post-mortems.
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Sometimes contributions are solicited from lower down the 
organisational hierarchy.
Liberal exploitation of Labor disarray in 1963 was
complemented by the allegation that Labor was dominated by 36
'faceless men'. Calwell's generous domestic policy promises
were 'shrewdly picked over' by Menzies (Hughes, 1964b:93):
... who offered reduced if slightly different 
versions of many of them, without being committed 
to any of them.
Menzies took advantage of Labor division on 'state aid' to 
private schools (including those in the Catholic parochial 
system). He offered five million pounds in federal grants for 
science blocks in all schools. NSW Labor was embroiled in a 
'state aid' row with the Federal Executive, which ruled a 
proposed NSW government scheme transgressed ALP policy. A 
month later, the 'snap' election was called. Menzies also 
emphasised foreign affairs and defence issues, implying that 
Labor's 'faceless men' could wreak havoc in these areas.
The term 'faceless men' was introduced in March 1963, 
after the publication of a photograph of Calwell and Whitlam 
waiting outside the Hotel Kingston in Canberra, under a street 
lamp. Inside the 36 Special Federal Conference delegates were 
defining Labor's line on US military installations in 
Australia, particularly the naval communications facility then 
being established at North West Cape. The 'faceless men' 
incident has been described as a media stunt (Freudenberg,
31977:89) and a consequence of poor leadership by Calwell 
(Dunstan, 1981:100-101). Calwell and Whitlam were not barred 
from attendance. Calwell had referred the issue to the Federal 
Executive to secure party legitimation for his endorsement of
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North West Cape. The Special Conference accepted North West 
Cape albeit with some qualifications to protect Australian 
sovereignty, by 19 votes to 17, on the votes of SA, Tasmania 
and NSW, augmented by the crucial defection of J.E. Duggan, 
Queensland SPLP leader.
The apparent ordering about of Calwell and Whitlam 
and the closeness of the vote, not the substantive decision, 
were capitalised on by Labor's opponents, none more so than 
Menzies:
In the very hey-day of our progress, the 
Australian Labor Party asks you to dismiss us, to 
commit the national fortunes to the hands of its 
Members of Parliament and the famous outside body,
36 'faceless men' whose qualifications are 
unknown, who have no elected responsibility to you 
... (quoted, Hughes, 1964a:99).
Would Parliament or Labor's 'faceless men' rule Australia?
Liberals linked this choice between 'Parliament' and 'Puppets'
with an ideological repertoire articulating 'affluence' with
'the Communist bogey':
In a country now growing and developing at express 
speed our external and internal security must be 
in the hands of known men, proved men - men whom 
Australia trusts. (Liberal advertisement,
Bulletin, 23 November 1963. See also Simms,
1982:121). 4
Those denouncing the 'faceless men' made great play 
of the fact that a number of Federal Conference delegates sat 
on the same union executives as members of the Communist Party 
of Australia. Calwell gave a spirited defence of the 
delegates. They represented 'some hundreds of thousands' of 
ordinary Australians ('Calwell Demands Election : Menzies 
Challenged', Socialist and Industrial Labor, April 1963). 
Calwell was not successful in having his picture of Labor Party 
democracy publicly accepted. He found it difficult to see
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beyond his own perceptions of Labor's role in Australian 
society (Tom Wheelwright, 1977:87).
The 'faceless men' furore did not undermine Labor's
confidence. No previous Labor leader went into a campaign
'with a greater feeling of confidence' than Calwell (S.W.
Stephens, Advertiser, 7 December 1963). None emerged 'in such
a state of angry impotence'. The latter feeling is clearly
shown in Calwell's eclectic catalogue of the causes of Labor's
defeat which seemed to include everything but his own
leadership and the party structure ('Bitterness by Calwell in
review of labor's Defeat', Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December
1963).^ He still hoped:
... to lead Labor to the promised land ... I 
should not have to accept responsibility for the 
election going wrong, Labor did not get the votes 
because of malicious influences working behind the 
scenes and outside Parliament ...
His willingness to believe his opponents' behaviour required
explanation in terms of conspiracy theories mirrored Menzies'
fascination with the 'faceless men'. While constantly
favouring 'explanations' of Labor's plight in terms of
malicious external influences, Calwell admitted Labor did not
know why it was losing and had to find out ('Calwell Seeks
£Defeat Facts', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 1964). Unlike 
his penchant for conspiracy theories, this admission of 
confusion opened the way to detailed internal inquiries.
By March 1964, many incantations within the ALP had 
denounced various demons, there were also some attempts at 
analysing what had gone wrong. All this was accompanied by 
didactic press commentary. The press call was for a far- 
reaching inquest, prepared to tackle difficult subjects,
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including Calwell's leadership ('Labor Faces the Future',
Advertiser, 3 December 1963). The standard rhetoric about
social change by-passing the ALP was deployed. New ideas on
education, housing and the economy were not enough. Labor
needed a classless image:
Its trade union ties, which it must doubtless 
maintain, have yet to be woven effectively with 
the threads of other community groups. Union 
officials predominate among ALP candidates; the 
classless image of the Whitlam type is much rarer.
Across Australia, editorial advice to the ALP 
recapitulated these themes. Not for nothing do Connell and 
Irving (1980:297) see a certain 'modernisation' rhetoric 
constituting a hegemonic discourse in Australia in the 1960s 
(see also Baldock, 1978):
The Mercury saw Labor's defeat as a consequence of 
the influence of old guard union leaders on ALP 
policy, part of what the West Australian called 
Labor's 'drab and unfriendly' visage (Hughes,
19 64b:10 3). 7
In 1961, uncharacteristically, the Sydney Morning 
Herald had supported Labor. By 1963, it had swung back to the 
Government. The ALP was 'unreliable', it bluntly declared 
('The Choice Before the Labor Party', 3 December 1963). A 
'reliable' Labor Party would change its image, repudiate its 
left wing, move towards rapprochement with the DLP and develop 
its Secretariat! The 'unreliable' ALP would avoid coming to 
grips with the electorate's distrust of the 'faceless men'. It 
would grasp at other explanations. Many excuses could be 
'manufactured'. Some 'were already being advanced'.
The themes of an 'out of date' Labor Party and 
unhealthy domination by 'faceless men' were also staples of 
Liberal argument. A pamphlet whose title (Back to Methuselah:
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The Faceless Men and the Power of the Labor Party) intertwined
both themes, confidently predicted:
... a further decline of the political influence 
of the ALP in an Australia which, unlike the Labor 
machine, belongs to the twentieth century (Liberal 
Party, 1964:10).
The programme being imposed by the 'faceless men' was still
essentially 'the socialist programme adopted by the ALP Federal
Conference of 1921' (Liberal Party, 1964:4):
The new Australia that has emerged since the end 
of World War II, its place and problems in the 
Pacific, the tempo and challenges of its internal 
development, occupy only a subsidiary place in the 
thinking of Labor's Faceless Men,
Perhaps conservative detection of a 'socialist tiger' lurking
Qbehind innocent ALP appearances (which goes back to 1905) was 
even more anachronistic. The Liberal Party (1964:6) complained 
that ALP evolution differed from British 'Labor' (sic) with its 
strong local branches and its increasingly middle-class 
leadership. Similar idealised images of the British Labour 
Party were commonly employed by the newspaper chorus, based 
more on the beholder's criticism of the ALP than on an informed 
account of the British Labour Party.
3B Debates in the States
In a party as federalised as the ALP in 1963-64, 
post-mortems largely took place, firstly, at a state level.
The Queensland Central Executive thought Labor had not put 
enough emphasis on youth ('The ALP Emphasis to be on Youth - 
Lesson from Poll', Courier-Mail, 25 February 1964). . A circular 
from Queensland TLC president John Egerton to 300 ALP branches 
and 100 unions said Labor had to find out what went wrong from 
the small voter rather than 'tall poppies' ('"Why Did We Fail?"
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Asks Labor', Sunday Mail, 19 April 1964). The Queensland
inquest found considerable dissatisfaction with the calibre of 
Labor candidates. ('Labor Study on Reasons for Defeat', Sunday 
Mail, 19 April 1964). SPLP leader, J.E. Duggan, told the 1965
9Labor-in-Politics convention that instead of recrimination the 
ALP should:
... adopt the policy of the British Labour Party 
and set up a committee to examine why elections 
were lost ('Duggan: Examine Election Losses',
Courier-Mail, 12 May 1965. See also ALP,
Queensland Branch, 1965:28).
Not only did he invoke a misleading idealisation of British 
Labour practice, he also reminded delegates, as insistently as 
any editorialist, that Australia was an 'affluent' society and 
that Labor had to dispose of allegations about 'faceless men'!
On 13 December 1963, the Victorian executive set up a 
seven-man review committee to find out what had gone wrong 
('Moderates Can Gain Labor Control', Australian Financial 
Review, 18 December 1963). Of the seven, only three were on
the executive themselves.^  The committee could have 'far- 
reaching repercussions' including, ultimately, a big change in 
the type of executive elected by the state conference. It had 
a majority of branch representatives.^ The committee was seen 
as a potential rallying-point for opponents of the executive. 
Had the 'Junta' as its opponents called it (see Mathews, 1986) 
unwittingly established a Trojan Horse?
We will never know. The review committee had an even 
more ethereal existence than the Federal Executive's NOC of a 
few years before. No report was tabled at the 1964 conference. 
Three years later, critics of the executive were still 
wondering:
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What happened to the 1963 Committee? It has never 
yet reported to Conference, or to anybody else as 
far as we know (Labor Comment, January/February 
1967 ) .
Realpolitik considerations may explain why the committee was
aborted. Its story has surface similarities to that of the
NOC. The review committee began amidst a panoply of
'rationalistic idealist' promises:
Its investigations should result in 
recommendations which will assist the ALP to 
streamline its electoral organisation and methods, 
and to increase its appeal to sectors of the 
community where we appear to have problems such as 
among young people, new citizens and, to some 
extent, women voters (Bill Hartley, 'DLP Attitude 
Precludes Any Future Reconciliation', Western Sun,
February 1964 ) . 12
The title of Hartley's piece points to some of the realpolitik 
post-mortem agenda; no deal with the DLP and protection of 
Calwell's leadership.
Hartley's patron, Chamberlain (see Jupp, 1983:90) was
defining similar post-mortem parameters in WA. The WA
executive expressed confidence in Calwell on 4 May 1964,
deploring attempts to depose him and to change policies 'to
satisfy the daily press' ('ALP Exec in WA Rejects Liberal Press
13Attacks on Calwell', Tribune, 3 June 1964). Battle lines 
were being drawn. Entrenchments were being fortified.
At the same time, platitudes were as pervasive as
ever in this type of situation. In Tasmania, too, the call
went up to attract youth back into the Labor movement (ALP,
14Tasmanian Branch, 1964:2). Tasmania also called on the 
Federal Conference to consider revising the 'socialisation 
objective', given the obstacles presented by Section 92 of the 
Constitution and judicial interpretations thereof (ALP, 
Tasmanian Branch, 1964:6).^ The local left opposed, but need
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not have worried. Federal Conference did not get around to 
considering the question in this round of 'party reform' 
debate, which focussed more on organisation, leadership and 
policy than on philosophy.
The 1964 SA convention decisively rejected a move to 
add the FPLP leader and deputy leader to Federal Conference and 
Executive ('No Vote for ALP Leaders', Age, 15 June 1964). Don
Dunstan reminded delegates that both leaders had every facility 
to attend such meetings and had done so. Senator Cavanagh 
suggested politicians should be servants of the organisation, 
not masters.
Cavanagh had earlier defended the 'faceless men' who
were:
... the appointed representatives of approximately 
2,500,000 politically enlightened supporters of 
the Australian Labor Party ... (CPD, Vol S25:156).
An investigation of what happened on 30 November 1963 would
be beneficial, although the term post-mortem was unsuitable:
... because the most certain finding of any 
ordinary post-mortem is that the body is dead ...
The Australian Labor Party will never be dead 
while there remains in Australia an under­
privileged class which needs the party for 
protection and to obtain jobs (CPD, Vol S25:151).
The SA Branch was aligned with the left on many 
issues and was fond of 'democratic socialist' rhetoric, but its 
delegates had accepted North West Cape at the Special Federal 
Conference. SA president, Clyde Cameron, was unsympathetic to 
calls for party reorganisation. Mew SA secretary Geoff Virgo 
agreed. Labor:
... should not be stampeded into altering our 
policy or machinery merely to satisfy the dictates
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of the daily press and other anti-Labor factions 
(ALP, SA Branch, 1964:7).
Press advice was tainted, Cameron insisted. Like
industry and the instruments of distribution and exchange, the
'organs of public expression' were controlled by the ruling
class, which feared that a socialist government would strip
monopoly capitalism of its:
... right to ruthlessly exploit the public in the 
way it now does ... the controllers of Big 
Business want to change the policy of the 
Australian Labor Party so that it will become 
nothing but a half-baked Liberal Party. They want 
Australian politics to follow the American 
pattern, where, no matter which party wins,
General Motors, Duponts, Bethlehem Steel and the 
House of Morgan never loses (ALP, SA Branch,
1964 : 2) .
Perhaps this was merely a tonic for the troops. At the same 
convention Calwell was eclectic enough to cite General 
Eisenhower and Harold Wilson as witnesses for the relevance of 
'socialism' in an affluent society (ALP, SA Branch:1964:10)! A 
later SA Labor figure, Neal Blewett (1973b:392-3), suggested 
Calwell postured about socialism for internal/factional 
purposes, but studiously avoided working out a relevant 
socialist strategy. The 'shibboleth of socialism' became a 
'war cry' which invested personal vendettas with a spurious 
ideological disguise (Blewett, 1973b:392-3, see also Jaensch, 
1983:186-7; Murray, 1970:298). Cameron insisted Laborites 
agreed on the objective of a society which placed community 
needs above individual greed, but differed on methods (ALP, SA 
Branch, 1964:3):
Too often we allow the capitalist press to divide 
our ranks by categorising good, loyal Labor 
supporters as either 'right-wingers', 'left­
wingers' or 'Moderates' ... (ALP SA Branch, 1964:2).
This was disingenuous. It understated intra-ALP division.
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Cameron added a strategic dimension that was not
always present in voluntaristic arguments in favour of a Labor
attempt to educate the electorate in the principles of
'democratic socialism'. The party had to judge the extent to
which it would 'allow immediate aims to override ultimate
aims', a problem with 'no simple answer':
Under existing circumstances, it would be 
politically unwise to force a Labor Leader to 
fight an election on a policy to socialise 
monopolies when a Labor Government would have no 
constitutional power to implement such a policy 
(ALP, SA Branch, 1964:3-4).
Cameron called for a constitutional reform campaign, while 
fighting elections on the platform planks that could be 
implemented, constitutionally and financially, within one 
federal term (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:4). He gave priority to 
reforms that put little strain on Treasury resources.
Like others who defended the party's existing 
structure, Cameron preferred external 'explanations' for 
Labor's reverse. Menzies had been able to exploit an 
atmosphere of international uncertainty following the Kennedy 
assassination:
This, coupled with the vicious and the lying DLP 
propaganda ... sowed the seeds of suspicion that 
were to cause a sufficient drift to rob us of a 
well deserved victory (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:4-5). 16
Cameron did not consider the possibility that the existing ALP
structure was inadequate for a long-term 'democratic socialist'
mobilisation. ALP mythology about the impact of the Kennedy
assassination was easily drawn on by defenders of the
organisational status quo. While this mythology tells us a lot
about internal Labor debate, it was misleading. Such instant
'explanations', however popular among political actors and
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commentators, under-estimate voter stability:
Over-emphasising the importance of the events in 
an election campaign is one of the occupational 
hazards of politicians and journalists ... The 
death of President Kennedy towards the end of the 
1963 election was widely thought to have steered 
waverers across to the government parties, a 
provocative thesis for which there is no evidence 
whatsoever (Aitkin, 1967:104).
Calwell's address to the convention echoed
Cameron's comments, particularly on organisational
matters. He praised the SA ALP for securing over 53
percent of the vote (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:10), thus
'giving the lie direct to the "faceless men" propaganda'.
The SA 'machine' included many prominent state and federal
parliamentarians, e.g. Cameron, Dunstan and Senator 
18Toohey. Like Cameron, Calwell suggested Labor 
factionalism was exogenously generated by the press and 
other enemies:
... we need not worry too much about the spurious 
distinctions that our cliche-ridden press and the 
slogan-mongers in the ranks of our political 
enemies say about us. Above all, let us, who 
belong to the Party, never make the grievous 
mistake of couching our own thoughts and opinions 
in the language and slogans of our enemies (ALP,
SA Branch, 1964:11).
This was a carefully coded attack on Whitlam.
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CHAPTER 4
FULL-SCALE INQUIRY : NEW SOUTH WALES
4A Establishing the Inquiry : The Officers' Rationale
The most extensive post-mortem was in NSW. Seven of 
the ten seats lost were in NSW, which was bound to encourage 
reflection in a state where Labor had a solid electoral record 
(see Table 1) . ^
Table 1
Labor Votes and Seats
by State, House of Representatives, 1958-63
Labor Share, 1st Average
Preference Votes Vote Share
(per cent) (per cent)
Labor Seats Total
Seats
1958 1961 1963 1958-63 1958 1961 1963 1958-63
NSW 47.1 52.2 47.6 49.0 22 27(+5) 20(-7) 46
Vic 39.5 41.6 40.4 40.5 10 10 10 33
Qld 37.5 48.1 46.3 44.0 3 1K+8) 8(-3) 18
SA 47.5 52.1 53.2 50.9 6 6 6 11
WA 35.0 40.9 39.2 38.4 1 3( +2) 3 9
Tas 46.8 53.9 52.3 51.0 3 3 3 5
Total 42.8 47.9 45.5 45.4 45 60(+15) 50(-10) 122
L-CP
Total 46.5 42.1 46.0 44.9 77 62 72 122
DLP
Total 9.4 8.7 7.4 8.5 0 0 0 122)
Sources: Labor shares, 1st preference votes; Mackerras,
1975:224. Seats; Mackerras, 1975:233-6. ACT and NT not 
included because their representatives had only limited 
voting rights.
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There were ongoing disputes between NSW and the Federal 
Executive, particularly on 'state aid' and 'unity tickets'.2 
NSW delegates would want to defend their Branch in federal 
arenas. There was considerable suspicion that NSW was still 
influenced by the 'Grouper' mentality, despite the upheaval of 
1955/56. Finding Federal Conference decisions unpalatable, NSW 
'heavies' were predisposed to take attacks on the 'faceless 
men' seriously.
Electoral losses put NSW party managers on the 
defensive, especially since they had been champions of 
electoral pragmatism. Their critics on the left of the labour 
movement had a field day. In the Communist Review, Eric Aarons
(1964:42) gloated that Labor's losses had been greatest in NSW
*
where Labor had antagonised many workers and was surrounded by
the smell of corruption. Waterside Workers' Federation
national secretary, Charlie Fitzgibbon, who was not himself
3aligned with the NSW ALP 'machine', felt it necessary to rebut 
the suggestion that right-wing half-heartedness had contributed 
to Labor's defeat ('Shock Election Result', Maritime Worker, 18 
December 196 3) .^
An extensive post-mortem could help the NSW executive 
in manoeuvres to alter Labor's federal complexion, as well as 
in the separate exercise of maintaining the internal Branch 
status quo. D. Stephens (1979:197ff) lists four consequences 
of the 1963 defeat:
(1) Pressure for organisational reform and reduction in 
federal machine power;
(2) A changed relationship between Calwell and Whitlam;
(3) The NSW Government joined the NSW executive in
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pushing for ’state aid’; and 
(4) Many NSW parliamentarians felt a special bid 
should be made for the Catholic vote.
The issues of ’state aid' and doing something about the 
'faceless men' were difficult to disentangle.5 For internal 
purposes, the NSW executive preferred to concentrate on 
organisational matters.
The NSW post-mortem gave Whitlam an opportunity to 
register his new relationship with Calwell. His controversial 
contribution appeared in the press, causing apoplexy in some 
quarters of the ALP, after the formal inquiry had been 
completed. Whitlam kept his distance from the NSW right, 
although there was some overlap in their positions (see Daly, 
1978 : 162) .
There was a substantial left-wing minority in the NSW
Branch. Les Haylen lost his seat in 1963.^ His post-election
mood was nostalgic and fatalistic. It was futile to explore
what had gone wrong (Haylen, 1969:174-5). Labor's rank-and-
file had gone rotten. 'The slobbering cry for change at the
top' did not address that. The party structure was all right.
You could not have all indians and no chiefs (Haylen, 1969:207).
The 'stupid controversy' about 'faceless men' was 'the most
amusing piece of political gimmickry' he had ever observed.
Delegates to the 6 December 1963 NSW executive
meeting received an officers’ report, which noted:
... the necessity for an examination of all factors 
which contributed to the unfortunate results 
(ALP, NSW Branch, 1964:14)
The officers did not fault the campaign, policy or
organisation; this was partly a justification of their own
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stewardship. The 'rank-and-file' were thanked; it is
difficult to criticise volunteers. Investigation was still
required. They did not want to make:
... any precipitate judgement based on first 
reactions, emotionalism, press statements or 
personal recrimination ... The real cause must be 
found. Where errors of policy, organisation or 
judgement are found they must be admitted and 
rectified.
'Rationalistic idealist' assumptions that 'the cause' of an 
organisation's problems can be dispassionately discerned in 
this way are inherent in this sort of exercise. They involve 
the pretence that official inquiries can proceed oblivious of 
ongoing personal, ideological and factional disputes (inherent 
in a party like the ALP).
The form of post-mortem suggested by the officers was 
accepted by the executive, with only one speaker against. 
Federal Electorate Councils would hold special meetings. Each 
FEC and each candidate would submit a written report to a 
special executive meeting on 21 February 1964.
The dissentient, Federated Ironworkers' Association 
secretary, Laurie Short, suggested awaiting FEC opinion was 
'cowardly' (Alan Reid, 'Labor Men Blamed for Poll Defeat',
Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1963). Labor's enemies would have 
the initiative. The executive's enemies were already 
organising a campaign to blame it for Labor's losses. The 
conflation of Labor's enemies with the executive's enemies is 
interesting. The officers had their own rationale for an FEC- 
based post-mortem. It was expressed by secretary Colbourne.
He, too, feared that forces within the ALP wanted to destroy
7the state government and the NSW executive. Drawing in the 
FECs could help rebuff them.
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The left minority on the executive was happy with the 
post-mortem. The round of FEC meetings would provide 
opportunities for them too. However, before the FEC meetings, 
they wanted to secure official NSW endorsement of Calwell's 
leadership and the prohibition of any deal with the DLP. A 
motion to this end from John Garland (an Amalgamated 
Engineering Union official) and John Heffernan (from the Sheet 
Metal Workers) was acceptable to the rightist majority, at the 
price of expressing confidence in Whitlam as well.
The executive's decision received considerable press 
coverage. The inquiry would be the biggest in NSW Labor 
history ('Searching Labor Inquiry on Poll Ordered', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 7 December 1963). Such accolades were dOUble-
D^edged. Labour movement suspicion of the capitalist press 
could interpret favourable publicity in many ways.
Outside the ALP, but expressing views held in some
parts of it, Communist journalist J.R. Hughes saw the inquiry
as part of an almost conspiratorial offensive against the unity
of the labour movement organised by:
... the big monopoly groups linked with the 
Democratic Labor Party and the National Civic 
Council ... aided by the pseudo-Labor men of the 
extreme right wing within the ALP, particularly in 
NSW ... The link between monopoly groups and right 
wing ALP leaders is not just ideological. There 
is a strong personal physical relationship 
('Monopoly Makes a Grab for the Labor Party',
Tribune, 5 February 1964).
He did not tell his readers exactly who was in bed with whom. 
His thesis was that certain NSW-based monopolies had become 
dissatisfied with Menzies and were casting around for an 
'acceptable' alternative government. In this interpretation, 
the FEC-based inquiry discriminated against affiliated unions:
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Hundreds of thousands of affiliated unionists who 
bear the main brunt of financing the Party are 
deliberately ignored when it comes to seeking 
opinions for Labor's defeat ('Monopoly Makes a 
Grab for the Labor Party', Tribune, 5 February 
1964 ) .
Its union positions and its propaganda sheets gave 
the CPA potential leverage. It took care in analysing trends 
within the ALP (Playford, 1962:192), constantly changing 
tactical emphases and theoretical labels. The NSW executive 
paid much attention to cutting off points of contact between 
ALP members and the CPA.
The Lang Labor Century was even more remote from the 
ALP debate. It regularly fulminated against the NSW Labor 
leadership and dismissed the post-mortem as an attempt by head 
office to divert criticisms of its own shortcomings. Room 32^0 
was instituting an inquisition among the rank-and-file 
('Labor's Inquisition', 13 December 1963). As FECs were not 
confined to self-criticism, this was misleading, although there 
was considerable stage-management by the officers. The nature 
of that stage-management needs to be analysed, rather than 
simply deduced from the officers' oligarchical position or the 
hidden hand of monopoly capital.
In post-mortem rituals, Realpolitik manoeuvres can 
often be discerned, alongside the routine deployment of 
'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric as a kind of liturgical 
language. Century, presumably drawing on Lang's extensive 
Labor 'machine' experience,^ assumed that the ALP could be 
analysed in terms of nothing but oligarchical Realpolitik. 
Maintenance of 'inner group' power was the name of the game.
The post-mortem ritual was futile and ridiculous:
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Now the ALP witch doctors and medicine men of 
magic are about to spend months of voodoo 
incantation of a landslide against Labor. State 
Branches will be inundated with voluminous reports 
containing out-worn cliches and repetitive excuses 
which will resolve nothing except the production 
of a bunch of crocodile tears. The time might as 
well be spent in sticking pins into a rotund 
devil-doll image of Sir Robert Menzies (K.M. Peir,
'A Right Wing Coup Will Smash the ALP', 20 
December 1963). 12
The NSW Labor left was happy with the post-mortem 
format, but wary of the officers. It was disturbed to hear 
some executive members pushing 'pre-conceived ideas' about the 
defeat, particularly the notion that some sort of anti­
communist campaign was needed in the unions, to placate the 
electorate ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, February 1964 ) . The left felt this violated the 
officers' expressed desire to avoid hasty conclusions.
However, 'rationalistic idealist' talk about discovering the 
facts 'without fear or favour' and without any 'heresy hunt' 
(ALP, NSW Branch, 1964:15) did not mean the officers were 
about to abstain from any attempt at agenda-setting. After 
all, the post-mortem was their idea.
The officers thought making the FPLP leader and 
deputy leader ex officio Federal Conference and Executive 
delegates would ease the 'faceless men' problem. An officers' 
memo on 2 December, before the inquiry had been established, 
shows how the exercise was conceived as a party management 
mechanism:
In the light of the current setback, it is 
essential that the Executive retains the 
initiative in all subsequent examination of 
various phases of the campaign (NSW ALP Branch 
Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).
Executive representatives would attend the FEC meetings. They
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would be briefed on the overall campaign and 'classic local 
factors'.
As well as trying to put out some local government 
bush fires,, the executive could use the FEC meetings to 
legitimate criticism of the federal party regime. The memo 
made this clear:
If, as preliminary inquiries reveal, some facets 
of foreign policy, e.g. US/Australian relations, 
were the subject of press distortion, our Federal 
Executive representatives would have had their 
hands strengthened by majority FEC complaints in 
this field.
Perspectives on why the party lost were clearly enmeshed in 
ongoing struggles. The NSW officers now had an opportunity to 
vent their frustration with federal decisions. Attack was a 
good form of defence. Another officers' report referred back 
to the Kingston Hotel Special Conference, suggesting, in a 
retrospective 'if only' mood, that Calwell should have staked
v
his leadership on unanimity. Many voters' doubts could be
blamed on 'the stubborn 17, who resolutely opposed the bas6 on
any grounds'. The NSW Branch had wanted the party to embrace
the ANZUS alliance more wholeheartedly for quite some time. It
was also ambivalent about Calwell's leadership. This report
mentioned that Whitlam was better on television and that
Calwell's comments, during the campaign, on the electoral
13system had been ill-judged. Yet another NSW officers' report
criticised the federal officers for setting themselves up as
14'clay pigeons to be shot down by Alan Reid'. The 2 December 
memo insisted the executive should have its own federal 
reorganisation proposals ready for the 1964 state conference. 
Again, attack could be used as a form of defence:
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The action would avoid dissentient elements 
calling the tune at Conference ... Debate on such 
issues will throw the Left on the defensive and 
prevent them seeking to attack the Executive on an 
organisational basis . . .
4B FECs and Federal Party Reconstruction
The FECs were an interesting battleground for the
officers and their critics. In many ways they were rather
unimportant bodies. At state conference union delegates
predominated and branch representation was through the state,
rather than the federal electorate councils. The SECs were
thus a more direct target for factional politicking (see Jupp,
1964:55 and 219; Cavalier, 1976:55). However, NSW 'rank-and-
file1 preselection methods meant factions had:
... to concentrate their activities at a local level 
far more than they would otherwise (T. Wheelwright, 
1983:31).
Local alignments and arguments surfaced at FEC meetings. The 
state-wide FEC-based post-mortem offers a snapshot of the 
branches. Class, religious and regional factors were linked to 
different factional allegiances in different areas. The out­
group was strong in the provincial cities, Newcastle and 
Wollongong. Labor activism:
... brought with it the possibility of moving 
in and being socialised by a number of party 
milieux ... (Walker, 1976:81; see also Cavalier:
1976 :87, note 11) .
Some FECs could be classed as 'loyalist' executive supporters. 
Others were 'left-wing'. There were also FECs locked in 
factional conflict and others where factional alignments were 
difficult to discern. A 1959 state conference decision to
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replace state-wide 'rank-and-file' Senate preselection ballots
with an electoral college consisting of 45 executive members
(including the officers) and 2 delegates from each of the 46
FECs increased the FECs' importance in the party structure.
The officers could not take the FECs for granted. In the first
ballot under the new preselection system they had been 
16rebuffed. From their perspective, executive/FEC relations 
could do with improvement.
The officers hoped to deflect dissatisfaction onto
the party's federal regime. They called for ex officio
representation of the FPLP leader and deputy leader on the
Federal Executive and at Federal Conference, as well as further
FPLP representation at the latter. 'Loyalist' FECs would
endorse such proposals. One of the first to do so was Cowper
FEC. Cowper was one of the two rural seats Labor had lost to
17the Country Party. Country organiser Don Sullivan
represented the executive at the Cowper FEC meeting.18 Cowper
FECs endorsement of the NSW officers' analysis was given
19considerable publicity. After the Cowper meeting, NSW
officials called for support from SA and possibly even Victoria
for federal reorganisation:
They said the party as a whole was in a receptive 
mood ... 'Let's face it, there is a vacuum to be 
filled and NSW has got to fill it before we get 
some wild schemes from somebody else', one 
official said. 'This will be a challenge to Mr 
Calwell to take the bit between his teeth ... to 
see that the other states play ball' ('Move to Put 
ALP Leaders on Executive', Sydney Morning Herald,
16 December 1963).
Reports from assistant secretary Tony Mulvihill noted 
FEC support for the officers. At Richmond FEC, also rural, 
there was:
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... very constructive discussion ... for several 
hours ... Various theories were expounded and 
unquestionably the federal structure imperfections 
loomed large in delegates' thoughts (NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).
Macquarie FEC agreed that the federal structure 'must be
drastically overhauled'. So did Mitchell FEC, after
20'remarkably temperate' discussion.
What particularly pleased Mulvihill was support for
the officers from beyond the factional faithful. He emphasised
that, at the Richmond meeting, 'even Senator McClelland' was
sympathetic. Indeed he wanted to go further on the question of
FPLP representation. Mulvihill had to remind delegates that:
... since Federal Conference itself had to ratify 
the changes, it would be unwise to become too 
revolutionary in our suggested reforms.
Doug McClelland, at this stage, was an opponent of the dominant
group. He had built up independent personal support,
particularly in country FECs (see T. Wheelwright, 1983:38). A
safe Country Party seat bordering on Queensland, Richmond was a
long way from Room 32. Visits by key party figures were
appreciated. Mulvihill thought Whitlam's Christmas visit was
useful:
... since his views coincided with those of the 
Party Officers for an overhaul of the party 
structure (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/
1016) .
Mulvihill attended the Shortland FEC meeting in Newcastle the 
21next day. In this 'left-wing' stronghold delegates still
22went along with much of the officers' analysis.
The officers' strategy put the left on the defensive. 
In Parkes, where Les Haylen had just lost his seat, the FEC 
began its report by emphasising 'exploitation of the "36
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faceless men" propaganda’. While insisting that Federal 
Executive elections were 'democratic and fair', Parkes FEC
2 3accepted the addition of the FPLP leader and deputy leader. 
'Party modernisation' discourse put the left on the defensive. 
Miriam Dixson (1964:6) noted a widespread belief among Labor 
activists in Parkes:
... that the workers above all 'let them down', 
while the middle class vote stayed more or less 
constant. Typical explanations were: 'All this
overtime', 'Two jobs a man, they've dumped 
Labor principle', 'Mum's working, so the worker 
thinks he'll give the Libs a try'. 24
Cunningham FEC in Wollongong rejected a resolution criticising
the Federal Executive, but was prepared to countenance a review
of the federal structure ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and
Industrial Labor, February 1964).
Neighbouring Hughes FEC, also aligned with the left, 
went a step further. Hughes delegates criticised the party 
managers' failure to defend the 'faceless men', but wanted to 
broaden the Federal Conference by including FEC and federal 
union representatives. This was a more extensive 
reorganisation than the officers had canvassed. Radical 
reconstruction was also endorsed by the right-wing Eden-Monaro 
FEC. In the long-term, it favoured a Federal Conference based 
on FEC delegates (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/ 
1016).25 In the interim, it supported the officers' plan to 
add the FPLP leader and deputy leader and four other FPLP 
representatives to the Conference. Eden-Monaro's aspiration 
for an FEC-based Conference embodied a concern for 'rank-and- 
file' rights but did so ambiguously. This FEC also insisted 
that while Federal Conference should formulate policy, timing 
should be left with the FPLP. 'Party modernisation' discourse
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wrong-footed the left, but was not always embraced
enthusiastically on the right. Eden-Monaro MHR Allan Fraser
(1964:16) was equivocal. He thought the extent of Labor's
debacle had been exaggerated but went:
... along with the critics to the extent that 
Labor urgently faces the need to present a more 
attractive program and image - curse the word - 
to a large section of ordinary people who no 
longer see themselves as oppressed or downtrodden.
There could be important differences between an FEC-
based Conference and one based on FECs and federal unions, but
both Eden-Monaro and Hughes FECs wanted radical Federal
Conference reform. On the policy issues and factional
controversies of the day, they were poles apart. Eden-Monaro
called the FPLP leadership into question, insisted that the ALP
should not accept affiliations or donations from unions which
contributed to Communist Party funds and demanded a 'state aid'
commitment for the 1964 Senate election (NSW ALP Branch
Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). Hughes, on the other hand,
proclaimed that Labor's campaign had paid insufficient
attention to the party's 'socialisation objective', which could
have informed its economic policy (Socialist and Industrial
2 6Labor, February 1964). Hughes delegates explicitly condemned 
the suggestion that the ALP should intervene in union ballots 
to counteract 'unity tickets'.
Factional stances on policy controversies were fairly 
clear-cut. They influenced FEC perceptions of the reasons for 
Labor's defeat. Factional allegiances were not rigidly defined 
at the FEC level on every issue. There were some cross- 
factional alignments on federal reorganisation. The officers 
could win at least qualified support beyond their own group.
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Assistant secretary Mulvihill was a key figure in this
endeavour. Indeed, he was the central figure in the whole 
27post-mortem. In the NSW Branch, a traditional task for the 
assistant general secretary has been to watch over the numbers 
for the ruling faction 'to ensure voting strength at the Annual 
Conference' (Tom Wheelwright, 1983:31). This partly explains 
Mulvihill's role. Given the federal election debacle, the 
ruling faction wanted to pre-empt criticism at the 1964 
conference. Since 1955/56, the reconstituted right in NSW 
devoted much of its energy to fending off challenges from the 
left, but its 'rather uninspired approach ... helped gather 
support for the left' (Murray, 1970:352). The two major 
factions played out:
... institutionalised war-games, openly engaging 
each other in set-piece battles to organise 
votes for a ballot box or on the floor of a 
meeting (Cavalier, 1976:7; see also Tom 
Wheelwright, 1983:56).
These ‘war-games' have a realpolitzk logic of their own.
Murray (1970:287) saw the traumatic struggle in NSW in 1955/56 
as :
... essentially a fairly blatant one for power, 
between 'ins' and 'outs', arising out of obscure 
feuds of minor intrinsic importance.
'-x
We could use such a perspective to explain the post­
mortem and the respective 'in-group' and 'out-group' analyses 
of Labor's woes, the myths they sustained and the grey areas in 
between. Competing myths could be dismissed as simple 
rationalisations. However, some consistency and a degree of 
continuity in the competing factional discourses suggest they 
were based on more than 'obscure feuds of minor intrinsic 
importance'. The debates have to be understood in their own
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terms, before their Realpolitik implications are analysed.
In the cycle of factional conflict, the post-mortem
was, by definition, a one-off, irregular event. It lacked the
focus of a ballot or a Conference agenda. This allowed for the
articulation of a wide range of 'solutions' and 'problems',
that expressed party mythologies. Analysis of the debate can
allow us to excavate such mythologies, which informed competing
factional recommendations. This is not to say that we should
ignore the Realpolitik dimension. The FECs were rather low
down the party hierarchy, but provided a forum for local branch
influentials. Winning such people over might be of some
benefit to the officers, come the next conference. Moreover
the electoral college arrangements for Senate preselections had
caught the officers napping in 1960. The FECs had to be
charmed. Mulvihill himself was a prospective 1964 Senate
candidate, although Century speculated that 'party
reconstruction preoccupations might force him to stay at Room
2 832 ('Haylen for Senate?', 13 December 1964).
4C 'Anti-Communist Blitz' : FECs in Conflict
The officers pursued a quasi-consensus strategy and
focused on organisational questions, but also flew a kite on
the controversial issue of certified ALP candidates in union
ballots. On 19 January 1964, a day when 11 FEC meetings were
due to be held (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016)
it was reported that 'NSW ALP chiefs' were planning an 'all-out
blitz' against Communists in the unions ('Labor Party Versus
29Red Unions', Sunday Mail). This was misleading. At the 
state executive meeting on 31 January, in a special
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presidential minute, Charlie Oliver rebutted 'misleading 
statements' in the press and denied discussing official ALP 
involvement in union ballots with union leaders (ALP, NSW 
Branch, 1964 : 14) .
Many FECs held their special meetings in the second 
half of January, between the press flurry about the 'anti­
communist blitz' and Oliver's clarification. Some of these
meetings were acrimonious. At Farrer FEC according to the
30Sydney Morning Herald:
... a rowdy meeting ... endorsed the NSW ALP 
executive decision to campaign against Communist 
officials in unions affiliated with the 
party ('Campaign Against Communists Gets 
Support', 20 January 1964). 31
This was a reference to reported comments from Oliver rather
*
than any official resolution. Farrer FEC called -on the Party 
to endorse ALP candidates to contest all union positions held 
by Communist Party members.
The Farrer meeting, which was attended by ALP country 
organiser Don Sullivan, got considerable publicity but the 
press seemed confused about what exactly was decided. This 
compounded the confusion on whether the executive had 
officially sponsored an 'anti-Communist blitz'. The ensuing 
picture of the Farrer FEC endorsement of the anti-Communist 
crusade as typical of the post-mortem as a whole (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 20 January 1964) was unfortunate. Farrer FEC 
also passed resolutions supporting the left's concerns such as 
a nuclear-free zone, 'anti-monopoly' economic policies and 
countering the 'faceless men' slander ('Attempt to Hoodwink ALP 
Members', Tribune, 22 January 1964). On the anti-Communist 
crusade, what Farrer FEC endorsed were proposals put forward by
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Sullivan as official recommendations, which also included the 
officers' federal reorganisation plan. Federal reorganisation 
and ALP candidates in union ballots were de-coupled later in 
the inquiry. The anti-Communist crusade was 'hotly contested' 
by some delegates. No wonder the Sydney Morning Herald called 
it 'a rowdy meeting'.
Another rural FEC meeting (Paterson) queried the 
exact status of the union ballot proposals. Executive 
representative Schofield (from the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association):
... tried to move, as an executive proposal, a 
resolution to run ALP candidates in union elections. 
Questioned by the chairman, he admitted that it 
was the view of some members of the executive only 
and his proposal lapsed ('Labor Bodies Rebuff Plan 
of Rightists', Tribune, 12 February 1964). 32
33Paterson -FEC came to no firm conclusions. Disagreement led
to stalemate. In East Sydney, although the left was strong,
debate was inconclusive, although there was concern that:
... the capitalist press was trying desperately 
to push Labor to the right (Socialist and 
Industrial Labor, February 1964 ) .
Press interest in the *FEC meetings was patchy. 
Acrimonious meetings were reported, as were Cowper's early 
'loyalist' recommendations. The most spectacularly acrimonious 
meeting was in St George, a southern Sydney seat lost by Labor. 
Colbourne (the state secretary) and Mulvihill attended as 
executive trouble-shooters. There had been considerable 
factional tensions in the area. The meeting could not come to 
an agreed conclusion (Tribune, 12 February 1964). In the Daily 
Telegraph, Alan Reid, with his keen eye for a good ALP story, 
presented the bitter St George meeting as a microcosm of 
Labor's national plight ('Labor Attitudes Attacked’, 31 January
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1964). Defeated MHR Lionel Clay's criticisms of the Labor left
and the Federal Executive were reported, to the effect that
Labor had to clean up its political stables:
Labor had to rid itself of its Communist associations 
and follow a responsible foreign policy ... It 
also had to remove the impression that its Federal 
Parliamentary leaders were puppets of the 
'faceless men' ...
Reid was no friend of the ALP left, nor the Federal Executive.
This influenced his perception of ALP affairs.
Despite Clay's strong sentiments and an even more
vitriolic attack on the Federal Executive by Rockdale delegate
E. Cunningham, St George FEC was too divided to endorse an
anti-Communist crusade or even agree on federal reorganisation.
Colbourne and Mulvihill went some of the way with Clay's
complaints without completely abandoning their quasi-consensus
strategy. Colbourne suggested that both groups on St George
FEC should send their diagnoses to the executive, without the
meeting endorsing either of them.
The officers hoped to deflect recriminations away
from themselves and the NSW Labor government. Thus their
emphasis on limited federal reconstruction. Local government
problems were another acceptable explanation taken up by some 
34FECs. However it was always on the cards that opponents of 
the NSW 'machine' would use the post-mortem to attack the 
ruling group. Criticisms of the dominant group mainly came 
from FECs where the 'out' faction was strong. There was cross- 
factional discontent about Labor's electoral advertising (co­
ordinated by the Hansen-Rubensohn agency). 'Loyalist' Mitchell 
FEC complained about inept Hansen-Rubensohn material (NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). So did Richmond.
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Mulvihill replied that the officers had no control over Hansen- 
Rubensohn. Eden Monaro called for an inquiry into the agency's 
role. The 'left-wing' Reid FEC, which thought the solid Labor 
voter had been overlooked in an endeavour to win the swing 
vote, argued Labor should rely on its own resources, rather 
than employ publicity firms that did not understand the party 
or its policy ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, February 1964). Parkes FEC linked criticism of Hansen- 
Rubensohn to a generalised attack on the NSW executive for 
allowing a poor public image to be created (NSW ALP Branch 
Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).
Perhaps the cross-factional dissatisfaction with the 
advertising agency reflected widespread branch unease that 
changed campaign techniques diminished the role of local 
activists (see Parker, 1978:101-2; Rawson, 1961:76). Grumbles 
about advertising were easy enough for the officers to contain. 
The Parkes FEC type of argument was not endorsed by a majority 
of FECs. The 'left-wing' Paramatta FEC took another 
unsuccessful tack, suggesting a general reorientation of party 
activity ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, February 1964). Parliamentarians and the Federal 
Secretariat should be deployed in a more propagandist capacity. 
Local branches would have to be reorganised also, becoming more 
familiar with national policy. This 'missionary' perspective 
also failed to win majority FEC support.
Criticism of the state government did not amount to
3 5much more than grumbling. In general, the left-wing FECs 
were quicker to criticise the state government, but there was 
no generalised critique. Protecting Calwell's leadership,
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opposing any talk of rapprochement with the DLP, emphasising 
that the ALP should stay out of internal union matters and 
defending the general role of unions in the party were the main 
themes canvassed by the left.
The officers' quasi-consensus strategy led them to
drop the 'anti-Communist blitz'. However, the arguments of
those who wanted to go beyond quasi-consensus parameters helped
the officers fend off criticism from the left. In reply to
Parkes FEC's charge against St George delegate E. Cunningham
for allegedly attributing Labor's defeat to Les Haylen's
support for Red China, the executive ruled that when it had:
... decided to ask members to express their views 
as to the reasons for Labor's defeat, it was 
expected that many frank expressions of view would 
be forthcoming ... (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 
2083/458/1191, Circular 64/15).
Cunningham's attacks on the Federal Executive and the 
left went well beyond diplomatic niceties. He berated 'an 
extreme ratbag fringe' in the party that would leave Australia 
defenceless (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). He 
dismissed Chamberlain as 'the person largely responsible' for 
the NSW disaster. 'State aid' was an issue taken up by many 
'loyalist' FECs.
Cunningham's attack on Labor's federal regime was 
echoed by ALP Greek Auxilary President E. Andronicus, who urged 
complete dissociation from unions with Communist officials. He 
thought the party should change its name to the Australian 
Democratic Party. The word Labor was 'linked with certain 
Communistic elements' which frightened migrant voters, while 
its connotations of manual work alienated the middle class and 
the young.
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Throughout the inquiry the officers retained the 
initiative. Their stewardship was not effectively challenged. 
Quasi-consensus was effective. Where the left proved 
recalcitrant, the 'anti-Communist blitz' supporters could be 
mobilised.
4D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class' : The Whitlam Line
While the officers deployed 'modernisation' rhetoric 
in support of their federal reconstruction proposals, they did 
not envisage dramatic changes to NSW Labor ways of doing 
things. Contributions from deputy FPLP leader Gough Whitlam 
and defeated North Sydney candidate Maurice Isaacs articulated 
more direct arguments for ALP 'modernisation' and were less 
constrained by diplomatic requirements.
Both Whitlam and Isaacs were highly critical of 
1  f)Calwell. Whitlam (1965a:8) thought Calwell did not speak or 
act as effectively as Menzies. The Labor 'machine' was less 
'self-effacing' and 'discreet' than its Liberal counterpart. 
Isaacs (1964:8) noted that Calwell did not go over well on TV. 
Many supporters would not vote Labor as long as Calwell 
remained leader (Isaacs, 1964:9). Calwell's comments on the 
electoral system 'revealed a streak of irresponsibility'.
Whitlam criticised the general calibre of Labor's 
candidates. This was not a theme that was taken up by the NSW 
officers or the FECs. Whitlam (1965b:8) wanted more policy 
experts in the FPLP:
There was not one trained economist or farmer in the 
New South Wales contingent of 33 in the last 
Federal Parliament.
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He was impatient with 'rank-and-file* parochialism and hoped 
factional criteria for preselection could be replaced with 
technocratic ones. Isaacs also expressed concern about the 
quality of candidates emerging from NSW's 'rank-and-file' 
preselection system. There were 'a lot of uncomplimentary 
remarks' about candidates (Isaacs, 1964:12). Preselection 
methods should be reviewed, if only to confirm their fairness. 
Many candidates did not properly understand Labor's economic 
policy (Isaacs, 1964:9). Foreign affairs and defence matters 
were poorly understood.
Whitlam and Isaacs thought party reform was 
necessary to attract 'white collar' voters, but prescribed 
different remedies. Whitlam emphasised Federal Conference 
reform and giving a higher profile to the FPLP. He had
37advocated 'de-federalisation' of the party for a long time. 
There was a tension between his argument that Federal 
Conference problems stemmed from party federalism and the 
influence of state Branch officials (a point which was only 
implicit in his report; he did observe some diplomatic 
niceties) and seeing the real problem as the low profile of 
the FPLP (which was not inherent in intra-party federalism). 
His general Conference reform proposals were fairly wide- 
ranging. Federal Conference should meet annually and be 
open to the press. As a general principle, delegates 
should comprise FEC and federal union representatives and 
endorsed federal candidates (Whitlam, 1965b:9). He did 
not go into the specifics of a new Conference format. It 
is not clear how seriously Whitlam was pursuing such 
radical Conference reform. Perhaps the rhetoric had more 
to do with setting the stage for more limited changes,
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particularly pertaining to increasing the federal
3 8parliamentarians' profile in the party. The latter 
theme runs through the whole document. Upgrading the FPLP 
would avoid the 'faceless men' problem. The FPLP leader 
and deputy leader should be ex officio Federal Conference 
and Executive delegates (Whitlam, 1965b:10). Here Whitlam's 
analysis intersected with the NSW officers' campaign.
Isaacs (1964:13) also worried about the gaps 
between a Laborist party and an increasingly 'middle class' 
electorate. He wanted:
... a shift of emphasis within the ALP from complete 
Trade Union domination so as to allow a white 
collar identification.
He wanted to upgrade the branches within the ALP (Isaacs,
1964:14). Labor should present a more intellectually coherent
image. In a spirit of continuous campaigning branches could
organise 'non-political' public lectures. A quarterly review
could be established to examine world events and local issues
in the light of Labor philosophy. Despite his call for a
concerted effort to build up Labor branches, Isaacs did not
argue for FEC delegates at Federal Conference. The 'faceless
men' tag did not worry him, although he did casually suggest
that Labor's shadow cabinet should be ex officio Federal
39Executive members (Isaacs, 1964:10).
To encourage increased Labor ideological self-
awareness and to meet increasing electoral demand for more
intellectually coherent parties, Isaacs (1964:14) proposed:
... that in addition to the usual form of Annual 
Conference, the ALP should hold every 3 years an 
ideological conference so that as a great mass 
movement it should continue its programme, policy 
and platform in the light of existing conditions ...
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Such a conference could examine the 'socialisation objective'.
Calwell would hardly have been surprised. Isaacs was reaching
4 0out to the 'middle-class intellectuals'. Adaptation to the 
'middle-classing' of the electorate in terms of policy and 
organisation (including candidates and union links) were often 
mentioned in the same breath as the suggestion that Labor 
should revise or abandon the objective. 'Modernisation' 
arguments were often rhetorically dismissed as 'right-wing' 
plans to turn the ALP into an 'alternative Liberal Party' but 
'modernisation' proposals can be dis-aggregated in different 
ways .
Whitlam and Isaacs raised some important strategic 
questions. The apparent incompatibilities in their analyses 
can be reconciled. Federal Conference reform could cater for 
Isaacs' concerns - attracting the 'white•collars' and • 
intellectuals to revitalise the branches, making policy 
formulation and presentation more sophisticated. Whitlam's 
proposal for annual conferences could have allowed for 
occasional special ideological conferences. Isaacs' 
suggestion, triennial ideological conferences alongside 
biennial ordinary ones, was unwieldy. His general emphasis on 
intellectual and 'grass-roots' ALP renewal was important, not 
only in terms of electoral arithmetic in a 'middle-classing' 
Australia, but also in terms of enhancing the party's capacity 
as a vehicle for progressive social change. Ironically, it 
applied the concern, often expressed by Whitlam, for Labor 
intellectual renovation to party organisation issues more 
thoroughly than Whitlam's own proposals. Whitlam seems to have 
thought that more intellectuals, particularly 'trained
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economists', in Caucus, or at least as parliamentary 
candidates, was enough, although his Conference reform ideas 
were potentially quite far-reaching.
Whitlam's project of 'wooing the white collars'
included a reappraisal of Labor's union links. He thought the
ALP should distance itself from the 'labour movement' and
appeal directly to the growing ranks of non-unionist citizens
on the issues of the day (Whitlam, 1965b:10). He did not
foresee the growth of white-collar unionism. Nor did Isaacs
(1964:13) who suggested that:
... except on the broad basis of humanity there is 
very little in common between the white collar 
worker and the trade unionist within the framework 
of the Labor Party. The distrust of the trade 
unionist levelled towards the intellectual is 
symptomatic of the gulf that exists between these 
two groups.
The party officers in NSW went along with some of the
'modernisation' talk, but given their faction's reliance on
affiliated union support they did not question the
appropriateness of the party's union links in a 'middle-
classing' society. The general issues raised by Whitlam and
Isaacs posed some dilemmas for the party managers, even though
neither was arguing for wholesale dis-affiliation or anything
like that. On the other hand, Whitlam's (1965b:10) antagonism
to 'unity tickets' and his worries about 'political subversion'
in some unions were shared by the officers. Whitlam did not
mention 'unity tickets' specifically but suggested unions could
show more 'loyalty' to the Party:
... by refraining from producing pamphlets and 
conducting campaigns on their own account. Many 
parliamentarians could show more loyalty to trade 
unions by consulting with union officials rather 
than area and job committees. 41
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On some immediate internal realpolitik issues, the 
new professional middle-class constituency offered support to 
the NSW officers. The alliance was tenuous. Much of the 
critique of traditional Laborism could be extended to the 
internal arrangements of the NSW Branch. The critique found no 
substantial bloc of support within the Branch. This 
accentuated its advocates' tendencies to 'rationalistic 
idealism'. Isaacs (1964:14) wanted re-examination of Labor 
strategy to be carried out in 'a spirit of critical detachment' 
rather than 'with the preconceived purpose of justifying the 
present set-up'. Such hopes are frequently generated by post­
mortem debates and just as often inadequately fulfilled. 'A 
spirit of critical detachment' was difficult to find. 
Organisational debates become enmeshed in ongoing intra-party 
conflicts. Whitlam's and Isaacs' constituency was not as 
disinterested as they made out. Party managers were willing to 
sponsor wide-ranging post-mortems to improve morale and for 
other reasons. Institutionalising organisational self- 
examination, however, might open a Pandora's Box and cause 
electoral damage. Party officials establishing post-mortems 
are partly motivated by the fact that continued tenure of their 
positions requires them to give the conference delegates who 
elect them (and more broadly the party membership as a whole) 
an adequate account of their stewardship. Thus such inquiries 
will be influenced by 'the preconceived purpose of justifying 
the present set-up'. Certainly this seems to have been the 
case with the NSW ALP in 1963-64. Of course, intention and 
outcome do not always correlate.
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Whitlam's document received considerable publicity.
His criticisms of Calwell were particularly newsworthy (see
4 2Rawson, 1964a:228). It was leaked in April, after the post­
mortem was officially completed. The Sydney Morning Herald 
hailed it as a courageous attempt to free the ALP from its 
shibboleths ('Bold Call for a Modern Labor Party', 15 April
1964 ) . FEC representations at Federal Conference was
4 3'elementary common sense'. Press enthusiasm for the Whitlam 
report stemmed from a belief that it accepted the 'adapt' or 
'perish' post-election editorial chorus.
Within the party, some argued that Whitlam's report 
had been leaked to embarass him ('Whitlam's Report Months Old', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 1964). Commenting on the 
discrepancies between the Whitlam line and the official post­
mortem summary, one member of the left-wing minority on the NSW 
executive commented:
The officers' summary embodied the points of 
criticism which appeared most frequently in the 
reports. If some of Mr Whitlam's points did not 
appear in the summary I assume it was because very 
few of the other reports contained these points.
Obviously there was no general rubbishing of Mr 
CalWell in the reports (quoted, 'Victimisation of 
Whitlam Opposed', Sydnev Morning Herald, 18 April 
1964 ) .
Whitlam had his agenda. The NSW officers had theirs. Short­
term considerations produced an uneasy alliance.
Ill
CHAPTER 5
NEW SOUTH WALES INQUIRY : REPORT AND REPERCUSSIONS
5A Drawing the Threads Together : Official Report
The NSW executive had promised to consider all
contributions carefully, but some dovetailed more closely with
the officers' agenda than others. The special executive
meeting, on 21 February 1964, proved contentious. After three
hours of debate, there was no statement for the press ('State
ALP Report Puts Blame on Federal Officers', Sydney Morning
Herald, 22 February 1964).^ Nevertheless, journalists quickly
pieced together what had transpired. The officers' arguments
2were accepted. The officers agreed that many factors 
contributed to Labor's defeat. 'No good purpose' was served by 
blaming 'any one particular cause, person or persons' (ALP, NSW 
Branch, 1964:14).
The meeting officially endorsed thirteen 
recommendations, which largely followed the officers' quasi­
consensus strategy. The officers backed down on their initial 
diagnosis, eschewed policy controversies and attempted to 
answer some FEC complaints. Alan Reid saw the recommendations 
as an attempt to avoid repetition of Hotel Kingston incidents 
('ALP Evading Issues that Lost Election', Daily Telegraph, 22 
February 1964). This was clear in the first of four sections 
into which the recommendations can be classified. Recommend­
ations 1-3 dealt with federal reorganisation. The suggestion 
that the FPLP leader and deputy leader should be ex officio 
additions to Federal Conference and Executive (Recommend­
ation 2), had been widely canvassed by the officers at
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the FEC meetings.3 They had also pushed for four further FPLP 
Federal Conference delegates, and had this endorsed by some 
FECs. Recommendation 3 simply settled for further 
consideration of Conference reform. The left was generally 
happy with the extant Conference format, although some left- 
wing FECs were willing to consider new formulae. On the other 
hand, some FECs, such as Farrer and Parkes, accepted an ex 
officio role for the leader and deputy leader, without 
considering further Conference reform. The issue would be 
fought out at the state conference in June.
Recommendations 4-5 and 7-8 shared a concern with 
centralising ALP communication with the electorate and raising 
the profile of the FPLP leader. The suggestion that Calwell 
screen parliamentary questions was seen as 'a move against 
left-wingers' to prevent them raising issues such as North-West 
Cape and Cuba (Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1964).
Binding all to party policy had similar disciplinary intent.
The move to make the new federal secretary, Cyril Wyndham, sole 
authorised spokesman on Federal Conference and Executive 
decisions was seen as a pre-emptive strike, should Chamberlain 
take up the federal presidency. In line with the general NSW 
executive push for a higher FPLP profile, Calwell was suggested 
as the only person entitled to present policy decisions, 
subsequent to those made by Federal Conference and Executive. 
This set of proposals had not surfaced in the FEC debates. The 
officers expected more sympathy from the FPLP than from the 
Federal Executive. There was also Whitlam's argument that the 
FPLP was best placed to put Labor's views to the public. It 
was ironic that the NSW 'machine controllers' argued for a
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higher FPLP profile, while telling the FPLP how to approach 
question time.
Recommendations 9-11 answered questions which 
embarrassed the executive at FEC meetings. Recommendation 9 
suggested advertising should be a responsibility of the federal 
secretary. This would insulate state officials from branch 
resentment. Recommendation 10 conceded the ineptness of 
Labor's television advertising. Recommendation 11 exonerated 
the state government.
Recommendations 6, 12 and 13 addressed more general 
points about the need for party 'modernisation'. Recommend­
ation 6 asked for a Federal Executive review, to bring the 
party platform 'more into line with changing methods of the 
Scientific Age'. At least rhetorically, this embraced 
Whitlam's 'technocratic Laborist' concerns. The final two 
recommendations targeted young people and white collar 
organisations for particular attention.
The omissions were as interesting as the content.
If young people and white collar organisations were targeted, 
women and migrants were not. Local government problems were 
not addressed. Nor (predictably) was the calibre of 
candidates. For the particular purposes of the post-mortem, 
the officers sought lowest common denominator positions on the 
major issues in that they attempted political management by 
platitude. The recommendations on centralising communication 
with the public were more pointed, although they were presented 
circumspectly. Calwell's leadership was another issue that 
failed to surface. Partly it had been pre-empted by the 
earlier executive resolution, but in any case it was too
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sensitive a topic for a report such as this.
In view of the way the 'anti-Communist blitz' kite 
was flown during the inquiry, the most interesting example of 
the officers' quasi-consensus strategy was their unwillingness 
to focus on the 'unity ticket' issue in the final report. They 
were pursuing it in other arenas.
Political management by platitude it may have been, 
but this was still a three-hour meeting, described by Colbourne 
as 'lively' ('Power Demand for Calwell : Reform Sought in ALP 
Control', Canberra Times, 22 February 1964). The left 
delegates were equivocal on Federal Conference reform. Garland 
warned that Labor should not be stampeded into change by 
criticisms of the 'faceless men' (Daily Telegraph, 22 February 
1964). Heffernan floated the idea of adding union delegates to
4Federal Conference.
The left was happy to have discussion opened up at 
FEC level, but had feared an executive attempt to ram through 
an 'anti-Communist crusade'. Socialist and Industrial Labor 
complained that the establishment of the inquiry gave the press 
a signal:
... to publish articles and 'news items' which 
tendered certain advice to ALP Branch members and 
delegates to the Federal Electorate Councils 
('Post Mortem - Right Wing Rebuffed - Federal 
Election Analysis', March 1964). 5
Such advice included changing the leader, changing foreign
policy and attacking Federal Conference delegates. In turn,
Labor's 'extreme right' took up these signals and amplified
them. Then Alan Reid further amplified the attack on the left.
All this was too much of a coincidence for Socialist and
Industrial Labor. It saw the 'anti-Communist blitz' as part of
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a 'newspaper monopolies campaign', which failed because the
FECs were not taken in. A survey of mainly left-wing FEC
reports showed the rank-and-file were:
... not prepared to jettison Labor's policy to suit 
the Fairfax family of the Sydney Morning Herald 
or Packer for the Telegraph ('Election Post-Mortems', 
Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964).
A general FEC theme was that there was 'not enough difference
between the ALP and the Liberal Party'.
The officers had to take account of a significant 
bloc of left-wing opinion at FEC level. The Tribune analysis 
of the post-mortem also pictured a 'newspaper monopolies 
campaign' being rebuffed by the FECs, despite support at high 
levels of the NSW ALP:
Proposals to interfere in trade unions, raise the 
anti-Communist chorus and adopt reactionary policies 
as a prelude to opening relations with the National 
Civic Council and the Democratic Labor Party, have 
been resoundingly rejected. (J.R. Hughes, 'ALP 
Electorate Councils ... Reject Moves to the Right',
4 March 1964 ) .
After initially criticising the exclusion of affiliated unions 
from the post-mortem, the CPA now saw the FEC reports as the 
embodiment of progressive Labor aspirations. Tribune went on 
to complain that:
... the positive proposals which flooded the 
executive were largely covered up and were not 
included in the final thirteen points. 6
W.J. Brown (1964:101-2) in Communist Review noted 
that the ALP right had suffered a series of setbacks in the 
wake of the election defeat. The 'Oliver-Colbourne clique' 
failed.
... to get away with the crude lie that 'Communists 
were to blame' for the Federal election defeat.
The 'rank-and-file' rebuffed them:
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The State Executive has finally had to table 13 
points on Labor's election defeat which, to the 
concern of the capitalist press, do not give anti­
communism a mention (Brown, 1964:102).
The 'rank-and-file' blamed Labor's losses on the party's
'failure to fight on a progressive policy'. Commentators
tended to simplify and inappropriately homogenise the FEC
reports. Alan Reid (Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1964) was as
guilty on this score, albeit from a different perspective, as
W.J. Brown. Reid thought the FECs had a more realistic
appraisal of Labor's problems than the NSW executive:
By failing to mention Communism, Foreign Affairs 
and Defence, the Executive has by implication 
rejected the proposition stated almost without 
exception by the FECs that these were the major 
issues that decided the last Federal elections.
Some 'loyalist' FECs accepted this line of argument. It did
not receive endorsement 'almost without exception'. Garbled
reports, however, had considerable influence on perceptions of
the post-mortem, not least in other ALP Branches.
5B State Conference : Another Arena
The recommendations were referred to state 
conference. They were unlikely to be defeated there. The 
various issues considered in the inquiry were likely to 
reappear in the state conference arena. From there, they could 
go to the federal bodies. State conference supported the FPLP 
leader and deputy leader being added to Federal Conference and 
Executive, alongside three further FPLP representatives to 
Federal Conference ('Gains in Labor Ballots by Right Wing', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1964). The long-standing ban on 
parliamentarians as NSW Federal Conference delegates was
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repealed, as Whitlam had advocated." Conference also decided 
that NSW should seek a rule change preventing federal
ginvolvement in purely state affairs.
After being dropped in the post-mortem, the proposal 
to certify ALP candidates in union ballots was resuscitated in 
the more manageable conference arena. It was passed by 391 
votes to 218 in a very bitter debate (Alan Reid, 'Bitter Debate 
at ALP Conference', Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1964). Punches
9were thrown on the Conference floor. Charlie Oliver warned 
interj ectors:
You are in the Labor Party now but the moment 
you give evidence that you are in the Communist 
Party you will be put out of this show (quoted,
'Stop Comms Plan Starts Row in Labor: NSW Party 
Move', Courier-Mail, 16 June 1964).
From the left, Heffernan claimed the officers' recommendation
breached federal policy, but his point of order was dismissed
(Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1964).^
The officers were more aggressive in the conference
than they had been during the post-mortem. The rationale
underlying their re-combined plan for federal reorganisation
and an 'anti-Communist blitz', or at least what rhetoric could
make of that rationale, was presented in Oliver's presidential
address. He began by praising the state government's record of
pro-worker legislation (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss
2083/459/1191). Then he referred back to the post-mortem. The
'unexpected' defeat in November 1963 was:
... the severest blow the party has suffered for 
many years. Many and varied are the reasons 
advanced for this defeat. The State Executive, 
when seeking the cause, invited all sections of 
the Party to give their reasons.
The 'great debate' was over. It had revitalised the party 'as
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a thinking force in Australian politics'. There was much 
repetition in the reports the executive received which, after 
careful analysis, provided valuable criticisms of party
I
organisation. Oliver was using the post-mortem exercise to 
legitimate the party reform programme he favoured, which 
included some sort of 'anti-Communist blitz'. He dismissed 
attempts, especially by the Daily Telegraph to split the party 
by selective quotation from individual FEC reports.
Oliver linked the 'faceless men' problem to the 
dispute between NSW and the Federal Executive on 'state aid'. 
Labor parliamentarians should have more autonomy. Conference 
resolutions, in this view, were no more than expressions of 
opinion. It was ironic to hear Oliver complaining about 'rigid 
control' and people in the Labor Party seeking to control and 
dominate through the machine. He was no slouch himself when it 
came to machine manoeuvring. However his minority position on 
the Federal Executive made it easier for him to complain about 
'dictatorship' (see D. Stephens, 1979:17). He was a skilful 
negotiator with:
... a bluff, direct manner and a disinclination to 
decentralise power. Moreover, he saw the main 
purpose of politics as winning benefits for one's 
members and supporters through Labor governments 
(D. Stephens, 1979:16).
Perhaps it was this emphasis on winning government that led 
Oliver to endorse Whitlam's analysis.^ The enthusiasm of the 
AWU boss and 'White Australia' champion for the Whitlam line 
poses some problems for the 'technocratic Labor' thesis.
Oliver was at least as 'paleo-Laborist' as Calwell.
Oliver shared Whitlam's worries about the 'political 
subversion' of some unions (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss
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2083/459/119 ). Opponents profited from allegations about
ALP/Communist links. Oliver stressed the general benefits of
union affiliation to the ALP and parliamentary representation
to the unions. Oliver deployed Whitlam's 'modernisation'
rhetoric. 'A steady process of upgrading of the labour
force' had made Australian society 'less and less working class 
12in outlook'. Industrial mechanisation and scientific advance 
meant more and more workers were acquiring a 'middle-class 
outlook':
It is natural for people to want a higher standing 
in the social scale, and as a consequence the 
traditional basis of the Labor Party is being 
steadily eroded.
Politics in a 'full employment' society was more marginal to 
people's lives than in societies where workers had yet to win 
effective social citizenship. Social, economic and 
psychological changes had created the marginal or swinging 
voter:
This vote is always in the centre, it is for this 
vote that all political parties are competing.
Labor would have to jettison some traditional assumptions to
compete effectively in this environment:
We have always worked on the theory perhaps 
subconsciously that the working class would be 
subject to more and more exploitation and 
degradation. This theory is being proved 
increasingly false.
Oliver concluded by emphasising the nexus between winning
government, in his eyes the party's raison d'etre, and
modernisation. Labor's biggest enemy was inflexibility and
13obstinacy against change.
Emphasising the importance of Labor being in 
government and attacking 'unity tickets' were old Oliver
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themes. He had also called on the ALP to adapt to changes in 
the electorate before the November 1963 debacle. His 1964 
presidential address, although foreshadowed by earlier 
speeches, was, with its specific endorsement of Whitlam's 
analysis, more focussed in its deployment of 'modernisation' 
rhetoric. Sociologism is not only an academic foible. It can 
underpin political discourses. It was probably because of its 
'modernisation' talk that Oliver's address was so well received 
in the press, where much critical commentary on the ALP was 
imbued with similar presuppositions. Thus Alan Reid welcomed 
Oliver's speech ('ALP told to Accept Prosperity : Blunt Talk by 
Chief', Sunday Telegraph, 14 June 1964). Although 'in some 
ways a statement of the obvious', it was 'almost revolutionary 
in the ALP context'. The West Australian was quick to draw an 
anti-left moral from Oliver's 'social change' story ('Reforming 
Voice in NSW', 16 June 1964). The Sydney Morning Herald 
welcomed NSW Labor's 'new realism', although NSW had its own 
'faceless men' ('The "Image" of the Labor Party', 16 June 
1964 ) .
The state conference decisions were clearly related
to the earlier post-mortem, although they were differently
constituted arenas with different parameters of debate and
decision. Some press commentary relating the conference to the
inquiry was quite misleading. Press discussion of 'ALP
modernisation' often involved a fair degree of barrow-pushing.
Thus the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that despite the
results of investigations into Labor's defeat:
... party controllers were determined not to 
interfere with trade union control of the 
machine (15 June 1964).
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Readers were solemnly told that the investigations found the 
controlling influence of unions, some Communist-controlled, as 
the source of Labor's woes! Whatever these 'investigations' 
referred to, it was not the NSW post-mortem. Some of the Labor 
'modernisation' favoured by Sydney Morning Herald editorialists 
was taken up in that post-mortem, but the principle of union 
affiliation remained unchallenged.
5C 'Morbid Self-Analysis' Rejected : Western Australia 
and Victoria
The WA Branch's own post-mortem seems to have been 
primarily designed as a riposte to the NSW inquiry 
(particularly press versions of the latter). Little was heard 
about the WA post-mortem until just before the August 1964 
Federal Executive meeting, due to consider NSW proposals about 
federal reorganisation and certified ALP union candidates. 
Chamberlain strongly opposed both proposals, which he saw as a 
smokescreen for ALP/DLP rapprochement. This line of argument 
was also favoured in Victoria where party reform was branded as 
'crypto-DLP' in its logic.
The WA executive had appointed a committee of five to
consider comment from branches and affiliates (Alan Reid,
'Secret Report Blasts NSW Labor', Sunday Telegraph, 2 August 
151964). The committee fretted about the dangers of election 
post-mortems. It feared recommendations which could further 
damage the party. The WA committee conflated the NSW post­
mortem and the NSW conference decisions. The latter were 
'blasted mercilessly' in the WA report. Reid concluded that 
WA's 'thumbs down' meant the NSW proposals could not succeed.
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Victoria and Queensland usually followed Chamberlain’s lead.
SA had already expressed its opposition.
The tone of the WA report was vintage authoritative 
Chamberlain. There was 'an abundance of factual material' to 
refute NSW suggestions that Communist union activity 
contributed to Labor's defeat and that the Party's federal 
structure had to be reorganised. Communist union influence 
must have been a NSW matter. NSW had 'no authority* to speak 
for other states. As to 'faceless men', the WA line was that 
parliamentarians had plenty of opportunities to contribute to 
policy formulation (e.g. through policy committees). NSW 
arguments implied that 'the nonsense published in the Press as 
a political gimmick' was in fact correct.
'Irrational attitudes', sometimes 'bordering on 
hysteria', developed after electoral setbacks. The atmosphere 
was 'anything but conducive to reaching sound conclusions'. 
Thus post-mortems were 'highly suspect'. The loss of seven 
seats in NSW 'was undoubtedly responsible for the post-mortem 
stampede'.^
An internal WA dispute earlier that year revealed
Chamberlain's suspicion of Whitlam and the NSW Branch. A WA
executive member laid a charge against his secretaryship
i(Hughes, 1964a:90). His unsuccessful critic, Mrs Betty
Smith, resigned from the party, complaining that Chamberlain
had accused her of being:
... motivated by malice and ... acting under the 
instruction of the NSW Branch in conjunction with 
Mr Whitlam ...
An editorial in Chamberlain's WA ALP Western Sun concluded:
The Party would appear to be more than unfortunate 
in its membership ... People should only be
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encouraged to join the ALP when they understand 
the privileges and responsibilities of 
membership ('The "Smiths" of the ALP, May 1964).
This stress on the privileges and responsibilities of ALP
membership illustrated Chamberlain's equivocal attitude towards
the 'rank-and-file'.
He veered between idealisations of the 'rank-and-
file' as the fount of all Labor wisdom and stern edicts that
they should fall in line behind their duly constituted
organisational leaders. One scholar argues that Chamberlain:
... expressed the inchoate feelings of a section 
of the party which sought a principled, even 
moralistic approach to politics which saw the 
Labor platform as a citadel to be defended and 
from which to launch attacks against exploitative 
capitalism (D. Stephens, 1979:14).
He contrasts such 'exclusivism' which 'tends towards the
protection of a citadel of immutable precepts', with an
'inclusivist' tendency to walk in 'the market place of ideas',
absorbing 'myriad influences' (D. Stephens, 1979:34).
Looking at the 1960s debates, Stephens' dichotomy 
seems to overlap with Overacker's (1968:40-3) distinction 
between traditionalists and modernists. The traditionalists 
were 'exclusive'. The modernists, by definition, shopped in 
the supermarket and were not afraid to take ideas from the 
shelf called 'the capitalist press'. However, this would be to 
oversimplify. The 'exclusive'/'inclusive' dichotomy is endemic 
in the ALP (D. Stephens, 1979:35). Exclusivist ideology could 
go hand in hand with inclusivist practice and vice versa (D. 
Stephens, 1979:34). Instead of talking about 'exclusivism' and 
'inclusivism' or 'traditionalism' and 'modernism', Houseman 
(1971:2-3) notes a contrast between 'movement' and 'electoral
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machine' conceptions of the ALP:
Perhaps the best way to describe these 
conflicting, but often strangely complimentary, 
outlooks is to say that one of them rests upon the 
conception of the party as an electoral machine, 
aimed principally at winning government and 
carrying out modest reforms, while the other 
regards the party as the basis of a broad social 
movement aimed at more far reaching changes in the 
social and political system.
He added that many in the ALP might see it as a movement at one 
time, and an election machine at another time. As well as 
being a movement and an electoral machine, the ALP should also 
be seen as constituting a self-sufficient political system in 
constant conflict.
Chamberlain often seemed to be the major advocate of 
the conception of the ALP as a 'movement'. Such advocacy, of 
course, also played its part in internal battles for party 
control. The rhetorical currency of this advocacy embodied a 
'rank-and-filist' mythology, which saw the platform welling up 
from the party's grass-roots. In this vein, Chamberlain 
(1964:16-7) told delegates to the 1957 Federal Conference that, 
although many agenda items represented considered state . 
executive views, the propositions had their origin in numerous 
small branches of the party. As in the early days of the Labor 
Movement:
... the humblest member of the humblest branch can, 
within the constitutional procedures laid down by 
gatherings such as this ... provide the original 
thought that may find its way on to the Statutes 
of our national Parliament.
At other times, Chamberlain insisted that if party 
leaders did not agree, the 'rank-and-file' would be confused. 
Therefore the organisational and parliamentary leadership 
(particularly the former) had to protect procedures and
125
principles. Back in 1950, during the intra-ALP debate on the
appropriate response to Menzies' legislation outlawing the
Communist Party, Chamberlain (1964:3) argued:
If leaders of the Party cannot agree as to what 
should be Labor's policy in respect to such a 
vital issue, then hopeless confusion will 
develop in the minds of the rank-and-file. 17
This top-down realpolitik view of party organisation was a more
accurate guide to Chamberlain's practice than the 'rank-and-
file' sentimentalism that could be trotted out on suitable
occasions. In intra-party matters, Chamberlain was renowned
for what critics called 'rule-book authoritarianism'. He
stressed connections between party discipline and party
democracy (Chamberlain, 1964:51-2); connections that were
distorted and misrepresented by the press to put the party in a
bad light:
The Parliamentary democracy of Australia does not 
permit anarchy. Neither do the rules of the 
Australian Labor Party. No citizen of the 
community can flout the law and flout immunity.
Neither can a member of the Australian Labor 
Party, pledged to support the cardinal principle 
of majority rule, flout the decisions of the 
Australian Labor Party and not expect to be dealt 
with accordingly. 18
Thus Chamberlain (1964:53-4) dismissed Federal Conference
reform. Conference enlargement was too expensive. The
propaganda about so-called 'faceless men' was an 'outstanding
political gimmick'. The press were really concerned with
fitting ALP policy into 'the conservative thinking and
interests of the people it represents' (Chamberlain,
191964 :54) .
For Chamberlain, party introspection and tinkering 
with the federal structure were an unwarranted over-reaction to 
electoral defeat and, worse, a surrender to the party's
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enemies. The WA committee devoted most of its energy to 
rebutting Whitlam and NSW arguments for 'modernisation'.20 
These arguments were also poorly received at the Victorian 
Conference. Party president R.W. Holt attacked the whole NSW 
exercise ('Victorian Labor Leader Attacks NSW Reports', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 25 July 1964). Labor's reputation had been 
impugned:
... by 'public and morbid self-analysis and 
introspection whereby we weep through the press 
to analyse our faults'.
Publicly airing intra-party grievances was 'disloyal and 
unworthy'. Holt conceded some case for Federal Conference 
enlargement, as long as there was no privilege for 
parliamentarians.^
5D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class' : The Victorian 
Debate
The 1964 Victorian conference was notable for the
'Jordan ticket' challenge to the ruling executive. Earlier in
the year Jordan had defeated the candidate favoured by the
Victorian ALP executive for the Melbourne Trades Hall Council
secretaryship. Afterwards he found himself suspended from the
ALP. The 'Jordan ticket' linked his craft union supporters
with an emerging grouping of predominantly 'middle-class'
branch members, unhappy with the authoritarianism of the
dominant mainly union-based left faction ('Moderates Set Out
- 22New Labor Plan', Age, 23 July 1964). The Victorian version 
of the sort of 'middle-class modernisation' project articulated 
by Whitlam and Isaacs in NSW had a more pointed political 
purpose and more direct factional implications.
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The press welcomed the 'Jordan ticket'. An Age
editorial praised its programme of keeping the ALP free of
Communist associations, giving more say to the branches and
general organisational modernisation ('Time for a Change in the
2 3ALP, 10 July 1964). The rebel group's 'new Labor' plan was
imbued with 'modernisation' rhetoric:
The ALP should use all available modern skills 
and knowledge in its traditional pursuit of 
social justice and freedom. We believe that 
there is a tremendous reservoir of untapped 
skill and ability within the membership of 
the party. (Age, 23 July 1964)
This would have to be drawn on if Labor was to take up
challenges such as 'technological change' and 'living with
Asia'. Anticipating the sort of opposition they would meet,
the rebels took the precaution of categorically repudiating
any deal with the DLP.
The challenge was crushed fairly easily. In a 
surprise move, Calwell took a place on the 'official' ticket.
So did Cairns:
... but the election of Calwell and Cairns did 
nothing to make the VCE more representative, in that 
neither represented a significant body of Party 
opinion likely to support changes in the way the 
Victorian Party operated (Allan, 1980:133).
The executive did concede a change in its own structure to 
allow for three electorate council representatives. Holt had 
been involved in attempts at a compromise between the ruling 
group and the insurgents ('Labor Heads for Major Showdown', 
Australian, 16 July 1964). His address conceded the case for 
some 'modernisation'. In an era of technological change 
(automation, improved communication and transport), the 
executive could be 'better informed' and more broadly repres­
entative ('Let's Keep it to Ourselves', Fact, 6 August 1964):
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The economist, the social worker, and the 
educationist could help the Party.
He warned that some of the challengers would be prepared to
come to terms with DLP policies and ideas, while denouncing the 
24DLP.
Calwell also suggested the moderate ticket wanted
reconciliation with the DLP (Robert Murray, 'Calwell Has His
Party Warned', Australian, 23 July 1964). The official
Victorian ALP paper described his speech as 'eagerly
anticipated and brilliant', sparking 'the most enthusiastic
reaction in the history of Victorian Labor Conferences'
('Calwell's Address', Fact, 6 August 1964). Calwell told
delegates that the fault for the 1963 defeat did not lie within
the ALP. Nor did the party need outside advice. The
capitalist press intended only to hurt the party. Labor would
run its business in its own way. Calwell said he was neither
left nor right; 'just plain Labor'. Commentators saw his new
alignment with the Victorian left as aimed at heading off any
Whitlam challenge. They also suggested he was motivated by
hostility to federal party reform. But Calwell was not
25unequivocally anti-reform.
In Victoria, the 'Jordan ticket' supporters took up
the running on party reform, especially in the branches, where
they attempted to articulate disenchantment with the
executive's disregard. The 'Jordan ticket' candidate, Barry
Jones, issued his personal moderate modernisation manifesto to
each delegate. Jones was a school teacher and television quiz
2 6champion, as well as an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate. 
His manifesto was reprinted in Dissent, a Melbourne University 
based journal which pursued a social democratic 'revisionist'
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critique of the Victorian ALP. The Jones document was a
usefully provocative summary of the dissident perspective. It
pursued many of the same lines of thought as Whitlam and Isaacs
did in NSW but in a more combative manner:
There are two ALPS in Australian politics today.
They share the same name but their philosophies, 
methods of organisation, public appeal and 
electoral successes vary greatly. Party No. 1 
comprises the ALP in New South Wales, South 
Australia and Tasmania ... (Jones, 1964:24).
It was generally successful, could win Senate majorities and
state elections (except in SA, given 'Liberal gerrymandering').
The same could not be said of Party No. 2 - in Victoria,
Queensland and WA.
Jones insisted that, in Victoria, Labor support was 
shrinking to a narrow base. It seemed to lack the competence 
to govern. Like Whitlam, Jones wanted the ALP to adapt to the 
'middle classing' of the electorate and give its parliament­
arians more autonomy:
The Victorian ALP attempts to create a moderate 
image in middle class electorates ... but we 
deny the middle class any effective say in 
policy.
Like Isaacs, he thought this could be remedied by facilitating
white-collar infiltration of the branches, as well as an
upgrading of the branches in the party structure. This was a
key concern of the Victorian dissidents. Jones (1964:26)
stressed the difficulties of local branches, often dead or
dying. Accurate membership figures were:
... one of the best-kept political secrets in 
Victoria. The flow of information from 
Executive to branch level is very poor.
Unlike LCP branches, which are bigger and more 
active, ALP branches are only useful for 
distributing literature and have little say on 
policy. Again, unlike their LCP counterparts,
ALP branch members often tend to take little
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part in community affairs and wield little 
influence in civic, professional and business 
life.
Perhaps this lack of influence in civic, professional and 
business life made the ALP's union links and its peculiar form 
of organisation all the more necessary. Anyway, branch members 
could be given more to do, without abandoning union 
affiliation.
There was some restiveness in the Victorian 
2 7branches. At the time of the 1964 conference, branch member
and Dissent editor Peter Samuel complained that branch members
resented authoritarian mistreatment by the executive and:
... felt that they had little function beyond 
letterboxing propaganda and manning polling 
booths at elections. And damned lucky if they 
were allowed to do that too ('Stage Set for Vic 
Labor Tussle', Canberra Times, 25 July 1964).
After the conference, branch activist Race Mathews
argued the branch structure had been sick for years. Before
1955, the symptoms had been masked by Tammany-style preselection
politicking. ('Our ALP Branch Structure : The Need for a
Remedy', Fact, 20 August 1964). This meant 'bloated' branches,
with minimal membership involvement. At the time of the Split,
most of the branch members went with the DLP. The new VCE was
suspicious of the branch sector of the party. Citing fears of
'infiltration by outsiders' and 'Menzies' fifth column
membership', it took over preselections (Allan, 1980:186).
This initially temporary expedient became an entrenched
practice. Later, two token representatives from the local
2 8campaign committee in each electorate were added.
For Mathews, the 1955 crisis was a lost opportunity 
to reorganise the branches (Fact, 20 August 1964). A committee
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of inquiry could have been established. However, the union 
leaders 'who had been forced to accept responsibility' for 
party management were hard-pressed. Time did not permit them 
'any great deal of speculative thinking' on organisational 
matters, had they wanted to pursue it.
In 1964, Mathews advocated an executive-initiated
branch revitalisation programme to educate the membership,
perform electoral tasks and ensure the ALP was 'active,
favourably regarded and trusted in every community'. A
comprehensive professionally-planned operation was required.
Many new members did not last long. Any influx brought in by a
skilful recruitment campaign were unlikely to be captivated by:
... dreary, ill-conducted meetings, hopelessly 
enmeshed in routine business, to rambling, ill- 
informed discussion and to immediate nomination 
to several limping inter-branch structures 
carefully avoided by more experienced members.
The executive should train branch officials. Many members were
keen to build an effective organisation, but lacked know-how.
Meetings could be less boring. Party education could:
... become a means of both attracting new members 
and of welding the membership as a whole into a 
thoroughly briefed and articulate body of Party 
spokesmen.
Local community activity was another ingredient in branch
revitalisation. Labor's local image would be enhanced if some
party members were active in each community organisation in
their area. The aim was not proselytisation, but the 'implicit
demonstration' that ALP members were:
... ordinary, decent Australians with much the 
same interests and hopes as their neighbours ...
The key to future Labor victories is inextricably 
bound up in the creation of an acceptable public 
image at the grass-roots level.
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In suggesting that Labor had to develop its branches,
to win back public trust, Mathews was implicitly critical of
the executive's priorities. Others made more head-on attacks
on what they saw as executive neglect of the branches. On
2 August 1961, Melbourne University ALP Club activist Bill
Thomas wrote to the NSW ALP assistant secretary Tony Mulvihill:
The set up is such that many of us in the branches 
are prepared to stage a 'Warsaw Uprising' come 
what may because some rallying point has to be 
established ... We realise of course that as far 
as a successful war of liberation is concerned 
that union support is needed (NSW ALP Branch 
Records, ML Mss 2083/107/240).
Barry Jones (1964:27) took up the branch-based
critique of maladministration in the Victorian Branch.
'Drastic surgery' was needed in 'Party No. 2'. A new spirit
was necessary in all states. State executives (whatever
factional complexion) had to concede a new intra-party
pluralism. A new professionalism was also needed. The
Victorian executive should utilise:
... the expert knowledge of party members, 
employ a full time country organiser, a full time 
journalist and put a competent television 
producer on retainer.
If the members were more involved, the party could ask more of
them. As well as a greater role for branches, Jones wanted
more professional administration and publicity. Labor's PR
problems could not be put down to capitalist press malevolence.
Before complaining of press mistreatment, the party should
29improve its own media presentation (Jones, 1964:26).
While there were many calls for Labor to adapt to the 
'middle classing' of Australian society at this time, as well 
as suggestions for targeting young voters, there were not so 
many calls for Labor to adapt to changing aspirations of
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Australian women, although there was widespread recognition
that the 'gender gap' cost Labor votes (even if the term itself
was not used). Jones (1964:24) noted inconsistencies in
Labor's attitudes to women:
We urge equal pay and status for women but never 
give women the opportunity to win seats or have an 
effective say in shaping policy. Unlike the LCP, 
our proportion of women members is very small.
At the NSW Labor Women's Diamond Jubilee Conference, Calwell
said the most important question facing the ALP was why it was
not attracting a greater share of women's votes ('ALP "Out of
Date to the Young"', Age, 24 February 1964):
Australia was still a long way from securing genuine 
equality for women and was falling behind most 
Western countries and Communist countries too.
The ALP, which had done so much for women, had 
not set a good example in encouraging them to 
enter public life.
This was not a question that Labor gave much attention to at 
this time.^
Jones (1964:25) stressed the inconsistency between 
Labor's philosophical centralism and its federal structure. In 
direct contrast to those who complained that party self- 
analysis was 'morbid' or 'weeping crocodile tears to the 
press', he bemoaned the lack of frank debate in the ALP.
Members adhered 'to particular lines on the basis of 
expediency', calculating factional advantage. The party had to 
make up its mind on 'socialism' (Jones 1964:27). Continued 
evasiveness was the worst option. The party should campaign 
openly for socialist policies or frankly modify or abandon the 
objective. On 'machine' matters, Jones thought Caucus should 
be represented on both Federal Executive and Conference to lift 
the 'faceless men' stigma.
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Jones' (1964:26-7) diagnosis also noted that Labor
could no longer be 'a party of the trade union movement'.
Union membership had been declining since 1954. Automation,
tertiary industry and increased self-employment meant the trend
would continue. Like Whitlam and Isaacs, Jones assumed that
'white collar worker' and 'unionist' were almost incompatible 
32categories. His assumption that the ALP in NSW and Tasmania
held government because unionists had relaxed their grip on the
machine was strange. Executives in these states and SA were
hardly less 'union-dominated' than in what Jones called 'Party
No. 2' (the other states). Jones' manifesto did not endear him
to the Victorian executive, where self-analysis was not looked
on kindly and calls for 'major surgery' seen as treacherous.
The Victorian executive had earlier declared itself:
... shocked and deeply concerned at the publication 
of a controversial and highly critical statement ... 
allegedly made by the Deputy Leader, Mr. E.G.
Whitlam MHR ... (ALP, Victorian Branch, 1964:31).
On federal reorganisation, it favoured attendance by the FPLP 
leader at Executive and Conference meetings, but not much more. 
Criticism of the Federal Executive or the state Branch were 
dismissed as 'capitalist press' or NCC inspired. During the 
1964 Victorian executive member A. McNolty deplored anti­
executive propaganda in the press and NCC-influenced news 
sheets. Only 'objective' criticism would be permitted:
We believe that Labor can govern in periods of 
relative prosperity but to achieve this we need 
the complete loyalty of all members in a solid 
front against the anti-Labor forces ... (letter,
Age, 25 July 1964).
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CHAPTER 6
THE WYNDHAM REPORT : CONTEXT
6A After the State Debates : Federal Executive 
Commissions Inquiry
Calwell made his own reorganisation proposals in the
run-up to the August Federal Executive meeting. Shortly after
he got himself elected to the Victorian executive ('Reply to
"Faceless Men" Charge : Calwell's Plan to Reshape Labor Party’,
Canberra Times 5 August 1964). His plan envisaged Federal
Conference enlargement with union, branch and parliamentary
representation. Conference should be 'truly representative of
the party as a national party'. The ideas were embryonic.
There were problems of cost and protecting the smaller states,
which re-surfaced every time Conference reform was discussed.
Calwell's Conference proposals resembled Whitlam's. However
Calwell envisaged leaving the Federal Executive alone. Some
saw Calwell's speech as being aimed at improving Labor's image
for the pending Senate election. There were doubts about how
seriously he was prepared to pursue party reform.
The Federal Executive meeting^ was its first
opportunity to respond to the post-mortem debates in the
Branches. In particular, the NSW proposals on federal
reorganisation and ALP union candidates (decoupled in the NSW
inquiry, reccupled at state conference) would surface. So
2would the WA rejection of these proposals. The Executive 
rejected the NSW scheme for certifying ALP union candidates.
Rebuffed, NSW delegate Oliver described his 
colleagues as 'a clique of dictators' (Alan Reid, 'Labor 
"Dictators" Blasted', Sunday Telegraph, 16 August 1964).3
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The dominant NSW faction's alienation from the
4federal regime was re-confirmed. The NSW reorganisation
proposals were also rejected, although the new full-time
federal secretary Cyril Wyndham was commissioned:
... to undertake a thorough and comprehensive 
review of all aspects of the Party's present 
Federal Structure, including the future position 
of the Northern Territory (NSW delegates' report,
NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/459/1192).
Wyndham could re-examine the post-mortem controversies.
Producing the report was a major task for Wyndham and
5the fledgling Secretariat. Consultation with state Branches 
and other party units was expected. The National Organising 
and Planning Committee, an ad hoc body consisting of the six 
state secretaries, would receive the report and send it on to 
the Executive. Executive recommendations would then be 
referred back to the Branches. The projected trajectory, with 
its complex filtering process, exemplified Labor organisational 
federalism. Final Branch opinions were expected by early 
1965. Informed discussion at the 1965 Federal Conference was 
the official intention.
The timetable came unstuck. Wyndham's report was 
available by May 1965, but there was a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm for reorganisation at key levels of the party. This 
hindered Wyndham and decisively shaped the delayed response his 
inquiry received. State offices refused to provide adequate 
membership data. This led Wyndham to see his report as 
provisional. Labor needed a more comprehensive self-analysis. 
Federal Conference should invoke its full authority and require
7Branches to hand over necessary information. Without such 
information, the feasibility of radical Federal Conference
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reform could not be assessed.
6B Cyril Wyndham : Party Professional, Symbolic Appointment 
Wyndham and the new Secretariat soon discovered the 
tension between 'rationalistic idealism' and realpolitik that 
recurs so regularly in ALP organisational debates. The 
'rationalistic idealist' expectations of what a Secretariat 
could achieve were mirrored by the hopes some Labor 
intellectuals invested in Wyndham's appointment. They saw him 
as a modernising, professional federal secretary, who could 
play a central role in party reform.
Cyril Stanley Wyndham was a career party bureaucrat
Q
par excellence. He began in 1947 as a clerk in Transport 
House, British Labour Party headquarters, at the age of 17. 
Later he was private secretary to British Labour general 
secretary Morgan Phillips and administrative officer in 
Transport House International Department. In Australia, he 
worked as press secretary for Evatt (1957-60) and then Calwell, 
before being appointed Victorian secretary in 1961. He saw the 
federal secretaryship in terms of being the ALP's equivalent of
a discreet 'traditional Westminster civil servant'.
\
Although Wyndham saw himself as an administrator
9rather than an intellectual, many intellectuals welcomed his 
appointment as a symbol of a new approach in the ALP. James 
Jupp soon noted improvements in Labor organisation under 
Wyndham's guidance:
The long-term aim of making the party literate, of 
giving it technical assistance from university and 
other trained well-wishers, of producing a few 
pamphlets and policy statements which do not 
arouse wild derision or despair in the educated is
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still in the early stages. It is still bedevilled 
by the historical accident that the ALP is 
virtually the only radical party in the world 
which has been consistently anti-intellectual ('15 
Years in the Wilderness - What's Wrong with 
Labour', Canberra Times, 10 December 1964).
Jupp thought Labor's 'refusal to tolerate critical support' was
particularly self-defeating. Wyndham's appointment and the
rise of Gough Whitlam were hopeful straws in the wind.1(1
Jupp's (1963:31) reservations were about Labor's 
policy-making process rather than its actual platform.11 Only 
minimal consistency could be expected from such 'a complex 
multi-centric process'. 'Specialist advice' would gradually 
improve the situation. This 'rationalistic idealist' analysis 
bemoaned factionalism as an obstacle to rational policy 
discussion (Jupp, 1963:47). We have already seen how such 
factional struggles cut across discussions on general 
organisational and strategic issues in the NOC fiasco. We 
should note t.he limitations of 'rationalistic idealistic' 
analysis and probe its disinterestedness. Political parties 
are 'coalitions of interests, ideologies, individuals and 
idiosyncrasies ...' (D. Stephens, 1980:43). Policy formulation
is influenced by 'a whole range of considerations unconnected 
with the strict merits of the policies'. Lloyd (1983:242) goes 
so far as to suggest:
The preparation and final format of the ALP's 
Federal platform makes the construction of the 
legendary pakapu ticket look like a flawless 
exercise in rational thought and a masterpiece of 
rational draftsmanship.
In his textbook, Australian Party Politics, Jupp 
(1964:53-4) again put ALP organisation under his critical 
microscope, seeing the party:
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... not so much as a machine for evolving policy, 
nor as an electoral fighting force, but primarily 
as a power structure, assured of electoral support 
and determined that this support shall be 
channelled into seeking benefits for those the 
movement represents.
This hindered 'rational' electoral strategies. Some party
activists were so engrossed:
... capturing and retaining positions in the 
complex structure that they overlook the 
relationship of their work to the more 
important capture of electoral positions.
The one, true 'rational' course was 'modernisation'. Labor's
problems were accentuated by social trends - changes in the
occupational structure favoured the Liberals (Jupp, 1964:73).
The ALP's impressive capacity in routine electioneering was
becoming less relevant (Jupp, 1964:72-3). The Liberals led it
*
in work among youth, women and migrants as Labor's 'largely
middle-aged, working-class and male' composition and its
'strong traditions' gave the party solidity, but also made it
'conservative in tackling new aspects of Australian society'^
'Rationalistic idealist' supporters of a 'middle-
class ' orientated Labor modernisation strategy saw Wyndham as
an ally. His Transport House professionalism might rub off
on the ALP. He was quick to get to work. A few months after
the Secretariat was opened, he was surveying all marginal
seats and establishing a 3-year organisation and advertising
plan ('Cyril Stanley Wyndham - The New Broom for an Untidy
Labor Party', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1964). Many
Labor intellectuals contrasted the ALP unfavourably with
the British Labour Party. Jupp (1965b:21) was unequivocal:
The main difference between the British Labour 
Party and the ALP is that the British party is much 
better ... Today there is not a socialist 
intellectual in Australia who does not get his
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inspiration from British Labour and the Fabian 
Society ... 12
Whatever its intellectual and organisational
deficiencies, the ALP was in some respects more successful than
its British counterpart. Its share of the vote was higher.
Only the vagaries of the Australian electoral system and the
distribution of preferences stood between it and victory in
1954 and 1961. The discrepancy between Labor's vote-share and
its poor electoral record is striking. Korpi and Shalev's
(1979:179) tabulation of the 'power resources' of 'left
parties' in 18 OECD countries in the post-war period has the
13ALP joint third in the 'percentage of the vote' column, well
ahead of British Labour. On 'cabinet participation', the ALP
drops back to eleventh place. In the early 1960s, the British
Labour Party was riding the crest of a wave that was to see it
win office in 1964 (and gain a big win in 1966 before beginning
an electoral slide), while Australian Labor was still searching
its soul after a long series of defeats. As well as providing
inspiration for Australian Fabians, the British Labour Party
became a handy general stick with which advocates of various
14professionalisation projects could beat the ALP. Australian
cultural affinities with Britain and media exposure to British
news facilitated such comparisons. Of course British Labour
hardly offered the last word on 'modernisation'. Successful
Scandinavian social democratic parties might have offered more
appropriate models, but little was known about them in
Australia at the time. British example was much more
15important then than it is now.
Some ALP peculiarities vis-a-vis the British Labour 
Party could be explained in terms of prior peculiarities in
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Australian political experience. Jupp (1965a) recognised this, 
but still advocated an ALP 'modernisation' project that 
combined social democratic principles and Fabian fact­
gathering. Of the two parties, the ALP was more union-based 
(Jupp, 1965a:4). This inhibited it in an 'affluent society'. 
The ALP's long history also hindered 'rethinking'. Partly 
because of federalism, the ALP was also more endemically 
factionalised (Jupp, 1965a:2). 'Certain peculiar features' 
meant ALP parliamentarians were given less autonomy (Jupp, 
1965a:7) and ALP rebels and dissidents less toleration (Jupp, 
1965a:5). The ALP had:
... never developed a middle class wing nor 
encouraged intellectuals other than lawyers ... 
despite widespread sympathy for it among 
academics, teachers and journalists (Jupp, 1965a:8).
ALP debates 'were conducted on a."head counting and head
breaking" level' (Jupp, 1965a:7). There were strong
undercurrents of religious sectarianism in Australian politics
(Jupp, 1965a:8). Catholics and Communists were both more
influential than in Britain. Australia was not a deferential
society. In politics those with 'the numbers' came up an top.
Wyndham had been in Australia for seven years by the 
time he was asked to investigate Labor's federal structure.
His experience as Victorian secretary may have been more 
significant than his Transport House past. When the Wyndham 
Report was commissioned, one journalist referred back to what 
Wyndham had attempted in Victoria (Brian Johns, 'Wyndham Gets 
the Green Light to Smarten Up ALP', Australian, 6 August
1964). His reports on local branches, the executive, finance 
and publicity were applicable across Australia. Victoria was 
not the only anachronistic Branch.
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Wyndham's knowledge of ALP realpolitik tempered his 
commitment to party professionalisation, although it failed to 
prevent his ultimate downfall. Wyndham favoured a process of 
incremental professionalisation. 'Time honoured and well 
proven' practices would not be thrown overboard ('ALP "New 
Look" Talks Called', Age, 7 August 1 9 6 5 Nor did he 
envisage 'a beautiful structure that exists merely for the 
purpose of being admired'. He hoped his recommendations 
embodied long-term aspirations, without transgressing the 
bounds of ALP realpolitik.
6C Factions, Patrons and the Federal Secretary
Wyndham's image of himself as the party's 'good civil 
servant' tended to keep him aloof from controversy. Proponents 
of party professionalisation welcomed his appointment as a 
triumph for technical efficiency over factional alignment. But 
technicalities and ideologies cannot be so neatly separated. 
Wyndham's reorganisation agenda could not avoid reflecting his 
personal interpretation of Labor's purposes and priorities.
This is not to suggest that his recommendations were crudely 
tailored to give a favoured group of people and/or line of 
thought 'the numbers' for Federal Conference and Executive.
They were not, but nor were they innocent of such 
considerations. Wyndham steered clear of immediate, day-to-day 
factional disputes, but his preference for professionalisation 
led to clashes with the left.
Different 'patrons' supported Wyndham at different 
points in his career, which factional intrigue eventually
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brought crashing to a halt. As Evatt's secretary, Wyndham 
admired Chamberlain. Chamberlain's patronage was important in 
securing him the Victorian secretaryship in 1961 (Reid, 
1971:256-7). Wyndham was tipped as a man with a bright future 
in the ALP, who had friends in high places in the party, 
nominating Chamberlain as the best of them (M.C. Uren, 'Young 
Man with a Future', West Australian, 14 November 1960).
Wyndham was still acceptable to Chamberlain in 1963.
Such sponsorship did not prevent him drifting. This was not
unusual. ALP factional allegiances have often been fluid
(yesterday's friend always being potentially tomorrow's 
17enemy). Wyndham did seem to have a genuinely non-factional
approach, at least at the beginning of his federal
secretaryship. Then proposals for party reorganisation brought
him into conflict with his former patron. He was
'temperamentally unsuited to be anyone's creature' (Reid,
1971:257). Reid (1971:261) traces Wyndham's demise to this
falling out with Chamberlain:
Despite his twelve years in Australia, his eight 
years in the ALP machine, and his realism in other 
directions, Wyndham was in some ways still naive.
He thought there were friendships in politics, 
not just alliances, and that associates give 
loyalty and backing, even when such loyalty and 
backing could affect adversely their political 
futures. He was to learn otherwise, unmistakably, 
and the hard way. 18
The question of Wyndham's factional orientation was 
raised on his appointment to the Victorian secretaryship (West 
Australian, 14 November 1960). He was happy to keep the pundits 
guessing, declaring that his ardent belief in nationalisation 
no more made him left-wing than his support for 'White 
Australia' made him right-wing. He believed Labor needed a
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strong organisational core, a bureaucracy that was 'above 
factions and of the party'.
As a federal secretary seeking to remain 'above
factions and of the party', Wyndham gave little homilies to
Labor gatherings on the importance of tolerance and compromise
19for an 'image' of party unity. In 1965 he preached against 
increasing factional virulence at the Victorian country 
conference in Wangaratta (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information 
Release No. 7/65). Labor policies had always been based on 
'legitimate compromise' between a variety of views, but 
'intolerance towards the other man's point of view' was 
growing. Debate should not be smothered but 'confined to the 
party structure'.
Wyndham (1966a:34) linked Labor's factional problems
to its 'seventeen years of frustration' in the federal
wilderness. The press could not be blamed for reporting real
disagreements and real difficulties. Healthy differences were
essential, but principles were soon forgotten, when
personalities entered the conflict (Wyndham, 1966a:34-5).
Wyndham thought telling the party how to prevent its electoral
stocks falling was one of his main tasks. He willingly
embraced it, often with refreshing bluntness:
If we continue to prevaricate our policy, indulge 
in the futile exercise of factional strife and 
behave like a collection of political delinquents, 
we will continue to drive people from us 
(Wyndham, 1966b:20).
Wyndham wanted to develop an appropriate Labor 
strategy for advanced capitalism and the 'welfare state'. The 
'real issue' was 'something much deeper' than 'just party 
reform' (quoted, Peter Smark, 'Wyndham the Frustrated
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Reformer', Australian, 24 May 1967). Labor had achieved many 
of its welfare goals:
We must now chart our course in a society in which 
the objectives are not so obviqus, and it is the 
differences over which tactical course to follow 
which is at the root of arguments in the 
Australian Labor Party.
Once Wyndham entered this tactical debate, he found it 
difficult to remain aloof from factional antagonisms.
Wyndham, who thought 'the primary goal of a party 
machine' was to ensure electoral success, (but not at any 
price), rejected the automatic equation of strategic change 
with the abandonment of party principle as a product of 
'illogical reasoning' ('Unity the First Essential, Says 
Wyndham', Canberra Times, 15 June 1965). In his pamphlet,
Democratic Socialism Today, he set about refuting the claims of
7 0this 'principles first' school of thought (Wyndham, 1966b:3).
Both capitalism and Australian society had changed dramatically
since the 1890s. To claim otherwise was to infer that Labor
had made no impact. Wyndham went on to list other groups that
hindered the party's strategic reorientation. The groups were
identified only by their adherence to certain general lines of
thought. Wyndham attacked the 'crisis mentality', which
awaited serious social dislocation to bring Labor back to
office. This was the most insidious group, because it helped
opponents portray the ALP as a ’gloom and doom-1 party (Wyndham, 
211966b:4). The 'crisis mentality' made strategic thinking 
redundant. In non-crisis conditions the ALP could simply sulk 
in fatalistic opposition. The 'crisis mentality' adherents 
overlapped with a third group, the 'permanent oppositionists'. 
Noting the government's tendency to steal Labor's clothes, this
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group counselled that resolute opposition could achieve Labor 
goals, a course that embodied dubious logic (Wyndham, 1966b:5). 
The government adopted Labor policies in limited circumstances 
because Labor was an effective political force and credible 
alternative government. Wyndham (1965a:6-7) linked the 
'permanent oppositionists' to a newer fourth group, which 
believed that Labor's domestic tasks were completed. Wyndham 
quoted the belief of an unnamed senior Labor parliamentarian 
that the only scope for a reform party in an affluent society 
lay in foreign policy.
While Wyndham observed supra-factional protocols,
this was clearly a reference to Jim Cairns, leader of the FPLP 
22left. In general, Wyndham had labelled the shoes but stopped 
short of saying which particular individuals they fitted 
(Jonathan Gaul, 'Englishman Had Courage to Answer', Canberra 
Times, 8 December 1965). Wyndham (1966b:7) thought the groups 
he delineated were small but troublesome. In other circum­
stances, they would comprise no more than 'a collection of 
frustrated failures'. However their energy in promoting 
themselves won considerable publicity. Their opinions were 
headlined. Their speeches were culled over and choicer 
bits were quoted. Ironically, Wyndham's own speech was 
fine-combed for choice quotations (see, for example, Alan 
Reid, 'Official Blasts Views of ALP Spokesman', Daily 
Telegraph, 7 December 1965). For all Wyndham's discretion 
and even-handed tone, his complaints were squarely directed 
against the left. This was probably why the NSW Branch 
reprinted the speech. Mainstream editorials patted Wyndham 
on the back. The Canberra Times eulogised his speech as:
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... a thoughtful but restrained attack on the 
myths on which the left wing of the party 
lives ( 'Challenge for ALP', Canberra Times,
7 December 1965). 23
Wyndham ridiculed Labor activists who clung to the 
belief that Marxism contained some magic, 'despite its 
antiquity' (Wyndham, 1966b: 12). He al-so scotched 'quaint' 
notions that Communists and democratic socialists shared common 
purposes. Wyndham's 'modernisation' discourse had an anti-left
inflection. He dismissed 'fashionable' Labor anti-
- • • 24Americanism.
Wyndham left room for a socialist objective in his
'modernised' party, albeit one based on humanitarian ideals
rather than economic doctrines. He defined socialism as a form
of society designed to allow innate human goodness break
through the mental bonds of bigotry, prejudice and selfishness
which restrained it in contemporary society (Wyndham,
2 51966b:14).fc Ever since Chifley's failure to nationalise the
banks, Labor had been attempting to neutralise its 'socialism',
redefining it to render it electorally innocuous (O'Meagher,
1983:24). Wbat we have called Australian Social Democracy,
Mark I combined arguments for party modernisation in the
organisational sphere with these attempts to refashion Labor
2 6'democratic socialism'. Whitlam (1965a) led the way. In a
more circumspect manner, and with more emphasis on
27organisation, Wyndham followed.
Wyndham spent more time denouncing the dangers of 
dogmatism than those of opportunism but stressed the 
distinction between (acceptable) 'realism' and (unacceptable, 
opportunistic) 'expediency'. 'Power with principles' lay 
within the party's grasp (Wyndham, 1966b:10). The ALP was,
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however, in danger of slipping into 'the fallacious belief'
that electoral expediency alone was what was required:
Fortunately, this thinking has been warded off and 
I say fortunately deliberately (Wyndham, 1966a:33).
Expediency might have short-term attractions, but in the long­
term it could cause 'a deep and costly loss of faith in a 
party'. The suggestion that Labor had warded off the 
expediency danger implies Wyndham observed pressure for such a 
course. In Democratic Socialism Today, however, he did not see 
fit to include 'expedient wheeler-dealers' in his catalogue of 
disruptive groups. They were his allies on some aspects of 
party professionalisation. In 1965, Wyndham discovered left 
hostility to federal reorganisation. Relations with 
Chamberlain deteriorated further, following more Federal 
Executive/NSW 'state aid' conflict (Reid, 1971:257-8). Labor 
lost government in NSW. Wyndham began taking a harder line 
against 'unity tickets' (Robert Daniel, 'Big Calwell Gamble? 
He'll Vote the Left Line on Unity Tickets', Australian, 14 June 
1965). Wyndham's criticisms of ALP amateurism were consistent 
and recurrent. Thus the 'Democratic Socialism Today' speech 
was seen as:
... not just a flash in the pan, but a culmination 
of a series of speeches ... tied in with his plea 
for a massive reorganisation of the party's 
structure (Jonathan Gaul, Canberra Times,
8 December 1967). 28
Wyndham's 'democratic socialist' commitment was 
heavily qualified. He told delegates to the 1965 Victorian 
country conference their first task was ensuring they did not 
provide their opponents with ammunition which could be fired 
back at the ALP (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release 
No. 7/65). The Cold War was still casting its shadow.
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Opponents emphasised Labor's 'unsoundness' on issues such as
anti-Communism and the American alliance. Much of Wyndham's
2 9time was taken up defending Labor's rear. Positions he took 
up in internal debates, eg on the enforcement of 'unity ticket' 
bans, were partly determined by his fear of giving ammunition 
to Labor's opponents:
The "soft-on-communism", "outside domination", 
"anti-American" charges have all taken their toll 
on the party's standing with the electorate ...
(Wyndham, 19 6 6 a:3 3).
Labor could expect 'a barrage of misrepresentation' in the
press. This could only succeed:
... because we, ourselves, give substance to 
the misrepresentations and distortions by our 
own actions and behaviours (ALP Federal 
Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65).
Wyndham was uncomfortable with the habitual excuses
Labor accepted. He looked at internal causes for the party's
ills. In this he had press support. The Australian
triumphantly counterposed his diagnosis to the ALP's
traditional fulminations against the capitalist press ('Overdue
30Insight on ALP', 7 December 1965). Wyndham also attacked his 
party's 'near neurotic tendency to blame the public' for its 
difficulties (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 
7/65). Labor should distinguish 'the partisan critic from the 
genuine friend and adviser'. This classification of 
commentators could do with more categories! Wyndham believed 
internal changes could solve Labor's problems, as long as the 
debate did not get out of hand.~^
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6D Blaming the Electorate : Labour Temptation
Denouncing the conservatism of the 'little
capitalist' electorate was one way Labor could avoid Wyndham's
organisational critique. Arthur Calwell exercised this option
from time to time. He told radio listeners that:
... Australia was 'a selfish, cowardly and lazy' 
community. Instead of thinking, people were 
running away from issues or allowing themselves 
to be brainwashed ('Calwell Says He Will Not Resign', 
Sydney Morning herald, 29 February 1968).
In his fighting memoirs, Be Just and Fear Not, Calwell
(1978:247) concluded a diatribe against the 'permissive
society' with the complaint that 'the great majority of
Australians' were 'too smug, too greedy, too slothful' to
32appreciate the benefits of 'socialism'. Calwell's particular
brand of authoritarianism was not shared by the left as a
whole, but this perspective on the irredeemable Australian
populace, sunk in its own apathy, was common in left circles.
Left intellectuals despaired of the Australian
working-class. Ian Turner (1959:9) assumed that:
... capitalist Australia will continue to drug and 
degrade its workers, if not with bread and 
circuses, then with T-bones and TV. 33
Outlook editorialised that 'the people at large' were 'happy to
be drugged by Ad-mass culture' ('The Politics of the Long
Haul', January 1959). Even Brian Fitzpatrick, champion of a
radical, populist Labor 'modernisation' project, fell into this
way of thinking, arguing that Anti-Labor had been kept in power
by 'the apathy of "swinging voters" content with washing
machines, refrigerators and TV sets' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor
Newsletter, September 1958). Labor's 1958 defeat represented a
'doubtful endorsement' of the Menzies Government by a
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disgruntled electorate that disliked Labor even more (Brian
Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, December 1958). Labor had to
overcome:
... that dislike, or suspicion, or sluggishness 
of uninformed, unthinking voters ... especially 
in those constituencies where new homemakers and 
New Australians are large elements.
Later, Fitzpatrick called on Labor to reach out to 'the
uninformed women who attributed their washing machines to Mr
Menzies' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, February 1959),
The left tended to find the electorate engrossed in
consumerist conformism. After Labor's 1963 debacle, Outlook
concluded:
A complacent electorate votes at the lowest level.
For the status quo rather than for change; for 
short-term handouts rather than long-term 
developments. It is gullible and easily panicked 
into conformity by hysterical images of what 
threaten house-and-garden and never-never 
payments ('Room at the Top', February 1964).
Amongst those most easily panicked were:
... the 'directed' Catholic and New Australian 
vote; the non-political 'first voters', the TV- 
bound wives who no longer take their line from 
their husbands, the uncommitted newly-weds who 
see a Liberal vote as a vote in defence of HP 
instalments.
As Outlook's reference to TV-bound wives illustrates, blaming
the electorate often ended up blaming half of it - women. The
sons and daughters of the old working-class had moved to newer
outer suburbs (Crisp, 1970:187). There, they lost:
... something of the old identity and neighbourly 
solidarity ... which so often expressed itself 
in a solid Labor vote. A desire of the wives, 
if not at first of the husbands, to conform to 
establish their respectability in the new ethos 
may well lose some permanently from Labor's 
ranks. At least they are inclined to become 
politically footloose. 34
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There was a 'gender gap' but facile generalisations by male 
Labor intellectuals failed to explore it.
Prophetic denunciation of the electorate did not 
make much sense in electoral terms. It bore witness for 
'socialism', but reduced 'socialism' to other-worldly, 
religious status. Failure to question sexist modes of thought 
reduced the attractiveness of the 'socialism' that was on 
offer. Political frustration was at the root of the left's 
embrace of this discourse. Whitlam, on the other hand, 
shortly after he became FPLP leader, insisted that 'the worst 
possible course' Labor could take would be to blame the 
Australian people for the party's own failures (Alan Ramsay, 
'Whitlam Tells Why Labor Lost Election', Australian,
-17 March 1967). At the Victorian conference later that year, 
Calwell told delegates that during the 1966 election the people 
had been 'scared, selfish and brainwashed by the press on 
Vietnam' ('State Parties Differ on Tr'oop Policy', Australian,
13 June 1967 ) .
A constant theme for Wyndham preaching was the danger
3 5of Labor under-estimating the intelligence of the electorate.
The elector today is a thinking one. He sifts and 
weighs the evidence available ... If we accept the 
argument ... that the great majority of voters are 
incapable of thinking for themselves, then we 
condemn the party to eternal political opposition 
(ALP Federal Secretariat Release No. 7/65).
Wyndham thought a more educated electorate necessitated the
professional presentation of intelligently articulated
policies. Old slogans may have been good enough in the past,
but their concerns had been partly institutionalised in the
'welfare state'. A new sophistication was required.
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Such a project of patiently educating the electorate
on the benefits of carefully worked reform programmes was taken
seriously in 'Australian Social Democracy, Mark I'. Swinging
voters were seen as open to rational persuasion (Mills,
1986:23). See also D. Stephens, 1979:468-9; Brugger,
1986:12). Labor advocates of party 'modernisation' were also
fascinated with the manipulative possibilities of advertising
strategies tailored to swinging voters' prejudices and whims.
The rationality of the swinging voter came to be re-evaluated 
3 6accordingly.
Wyndham was no exception. He stressed the centrality
of 'image' improvements for ALP professionalisation. He
invoked 'the Kennedy legend', founded on the image of a man
aware of contemporary problems and seeking to address them
(Peter Smark, 'Wyndham : The Frustrated Reformer', Australian,
24 May 1967). British Labour Party 'modernisers' at this time
also found a star to follow in the 'Kennedy legend' (see Foot,
1968:15-6). Harold Wilson took up a rhetoric of 'dynamism and
change'. Wilson's 1955 report on British Labour Party 
37organisation, which Wyndham would have been familiar with, 
stressed the inappropriateness of 'a penny farthing bicycle in 
a jet age'.
In the ALP, Whitlam's accession to the leadership 
coincided with a new emphasis on 'image politics', as well as 
on patient education of the electorate. Thus, Wyndham's 
concerns were taken up, even though most of his specific party 
reform proposals were not and he fell by the wayside. With 
Whitlam's strategy clearly discernible, Bruce Grant noted that 
Labor would present itself:
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... as the party best equipped to enhance the 
quality of life in Australia ... Labor is 
following at a respectful distance the 
principles which brought success to Kennedy in 
1960, Wilson in 1964 and Trudeau in 1968 ...
( 'The Signs are Promising', Acre, 19 February 
1969). 38
Other commentators were more jaundiced. Kelvin Rowley 
(1972:310) saw technocratic Labor's emphasis on professionalism 
and efficiency in a less favourable light. The ideology of 
'technocratism' assumed all political and social problems could 
be reduced to technical and administrative ones (Rowley, 
1971:10). This was:
... blind adulation of capitalist rationalisation ...
Mr Cyril Wyndham, for example, seems a well- 
intentioned person, but this only makes his 
politics look all the more ominous. Writing as 
Secretary of the ALP, he objects to the 'lethargy', 
'listlessness' and 'somnambulism' of the present 
regime, its 'lack of direction and purpose'.
Without throwing capitalism into quesrion, he sees 
the 'socialism' of the ALP as remedying this 
failing ... 39
Programmes for party professionalisation and 
'modernisation', when their presuppositions and underlying 
assumptions are scrutinised, involve matters of political and 
ideological debate and not simply neutral 'organisational' 
matters. Of course, such programmes often use a 'rationalistic 
idealist' language that aspires to appear politically and 
ideologically 'innocent'.
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CHAPTER 7
THE WYNDHAM REPORT : CONTENT AND RESPONSES
7A Labor Amateurism : The Wyndham Diagnosis
Although Wyndham felt he was not given adequate
information, his report was quite comprehensive.^ It began by
looking at Federal Conference structure, suggesting limited
reforms. It was hardly surprising that this was the first
topic examined, given the 'faceless men' furore, which led to
2the commissioning of the report. The Wyndham Report went on 
to look at the Federal Executive, party discipline, 
organisation in the territories, Labor women and Labor youth, 
finance, membership, local branches, campaigning, ALP/union 
relations, the Federal Secretariat, standardising party rules 
and a superannuation scheme for party officials.
Underlying this array of issues was a concern with 
party professionalisation and an improved 'image'. It makes 
sense to see the report as one focused on improving the party's 
performance as a 'rational-efficient' vote-gathering machine 
(see Wright, 1971). Yet it would be a mistake to see it solely 
in such terms. 'Party democracy' themes were also explored. 
Wyndham looked at membership development schemes and local 
branch revitalisation. The emphasis was primarily party- 
managerial, but there was a participatory sub-text. The model 
'rational-efficient' electoral party was not expected to bother 
much with 'grass-roots' concerns that might obstruct
3professionalised campaigning through the media. Wyndham, for 
all his professionalisation rhetoric, did not accept that the 
ALP's days as a 'mass party' were over or that local branches 
were irrelevant. If we analyse the report's recommendations
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and the arguments Wvndham deployed, we find some tensions 
between its party-managerial professionalisation major text and 
its participatory 'party democracy' sub-text. The tension was 
latent only. The sub-text is particularly muted at key points. 
Even arguments for 'party democracy' deployed 'rational- 
efficient' managerial imagery. Nevertheless, Wyndham's 
diagnosis did not entail the ALP fully embracing what might 
(clumsily) be called 'post-mass-party' politics. Alongside a 
'better image’, improved finances and general 'adaptation' to 
social change, Wyndham invoked 'grass-roots' ALP renewal.
Federal Conference was the most pressing 'image' 
problem. The 'faceless men' jibe was an all too recent memory. 
Wyndham wanted a larger and'more representative Conference. 
There was room for 'party democracy' arguments here, but 
Wyndham's emphasis was on 'image' and the efficient discharge 
of Conference business. The case for increasing state 
delegations from 6 to 10 was couched in terms of allowing 'key 
people' to be included. The 'key people' Wyndham particularly 
emphasised were the parliamentarians. On a delegation of 6, it
4was difficult to accommodate key parliamentary figures.
Wyndham hoped that the increased delegations would include at 
least one federal parliamentarian, one state parliamentarian 
and (a concession to the 'grass-roots' sub-text) one FEC 
representative. Furthermore the FPLP leader and deputy leader, 
as well as Labor's Senate leader and deputy leader, would be 
automatically accredited. So would each SPLP leader. Wyndham 
also envisaged 2 delegates from the Labor Women's Organisation 
Committee and a delegate each from the ACT and the Northern 
Territory. In all, Conference would have 74 rather than 36
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delegates, with key politicians automatically included.^
Wyndham saw merit in the suggestion that all FPLP
members should have speaking rights, but preferred a more
manageable proposal, giving such access to 'shadow Ministers'.
Wyndham's rationale embodied a technocratic conceptualisation
of Conference. He was seeking to tap 'the expert knowledge of
the key people in the Caucus'. Ordinary Conference delegates
lacked 'detailed knowledge' on many issues.
Federal Executive reconstruction was also
recommended. The FPLP leader and deputy leader should be
added. The Executive should meet more often. That might get
it a better press. Disciplinary disputes should be resolved
more speedily. Federal officers and FPLP officers should
£
constitute a supervisory high policy committee, to ensure
platform coherence and consistency.
Wyndham urged the establishment of a federal finance
committee made up of a federal party treasurer (elected by the
Federal Executive), two other federal officers and the FPLP
leader and deputy leader. Wyndham criticised Labor's
'slapdash' financing at the 1965 NSW conference ('Unity the
First Essential Says Wyndham', Canberra Times, 15 June 1965):
What business would expend its energies in raising 
half a million and then fritter it away in the 
manner we do (quoted, '"One Voice" Urged for ALP',
Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1965). 7
This was for party professionalisation.
Wyndham's proposals suggested an alliance between the
FPLP leadership and a reconstructed federal 'machine'. He had
his own barrow to push. His proposals upgraded the role of the
federal secretary (included in both high policy and federal
finance committees). He did not forego the opportunity to
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suggest increased Secretariat staffing, finance permitting and 
a superannuation scheme for party officials. Labor's 'humble 
civil servant' had a personal and institutional agenda to 
pursue, but his report was not simply an exercise in 
bureaucratic politics.
To improve Labor's electoral campaigning, Wyndham 
targeted specific groups of voters (women, youth and 
unionists). Other suggestions included earlier preselections, 
more professional use of the media, more concentration on
g
marginal seats and (surprise, surprise) greater involvement 
by the federal secretary.
Wyndham recommended giving the Labor Women's
Organisation greater status. The LWCOC was 'a rather insipid
body' with limited powers. Its decisions were ignored. He
would reconstitute it as a standing policy committee on women's
affairs. It should nominate a woman for every other policy
committee. As well as the two LWCOC Federal Conference
delegates the LWCOC secretary should be given an advisory seat
9on the Federal Executive. Wyndham's proposals were mainly 
involved with cosmetic improvements to Labor's 'image' with 
women voters. They also involved hesitant steps towards 
internal reform in a very male-dominated party. Wyndham was 
sympathetic towards the cause of increasing the clout of the 
Labor Women's Organisation.^ Although sometimes expressed 
rather patronisingly, this was well received by LWCOC leaders. 
Wyndham did not address the question of the obstacles to 
women's participation inherent in many ALP traditions and 
practices.
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Youth was another target category. Young people, 
like women, were not a homogeneous group, but Labor would 
suffer if it was seen as 'an old man's party'T Wyndham 
recommended a federal youth advisory committee (of six members, 
under 25).
Perhaps it was strange for a party with the history, 
structure and traditions of the ALP to see unionists as an 
electoral target group requiring special attention. Wyndham 
felt it necessary to press home that important changes were 
afoot in the union movement. Labor should not be complacent 
about unionists as voters. Nor could institutional party/union 
relations be taken for granted.
Labor had problems with its affiliated blue-collar 
unions. In particular, Wyndham warned, the involvement of 
union officials in ALP faction fights often led to negative 
perceptions of the ALP at union-membership level. Labor's 
approach to unionists as voters was predicated on outdated 
assumptions :
The Party itself alienates many unionists by 
assuming that they think in the same way as they 
did twenty years ago. References to the 'workers', 
the 'working class' and the 'underprivileged' are 
just so much meaningless and sometimes offensive 
jargon in modern society. A glance at the 
Taxation Commission Reports shows that not all 
the cars, all the boats and all the holiday homes 
are owned by 'the bosses'. In any case, many of 
the underprivileged are not organised or eligible 
to be organised in unions.
This was the clearest instance in the report of Wyndham's 
fondness for 'modernisation' rhetoric. 'Affluence' and the 
'end of class' were often seen as sociological explanations for 
British Labour's travails. British 'revisionists' took up the 
argument of Abrams and Rose (1960) for polemical purposes.
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Wyndham, in Australia a few years later, followed in their
footsteps. His 'modernisation' rhetoric relegated 'class' to
the realm of 'traditionalism'. His argument for annual Federal
Conferences was not couched in terms of 'party democracy', but
on the grounds that parties had to keep up with changing times.
Policy made today could 'well become outmoded tomorrow1.
Wyndham thought Labor could improve its relations with white-
collar unions. ACPSA should be invited onto the Commonwealth
12Labor Advisory Council. State Branches should develop links
with professional associations. As in other areas, he thought
a new committee was the appropriate federal response. The
Executive should establish a consultative committee made up of
members of professional and salaried associations. Wyndham
also advocated a general campaign to convince unionists of the
benefits of ALP affiliation.
Wyndham's personal and institutional agenda shaped
his concern with more uniform national rules. He drew
attention to anomalies of procedure and practice in the
organisation of preselection ballots for federal candidates.
A more national approach was easily justifiable on
'rationalistic idealist' grounds, given Labor ideology on 
13centralism." It would also increase the power of a 
reconstructed federal 'machine' within the party. Wyndham 
suggested an incremental approach. The Federal Executive 
should review state conference and executive decisions, which 
affected 'the conditions of candidature for the Federal 
Parliament'. Preselection methods varied considerably. Only 
two states retained 'rank-and-file' ballots; NSW (where branch 
members took part) and Queensland (where affiliated unionists
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could also vote). Wyndham was wary of disturbing the Branches. 
Preselections for the next election were about to begin.
7B Party Democracy : Sub-Text
Wyndham's concern for party professionalisation led 
to consistent, interrelated recommendations on improving 
Labor's image, involving the federal parliamentarians more in 
the federal 'machine'; new approaches to policy-making and 
electoral campaigning; and more nationally standardised rules. 
In a more professionalised party, the Federal Secretary would 
be an important figure. There was another side to the Wyndham 
Report, its sub-text on membership participation, intra-party 
democracy and such topics. Thus Wyndham hoped, rather piously, 
that the increased state delegations to Federal Conference 
might each include at least one FEC representative. More 
substantially, perhaps, he recommended improved access for FECs 
and federal unions to Federal Conference and Executive.
Material for the federal bodies normally had to go through 
state Branch channels.
Wyndham wanted to rehabilitate the 'grass roots' ALP
(FECs and local branches). His argument was not so much 'party
democracy' as the dividends that better local organisation
could pay in increased electoral competitiveness. FECs were
poorly funded 'Cinderellas'. The local branch, the party's
14'first line of defence and attack' merited mere support.
The party did little to encourage potential members:
Too many branches meet in ill-lit, shabby and 
depressing surroundings. Too much time is 
wasted on routine matters. Standing orders are 
so restrictive and so slavishly followed that a
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strong heart is needed to remain. Too many 
chairmen and too many secretaries are ill- 
equipped to run meetings. This is not their 
fault but the fault of the Party in that it 
has never provided training for them.
Wyndham believed electoral success depended on branch 
revitalisation. Federal Secretariat servicing, especially in 
party education, could improve branch input. His remedy for 
boring meetings and low branch morale was rather simple - 
education for key local personnel,^ plus better communication 
with the federal bodies. The obvious organisational level 
where federal/local communications could be improved was the 
FEC, often neglected in state Branches.
Wyndham's concern with membership development and his 
belief in the organisational importance of local branches were 
long-standing. Attempts to rejuvenate local branches were 
central to his 1962 study for the Victorian ALP ('Labor Party 
Talks on Rule Changes to Strengthen Movement', Age, 7 April 
1962).^ Just before his report was ready, Wyndham told the 
1965 Victorian country conference that branch members had wide 
networks of contacts in factories, offices, neighbourhoods and 
social clubs (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 
7/65). Given adequate information, they could push Labor 
arguments in these networks. Lines of communication between 
'the highest councils of the party' and ordinary members had 
to be 'streamlined', a favourite word of Wyndham, the 
administrator (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release 
No. 7/65).17
The Wyndham Report argued direct access for FECs to 
the federal bodies would raise their status in the party. They 
would feel their views were being considered. The same applied
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to federal unions. Wyndham's concern for party
professionalisation qualified his support for these 'party
democracy' measures. FECs and federal unions might clutter up
the agenda 'with items that should not be there'. Wyndham had
strong doubts about how the FECs use 'this privilege'. While
he complained that FECs were treated like 'Cinderellas1 , his
own assessment of what the 'rank-and-file' could contribute to
Labor decision-making was rather harsh (electioneering was
another matter altogether, as was spreading the word at work
and across the back fence). Wyndham consoled himself with the
hope that the task of formulating a strictly limited number of
Federal Conference items would educate local branches beyond
parochial concerns. FEC and federal union Federal Conference
items could be on federal matters only. They could have no
more than three items each. The- agenda could not be:
... cluttered up with the petty grievances of 
members affecting the location of a public 
convenience on the corner of a street. 18
Wyndham suggested various party education programmes, 
with strong Federal Secretariat involvement. They included 
summer schools and correspondence colleges for local officials, 
partly modelled on British Labour practice. The Secretariat's 
role in co-ordinating party education would further boost its 
status. Circulated discussion notes might help drag branches 
away from parochial concerns.
Generous provision of educational resources was 
something party reformers had hoped for from the Secretariat, 
serving the general membership as well as the Executive and the 
FPLP. They deplored the way internal education had always been 
relegated to the bottom end of Labor's priorities. John Burton
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(1957:26), for example, in his attempt to rekindle idealistic
Labor radicalism by means other than the reassertion of the
'socialisation objective', stressed the importance of local-
level revitalisation. A Federal Secretariat could facilitate
such a process, by developing internal education programmes:
Even in a fully developed democratic movement, in 
which authority and control are spread, and great 
responsibilities are placed on the local branches, 
strong higher levels are still needed.
Labor needed a Secretariat, which would supply research and
initiative:
Local branches require something to chew on ...
The Federal Organisation more than any other 
level of the structure can take advantage of 
the studies of specialists subjecting these 
studies to the examination of the rank-and-file ...
Wyndham appears to have agreed with this conception 
of Secretariat activity. He tried to develop communications 
with FECs and branches. Encouraging discussion on party aims, 
objectives and policy would not always run in harness with 
increasing the party's efficiency as a vote-gathering machine. 
Here, as in other areas, there was potential for conflict 
between party democratisation and party professionalisation.-9 
The effects of internal education would depend on whether the 
programmes would encourage discussion on policy and philosophy 
or have a narrower campaign focus (on matters such as 
scrutineering and electoral law). Whether branch members and 
FEC delegates wanted to be 'educated' and if so, by whom and on 
what topics, would also be crucial. There were many 
imponderables. Wyndham believed teaching local officials how 
to run meetings and conduct branch business was the key to 
local revitalisation. Wyndham-style party education would be 
about equipping ordinary members to be better 'ambassadors' for
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the party. He saw the local branch as the party's first line 
of defence and attack, but failed to consider whether there was 
much enthusiasm in the branches for his kind of party 
education.
If the party wanted its members to be 'ambassadors',
the overall low level of direct membership was an obvious
problem. In her sympathetic discussion Overacker (1968:108)
notes that the Wyndham Report saw lack of branch and affiliate
vitality as 'the party's basic weakness'. Wyndham bluntly
commented that individual membership was 'appalling'; less
than one percent of the Labor vote. He made some suggestions
for a recruitment drive. 1966 was to be declared 'membership
year', with a target of 100,000 individual members (five
percent of the Labor vote). Professional and 'other'
(presumably related) social strata were singled out for special
recruitment efforts. This was in tune with Whitlam's 'wooing
20the white collars' strategy.
The Wyndham Report was a wide-ranging document. Its 
primary concern was improving the party's electoral 'image' by 
a series of internal reforms that would have the incidental 
effect of making the Secretariat a considerably more significant 
body. Short-term Conference and Executive reform would 
strengthen the hands of the FPLP leaders and banish the 'faceless 
men' taunt for once and for all. Some of his recommendations 
were pertinent to the ALP as a 'reform movement', as well as an 
'electoral machine'. His membership development suggestions 
could be looked at in this light, although they were mainly 
justified on the grounds that branch revitalisation would 
enhance the party's vote-gathering capacities.^
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7C Commentary
James Jupp strongly endorsed the report ('The Wyndham
Report - Changing the Old Guard', Canberra Times, 1 June 1965).
He had advocated similar measures himself. Jupp saw the higher
profile for the FPLP as the most important part of the Wyndham
package. Parliamentarians would be able to have more influence
at Federal Conference. Parliamentarians and expert advisers
could work together to give the ALP better researched and more
professionally presented policies. Steps in this direction had
22already been taken. Wyndham's proposals would consolidate 
the process. They were likely to be resisted by the left, 
which preferred 'its banners, demonstrations and slogans', to 
'this kind of quiet fact accumulation'. Party professional- 
isation challenged the unions' veto 'on all matters from 
arbitration to atomic energy'. The left wanted to leave 
the federal politicians 'in their current condition of 
formal servitude'. The unions, however, were by no means 
unambiguously left-wing, although Australian union 
officials maintained 'an unusual, if not unique' combination 
of 'ideological self-reliance, radicalism and political 
(in the sense of partisan) action' (Rawson, 1964b:18).
Jupp noted that while Wyndham suggested increased 
FPLP influence on the Federal Executive, his proposals 
maintained the 'essential balance' of the federal structure 
(Canberra Times, 1 June 1965). State variations and 
idiosyncrasies would survive. At least in the short term. 
Wyndham hoped to iron out many variations eventually.
Wyndham's very acceptance of Labor federalism, while it was 
essential to his incrementalism, may have meant many of his
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recommendations were unlikely to be implemented; Jupp 
concluded;
Building up the individual membership, diversifying 
the sources of income and of recruits, polishing 
up the public image must all be done in the 
Trades Halls of the capital cities rather than in 
Canberra. And very little stirs in some of them.
Wyndham was likely to be frustrated by state Branch
r e a l  vo l i t i k .
Rawson (1965:34) noted that federal reorganisation
raised 'some fundamental questions' about Labor's priorities.
He queried Wyndham's assumption that reorganisation was
essential for electoral success (Rawson, 1965:25).
Organisational efficiency was prized by people like Wyndham:
... whose life and profession are the production 
of an efficient machine rather than its direction 
towards particular ends.
Yet Tasmanian Labor, electorally strong, had one of the weakest
organisations. Here, we could note comments made by the NSW
Press, Radio and TV Committee on 30 October 1959:
The whole question of publicity is complicated 
by the fact that, in NSW, the Party continues to 
achieve substantial electoral success without a 
publicity policy and, in fact, with almost -total 
lack of planning in this important field (NSW 
ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/454/1181). 23
Anyway, even if Wyndham could have unambiguously shown that his
proposals would lift Labor's electoral prospects, some groups
in the party would have remained hostile. The degree to which
electoral success was the main priority was always a matter of
internal dispute. Organisational proposals could not be seen
in isolation:
They are always associated, even if unintentionally, 
with particular tendencies in policy and in 
factional control and this, of course, is largely 
what explains resistance to them (Rawson, 1965:25).
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'Rationalistic idealist' proposals always have internal 
Realpolitik implications. Even when the priority of electoral 
success is accepted:
It is always difficult to discover motives and to 
distinguish between the organisation-maintenance 
necessary to win elections and that which 
preserves oligarchy ... (D. Stephens, 1979:486).
While sceptical about their electoral importance,
Rawson (1965:33) thought Wyndham's recommendations were
worthwhile for other reasons. They were not simply about
24improving the position of the FPLP. Labor's federal 
machine was:
... satisfactory neither for the determination of 
policy nor for the conduct of election campaigns 
and still less for maintaining long-term 
campaigns between elections.
It would be ironic if the federal structure was left unchanged, 
because Labor 'radicals' wanted to keep politicians in their 
place:
... since its inadequacies make inevitable the 
predominance of the politicians in the 
formulation of election policy and the heavy 
dependence upon a single advertising agency for 
the conduct of election campaigns (Rawson, 1965:33-4).
If Wyndham's plan failed, it would probably only be because of
sheer organisational conservatism, combined with 'an
unwillingness of one faction to appear to give another a
victory', even if both stood to gain (Rawson, 1965:34). Such
considerations were quite important in organisations like the
ALP.
Rawson thought Wyndham's recommendations would 
benefit the ALP as a whole. Humphrey McQueen disagreed 
(letter, Australian, 20 December 1965). He saw a right-wing 
factional agenda at work in the proposals. They arose out of
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'counter-criticisms made by the Press and other opponents'
rather than 'any investigation of the ALP's structure'.
Wyndham did not prove Federal Conference was inefficient. His
worry was it was 'unrepresentative ... of his right-wing
opinion'. Wyndham, for all his professional organiser's pride
in his practicality, had misunderstood factional realpolitzk
and demonstrated ignorance about the 'grass roots' party:
Mr Wyndham is particularly fond of efficiency and 
organisational rationality as concepts. This is 
not surprising as it is symptomatic of the right 
to look for causes of its failure in the only 
area of politics in which it has an interest - 
namely the purely administrative. 25
This made Wyndham 'the greatest utopian of them all'. The
left would not vote itself out of power to satisfy his 'orderly
mind'. The proposals were naive if Wyndham expected them to
work. They were devious if he did not, and was trying 'to
cause trouble and/or frustrate more realistic reforms'.
Unfortunately, McQueen did not specify any 'realistic reforms'
himself.
Press praise for the Wyndham Report concentrated on
2 6FPLP representation at Federal Conference. The Mercury
suggested politicians were more attuned to public opinion than
delegates who lived in 'an atmosphere of fervid party support
and economic theories' ('ALP Seeks New Face', 27 May 1965).
The good press Wyndham's proposals received was not surprising.
Leader writers were always advising Labor to 'reform' and
'modernise' itself. There was, however, some concern that
27Wyndham did not go far enough.
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7D After the Report : 'Machine' Manoeuvres in New South
Wales, New Faction in Victoria
The May 1965 Federal Executive meeting postponed
consideration of Wyndham's proposals but opened the 1965
Federal Conference to the press. The NOPC was due to consider
the report in July. The holiday weekend, 12-14 June, saw state
conferences in NSW, Victoria and SA. Responses to the report
2 8could be aired. Brian Johns thought the Federal Executive's
referral of the Wyndham Report to the states was not a defeat
for the federal secretary ('Changing from White to Grey',
Bulletin, 5 June 1965). It kept debate on the document alive.
The NSW conference was expected to be testing for the
ruling faction. Labor had just lost state government, which it
had held since 1941. A manifesto from 14 'out' unions called
on NSW Labor to reassert its socialist objective and its
'traditional radical approach' ('Labor Postmortem', Canberra
Times, 8 June 1965). Labor's thinking was being paralysed by
'a pathological fear of the word socialism'. The manifesto
went on to attack the NSW executive for failing to keep pace
with 'world-shaking social and political change' ('Strong
Attack on State ALP in Unions' Manifesto', Sydney Morning
Herald, 8 June 1965). The left could turn its hand to
'modernisation' rhetoric on appropriate occasions, but it was
decidedly cool on the Wyndham Report. Socialist and Industrial
Labor thought Wyndham's 'highly controversial' proposals could
only be considered if direct representation was given to
federal unions ('Unions Must Be Represented', June 1965). The
'faceless men' charge was a malevolent and misleading
2 9capitalist press concoction. The Canberra Times predicted
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the NSW conference would be 'an organisational field par
excellence' ('Pressure from the Left', 11 June 1965). There
would be complex plots, counter-plots, tickets, counter-tickets
30and set-piece left/right clashes.
By-passing Wyndham's carefully modest proposals, the
conference confronted the federal structure head-on. NSW had
31often found federalism a major irrrtant. The state executive
recommended increasing the number of Conference delegates from
36 to 100, elected on a pro rata basis of party membership.
Conference preferred an amendment from a young Electrical
Trades' Union organiser Barry Unsworth. This was based on the
US Democratic Party Convention, which drew delegates on a
population basis from the states ('Drastic State ALP Plan to
Reorganise Federal Body', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 1965).
Unsworth envisaged a Federal Conference with 132 delegates;
made up of the FPLP leader and deputy leader, the SPLP leaders
3 2and 124 delegates from the states. The number of delegates 
each state or territory would be entitled to would be 
determined by the number of House of Representatives seats 
within its borders. The method of electing delegates would be 
left to the Branches. Thus the ruling NSW faction could 
redress some of its long-standing grievances. Unsworth's 
proposal contradicted the spirit of Wyndham's drive towards 
more national rules.
There was much confusion about Unsworth's 
recommendation. There was a fairly widespread mistaken 
assumption that because he favoured 124 delegates from the 
Branches, he favoured one delegate from each FEC. While leaving 
the method of delegate selection unresolved, the NSW conference
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endorsed the abstract notion of Federal Conference 
representation for federal unions, FECs, state executives and 
federal MPs ('Right Wing Wins Vote to Wipe Out Faceless Men', 
Australian, 14 June 1965).
NSW would also expand the Federal Executive from 12
to 20, adding the FPLP leader and deputy leader and the SPLP
leaders. Here, there was no attempt to redress the iniquities
of federalism (the assumption that, on balance at least, the
parliamentary leaders could be trusted to reject the NSW Branch
3 3controllers' left-wing opponents on the Federal Executive).
The press saw the NSW reorganisation decisions as one 
more victory for the ruling faction in a conference it 
dominated (Australian, 14 June 1965). However, some of its
opponents supported federal reorganisation. Charlie 
Fitzgibbon, for example, told delegates Labor had to counter 
the damage done by the 'faceless men' myth, although 'our need 
is more than just to fix this' ('Key Posts to All the Right 
Men', Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1965). Fitzgibbon strongly 
supported federal union representation at Federal Conference 
and proposed a federal affiliation mechanism for such unions.34
The NSW format for Conference enlargement may have 
been more a part of state conference plotting and counter­
plotting than a serious proposition. It was a ploy to wrong­
foot anticipated attacks on the NSW executive for being behind 
the times and out of touch with the membership. One 
commentator noted that the decisions were seen within the party 
as 'largely academic' as the other states were certain to 
reject them ('Right Wing Wins Vote to Wipe Out Faceless Men 
Stigma', Australian, 14 June 1965). NSW delegates did not
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pursue them with much vigour at the federal level. The press
praised the NSW proposals as 'far bolder and more imaginative'
than Wyndham's ('Two Faces of the Labor Party', Canberra Times, 
3515 June 1965). This was partly because of a misperception 
that NSW had committed itself to a Federal Conference based 
mainly on FEC delegates.
Tribune suggested the Unsworth proposal was aimed at:
... strengthening NSW right-wing influence at 
Federal Conference and weakening trade union 
influence ('Strong ALP Stand on Troops to Vietnam',
16 June 1965).
Tribune claimed NSW wanted 124 FEC delegates, but no role for 
affiliated unions:
This action, supported by the anti-Labor press, 
constituted a right wing slap in the face to the 
trade unions ('Right Wing Attack on Trade 
Unions', 23 June 1965).
A Sydney University Fabian Society journal made a similar 
misinterpretation, but saw virtue where the CPA saw vice. 
Whereas Wyndham still worked within the federal framework, 'the 
NSW scheme apparently called for the abolition of state 
delegations' ('New Basis Editorial', August 1965). The 
editorial combined an awareness of the NSW scheme's ambiguities 
with an interpretation, based mainly on its own wishful 
thinking:
While the NSW proposals do not make it clear how 
these delegations are to be elected it is 
necessary for success that this be done by the 
Federal Electorate Councils themselves.
The Sydney University Fabians and the NSW machine had
different criteria of what was 'necessary for success'. The
Unsworth motion left the method of electing the increased state
delegations entirely in the hands of each state executive. New
Basis surprise that the NSW executive seemed 'willing to
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sacrifice its own status' was premature. Clinging to its 
interpretation of the NSW proposal as one for an FEC-based 
Conference, New Basis stressed the 'equity' and 'rationality' 
of such a structure. An FEC-based Conference would produce 'a 
more rational policy' and 'reduce internal splitting'. Here, 
New Basis slipped into the 'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric, 
so beloved of party reform protagonists, clung to all the more 
desperately when realpolit'tk considerations suggested that 
reform was unlikely. At this stage, frustrated denunciation of 
the irrationality of realpolitik criteria usually followed. So 
it was with New Basis. Small state defensiveness would 
prevail, and the issue would not be debated on its merits, but 
in relation to which faction would have 'the numbers'.
The Victorian executive was hostile to the Wyndham
Report but there was more ferment on party reform in Victoria
than in NSW. 'Dissidents' rallied around the Wyndham Report.
They became a formal faction after the 1965 state conference,
where the report had hardly been discussed and no
reorganisation initiatives were forthcoming. When the report
was mentioned, near the end of the conference, party treasurer
Albert McNolty indicated his unhappiness with its
recommendations (Robert Daniel, 'Labor Split Widens - Worst for
3 610 Years', Australian, 15 June 1965). The conference
37formalised Victorian tolerance of 'unity tickets'. Party 
president Bob Holt resigned. He disagreed with the dominant 
group on 'unity tickets' and declared his support for the 
Wyndham Report ('ALP Leader Not Seeking Re-Election', Age, 9 
June 1965; 'Holt Resigns', Australian, 9 June 1965).
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As in the previous year, the official executive
ticket was easily returned. Autonomous SEC representation on
the executive was abolished, after only one year. In the wake
of this decision, and the general failure of the opposition
ticket, a more organised anti-executive faction was formed,
calling itself 'The Participants'. One of its major complaints
was that branch activists were squeezed out by the dominant set
of union officials on the executive, (co-ordinated by the
nebulous but effective Trade Union Defence Committee). The
Wyndham Report gave the Participants fairly obvious ammunition.
They became its most wholehearted champions in the whole ALP.
The foundation meeting of the Participants, on 18
August 1965, brought together signatories of a letter
condemning the new 'unity ticket' line. They felt organisation
was required if 'the ordinary members' were to regain control
of the Victorian ALP ('The Participants, Labor Comment, May 
8 81969). Those who agreed to pursue 'participatory democracy
within the ALP’ at this meeting later became known as 'the
Participants'. They would work within official ALP processes.
'Thus, the Participants were not mentioned in the press until
1969. The inaugural meeting elected white-collar union
3 9official Barney Williams as president and James Jupp as 
secretary. It decided to establish a panel of speakers, 
publish a broadsheet and distribute copies of the Wyndham 
Report, which the state executive 'was treating as proscribed 
literature for ALP members'. The Participants were as worried 
about 'unity tickets' as the lack of branch representation.
The focus on branch members' rights was important for a group 
trying to build an alternative coalition to run the Branch.
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The first Labor Comment appeared in November 1965, edited by-
Robert Murray. The Participants became a pressure group for 
federal intervention in Victoria, which would put new people in 
key positions and change the Branch's political complexion.
The Participants constantly drew attention to executive 
authoritarianism and the shoddy deal received by branches and 
non-TUDC unions. 'Modernisation' rhetoric came in handy in 
denunciations of the executive. The Participants argued the 
Victorian set-up was anachronistic. If it was not changed, 
there would be serious problems recruiting and retaining 
members.
A short-term objective of the Participants was to 
change the method of election to the state executive. They 
took heart from the suggestion in Holt's resignation speech 
that more 'interests' should be included ('Victorian ALP 
President Talks of Split in the Ranks', Canberra Times,
12 June 1965). There were a number of non-TUDC unions 
affiliated to the ALP, but the Participants focused mainly on 
the branches; initially concentrating on the restoration of 
the three 'autonomous' SEC representatives ('Mr R.D. Williams' 
Speech to First "Participants" Meeting', Labor Comment, May 
1969). Branch members should not feel they were confined to 
handing out 'how to vote' cards. Barney Williams hoped that, 
before the 1966 conference, the Participants could call a 
meeting of branch representatives:
... to endorse three members to stand as the
endorsed candidates of the branches for the three
SEC representatives on the Central Executive.
This strategy failed. The majority of branch delegates 
supported the executive on the controversies of the day. They
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accepted their lowly role in party affairs. In 1965, the only 
year with autonomous SEC representation, the 'non-industrial' 
wing supported ruling group candidates by a more than 3-to-l 
margin.
Executive control of communication lines made it
difficult to express branch discontent. The Participants were
not the only group attempting to organise horizontal
communication between branches. The Victorian Fabian Society
tried to promote discussion on the Wyndham Report ('Wyndham
40Plan Talk Tonight', Age, 16 July 1965). Its secretary Race
Mathews circulated a newsletter praising the Wyndham Report and
urging ALP members to consider it carefully. The executive did
not appreciate this challenge to its control of the Victorian
ALP's vertical communication lines.
Mathews also organised a 'Committee to Inquire into
Representation and Decision-Making in the ALP', set up by
Scoresby SEC in September 1965. This committee circulated the
'Scoresby letter' calling for increased branch representation
4 1at conference and on the executive. It attempted to tap into
branch revulsion at the abolition of the autonomous SEC
representation on the executive (see Mathews, 1986:120). The
Participants' panel of speakers, with their talks on the
Wyndham Report, were involved in a similar, if more indirect,
exercise. The executive's heavy-handed response to the
Scoresby challenge vindicated its critics. The tale was later
retold in Labor Comment. The Scoresby document was regarded as
so dangerous that state secretary Hartley wrote to branches and
SECs demanding they return the letter to him immediately:
Such was morale in the pliant branches that head 
office soon had a table littered with a pile of
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(presumably unread) Scoresby letters ('The 
Participants', May 1969. See also Mathews,1986 : 120-1) .
When Labor Comment first appeared, the Australian
reported that it was under the sponsorship of the Scoresby
committee ('The Political Circus', 19 November 1965).
This confusion between the Participants and the Scoresby
exercise was cleared up by Mathews. The committee was composed
of 'socialists in the ALP mainstream' (letter, Australian, 1
December 1965). Its terms of reference were organisational:
... and their purpose to determine one aspect 
of the changes which must be made in order to give 
the ALP a membership in number and quality 
adequate for effective political operations.
Participants were wary of declaring themselves at 
this stage. The Scoresby letter took up some important 
Participant themes, but Mathews had been advocating them for 
quite some time. The official response queried the Scoresby 
figures and classified party membership data as confidential 
('Lush Rumours as Basis of Hint and Guess', Fact, 22 April 
1965). Mathews replied that, whatever the figures, there was 
room for improvement (letter, Fact, 20 May 1966). The branch 
structure had been 'outstripped by social change'. It had 
served Labor when the majority of the electorate belonged to 
the industrial working-class and daily experience strengthened 
their solidarity and consciousness of capitalist exploitation 
and injustice, but:
... failed to cope with the challenge of a 
community in which a majority of the workforce are 
white-collar workers.
For Mathews, the appropriate 'modern' form of 'grass roots' 
organisation involved the consolidation of branches into larger 
units. Routine functions and political education should be
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clearly separated. Political education was a state executive 
responsibility. Scoresby committee members and others could be 
drafted to plan 'a new system of electoral organisation' with 
'direct access to accurately identified community groups'. The 
executive would have to concede members 'a significant say' in 
party management.4^
Many local branches were unwilling to revolt.
Mathews' own branch (Croydon) rejected the motion setting up
the inquiry, before it was passed by Scoresby SEC (Lew Gibson,
letter, Fact, 20 May 1966). State Branch president Bill Brown
argued Mathews had no bona fide organisational concern but
wanted to 'exploit branch members for other ends' ('Debate on
4 3Role of Mathews', Fact, 22 April 1966). Hartley saw the
Scoresby exercise as an ideological attack on the executive.
In defending the executive's recommendation to abandon separate
SEC representation after only one year, Bill Brown sent a
special letter to conference delegates. Electing SEC
representatives by the whole conference would:
... ensure that the will of Conference and its 
adherence to the present socialist criteria be 
maintained (quoted, Mathews, 1986:120).
7E Non-Response : 1965 Federal Conference
The SA convention ignored the Wyndham Report. SA 
delegates would oppose reorganisation at federal meetings. In 
July 1965, the NOPC rejected most of Wyndham's recommendations 
(including the admission of the parliamentary leaders to the 
federal bodies) or referred them back to the Branches. Thus 
the bulk of Wyndham's proposals were unlikely to be considered
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by Federal Conference (Robert Daniel, 'Wyndham Plan Gets 
Stinging Rebuff', Australian, 14 July 1965). The report's 
supporters believed that they had lost only the first round in 
a fight with the left for federal reconstruction ('ALP 
Reconstruction Report May Not Be Discussed', (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 31 July 1965).
Federal Conference began on 2 August at Hellenic
House in Elizabeth Street, Sydney. As it was about to open
Sydney Morning Herald journalist Ian Fitchett speculated that
most Labor supporters would regret the shelving of the Wyndham
Report ('Labor's Future Depends on this Conference', 2 August
1965). Wyndham's main achievement might have been to show 'the
diminishing "rank-and-file"' how weak its voice was:
The message must be: "Build up your branches and
bring your louder voice to bear on your State 
branches".
The only groups that attempted this were the Participants and 
the Scoresby committee. They had little impact. Fitchett 
thought Labor also needed change at the top. Without 'dynamic 
new leadership', it would 'wither and decline'. Whitlam 
carried the hopes of many 'party reform' supporters. The line 
he carved out linked reorganisation to opposition to 'unity
*-N
tickets' and support for 'state aid'. This put him at odds 
with Calwell.
Whitlam made his position clear. In March 1965, he
denounced the Victorian executive's 'unrepresentativeness' and
'anti-Americanism' ('Whitlam Will Face Vic ALP', Courier-Mail,
4416 March 1965). He threw down the gauntlet on 'unity
tickets' in a controversial speech at Newcastle Workers'
4 5Club. He warned about the opportunities union affiliation
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gave minority parties to subvert the ALP (Whitlam, 1966:252).
He declared war on 'unity tickets' to assert Labor's 'anti­
communist' credentials. He made much of changes in the 
workforce. Collaboration with white-collar unions was 
important. Labor needed a more national structure. In a 
carefully coded attack on the Victorian executive, Whitlam 
declared Labor was weakest where it was not fully 
representative of the whole union movement. Being fully 
representative of its affiliate base was not enough. Labor had 
to 'woo the white collars'. Many industrial workers had sons 
and daughters who were:
... entering the professions and taking clerical 
positions .. . The great change in the composition 
of the work force is largely explained by the vision 
and encouragement of the miner or other industrial 
worker for his family (Whitlam, 1966:253).
Unionism was changing. ACSPA unions were growing dramatically.
The new collective professional worker was a favourite Whitlam
theme. The current generation contained more 'professional
people' than all previous generations combined (Whitlam,
1966:254). The ACTU sought industrial support from ACSPA and
the High Council of Commonwealth Public Service Associations.
The ALP should seek political support:
Investors and directors can make and carry out 
their own decisions on the use they make of 
Australia's resources and the opportunities 
they offer to other Australians. All employees 
and, not least, white-collar employees should 
look to the Labor Party as their instrument for 
making fair decisions on resources and 
opportunities.
Unions should support 'party reform' against the obstruction of 
state ALP officials.
Some of Whitlam's (1966:257) remarks aroused 
considerable antagonism, especially his attack on 'unity
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ticketers' who 'betrayed' the ALP to hang on to union jobs:
These men are without honour or courage; 
they put their own interests before those of 
the party to which they and their unions owe 
allegiance. 46
Tribune quoted outraged union officials ('Trade Union Anger at
1 *7Whitlam Attack', 30 June 1965) and linked Whitlam's attack on
'unity tickets' to his support for 'party reform':
The speech was part of a two-pronged attack now 
being developed by right-wing circles generally 
against the role and influence of the trade 
unions in the broad affairs of the labour 
movement.
Whitlam would increase ALP 'party-political interference' in 
unions:
The second line of attack on the trade unions 
is a scheme to weaken union influence from the 
top controlling authority of the ALP.
Party reform proposals could not avoid being embroiled willy- 
nilly in ongoing Labor disputes.
Addressing the 1965 Federal Conference, Whitlam 
repeated his favourite themes. He strongly endorsed the 
Wyndham Report, but seemed to conflate Wyndham's modest short­
term proposals with his own earlier suggestion; a new 'Mass
4 8Conference' based on FECs and federal unions (ALP, 1965:255). 
Adoption of the Wyndham proposals would give ALP 
parliamentarians the sort of profile their counterparts had in 
other socialist parties. Whitlam claimed widespread party 
support for broadening the Conference. Labor should abandon 
its federalist practices and leave states' rights to the 
Liberals. He welcomed the admission of the press to 
Conference. Rank-and-file members were only able to find out 
about the Wyndham recommendations through the media (ALP, 
1965:257). Union and party journals had not been informative.
183
Labor had to cultivate intellectual support and 'expert'
49advice.
The 1965 Federal Conference abolished the 'White 
Australia' plank, further clarified the ban on 'unity tickets' 
and reaffirmed opposition to 'state aid' for non-government 
schools. There was no reorganisation debate. The NSW proposal 
for a 132-delegate Conference was formally moved, but rendered 
irrelevant by a motion from Wyndham himself, on behalf of the 
Federal Executive, asking the NOPC to continue its 
deliberations and consultations on the report (ALP, 1965:99). 
This was passed unanimously. A further resolution from Bert 
Milliner (Qld) stipulated that a special Federal Conference on 
reorganisation would be held following the NOPC review. This 
was also passed unanimously.
Wyndham took the opportunity, when moving his motion, 
to rebut distortions of his report. There were so many and 
varied criticisms, he sometimes wondered what document his 
detractors were talking about ('ALP "New Look" Talks Called', 
Age, 7 August 1965). The report was mentioned a lot more often 
than read. The proposals would not hand the party over to the 
parliamentarians ('Wyndham Says Plan Would Lift Unions', 
Canberra Times, 7 August 1965). Long-term Conference reform 
would strengthen the position of unions, giving them direct 
federal representation.
Wyndham could only argue for further consideration of 
his report. The NOPC had foreclosed general debate on his 
proposals. No delegate was willing to re-open it on the 
Conference floor. In the circumstances, party reformers 
welcomed Milliner's motion (see Overacker, 1968:110). The
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special 'reorganisation' Conference could prevent the NOPC from 
burying the whole issue.
Observers interpreted the Conference as a setback for 
both Whitlam and 'party reform'. The Canberra Times suggested 
Whitlam's pre-Conference barnstorming had been counter­
productive ('Victory for the Left Wing', 4 August 1965).
Greater focus on the Wyndham Report might have yielded him 
more.^ This was probably wishful thinking. Another view was 
that the opening of the Conference to the press and decisions 
on topics such as 'White Australia' indicated new forces were 
making their presence felt in the party. Openness to the media 
had largely erased the 'faceless men' image (Overacker, 
1968:109). Much of the platform was rewritten. 'Younger, more 
radical elements' had emerged at Labor's top policy-making 
levels (James Jupp, 'Radicals Find Room at the Top', Canberra 
Times, 9 August 1965). Jupp preferred the terms 'radical' 
and 'conservative' to 'left' and 'right'. He thought Labor 
'radicals' had a leader in Whitlam, who
... mapped out precisely the attitude to the future 
which had come to be accepted as standard in 
Western Social Democracy. 51
The 'rational radicals' made policy gains, but the 'instinctive 
conservatives' still held sway in their organisational arena. 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 made greater progress 
within the ALP as a policy package than as a new organisational 
model.
Those favouring the organisational status quo found 
the 1965 Conference decisions congenial. Whitlam's rhetoric 
was not enough to deflect delegates from attachment to a 
structure they were thoroughly familiar with and happy to leave
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alone. Calwell defended his leadership by attacking the press 
(ALP, 1965:249). Defending his decisions to accept a place on 
the Victorian executive in 1964 and become a Victorian Federal 
Executive delegate in 1965, Calwell criticised the Wyndham 
Report implicitly:
If Leaders are elected by their State Branches 
to Party Executives or Party Conferences, they 
can take part directly in policy-making 
decisions. Whether they win or lose, they are 
bound by those decisions.
I don't want the right to have two bites of the 
cherry (ALP, 1965:252).
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CHAPTER 8
POST-MORTEM POLITICS AGAIN - 'DISLOYALTY' AND 'ADAPTATION*
8A Crises in 1966
Had the Wyndham Report been implemented, 1966 would 
have been 'Membership Year' with special meetings, conferences 
and rallies to bolster recruitment. Such was not to be. In 
1966, Labor found itself regularly in the headlines over 
internal disputes as 1965 Conference compromises came unstuck. 
The particularly contentious 'state aid' issue served as a 
battleground for more general conflicts. Injudicious 
intervention by Whitlam almost had him expelled in March. The 
following month he was manoeuvring to challenge Calwell. A 
Special Federal Conference in July reversed Labor's opposition 
to 'state aid'. When the federal election came in November, 
Labor was defeated easily after campaigning against 
conscription and the Vietnam War. After abating in the run-up 
to the election, intra-party hostilities reopened as different 
groups drew different 'lessons' from the defeat. Whitlam and 
his supporters argued Labor had to 'adapt' to changes in 
Australian society. Calwell and the Federal Executive argued 
that Whitlam had been 'disloyal'. Competing 'disloyalty' and 
'adaptation' rhetorics were deployed in complicated ways.
A Federal Executive 'interpretation' of the ambiguous 
1965 Conference resolution on 'state aid' was the catalyst for 
much of the pre-election conflict (Overacker, 1968:112).
Federal parliamentarians were instructed to oppose any 
extension of grants to private schools for science
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laboratories.-*- The Executive also established a legal 
committee to investigate challenging the constitutionality of 
'state aid'. The 1965 Conference, while opposing the general 
principle of 'state aid' appeared to accept existing programmes 
as faits accomplis. Whitlam strongly disputed the Executive 
'interpretation'. He took the opportunity to raise the general 
issue of party reorganisation, which was beginning to slip from 
Labor's agenda ('Whitlam Declares Open War on ALP's Federal 
Executive', Canberra Times, 2 February 1966). After attacking 
'petty men' who wanted to reduce the ALP to their 'personal
nplaything',“ Whitlam again called for Federal Conference
3reform. On television, his attack was more pointed:
We've only just got rid of the 36 faceless men 
stigma to be faced with twelve witless men ...
Do you realise four of these people live on the 
Labor movement, batten on the Labor movement as 
paid secretaries? (quoted, Calwell, 1978:229).
In the same interview he ruffled Labor feathers further by
declaring his 'destiny' to lead the FPLP.
Whitlam's opponents thought these remarks gave them
4enough cause to expel him from the party. Just before the 
Federal Executive meeting which would decide Whitlam's fate, 
Calwell exultantly telephoned supporters that he 'had the 
numbers' against his deputy ('Labor Indecision : Mr Whitlam's 
"Loyalty" Trial Collapses', Age, 4 March 1966). Calwell 
assumed Victoria, SA, WA and Queensland would all support 
expulsion. However, in a day of drama, the Queensland Central 
Executive*, in the form of secretary Tom Burns, asked Queensland 
delegates (Jim Keeffe and Fred Whitby) to leave Whitlam alone. 
He had campaigned strongly in a federal by-election Labor had 
just won in Queensland, where a state election was due. Keeffe
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and Whitby reluctantly complied. With the forces for and 
against expulsion equally divided, the issue was referred to a 
Special Federal Conference later that month. There Whitlam 
apologised and was mildly reprimanded. Ironically Tom Burns 
and the Queensland executive had saved Whitlam on 2 March 
through a classic 'machine' manoeuvre.
The disputes over 'state aid' and Whitlam's comments
did not get federal reorganisation back on the agenda but the
subject got some airing, albeit in partly coded terms.
Victorian secretary Hartley complained that:
... some were using the issue of constitutional 
reform of Labor to hide very deep ideological 
differences within the party ('One Man to 
Blame: Labor Split Claim - Hartley', Age,
4 April 1966 ) . 5
Just before the crucial Federal Executive meeting, Chamberlain 
stressed the responsibility of those holding important party 
positions:
... to observe and protect constitutional 
procedures and policies. That was because any 
breach of that responsibility had widespread 
repercussions among the rank-and-file who had 
personal loyalty to such people (John Slee,
'Chamberlain Hits Out at Whitlam', West 
Australian, 1 March 1966).
Chamberlain saw himself and the eleven other 'witless men' as
the final and proper arbiters and protectors of Labor
procedures and policies. Early in the crisis, Calwell
declared on ATV-6 (Ballarat):
Those who want to change the party structure 
want to turn the ALP into an alternative Liberal 
Party (quoted, Fact, 25 February 1966). 7
Whitlam and his supporters scored a further win at 
the Special 'state aid' Federal Conference in Surfers Paradise 
in July. Deadlock between delegations was resolved when
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Calwell broke ranks with his Victorian comrades. Academic 
'adaptation' advocate Louise Overacker (1968:117) argued much 
delay and friction might have been avoided if the federal 
bodies had been in closer touch with rank-and-file opinion and 
on better terms with the FPLP. The tortuous process of 
changing the 'state aid' platform 'emphasized the need for 
better policy-making machinery'. Even those who supported such 
an analysis did not act on it at the time. An election was due 
in a few months. This made it difficult to reopen the 
reorganisation debate (Overacker, 1968:110). The Whitlam 
forces contented themselves with their 'state aid' win. The 
question of reorganisation had become entwined with the 
leadership issue. Calwell, whatever his own position on the 
abstract desirability of Federal Conference reform, championed 
the status quo. The party was heading into an election under 
him. The challenge in the FPLP had been held off. 
Reorganisation would become a big issue if Labor went down to 
its expected defeat. Wyndham's proposals would then resurface
Q(Rawson, 1966b:156-7 ) . Calwell had indicated he would stand 
down in such circumstances.
While Labor crises and the imminent election pushed 
reorganisation from the agenda in 1966, the Wyndham Report was 
still given occasional consideration. The main debate was in 
Victoria, spurred on by the Participants. Barry Jones warned 
that if Labor did not reform itself, Australia could end up 
with a one-and-a-half party system ('Labor's Election Hopes 
Almost Nil : Labor Man' Age, 11 May 1966). Several branches 
called on the executive to clarify its position on the Wyndham 
Report. It did so, favouring retention of strict federal
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principles in party organisation. It opposed adding
'superannuary' personnel, who were not elected by the state
Branches, to the federal bodies (ALP, Victorian Branch,
91966:33). The Victorian executive's federalism was not based 
on any permanent organisational principle, but was caused by 
'the present leaders' considering themselves to be threatened 
by 'the present NSW leaders' and saw 'the present leaders in 
some of the smaller states' as useful allies (Rawson, 1965:29).
The Victorian executive's substantial rejection of 
the Wyndham Report was upheld by state conference. The anti­
executive forces, now organised by the Participants, consoled 
themselves that the 184-95 margin was 'a vast improvement on 
their usual position' (Geoffrey Barker, 'Left Wingers Retain 
Firm Hold', Age, 14 June 1966 ).1(^ The Participants continued to 
press strongly for full implementation of the Wyndham Report.
Jim Cairns argued the organisational debate boiled 
down to which leading party personalities delegates identified 
with:
If you want a radical policy who would you choose?
Hartley or Wyndham? And, let's be frank, Whitlam 
or me? (quoted, Age, 14 June 1966).
Factional realpolitik and party traditions offered better
organisational guidelines than 'rationalistic idealist' reform
plans, Cairns implied. He admitted defects in the ALP
structure, but repairing them did not involve any specifically
organisational principles. The flow of influence from the
rank-and-file had always been obstructed ('Labor Must Not
Surrender its Traditions', Socialist and Industrial Labor,
February 1966). 'Checks and balances' gave those higher up in
the party disproportionate influence. Executives and
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conferences had always been small. This could be blamed on the
tyranny of distance. It was 'the result of the sort of country
that Australia is'. Perhaps ALP vealpolitik was geographically
determined! The influence of executives and conferences, in
ALP history, had been in the interests of the rank-and-file,
12Cairns argued. He did not consider Wyndham's suggestion that 
links between the party membership and the FPLP could be 
improved by by-passing the state Branch organisational 
leaderships.
Labor was in disarray during the 1966 election,
although it was ready to take a strong stand against
conscription and the Vietnam War. Internal conflicts delayed
campaign planning (Overacker, 1968:117). Finance was scarce.
Right-wing MHR Allan Fraser asked 'Can Labor Win the Election?'
(Sunday Telegraph, 14 August 1966). Radio and TV time would
require money. On the Vietnam War, Labor had to maintain its
principles,^  while saying 'to hell with Communism'. Fraser
also thought Labor had to show it was free from 'outside
control'. Fraser's outspoken support for 'state aid' earlier
in the year had him in trouble with the Federal Executive. He
had attempted to raise the reorganisation issue then:
The issue is that the executive shall be the 
servant and not master of the membership ... the 
policy must be made by the party as a whole in a 
directly representative conference ... this must 
not be supplanted by the edicts of a handful of 
officials (quoted, Aitkin, 1966:117). 14
Some Gallup polls suggested Labor's chances were 
slim. Queensland by-election victor Rex Patterson, on the 
basis of private polling, thought Labor should drop its 
opposition to the war and concentrate on domestic issues.
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On the other hand, Bill Hartley thought a February
1966 poll portended a ’sensational political swing':
For the first time in many years, the collective 
support for the Labor Party by women was greater 
than by men. The obvious reason: Conscription 
for Vietnam ... ('Vietnam Swing is Gaining 
Force', Herald, 10 November 1966).
8B 'Disloyalty' and 'Adaptation1 Rhetorics
The sensational swing did net materialise. Labor did
even worse than in 1963. Its share of first preference votes
15(40%) was the lowest since 1931. Factional conflict 
continued in the run-up to the election. During the campaign 
Whitlam appeared to distance himself from Calwell's opposition 
to Australian involvement in Vietnam. He suggested an ALP 
government might retain some regular troops in a 'holding 
operation'. The post-mortem was bound to be bitter. Calwell 
and Chamberlain fulminated about Whitlam's 'disloyalty', while 
Whitlam's supporters thought the time was ripe to reopen the 
reorganisation battle. Ironworkers' national leader Laurie 
Short suggested that if Labor could not learn the 'obvious 
lessons' from 'this disaster', it faced 'a very bleak future 
indeed' ('Labor Vietnam View Rejected, Says Calwell', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 28 November 1966). What the obvious lessons 
were was a matter of bitter disputation. What you thought they 
were depended to a large extent on where you stood in the Labor 
spectrum.
Press commentators generally sympathised with the 
'adaptation' analysis. In the Australian, Alan Ramsey and 
Patrick Nilon predicted 'more muck-raking' and settling of 
personal scores rather than 'an objective appraisal of what
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went wrong' or any realisation that Labor had 'lost its way in
modern society' ('The Party's Over', 1 December 1966).
Defenders of Calwell and the Federal Executive got short
shrift. The ALP 'modernisers' and their sympathisers used the
Wyndham Report as a reference point. The Canberra Times again
urged the ALP to adopt Wyndham's proposals:
The challenge now is to merge the old traditions 
into a programme fitting a society in which the 
blue collars dissolve into a sea of white. There 
is radicalism under the white shirt but it has 
nothing to do with the dole. It is more directly 
connected with the principles inherent in the 
Wyndham plan, seeking to build Labor as a mass 
party with a unitary structure which reduces the 
power of the old State machines and the trade 
union vote ('A Hard Job to Salvage', 3 December 
1966 ) .
Chamberlain articulated the Federal Executive's 
'disloyalty' analysis. Loss of support was due to 'lack of 
loyalty to principles, policy and leadership' within the party 
('Chamberlain Blames Lack of Loyalty', West Australian, 29 
November 1966). Even the 'finest organisational machinery' 
would not be much use if Labor presented an image of dissension 
and disunity. He clearly saw Whitlam as the chief culprit. 
Calwell agreed. His confidential report devoted 13 of 32 
foolscap typed pages to problems of disunity and personality 
conflicts (Calwell, 1978:232-3). He went into much detail, 
because he felt strongly about the matter. Whitlam's name was 
mentioned often in what Calwell saw as a catalogue of 
disloyalties.^
Defenders of the internal ALP status quo saw 'party 
reform' as an attempt to change Labor ideology. Public 
complaints about the party structure were 'disloyal'.
Calwell's report remained more or less confidential. His
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public comments aligned him with those who seemed more worried
about 'disloyalty' than about organisational anachronisms.
Those emphasising 'disloyalty' were prepared to concede some
organisational deficiencies but implied they could be remedied
without drastic restructuring. Cairns warned that the party
could only be led effectively by 'consultation with the whole
movement' and especially 'with those near to the top who
represent somewhat different views' ('Labor's Guiding Role in
Politics', Advertiser, 7 December 1966). Labor should not
become too despondent. An election should not be judged by the
same criteria as a football match. The result was a judgement
on 'the current state of acceptability' of Labor principles,
17not of 'their essential rightness'.
There were some interesting parallels between Cairns' 
'left-wing' analysis and comments by leading 'right-wing'
18parliamentarian Allan Fraser ('Stocktaking by Labor Party'). 
Fraser dismissed the suggestion that Labor should reverse 
crucial policies on issues like Vietnam. That would be 'the 
most facile course' and 'the most obviously futile'.
Identifying with US policy in Asia, jumping on the 
anti-Communist bandwagon and 'piping down on social welfare' 
would not dispel Labor's woes. Here the parallel with Cairns 
ends. Fraser had been advocating reorganisation since the 1963 
defeat. He now returned to one of his favourite themes, 
enunciating the 'party disorganisation' explanation of the 
election loss. This tended to be crudely correlated with 
'right-wing' factional alignment, compared to the left's 
emphasis on 'disloyalty'. The significance of such 
correlations should not be exaggerated.
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Fraser hoped the post-mortem focus would be on what
Labor could do to get back into government. How could it
harmonise its policies mere with Australian public opinion
without losing its soul? Press bias was real but the party
could present itself more carefully. Reorganisation was the
19route to rejuvenation.
Pointing to organisational 'problems' was not simply
a response to election defeat. Wyndham's 'solutions' had been
around for a while (and they echoed earlier complaints). They
were easily available for deployment in post-mortem debates.
The losses in 1966 gave opportunities for supporters of
Wyndham's 'solutions' to champion them again and to catalogue
the 'problems' they might 'solve'. Fraser dramatically
exaggerated the Liberals' superior electoral organisation to
20support his case for Labor professionalism. His
reorganisation strategy centred on Conference reform and local
branch renewal. A Conference mainly made up of directly
elected FEC delegates would lead to 'a great increase in branch
membership and interest'. Fraser did not mention direct
federal union representation. He wanted a 'middle of the road'
Labor Party, neither anti-American nor pro-Communist. He
attacked authoritarianism within the party. Recognition of
members' right to differ within the bounds of the party's
broad-based principles was central to recovery. Fraser opposed
Calwell's view that Labor needed stronger discipline and more
integration with the union movement. Calwell wanted to run a
21tighter and less leak-prone ship in parliament.
WWF secretary Charlie Fitzgibbon's soothing 
statements bridged competing rhetorics. On the one hand, it
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was time for Labor to take 'a good long objective look' at 
itself ('Shock Election Defeat and its Lessons for Labor', 
Maritime Worker, 7 December 1966). 'State jealousy and bigoted 
thinking' were a hindrance. Could the ALP remain 'the mass 
political voice of the workers' without federal reorganisation, 
including federal union affiliation and 'a properly based 
Federal Conference'? On the other hand, Fitzgibbon 
specifically emphasised 'party unity' and nodded towards party 
tradition:
The workers of this country will hope that the
ALP remains the socialist-based party it has
always been.
An interesting contribution from Doug White in the 
CPA-sponsored Australian Left Review complicated the factional 
classification of the competing rhetorics. It articulated a 
distinctive left-wing 'adaptation' analysis. The 1966 election 
marked the dea+-h throes of Australian Laborism (White,
1967:47). Restating the best labour movement traditions 
'without taking into account present day reality' was no longer 
an option. - Labor lost support in factories and on building 
sites, but schools, universities (and the intelligentsia 
generally) swung against the government (White, 1967:48). This 
decline in class consciousness was presented in holistic 
'marxist' terms: working class 'social being' included more
than work relationships. With 'a shift in emphasis from 
production to salesmanship' and media growth, leisure-time 
relationships contradicted 'the ideology which could be 
expected to arise from work relationships'. Such a decline in 
old working class ideology did not herald the decline of 
radical and socialist politics. The 'end of ideology' was not
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at hand, but parties of the left had to find new ways to pursue
radical and socialist projects. White (1967:50) was
enthusiastic about the political potential of the new
2 2Australian intelligentsia. Although he used different
terminology, his argument echoed Whitlam's. The
intelligentsia's ideology arose from its lifestyle:
The theme of individual responsibility, a respect 
for the humanity of others, a refusal to hand 
over one's moral obligations or power to make 
decisions to another, is characteristic.
'Knowledge' challenged 'authority' in this rather romantic
model of professional integrity: 'The machine, public service
regulations, history or the organisation' could not determine
what was correct. 'New forces for social reform' were
emerging. Socialist ideology had to be reformulated and
progressive unity reconceptualised. Communist WWF official
Norm Docker (1967:23) replied that the 'sectoral trends' White
referred to were hardly sufficient evidence for his
conclusions. Docker dis-aggregated the category
'intelligentsia'. Different types of intellectuals had
different class positions; although more were linked to the
working class than before. White's analysis, however, was more
important for the possibility it offered of changing the terms
of the debate than for its actual conclusions. A left-wing
'adaptation' project was possible, although this position did
not receive much consideration inside the ALP.
8C Calwell's Confidential Report
Calwell's report (NSW ALP Branch Records ML Mss 
2083/14/283) maintained its confidentiality more successfully
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than Whitlam's 1964 document.23 Calwell strongly condemned
'disloyalty', but was not totally opposed to reorganisation.
He had his own version of 'party reform'. Those who
characterised Calwell's conception of the party as 
24anachronistic might have had their views confirmed by his 
suggestion that Labor was still wracked by the effects of the 
World War I conscription split. Australian society had changed 
considerably between 1917 and 1967. Calwell argued that ethno- 
sectarian tensions dating back to 1916-17 lingered in the ALP. 
Rebuilding the pre-1917 ALP was hardly an option in 1967. 
Although Calwell gestured in that direction, it would be a 
caricature to say that he advocated such a course.
Calwell claimed that his report set out the reasons 
for Labor's setback 'without rancour or resentment', but the 
'disloyalties' of Whitlam in particular were carefully 
recounted. The section on 'Disunity' was the longest one.23 
The report, however, also illustrated Calwell's dissatisfaction 
with the party structure, painted as 'the basic reason' for 
Labor's poor electoral record. The ALP was still a federation 
of six colonial parties. Despite its members' 'healthy 
Australianism' and their 'noble ideal' of constitutional 
reform, the party functioned as 'six watertight compartments', 
each more interested in state than federal office. This echoed 
long-standing Whitlam themes. Calwell drew on the anti­
federalist rhetoric which had always gone hand-in-hand with 
Labor's internal federalisation (see Crisp, 1978; Galligan, 
1981a).
Calwell saw Conference reform as the appropriate 
'solution' to Labor's organisational 'problems'. It was 'the
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only way ... to develop on a truly national basis' (NSW ALP
Branch Records ML Mss 2083/14/283). He favoured direct
representation for FECs and federal unions. The latter would
have 60 percent of the delegates. This provision
differentiated Calwell's plan from what Whitlam had advocated 
2 6in 1964. Calwell paid greater attention to the affiliated
(mainly blue-collar) unions. Calwell wanted a card vote for
2 7union delegates (as in Britain).
Calwell's line is interesting, although it was not
seriously pursued and is something of an historical curiosity.
Generally those who opposed the Whitlam/Wyndham conception of
'party reform' made little attempt to defend the details of the
traditional party structure. They preferred' to find suspect
motives for the reform plans. Calwell's response was
different. He accepted the critique of internal federalism and
the need for 'party reform', but delineated a 'party reform'
plan, imbued with his own concerns.
Calwell argued Labor's 'crisis mentality' was
inappropriate. Labor could only become 'the major political
force' by convincing voters that 'democratic socialism' was
'better than monopoly capitalism'. Labor's federal finances
were 'pathetically weak'. He shared Wyndham's preference for
nationally uniform preselection methods. He suggested an
electoral college weighted in favour of local branches. This
2 8could assist local branch renewal.
Calwell stressed that co-operation between the party
and the union movement had been in decline since 1949, a year
of confrontation between the Chifley Government and the Miners' 
29Federation. The Split and the dis-affiliation of some
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'Grouper'-led unions accentuated this decline. ALP/ACTU co­
ordination was non-existent. Without close links between the 
ACTU, the FPLP and the Federal Executive:
... the forces of monopoly capitalism will continue 
to triumph, and the wealth producers of Australia, 
whether white collar workers, non-white collar workers, 
or primary producers, will continue to suffer and 
questions like education and social services will 
continue to be neglected.
Few unions gave generously to the ALP at election time.
Many workers were not unionised and many unionists
did not vote ALP. Calwell wanted a combined ACTU/ALP response
to such problems. Traditional Laborist practices and forms of
militancy remained relevant in the 'so-called affluent
society', characterised by:
... profitless prosperity, in which the great 
majority of people are in debt, and where wives 
have to work, and where workers have to take two 
jobs, or seek overtime, to meet hire purchase 
payments at usurers' rates of interest.
Calwell seems to have had militant pursuit of the old gender-
inbased 'family wage' ideal (see Macintyre, 1985:58) in mind.
He did, however, chide:
... certain elements in our party membership who 
pussy-foot on such issues as the cruel, dirty 
war in Vietnam ... (NSW ALP Branch Records,
ML Mss 2083/14/283).
Although he had described the organisational
structure as the basic reason for Labor's electoral
difficulties, Calwell explained the 1966 loss in terms of
Liberal-Country vilification and internal personal and policy
conflicts. He castigated Whitlam for insufficient loyalty.
Whitlam's 1964 document was 'arrant nonsense ... self-
31glorification and opportunism'. Whitlam's description of him 
as 'old-fashioned' particularly incensed Calwell. It was
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'gross disloyalty'. Some of Whitlam's calls for reorganisation
were seen in the same light. Calwell raked over the 'state
aid'/'witless men' crisis, arguing that ambition had led
Whitlam, the self-proclaimed man of destiny, to throw the party
into grievously damaging, needless turmoil. 'Intrigues and
denigrations of my leadership' continued, even after the
'witless men' incident had been patched up. The last straw for
Calwell was a Whitlam speech in Adelaide, fudging Labor's
opposition to the Vietnam War. More generally, Calwell called
for a more disciplined Caucus. The FPLP could not be run:
... like a Victorian boarding school, but it should 
be run along business-like lines. The board members 
of a major company, particularly when it is in 
trouble, do not shout their criticism of each other 
from the floor of the stock exchange.
A revealing analogy! Calwell wanted MPs to stop leaks which
enabled the media to present the party as 'a disunited rabble,
unfit to govern and incapable of working together'.
After insisting that there could be no reconciliation
with the DLP, Calwell concluded with more on restoring
ALP/union co-operation. The gulf between different unions was
widening. The old 'clear identity of interests' between the
32union movement and the ALP no longer existed, but there was
light on the hill. Labor was no more down and out than it had
been in 1931 or 1917. It could win in 1972, perhaps even 1969:
It is not a matter of discarding our ideology, it is 
a question of modernising the internal activities of 
the party and instilling into its members a feeling 
of confidence and unity around ... democratic 
socialism and a healthy Australianism. Unity is 
strength and only real unity can give us victory.
The populist and racist connotations of Calwell's 'healthy
Australianism' raise queries about the 'democratic socialist'
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nature of such a project. However, Calwell's Labor 
'traditionalism' was qualified. He seemed prepared to 
countenance some reorganisation, while distrusting the motives 
of the party reformers and would-be reorganisers.
8D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': Once Again
The Participants were quick to step up their calls
for party reorganisation and professionalisation after the 1966
defeat. The 6 percent drop in the ALP vote was:
... one of the strongest rebukes the Australian 
public has ever given a political party ...
Public rejection of this order was the 
inevitable and deserved fate of a Party that 
has refused to learn any lessons from 17 years 
in opposition ('A Disgraceful Result - But It's Time 
to Think of 1969', Labor Comment, December 1966).
Strong words. The Participants felt the result vindicated
their previous criticisms of Labor's lack of political
professionalism and membership participation (not always
compatible qualities). They deplored Labor's tendency to see
politics 'as a matter of striking attitudes' rather than 'a
complex business of winning people over' to a practicable
social reform programme. Labor Comment almost exulted in the
party's humiliation. The result had a 'comforting feature'.
It demonstrated the sensitivity of public opinion. Public
rejection of a 'sick' party augured well for a 'healthy',
reorganised ALP. But the patient had to be disabused of the
3 3merits of a rival diagnosis, centred on 'disloyalty'. In the
Participant analysis, Labor had not been serious about winning.
34Political idealism and romanticism had led it astray. Labor 
needed more money and more paid officials ( 'Party Reform is 
Urgent Task ...', Labor Comment, December 1966).
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Wyndham's suggestions on regular bank orders and subscription 
cards for party supporters could be taken up. Once finance 
improved, Labor could embark on research, publicity and 
advertising projects.
The Participants complained more about the exclusion 
of parliamentary than branch member influence from what was 
presented as a 'union-dominated' party machine. The ALP, the 
Participants complained, was 'just about unique in the world' 
in allowing union-dominated conferences to dictate to 
parliamentary leaders. This tendentious analysis ascribed 
'completely unnecessary faction fights' to a debilitating 
tendency for Trades Hall politics to spill over into the ALP. 
The Participants paid little attention to the possibility that 
increased 'participation' by branch members might increase 
factional differentiation.
The Participants sought better representation for
3 5Victorian branches and SECs. Membership rights was a crucial 
part of their initial charter, as their name suggests.
Changing the complexion of the state executive was even more 
central to their project. They wanted automatic representation 
for the Trades Hall Council, the ACTU and white collar unions 
on the executive. Participant 'party reform' had its own 
contradictions:
They warn against control of the ALP by outside 
organizations, yet are prepared to give ACPSA 
(many of whose member organizations are 
politically non-partisan) the THC and the 
ACTU the right to appoint members of the VCE 
(Hudson, 1968:20).
The point of the 'reform' campaign was to replace the VCE with 
one that would support Whitlam. Arguments for 'modernisation' 
and 'efficiency' were incidental. Perhaps they were a
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'rationalistic idealist' gloss on a minority faction's
Realpolitik. However the 'rationalistic idealist' logic
deployed by the Participants raised important strategic issues
that could not be dismissed with calls for party 'loyalty'.
'Unity tickets' had both electoral and intra-party
Realpolitik implications for the Participants. They wanted to
curb 'Communist-dominated' union influence:
One simple, if drastic, solution would be to 
disaffiliate unions with paid officers who are 
members of a Party other than the ALP. Another 
would be to limit their voting rights at 
Conference. 36
The Participants attacked suggestions that Labor should 'turn
to the left', 'stick to its principles' and 'not become an
alternative Liberal party' ('Goldwaters in the ALP', Labor
3 7Comment, February 1967). Such slogans were invoked to give
refusal to change 'a spurious moral superiority'. Labor should
abandon romantic, idealist sloganeering:
It should be clear to anybody seriously interested 
in politics that political parties can't wave 
magic wands. Changing society for the better is 
hard, slogging work that requires clear thinking, 
realism and courage.
The case for reorganisation was also presented by two
leading Victorian ALP reform protagonists (John Paterson and
38Race Mathews) in the December 1966 issue of Overland.
39Paterson was a Labor Comment editorial board member. His 
article, presciently entitled 'Out of the Abyss', was written 
before the election. Mathews used the forum of a review of Don 
Rawson's Labor in Vain?4  ^ to canvass his own ideas on 
reorganisation. There were parallels between the two articles. 
Both were aimed at intellectual Labor supporters, but 
Paterson's 'managerialist' rhetoric and Mathews' more
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'participatory' arguments contained different rationales for 
party reform.
Paterson (1966:21) thought Labor's organisational
structure was unstable and out of kilter with the party's
political goals. Factionalism made for many interpretations of
Labor's goals. Party goals could not be traded for electoral
success 'without legitimately attracting the charge of
opportunism' (Paterson, 1966:25), but there was room for
considerable tactical discussion. Factional posturing hindered
this, preventing Labor from bearing electoral factors in mind
when settling on tactics. Paterson (1966:26) assumed there
were over-riding goals within the ALP:
It is a basic rule of organisational theory that 
once you know the goals you wish to reach, and 
measure your resources, then the correct structure 
of your organisation is specified. The overwhelming 
goal of the ALP at present must be to win power ...
Paterson's evaluation of Labor factionalism was
informed by his managerialist 'rationalistic idealism'. The
party should adopt rational criteria for its internal
operations. Appointments and preselections should be geared
towards electoral outcomes, instead of being 'counters in
private tactical games or rewards for services rendered'.
Labor needed 'the right people' in 'the right positions'.
The 'wrong' people were in control. This could only be righted
by a structure which provided a rational framework, as in any
'properly run' business or government department. Paterson did
not see increasing membership participation as a goal in its
own right. He deplored the irrationality.of factionalism.
The dominant Victorian TUDC group was:
... a good example of a faction which stifles 
discussion, makes inappropriate appointments,
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and has a record of electoral failure. It should 
be regarded, on a managerial basis alone, as 
subversive of the goals of the party.
Union blocs at state conferences hindered a rational allocation
of delegateships based on 'who has something to offer'.41
Federal Conferences were made up from the dominant faction in
each state, 'not the people who can contribute to electoral
success'.
For Paterson continued electoral failure fed into 
destructive inward-looking factionalism. The vicious circle 
served only the oligarchy of the 'wrong' people. An 
alternative virtuous circle would link electoral success to 
organisational 'sanity'. Paterson adopted the 'adaptation' 
analogy directly:
Organisations, like living organisms, must 
continually test themselves out on their 
environment ... If organisations do not work in 
a real environment they have to manufacture a 
fantasy-environment to give meaning to their 
existence. An organisation which does this is 
effectively insane.
The ALP is in this state. It regards seventeen 
years in the wilderness as a tribute to its moral 
virtue ... (See also Allan, 1980:3-4, 23, 29-30,
132-4, 157-62).
Thus Paterson's managerial 'rationalistic idealism' led him to 
see his factional opponents as effectively insane.4^
Paterson's subsidiary argument was that 'social 
change' had undermined old-style Labor factionalism. 
Relationships between politicians, supporters and voters were 
changing. ALP members had different 'authority beliefs', 
beliefs about who to believe on matters beyond personal 
experience (Paterson, 1966:25). What made political leaders 
'authoritative', in the community if not the party, was 
changing. Educational achievement and technical competence
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were becoming more important, as they increasingly resonated
with 'the individual aspirations of a large part of the 
4 3electorate'. Paterson articulated claims of (professional)
4 4'knowledge' against (party/'machine') 'authority'. But
this form of 'authority' had some democratic legitimacy.
'Knowledge' could be infused into the ALP in many ways, not
only the elitist one advocated by Paterson.
Paterson saw a professional, technically-proficient
'rational' style of politics as essential in a society
undergoing considerable modernisation and 'rationalisation'.
However, those who had steered the ALP into the abyss would
refuse to relinquish control. The 'dead-heads' would be
difficult to move. Rational decision-making on how to exit
from the abyss was unlikely. Paterson put his faith in 'the
strongman solution'. Changes could come from the top:
... at the hands of a ruthless federal leader, 
hell-bent for electoral success and recognising 
no loyalties other than the capacity to win ...
A leader who would 'crash through or crash' (see Oakes, 1976)?
A self-proclaimed 'man of destiny' who would overcome the
'witless' objections of the 'dead-heads'?
Whitlam, the sort of technocratic leader Paterson had
in mind, invoked a participatory rhetoric of renewal as well as
a managerial rhetoric of efficiency, in his arguments for party
reform. Race Mathews had been advocating ALP renewal for quite
some time. His conception of party reform was broader than
4Paterson's. Mathews (1966:28) warned Overland ~ readers that 
the left did not have a monopoly on radical and progressive 
positions in the ALP. Whatever their factional origins, 
organisational proposals should be evaluated objectively as to
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whether they advanced radical goals or not.47 ALP radicals and 
socialists found an administratively incompetent 'left' whose 
radicalism was fraudulent in conflict with a 'right' that was 
'ideologically repugnant' and not necessarily any more 
competent. The way issues were 'inevitably personalised' was 
symptomatic of Labor's 'low level of political debate'. 
Factional labels were misleading. The ALP had to be re­
politicised. A new leader or a different executive would solve 
little. 'A class and an institution' had to be dragged 'into 
the real world of contemporary Australian politics'. Once 
again changes in Australian society were assumed to necessitate 
changes in the ALP. Instead of Paterson's 'strong man 
solution', Mathews favoured a co-ordinated 'party renewal' 
project, by-passing obstructionist ruling factions and 
challenging oligarchical inertia at all levels. The 
Paterson/Mathews contrast illustrated tensions between 
'managerial' and 'participatory' arguments for party reform. 
Both were presented in mainly 'rationalistic idealist' terms.
Professional 'cosmopolitan' standards were invoked against
4 8internal 'parochial' ones (see Gabriel, 1981).
'Cosmopolitan'/'adaptation' and 'parochial'/ 
'disloyalty' arguments fed off each other's weaknesses. Thus, 
after Whitlam won the leadership and his troubles with the 
Federal Executive continued, Cairns stood against him, 
championing traditional intra-party democracy. He argued that 
Whitlam's ideas were characteristically 'theoretical and not 
drawn from a sense of history or particular circumstances' 
(Brian Johns, 'Dr Cairns States His Case', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 29 April 1968). Labor's consultative processes were
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'perhaps rough and ready, but basically sound' ('Dr Cairns's
Letter', Advertiser, 27 April 1968). 'Modernisers' would place
an elite or even an individual on top 'on the assumption that
it, or he, knows best', which was 'intellectual arrogance and
49dangerous folly'. This perspective punctures some 
'rationalistic-elitist' strains in many of the 'adaptation' 
analyses, but relies on 'rank-and-file' mythology which has 
never been much of a guide to internal ALP operations.
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CHAPTER 9
COMPROMISE ON PARTY REFORM, ADELAIDE, AUGUST 1967
9A Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, Phase I
The drama of the Calwell succession overshadowed 
debate on reorganisation. Would the front runner Whitlam be 
expelled because of his equivocation on Vietnam? Would Calwell 
defy expectations and soldier on? Would there be an agreed 
alternative to Whitlam? There was plenty to speculate on. 
Caucus met on 6 February. Calwell stepped down. Whitlam 
succeeded him, defeating four rivals, the main ones being the 
Victorians, Frank Crean and Jim Cairns.^ With his new 
authority, Whitlam rejoined the reorganisation battle. He 
wanted to modernise Australia ('Whitlam Meets the Press - He 
Accuses the Liberals of Passive Policies and Smugness', 
Australian, 10 February 1967). Labor would question everything 
that was being done by Australian governments ’in the light of 
experience in similar democracies' and the suggestions of 
Australian experts. To do this, it would need to modernise 
itself.
In the next six months Whitlam missed no opportunity 
to canvass 'party reform' with Labor audiences. The Special 
Conference on the Wyndham proposals (agreed on in 1965) had not 
taken place in 1966. It would be held in conjunction with the 
1967 Federal Conference. Whitlam had to move quickly. His 
crusade had two phases. Phase one lasted until the Federal 
Executive meeting in May, which rejected any drastic 
reorganisation. In phase two, Whitlam appealed to conference 
delegates in NSW, Victoria, SA and WA over the heads of Branch
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'machines’. He also used his newfound status to pressure the 
'machines'. His main demand in both phases was a committee of 
inquiry on party organisation. His opponents felt that 
stopping such an inquiry would derail Whitlam's 'party reform' 
project. They were quick to warn Whitlam that his 
outspokenness could damage the party (see 'Chamberlain v
2Whitlam : The Move that Rebounded', Bulletin, 1 April 1967).
From the beginning Whitlam's speeches revolved around 
familiar themes and familiar ambiguities. Long-held concerns 
to 'woo the white-collars' and 'de-federalise' the party were 
regularly re-aired. The old ambiguity between 'image'- 
oriented, 'efficient' reforms and participatory ones remained. 
In phase one, Whitlam emphasised the need for Labor to respond 
to:
... the great industrial and political opportunities 
presented by the white collar workers ... the most 
significant and important change ... in the occupational 
make up of Australia since the last war ('Whitlam 
Woos White Collar Workers, Australian, 13 March 1967). 3
'A trade union party' was 'no longer sufficient' ( 'Whitlam
4Wants Sweeping Party Reforms', Australian, 13 March 1967).
Labor should become 'the proper political spokesman for all
employees'. Commentators suggested that even when addressing
ALP and union audiences, Whitlam was mainly trying to boost his
'image' with the voters (see Jonathan Gaul, 'Whitlam Stakes His
Future: Labor Reform', Canberra Times, 14 March 1967). The
'noisy' Labor 'machine' attracted press attention:
The public agony as the State branches slug it out 
at a Federal Conference. Will 'X' be expelled by 
the Federal Executive? Will this or that stage 
change its vital vote at the last moment? Will 
such-and-such a policy be changed? Read 
tomorrow's blow-by-blow account.
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Whitlam emphasised the need to exorcise electorally
burdensome bogeys. He also conjured up a picture of party
renewal through membership participation. Alongside the
negative arguments about the electorally damaging consequences
of not holding an exorcism ceremony, there were positive
arguments for Labor revitalisation. Some of the latter were
more important to Whitlam personally than to his 'right-wing'
backers (especially in NSW). The Participants consistently
supported him but had little influence. Whitlam's alliance
with the NSW 'machine' was circumstantial:
Those key organisational supporters of his on the 
'Right' whom other men would never have humiliated 
in the way that he did, do not really have a vision 
of a new Labor Party. And Whitlam knows it ... 
Circumstances have cast Mr Whitlam's fortune with 
the wheeling-and-dealing 'Right', but this has 
not made him accept it (Brian Johns, 'Leap in the 
Dark by Labor', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 February 1967).
Whitlam wanted membership 'talent' and policy-making
competence to be utilised more effectively. His 'party
renewal' message was targeted at specific groups of members.
The white collars and the intellectuals were again being wooed.
Rhetorically Whitlam went further. He spoke of the 'rank-and-.
file'. This was the managerial/participatory dichotomy again.
Participation for whom? The experts? The membership as a
whole? Integrating the experts did not necessitate wholesale
5party renewal, whatever Whitlam claimed. Perhaps such 
rhetoric was required, however, if it was to be considered 
seriously within the party.
The Tasmanian conference was in March, before the 
general (winter) ALP conference season. Whitlam insisted Labor 
could not simply blame the electorate for its troubles (Alan 
Ramsey, 'Whitlam Tells Why Labor Lost the Election',
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Australian, 17 March 1967). That was futile. So were
complaints about capitalist press conspiracies. Labor had to 
demonstrate its competence and cohesion. That required 
reorganisation. Whitlam did not spell out whether he was 
advocating Wyndham's interim proposals or a more thorough 
reorganisation. Such differences were blurred in the call for 
a committee of inquiry. Whitlam's key demand was designed to 
maintain the momentum for reorganisation. It was endorsed by
the Tasmanian Branch. That would give Whitlam six votes at
£Federal Conference.
Whitlam was trying to create an atmosphere that would
facilitate party reform. He wanted the Branches to endorse FEC
and federal union Conference representation:
It would then be for a committee to work out the 
details of alterations to the party's 
constitution and such thorny questions as 
representation of parliamentarians, large 
State unions etc. (Harold Cox, 'Whitlam's Plan 
Could Strengthen the Political Wing ...' (Sunday
Mail, 14 March 1967).
Cox believed that Whitlam's real agenda was to enable the FPLP 
leadership to dominate the party more effectively. In 
realpolitik terms, 'a big communion of miscellaneous delegates' 
could hardly attain the 'unity of purpose' achieved by 'the 
present tightly-integrated management'. The power 'now 
exercised by Labor's managers outside Parliament' would 
inevitably drift to the FPLP, 'particularly its senior officers 
and leaders'. FEC delegates may well have preferred Whitlam 
to Chamberlain, but they did not constitute automatic reserves 
of support for the 'right wing'. The simplistic assumption 
that branches were 'middle-class' and 'right-wing', while 
unions were 'working class' and 'left-wing' lurked around in
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many minds at this time."7 A related assumption contrasted a 
'modern' Labor 'rank-and-file' with a more traditional 
'machine'. Such was the mythology of the debates.
Shortly after his Tasmanian success, Whitlam made a 
foray into Victoria. He told a Young Labor Association dinner 
he intended:
... to convert the ALP in the eyes of the public into 
a mass movement once again ('Labor Must Show It Is 
Mending Its Ways', Age, 20 March 1967). 8
This hope encapsulated Whitlam's ambiguity. Was he advocating
a cosmetic job to exorcise a few bogeys or a substantial 'party
renewal' project? The term 'once again' was interesting. Had
the ALP ever been a 'mass movement'? Whitlam was genuflecting
to Labor myths about the 'collective sovereignty' of the
membership.
There was much press support for 'party reform', but 
there were suggestions that Whitlam exaggerated its benefits. 
The Sydney Morning Herald supported reorganisation more as a 
blow to the left than anything else ('Organising Labor', 17
9March 1967). It wanted FEC delegates at Federal Conference, 
but found it 'difficult to muster enthusiasm' for federal union 
representation. Large conferences were often manipulated, but 
could debate issues in a way that was 'impossible with 
Australian coteries of p o w e r ' T h e  Advertiser thought 
Whitlam was 'so far giving good value' to those who hoped he 
might redecorate Labor's 'dusty, musty shop window' with 
something more appealing to the vote-spender ('Mr Whitlam 
Speaks Out', 21 March 1967). Interesting imagery. Workers in 
the shop might still have little say, after the window had been 
redecorated. The Northern Daily Leader suggested the alleged
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nexus between reorganisation and electoral recovery was
historically spurious ('Rebuilding Federal Labor', 23 March
1967). 'The Whitlam-Barnard theory' ignored nearly seventy
years of achievement in all states and periodic national 
11success.
Wyndham's reorganisation proposals aroused
considerable 'machine' disquiet, but this was not often
publicly articulated. Perhaps Wyndham's opponents thought the
topic would disappear, if ignored. Whitlam's crusade made
further procrastination impossible. The May 1967 Federal
Executive meeting rejected any move towards a Mass 
12Conference. Whitlam did not call off his crusade or explore 
available compromises. The showdown would be at Federal 
Conference. The Executive decision was 'only tactical 
skirmishing, a drawing of the battle lines' (Alan Ramsey, 'Mr 
Whitlam Still Has a Chance on Reform', Australian, 11 May
1967 ) .
By 'discharging' the Wyndham proposals, 'this strange
body of men' made it clear to ordinary members that it would go
to any length to retain its power ('For Mr Whitlam ... A Case
13of Numbers', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 1967). The
Executive seemed deaf to changes in Australian society that
Whitlam could hear loud and clear:
The opponents of reorganisation must recognise that in 
Australian society as it is now developing, politics 
will increasingly be an exercise of efficiency more 
than anything else, the party which attains power 
will have to prove itself an effective managerial 
body. Ideology will have a diminishing role in 
government in the future. Mr Whitlam has understood 
this: hence the emphasis in his recent speeches
on roads, transportation and the quality of life: 
ideas which people can readily appreciate ('Labor's 
Latest Inner Struggle', Australian, 9 May 1967).
O 1 a
This view (akin to that held in the 'technocratic' face of
Participant ideology) suggested reorganisation would help Labor
project itself in an 'end of ideology' era. To an extent, so
did Whitlam. Yet his declared aim of rebuilding the party as a
'mass movement' and clarification of Australian Social
Democracy, mark 1 helped to re-ideologise the ALP.
While the Federal Executive decision registered the
difficulties faced by 'party reformers', the fate of the Mass
Conference idea may have been sealed at a Commonwealth Labor
Advisory Council (CLAC) meeting back in March. Here ACTU
officials told Whitlam they had grave doubts about the proposal
for direct union representation (Geoffrey Barker KSetback for
14Whitlam', Age, 30 March 1967). The Mass Conference had been
*
argued for in a rhetorical way without much attention to
detail. The ACTU foresaw problems.
In speeches to the Federal Ironworkers' Association
and the Union of Postal Clerks and Telephonists, after the
Federal Executive discharged Wyndham's proposals, Whitlam
continued his crusade. He told the UPCT, one of the few 'white
collar' unions affiliated to the ALP, that unions should pursue
'quality of life' issues, as well as wages and working
conditions, in a difficult era of 'technological revolution'
(Whitlam, 1967a). Federal Government initiatives would
complement traditional union techniques. He told the FIA
delegates that never before had the whole labour movement:
... needed to look so critically at its own capacity 
to handle and channel change into beneficial channels 
('Automation Will Win', Age, 23 May 1967).
May 1967 saw yet another Victorian election defeat.
This led Whitlam to link criticisms of the Victorian executive
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to calls for 'party reform' ('Whitlam Hits Vic Labor', Age, 27 
May 1967). The big test for Whitlam was about to come; the 
NSW, Victorian, SA and WA conferences (the first three all on 
the same June holiday w e e k e n d ) W h i t l a m  believed there was a 
large constituency in ALP branches (not usually strongly 
represented at state conferences) which would prefer the 
parliamentary leadership to the Federal Executive in any 
showdown.
9B Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, Phase II: Around the
State Conference Circuit
Whitlam prepared thoroughly for the June weekend 
16round of conferences. He was going to pursue his 'own
particular method of kamikaze-style politics' (Jonathan Gaul,
'Three State Conferences for Labor Party: Whitlam to Face His
Biggest Challenge', Canberra Times, 9 June 1967). Whitlam's
(1967b) pamphlet, Towards a National Party with a National
Purpose: Let Us Now Begin, documents his thinking on
17reorganisation. His speechwriter Graham Freudenberg
(1977:91-2) recalled the reorganisation campaign as:
... a deliberate mixture of persuasion and 
confrontation ... The task was to stir up the 
membership to generate pressure for reform.
Whitlam used all his prestige as a new leader 
in that task.
The campaign had been carefully planned to build up to the
Queen's birthday conference weekend (Freudenberg, 1977:93).
NSW and SA would get persuasion, Victoria confrontation. SA's
recently installed Labor premier Don Dunstan was worried that
18Whitlam might upset the SA 'machine' (Freudenberg, 1977:97).
Dunstan had dismissed the Mass Conference idea in
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1 9 6 4 .^ -9 Federal Conference reform would not guarantee intra­
party democracy. The much derided 'faceless men' could bargain 
and compromise easily. He was doubtful that a large unitary 
conference would be an improvement. (Dunstan, 1964:15-6).
Some overseas Labour conferences were:
... ruthlessly managed from the platform and the 
opportunities for advancing of rank and file members 
effectively and for arriving at reasoned compromise 
available in the ALP are missing (Dunstan, 1964:16).
The suggestion that Labor's oligarchic structure allowed for
effective representation of 'rank-and-file' views was
disingenuous. However, a Mass Conference was no panacea.
Dunstan was an ally of Whitlam. He shared many of Whitlam's
policy preferences and his desire to 'woo the white collars'
and cultivate intellectual support. Dunstan disagreed with
Whitlam's belief that ALP reorientation required formal
reorganisation as well. The existing structure was flexible.
Whitlam (1967b:2) argued that reorganisation was
20necessary for Labor resurgence. He knew many in the party 
were implacably opposed. He pitched his appeal to those with 
an open mind. For this critical segment, Whitlam stressed the 
participatory aspects of the link between reorganisation and 
ALP resurgence as a mass, national party. His arguments had a 
'managerial* face as well. He attacked structural incentives 
to 'divisiveness and discord' (Whitlam, 1967b:3). Conference 
reform was presented as the key to party renewal and electoral 
revival:
The National Conference should be a dynamic source 
of energy and enthusiasm. A voice and a vote in a 
viable organisation are the best means to ensure 
that rank and file members will enthusiastically wage 
a campaign over three years and not just three weeks 
before an election (Whitlam, 1967b:3-4).
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Whitlam (1967b:4) complained that the FPLP was
suffering most from the prevailing arrangements. His plan
would not swamp smaller states. The FPLP never divided along
state lines. It was a misconception to think that it would be
the state Branches that would elect a number of delegates to
National Conference, corresponding to the number of federal
electorates in each state (Whitlam, 1967b:5). Such a
misconception had been encouraged by the endorsement of exactly
21such a 'party reform' proposal by the NSW Branch in 1965.
Anyway, Whitlam's call was for an inquiry with one
representative from each state executive, the federal leader
and deputy leader and the federal secretary. On such a
committee of nine, Whitlam, Barnard and Wyndham would only need
the support of two states (NSW and Tasmania?) to constitute a
2 2pro-'reform' majority.
Whitlam intimately linked reorganisation to improving
Labor's 'image'. He alluded to a September 1966 survey, where
27 percent of respondents named organisation as Labor's
2 3greatest weakness. Swinging voters were particularly prone
to take this view. Reorganisation had intrinsic merits as well.
In Melbourne, Whitlam denounced the Victorian
executive rather than canvass the abstract desirability of
reorganisation. He was particularly disturbed by their
apparent indifference to electoral defeat:
There is nothing more disloyal to the tradition of 
Labor than the new heresy that power is not 
important, or that the attainment of political 
power is not fundamental to our purpose ...
(Whitlam, 1967b:6).
'Quality of life' issues and social policy concerns could not 
be won industrially. He dismissed the 'delusion' that
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political pressure could be successfully exerted:
... irrespective of parliamentary success or 
failure. This theory reached its zenith in 
protests on Vietnam ... (Whitlam, 1967b:8).
Many ALP members had participated in such protests. The
Victorian executive encouraged such activity. Whitlam was not
24comfortable with this form of 'membership participation'.
His main supporters in Victoria, the Participants, shared his
discomfort. Labor Comment dismissed 'pointless exercises' like
the Victorian ALP's 'Vietnam Mobilisation' as a waste of money,
while unpaid bills were piling up and 'the efficiency of the
whole organisation' was 'rapidly declining' ('Labor News',
25December 1967). However, there was no logical contradiction 
between increased 'rank-and-file' input into Labor decisions 
and activities such as the 'Vietnam mobilisation'.
Parliamentary reformism and political protest could complement 
each other.
Whitlam rejected the view that preserving the 
Victorian executive was necessary to maintain ALP opposition to 
the Vietnam War. A group of academics had taken this line of 
critical defence:
The style of work of the Victorian ALP Central 
Executive undoubtedly contains many unsatisfactory 
features and some of these can be traced to 
structural as well as administrative shortcomings.
But in a political party, politics and policy are 
paramount, style secondary (letter, Age, 5 June, 1967).
Although mainly concerned with improving Labor's
capacity to compete effectively in federal elections,
Whitlam pushed the 'rank-and-file' versus 'bureaucracy' line
with considerable flourish. Reorganisation was more than
simply better public relations (Whitlam, 1967b:11). A new
leadership or a new 'image' would not suffice. He refused to
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accept such a compliment:
I wish to lead a mass party, as the Labor Party 
used to be proud to proclaim itself, not a 
one-man band.
Whitlam criticised TUDC domination of the Victorian Branch. The
TUDC operated secretly and included all the unions that were
'accident-prone on unity tickets' (Whitlam, 1967b:12). He really
raised the heckles (and hacklesi) of delegates by comparing TUDC
2 6methods to those of Santamaria's 'Movement'. State conferences 
could choose their own executives but he would repudiate people 
he believed were 'disloyal to the ALP, disruptive of its
2 7electoral prospects' and destructive of all it stood for.
Whitlam's speech 'created bitterness and resentment' 
(John Hurst and Brian Kitching, 'Split in Labor party: Vic Left 
and NSW Right Stand Firm', Australian, 13 June 1967). Calwell
laughed, because he thought it meant Whitlam's days were 
numbered (Freudenberg, 1977:96). Provocation of the Victorian 
Branch had been a deliberate tactic. The boos in the hall 
mattered a lot less to Whitlam than the electoral gains he 
might make in taking on the Victorian executive.
Fact thought some of Whitlam's remarks were 
'intemperate and ill-advised' ('Pledge to Fight On: Support for 
Leaders', 16 June 1967). In an earlier -issue, Bill Hartley 
rehearsed the main anti-reorganisation arguments ('Labor 
Executive's "Meet the Press" on Party', 31 May 1967). 
Reorganisation meant parliamentary domination of policy-making, 
not increased 'rank-and-file' input. The Victorian Branch took 
upon itself the task of defending the existing ALP set-up 
('Reorganisation', Fact, 31 May 1967 ). 'Too public' discussion 
had done 'a lot of damage'. FEC representation would give the
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Labor ‘right* and the FPLP greater clout in party affairs.
Travel costs might mean many areas went unrepresented or
represented by MPs with free travel and accommodation allowances:
Conference would be heavily loaded with these 
delegates and they would be responsible to 
nobody except to their own Federal campaign 
committee.
They might pursue policies in conflict with those of their
Branch. State executive guardianship of the ’true' interests of
the rank-and-file' was the core of the Victorian position. ALP
conflict was seen as a zero-sum game between politicians (always
ready to compromise to win office) and party officials (vigilant
guardians of Labor's principles and the 'interests' of the 'rank-
and-file'). Proposals were evaluated according to whether they
favoured the FPLP or the Federal Executive. Other criteria were
irrelevant. Thus FEC Federal Conference delegates had to be a
plus to the politicians and a minus for the 'machine'. Indeed,
FEC representation was against the interests of the 'rank-and-
2 8file' which only the state executives could defend! Needless 
to say, given the balance of forces within Victoria, Whitlam's 
call for an inquiry was rejected.
In Adelaide, following an airport parley with Dunstan, 
Whitlam dropped many references to party reform from his original 
script. With an electorally successful Branch, Whitlam could 
leave his sledgehammer at home. He did allude to reorganisation 
at the end of his speech. His views on Wyndham's proposals were 
'well known' (Whitlam, 1967b:19). Party reform would not be 
easy. No 'brand new organisation' would emerge 'fully-fledged, 
fully-armed from Zeus' forehead'.
2 9Whitlam was well received but Dunstan's calculations 
were correct. The SA convention did not even consider
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reorganisation.30 SA had settled on opposition to reorganisation 
before the convention.
The final leg of Whitlam's holiday weekend trip around 
the ALP conference circuit, pushing his reorganisation barrow, 
brought him to Sydney. His relationship with the dominant NSW 
faction was ambiguous. It would support some form of 
reorganisation, partly because Victoria, Chamberlain and the left 
opposed it. Whitlam presented his 'party reform' party piece.
He solemnly warned delegates the historical vista was littered 
with the remains of parties which had not adapted to change 
(Whitlam, 1967b:23). Labor was in danger of fossilisation.
Party reform would require a move away from a winner-take-all 
approach to 'getting the numbers' internally.
Whitlam (1967b:24) told NSW delegates reform should not
be a factional question at all. He tried to disentangle
reorganisation from policy disputes. This pious hope was not
fulfilled. The left continued to oppose any tampering with
prevailing federal practices. Rhetorically, Whitlam invoked a
cross - factional 'party reform' coalition. The committee of
inquiry could facilitate such a coalition:
Details cannot be determined without information on 
branch membership, union affiliations and finances.
Let us get the facts and then determine the details.
A classic Whitlam prescription! Party operations confounded such
rationalistic expectations.
Whitlam was well received. NSW endorsed the committee 
of inquiry. It also wanted all federal and state leaders 
admitted to Federal Conference and Executive, with full voting 
rights. The call for SPLP leaders to be included in the Federal 
Executive was not derived from Wyndham. Nor had Whitlam
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canvassed it. The NSW Branch pursued its own concerns under the
'party reform' rubric. Admission of the SPLP leaders would shift
the balance on the small Federal Executive and blur distinctions
31between parliamentary Labor and the party organisation.
Charlie Oliver spelled out the NSW 'machine' position in his 
presidential address ('"We Are Not Acceptable" - Oliver's "Reform 
Labor" Crusade', Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1967). He reinforced 
Whitlam's message on the importance of securing Labor 
governments. Oliver was more concerned with increasing 
parliamentary representation on the federal bodies than anything 
like membership participation. It should not even be necessary 
to canvass:
... the value of having our Federal and State 
Parliamentary Leaders taking their place on the 
administrative Federal Executive and the policy­
making Federal Conference with full voting rights.
The NSW left wanted some reorganisation at the state
level. There was no power-sharing within the Branch. A
3 2minority report deplored the way the official report ignored 
dissenting viewpoints. The officers had not addressed the 
realities of 1967:
Everyone is aware that party morale is down and some 
branches fail to meet because less than 7 members 
can be persuaded to attend a branch meeting once 
a month (quoted, Fred Wells, 'Report Hits 3^
Executive's Right Wing', Sun-Herald, 11 June 1967).
The left emphasised the contradiction between
Whitlam's 'modernisation' project and the NSW 'witch hunt'
against party members involved in the Association for
International Co-operation and Disarmament:
How this authoritarian edict, commanding written 
confession, could help the Whitlam-style Labor 
Party is not clear ('Opposition to AICD Ban',
Socialist and Industrial Labor, April 1967).
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Willingness to deploy 'modernisation' rhetoric did not mean the
NSW left was aligning itself with Whitlam or his proposals.
Socialist and Industrial Labor suggested there was no evidence
that reorganisation would lead to better policy or win Labor more
votes ('When Will It End?', July 1967).^* It feared dangerous
'right-wing' plots lurked behind reorganisation proposals:
Why ... disrupt and divide ourselves on an issue 
which is superficial and doubtful in its 
electoral appeal?
The NSW left went along with its interstate comrades, although 
FEC representation could secure it Federal Conference 
delegateships.
Whitlam had Tasmania and NSW onside. Victoria and SA
opposed reorganisation. Attention switched to WA. Queensland
would not have a (triennial) conference until 1968. Queensland
federal delegates would be unencumbered by state conference
guidelines. Whitlam went overseas after the hectic June weekend.
35He returned to take on Chamberlain on his home ground.
Whitlam told WA delegates Labor had to professionalise 
itself ('Whitlam Calls for New Federal ALP Rule', West 
Australian, 8 July 1967). Existing arrangements
'disenfranchised' Labor parliamentarians. He again called for a 
committee of inquiry and asked delegates to read the Wyndham 
Report:
Do not ask a man to do something when you have
been defeated and then do nothing further about it. 36
An amendment from Joe Berinson endorsed Whitlam's
inquiry. Two MHRs, Kim Beazley and Harry Webb, spoke in support
('Vital Whitlam Win at WA State Conference', Sydney Morning
3 7Herald, 10 July 1967). Chamberlain spoke for about an hour
against. His influence in the Branch was beginning to wane.
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He wanted to clarify his position. He had been 'portrayed as the
big bad wolf' in the controversy ('ALP in WA Agree to Inquiry on
Reform', West Australian, 10 July 1967). Chamberlain felt his
personal mistreatment was symptomatic of general press hostility
to the ALP. The party should be suspicious of reorganisation.
The press supported it. Press classification of Labor 'goodies'
and 'baddies' was mischievous. A committee of inquiry, with its
inevitable attendant disputation, would only provide more
opportunities for press misrepresentation:
After three years of public wrangling it would 
be ludicrous to go back to another inquiry. It 
would damage the party more than anything he could 
imagine.
Whitlam's crusade had already done damage and compromised the
Federal Conference. Chamberlain could only hope that the
forthcoming Conference would 'find a formula to protect the
party' and allow Whitlam to sell 'this great policy we have'.
The press trumped up reorganisation to discredit the ALP.
Chamberlain harped on about the cost of a Mass Conference and the
way it would swallow the smaller states.
Despite Chamberlain's best oratorical efforts,
3 8conference accepted the Berinson amendment. The-unexpected WA 
decision was 'something of a coup' for Whitlam (Freudenberg, 
1977:99). Internal WA developments, however, had been 
undermining Chamberlain. With the WA votes, Whitlam had support 
from 18 Conference delegates out of 36 for an inquiry.
Queensland could again swing the day, as it had in the 'witless 
men' episode. The Special Conference would be held in 
conjunction with the regular biennial Federal Conference, due to 
open in the Hotel Australia in Adelaide on 31 July.
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In May, the Federal Executive had rejected Wvndham's
recommendation for further investigation of party structure, on
which Whitlam was basing his call for an inquiry. It also
rejected Wyndham's interim recommendation of increasing state 
39delegations. Some Wyndham recommendations were acceptable to 
the Executive (eg his financial proposals). The Federal 
Executive had no problems with large segments of the Wyndham 
Keport. However, the headlines about Federal Executive rejection 
of ‘party reform' were accurate. On crucial matters (further 
investigation and Federal Conference reform) the Executive was 
unambiguously negative.
The lengthy Federal Executive recommendation contained
22 of the 28 Special Conference agenda items. Other items
included LWCOC support for LWCOC representation at Federal
Conference and on the Federal Executive and an LWCOC role in the
policy committees (ALP, 1967:12). This built on Wyndham's
proposals and took them a bit further. There was a resolution
from NSW calling for the committee of inquiry and for increased
parliamentary representation in the federal bodies. This offered
a potential rallying point for supporters of an inquiry, if
amended perhaps. Some inquiry supporters might not want SPLP
leaders on the Federal Executive. There were three Queensland
motions, two of which seemed close in spirit to Wyndham's call
for Federal Secretariat/FEC co-operation and co-ordination (which
4 0the Federal Executive partly accepted). These motions took an 
added interest when we remember the Queenslanders were being 
lobbied so assiduously on the inquiry. The remaining items (from 
SA) suggested that federal platform, policy or rules could not be 
validly altered without being approved and endorsed by four
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Branches out of six (ALP, 1967:11). This would maintain a 
strong federalist component in the party structure and prevent 
controversial deadlocks being resolved by delegates breaking 
Branch ranks.
Such was the official agenda. The terms of debate
were open to last-minute amendments from the floor. There was
much Conference-eve speculation about a 'deal' whereby Whitlam
would settle for less than he had been advocating and his
opponents would accept some change to Federal Conference. Talk
of 'deals' increased as the showdown approached. 'Whitlam
Seems Assured of Conference Win' said the Sydney Morning Herald
on 31 July. The following day it was less sure ('Whitlam in
Battle to Alter Party', 1 August 1967). A suggested compromise
involved the left accepting the four FPLP leaders and the six
SPLP leaders as full Conference delegates, if the inquiry was
dropped. A further compromise was for the four FPLP leaders to
be added to the Executive as well. Whitlam's speech was
deferred, feeding the rumour mills. Around the conference
lobbies, it was interpreted as:
... a clear-cut indication of the strong doubts 
existing among many pro-reorganisation plan 
delegates about their prospects ... The anti­
reconstruction delegates are prepared to agree to 
a limited reconstruction ... but it goes nowhere 
near what the Whitlam supporters want (S.W. Stephen, 
'Whitlam's Reform Plan in Jeopardy', Advertiser,
1 August 196 7) .
There were cracks in the pro-reorganisation facade (Alan 
Ramsey, 'Whitlam Faces Power Challenge', Australian, 1 August
1967). Barnard, Oliver and Dunstan were pressuring Whitlam to 
accept compromise.
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9C Oiling the 'Old Machine'?
As the Special Conference opened, commentators were 
still speculating about the back-room negotiating, horse­
trading and manoeuvring. Tension was increased by a two-hour 
delay in getting proceedings under way. Conference was not 
declared open until after 11 am. What followed was stranger 
still. Delegates took only 3 minutes 25 seconds to resolve the 
issues at hand. They endorsed an amended version of the
Executive recommendations and discharged all other agenda items
4 1by 35 votes to nil. The amendment (moved Chamberlain,
seconded Barnard) showed the Executive had softened its
opposition to 'party reform'. Whitlam did not get his inquiry,
but the four FPLP leaders would be added to Federal Conference
and the Federal Executive (ALP, 1969:111). The six SPLP
4 2leaders would be added to Federal Conference. Opponents of
reorganisation found it was easier to accept the four FPLP
leaders than just Whitlam and Barnard.
The accomplishment of all this in so little time was
anti-climactic. Some had expected a high noon:
The tension was broken by a burst of laughter from 
people in the visitors gallery in which a number 
of delegates joined. Mr Cameron MHR (SA) called 
out as he walked from the conference room to take 
a telephone call: 'The old machine works
well, doesn't it?' ('ALP Adopts Compromise 
Proposals', Advertiser, 2 August 1967).
To which Chamberlain is said to have replied: 'When it is
properly oiled' (S.W. Stephens, 'Negative Meeting for Mr
Whitlam', Advertiser, 12 August 1967). The old machine had
prevented any attempt to have it sent off for a thorough
check-up, to see whether it needed a new engine.
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The enigmatic nature of the brief Special Conference
led to much curiosity about the implications of what had
happened and many attempts at reconstructing the negotiations
of the night before. Allan Barnes was blunt:
It took Joe Chamberlain and the old guard of the 
ALP machine just 3 minutes 25 seconds to cut Gough 
Whitlam down to size ... ('Cut Down to Size', Age,
2 August 1967 ) . 43
The press focus was on whether Whitlam or the 'machine' had 
'won'. There was disagreement. Maybe the inquiry was only an 
ambit claim. Labor Party reformers always had to go for a 
target much higher than they hoped to achieve (Ian Fitchett, 
'Whitlam Wins Vital Change in ALP Control', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2 August 1967). The parliamentary leaders might form a 
cohesive bloc of 10 at'future Conferences. Whitlam had defied 
the odds:
If the opposition leader ... ever imagined that he 
would force the intractably conservative Federal 
Labor Conference to digest in one sitting the most 
comprehensive and, to some of its members, most 
distasteful menu of changes in policy and 
organisation ever presented to it, he would have 
been a visionary without peer (Harold Cox, 'It Really 
Was a Win for Whitlam', Sunday Mail, 6 August 1967).
Brian Johns, in a thorough review, saw the Adelaide compromise
as a warning to Whitlam ('Whitlam's Two Problems - To Keep the
People and the Party with Him', Clarion, 9 August 1967). There
would be no more electoral mileage 'in running public battles
with witless, faceless or any other kind of ALP men'. The
beauty of the Adelaide compromise for the 'old machine' was
that it made it difficult for Whitlam to play such games. He
could have continued his vendetta with the inquiry:
Even if the left controlled the committee, they 
reckoned that Mr Whitlam would be able to go 
ahead with his old manoeuvre of 'trial by the 
Press' ...
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Whitlam himself put a brave face on the compromise.
He acclaimed it as a historical reform with full rhetorical 
flourish (ALP, 1969:51-3). He might press for further reform 
on other occasions. The agreed measure was the work of the 
whole Conference. He dismissed speculation about 'left' and 
'right' positions. The Adelaide compromise implemented 
Wyndham's plan. This was a disingenuous interpretation. The 
Adelaide compromise fell considerably short of what Wyndham 
advocated.
On television, Whitlam passed responsibility for
further reform over to local branches and affiliated unions
('Labor and that Troop Problem', Australian, 7 August 1967).
They had to demonstrate that a Mass Conference was practicable.
He would help in any such efforts. However, as Whitlam was
well aware, without the inquiry as a focus, FECs and federal
unions would be isolated. At the time, there was speculation
that Whitlam would use his new Federal Executive membership to
44resurrect the inquiry proposal in that arena. 'One great 
step forward' rapidly became the official ALP interpretation. 
Victorian SPLP leader Clyde Holding, who had not championed 
Conference reform in the first place, now insisted that further 
broadening of Conference was just not practical ('Broader Labor 
Conference "Not Practical"', Age, 3 August 1967).
Shortly after the Conference, Wyndham argued that, in 
effect, it had passed 69 of his 87 recommendations (ALP Federal 
Secretariat Release, 'Liberals on the Defensive'; quoted 
Overacker, 1968:130, note 84). At first sight this almost 80 
percent success rate constitutes an impressive degree of 
reorganisation. As we unravel the story, a rather different
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picture emerges. The Wyndham Report contained 28 substantial 
recommendations. Many of these included various sub­
recommendations. Wyndham got his 80 percent success rate by 
counting each sub-recommendation (see Table 1). On my 
calculations, only 15 of the 28 full recommendations were 
generally accepted. Making allowance for half-accepted 
recommendations this would give a success rate more like 60 
percent than 80 percent.
Table 1
Special Conference 1967 : Acceptance 
Wyndham Report Recommendations
Accepted Half
Accepted
Rej ected
Recommendations 15 3 10
Total
28 (O'Connell 
figures)
Recommendations + 6 9  0
Sub-recommendations
18 87 (Wyndham
figures)
Even the 60 percent figure is misleading. Each 
recommendation was not exactly equal in importance. A 
superannuation scheme for party employees (accepted in 
principle) was less significant than a Conference reform 
inquiry. If the original recommendations were weighted for 
'degree of importance' the 'success rate' figure would drop 
well below 60 percent. Furthermore Conference acceptance did 
not equal implementation. Resolutions changing rules were one 
thing, resolutions expressing aspirations were another.
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Whitlam eulogised the Adelaide compromise, but he had
remained aloof from it, until it was accomplished. He took 
little part in the negotiations. Queensland delegates were 
effectively lobbied to oppose the Whitlam-Wyndham proposal 
(Freudenberg, 1977:99-100). Barnard and Wyndham more or less 
did Whitlam's negotiating for him (Brian Johns, Australian,
9 August 1967). Whitlam worried supporters by frequently 
changing settlement terms 'and by reverting to his old tactic 
of asking for the lot' (see also Houseman, 1971:159). 
Chamberlain and Barnard were the architects of the eventual 
compromise (Jonathan Gaul, 'Parliamentary Leaders Get Vote in 
ALP Machine', Canberra Times, 2 August 1967). The SA 
delegation also played a significant role ('ALP Adopts 
Compromise Proposals', Advertiser, 2 August 1967).
The 'old machine' was able to see off the inquiry 
threat, partly because at heart many of Whitlam's supporters 
were more at home with 'old machine' ways than any unknown 
'party reform' alternative. Opening the Conference, party 
president Jim Keeffe suggested that before changes were made to 
the party structure 'resolutions must be carefully debated'
(ALP, 1969:33). Careful debate was conspicuously absent from 
the Special Conference floor. A fait accompli was hurriedly 
ratified. Doubtless, the lobbying and negotiating had involved 
much private 'debate'. Such was the way the 'old machine' 
could work, when it was 'well oiled'.
9D Adelaide Compromise: Implications and Interpretations
Freudenberg (1977:91) stressed the irony of the 
Adelaide decision. The Whitlam-Wyndham party reform plan had
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six objectives:
(1) Direct representation of the parliamentary leadership 
on the federal bodies;
(2) Better policy-making processes;
(3) A strengthened national organisation;
(4) Less power for paid officials;
(5) An alteration of Labor's 'union-dominated'
'image'; and
(6) Direct representation for the rank-and-file 
membership.
The first four were attained, wholly or in part:
The last has still not been achieved. Yet it was
through the appeal of the idea of rank-and-file
representation that Whitlam was able to achieve
so much on the other four.
Some have seen this disjuncture as evidence that Whitlam's 
rhetoric was merely a smokescreen for his real aim, increasing 
FPLP domination of the party (see e.g. Theophanus, 1980:291-2).
Theophanus (1980:290) argues Whitlam's aim was to reduce 
'socialist' influence in the ALP to make the party more 
electorally attractive'. This is misleading. Opposition to 
reorganisation was at least as much about protecting positions 
within the partly structure as it was about defending 
ideologies. Confusion was built into Whitlam's project from 
the start. 'Managerial' and 'participatory' concerns went hand 
in hand. Party reform always combined rhetorical grandstanding 
with factional manoeuvring (see Houseman, 1971:156-7). The 
degree to which this was blatantly displayed in Adelaide was 
surprising (Houseman, 1971:157-8). The debate was accompanied 
'by activities and motives unrelated to altruism or 
objectivity' in a particularly 'transparent fashion'.
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Discussion behind closed doors could be 'transparent', as it 
was easy to reconstruct the rationale of those who negotiated 
the 'deal'. If Whitlam's earlier crusade had provided the 
'rationalistic idealism', the Adelaide compromise was easily 
explicable in Realpolitik terms. But 'rationalistic idealism' 
was more than a smokescreen for vealpolitik manoeuvres.
Realpolitik power plays were common currency at ALP 
Federal Conferences. One reason the Mass Conference won such 
little support was because it would cut across familiar ways of 
doing things - the bluffing, lobbying and bargaining between 
state delegation leaders, well-known to each other, that 
produced decisions such as the Adelaide compromise, the 
incrementalist 'oiling' of the 'old machine' (see D. Stephens, 
1979:497).
The Labor left saw the Adelaide compromise as a
'victory for common sense' and hoped it meant 'the end of the
so-called party reform proposals' ('Structural Reform
Determined', Socialist and Industrial Labor, August 1967).45
For the CPA, Tribune welcomed the Adelaide compromise:
The party’s 'reorganisation plan' born in panic 
following 1963 election accusations against the 36 
'faceless men' was superseded by a proposal
inspired by Mr Joe Chamberlain ... In private ^
tick-tacking in hotel rooms, all made clear to 
Federal Leader Whitlam that he had to support 
Mr Chamberlain's plan ('Who Won at Adelaide - The 
Victory Went to Labor as a Whole', 9 August 1967).
The ALP left dismissed reorganisation as a 'right-wing' plot to
change the federal 'numbers'. It did not respond to Whitlam's
arguments about a national structure and membership
participation. Whitlam's arguments challenged the left on its
weakest ground. Control of state 'machines' rested on branch
and affiliate apathy. Oligarchic practices belied theories of
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intra-party democracy, dear to Labor rhetoric (Freudenberg, 
1977:89-90). From the beginning, membership sovereignty or 
'proletarian democracy' had been diluted by Labor federalism 
(Houseman, 1971:22; K. Turner, 1967:22). The left responded 
to Whitlam's argument by shoring up its position, playing the 
'numbers' game within an unreformed ALP. Chamberlain's 
Adelaide success may have been somewhat pyrrhic (Houseman, 
1971:235). Using a 'top down' structure, the left failed to 
build 'a mass support base within the party'. This may 'have 
inadvertently aided the pragmatic wing of the party'. The 
left's semi-conspiratorial internal practice belied its hopes 
for a Labor 'mass movement' rather than just an 'electoral 
machine' . ^
Playing old ALP 'numbers games' hindered the Labor 
left's involvement in the political ferment brewing in 
Australia, with the development of the movement against the 
Vietnam War. Whitlam had not anticipated this ferment but it 
fed into Labor's acceptance of Australian Social Democracy,
Mark I. Cairns was involved in the protests against the 
Vietnam War, but remained aloof from 'party reform'. Whitlam 
fought for 'party renewal', but kept his distance from protest 
politics. Australian Social Democracy, Mark I was a 
conventional Fabian exercise, but it coincided with cultural 
conflict and a process of contestation in many Australian 
institutions (see Little, 1986).
No leading Labor left figure publicly supported the 
Whitlam/Wyndham proposals. Some left-wing intellectual Labor 
supporters favoured party reconstruction. Before the 1966 
election, the Sydney independent left 'little magazine' Outlook
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saw the conflicts in the ALP as a consequence of tactical 
differences over Labor's response to the 'Comfortable Society' 
('Labor In Search of a New Identity', April 1966). A new 
radicalism was emerging in that society, where traditional 
class lines were shifting. ALP 'modernisation' was important 
in that context:
To be 'modern', the ALP must become flexible, 
well-informed, non-bureaucratic capable of 
attracting young people and the new professionals.
This was a general endorsement of the Wyndham Plan, although 
Wyndham's worry was under-bureaucratisation not over­
bureaucrat isat ion . Outlook saw responsiveness to newly 
emergent issues as the relevant index of party modernisation.
A 'modernised' ALP should be a lively, campaigning, year-round 
organisation. Outlook unequivocally dismissed left Labor 
opposition to 'modernisation':
The Old Left in the ALP has failed dismally to 
respond to this need. It has merely dug its toes 
in and shown itself resistant to all political 
change.
'Modernisation' did not have to mean unconditional acceptance
of Whitlam's project, which embodied contradictions between
'managerialism' and 'participation', as well as between its
4 8elitist and egalitarian components. One did not have to take
Whitlam's 'rationalistic idealism' and its piety towards
4 9professional 'knowledge' at face value to accept that there 
was something in his critique of Labor organisation. Outlook 
upbraided the left for not developing its own politics of 
modernisation, its own politics of party reform (see also 
Hudson, 1968:21-2). Left abstentionism from party 
reconstruction conceded the whole arena to right-wing 
'modernisers' who were:
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... prepared to jettison whatever features of Labor 
policy they feel may embarrass them in their search 
for a public 'image' acceptable to the Comfortable 
Society ... (Outlook, April 1966).
'Modernisation' did not have to mean 'adaptation' to an
electoral marketplace beyond the reach of political persuasion.
That was a possibility. It all depended on internal debate and
how the ALP linked up with various conflicts in Australian
society. Australian Social Democracy, Mark I involved
'adaptation' in some arenas and 're-ideologisation' in others.
In 're-ideologisation', it benefited from 'the crisis of Cold
War liberalism' in Australia (Simms, 1982 :119-22).^ This was
not clearly evident in 1967. The 1966 election seemed to
endorse going 'All the Way with LBJ'. By 1969, the tide was
turning. In 1965, Outlook had hoped a Labor campaign against
the Vietnam War would revive an organisation 'stultified by too
much backbiting and too little activity' ('Can Labor Lead?',
August 1965). Backbiting and 'jockeying for power' were
unlikely to be eradicated by any form of Labor 'modernisation'.
Outlook fell victim to its own 'rationalistic idealism' in this
regard. Outlook believed the Wyndham proposals did not go far
enough, although they would 'let some air' into the party and
would encourage better contact with white collar groups.^
Two Outlook articles by Sydney University Department
of Government research student Bob Connell (1968a, 1968b)
presented a particularly strong statement of 'new left' support
for the Whitlam/Wyndham proposals. Although partly resting on
a sociological and technological determinism that was similar
to, if more elaborate and theorised than that of Wyndham
himself, the articles made a number of important points about
'party renewal' and its relationship to political ferment m
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late 1960s Australia. Connell (1968a:12) saw improved
communications, with the electorate and within the party, as
5 2the key to 'party reform'. A revitalised mass membership
5 3could complement Labor leaders on TV. State executives
clogged internal Labor communications. Instructions (in the
'how-to-vote' mode) were relayed down the party hierarchy, but
policy discussion was more rarefied (Connell, 1968a:11-2).
Labor parliamentary leaders could communicate an 'alternative
vision' and an 'alternative style' (Connell, 1968a:13). Labor
'modernisation' would have to by-pass the Branch managers.
Their 'numbers' games hindered the party from reaching out to
54the electorate and developing a new radicalism. The emerging
constituency for 'new left' politics would respond to a
reformed ALP (Connell, 1968a:6). This constituency was a
consequence of educational expansion and generational rebellion
(see Alomes, 1983; Rowse, 1982).
Denis Altman (1968:13) criticised Connell for not
embracing 'modernisation' and a new Labor radicalism
55wholeheartedly enough. Labor had to show it was 'dynamic' and 
'relevant' in a new era o-f 'presidential' TV-based politics. 
Having the Parliamentary leader chosen by the whole party would 
recognise the leader's centrality, while gesturing towards 
Labor notions of collective membership sovereignty. The notion 
of 'party democracy' had to be re-interpreted as Labor took up 
'quality of life' issues in 'an increasingly complex and 
socially heterogeneous society' (Altman, 1968:12). Altman 
called for 'freedom of expression and diversity within the 
party' rather than submission to federal authorities.(however 
they were constituted). He suggested a radicalism that was 'no
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longer predicated on the material interests of lower income 
groups'. In Altman's 'adaptation' analysis a more pluralist 
ALP could appeal to different segments of the electorate in 
different ways:
The one unifying theme that the Labor Party should 
offer ... is that it is better able to cope with 
the problems of modern society than its opponents, 
and here the character of the leader is important.
Altman's emphasis on coping with modern problems and 
on the parliamentary leader brought him close to Australian 
Social Democracy, Mark 1. He thought the Labor modernisers 
were too timid and the reorganisers had not paid enough 
attention to 'participation'. Yet he reproduced their 
ambiguities. His project suggested a 'managerial' as well as a 
'participatory' reading. The Participants also urged Labor to 
'adapt' to a 'post-capitalist', 'managerial' society, 
presenting itself as the party with the best understanding and 
the best prospects of 'humanising' the 'New Corporate State' 
('Our "Managerial” Society', Labor Comment, December 1968).
This would incorporate Labor into the 'technocratic' logic of 
the 'new corporate state'. Managerial ideologies were being 
popularised in Australia in the 1960s (Rowse, 1978:191, 218). 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 had some elective
affinities with such ideologies (see Rowse, 1978:210, 262-3).
5 6This became clear when the Cold War fog lifted. Labor 
Comment called for 'more democratic control and more 
consideration for people's ... needs' within the corporation 
'without sacrificing too much in efficiency and existing 
advantages' (December 1968). This concern was part of 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. But pace the 
'Technocratic Laborist' theory (see e.g. Catley and McFarlane,
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1974), this was not the totality of what Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 1 was about.
The 'new left' ferment spilled over into the 
Communist Party of Australia (see Docker, 1984). It had its 
own 'modernisation' debates, couched in the language of Marxist 
'revisionism'. The divided CPA found Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 1 a confusing phenomenon. Richard Dixon 
(1967:35) attacked:
... the proposition that the industrial working 
class is disappearing, being absorbed by, or 
subordinated to, the middle-class ...
On the other hand, leading CPA moderniser, Rex 
Mortimer (1967:47) saw increased differentiation within the 
workforce, the development of 'high culture' in Australia and 
the increasing importance of the 'intellectual strata' 
providing opportunities for left renewal. He wanted his CPA 
comrades to de-emphasise economistic industrial struggle. 
Mortimer subscribed to the 'Arena thesis' developed by 
Melbourne marxist Geoff Sharp (1964a; 1964b. See also Sharp 
and White, 1968). This welcomed the growth of 'intellectual 
culture' in Australia as the 'embryonic embodiment' of
'implicitly socialist' ethics and social relations (Osmond,
5 71970:196). At times Mortimer seemed to see the 
'intellectually trained' as a new universal class that would 
overthrow capitalism.
There are interesting parallels in ALP and CPA 
'modernisation' debates. Both explored the relationship with 
an emergent intellectual stratum (see Irving, 1982). However, 
while the CPA 'traditionalists' still thought in terms of a 
'united front' with the ALP where possible, the 'revisionists'
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called for:
... a more searching and trenchant critique of Whitlam's 
'modernisation' policies as expressions of corporate- 
bureaucratic ideology within the ALP (Mortimer, 1969:393).
t
This was peculiar. It glossed over the extent to which
'modernised' Australian Communism overlapped with Australian
Social Democracy, Mark 1. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1
was a contradictory phenomenon. In part, it did express
'corporate-bureaucratic ideology'. This was its 'managerial'
face. But it also had a 'participatory' face, which expressed
a new Labor radicalism. Mortimer over-simplified the picture.
No wonder intra-ALP alignments puzzled him:
Why do so many ALP members from the ranks of the 
intelligentsia gravitate to the right wing as the 
representatives of 'modern' and 'progressive' 
trends, dismissing the left as 'traditionalist' 
and out-of-date?
Why indeed? But more to the point, why did Mortimer expect 
the intelligentsia to be a political 'bloc' with widely shared 
views ?
The Adelaide compromise marked the end of the debate
on 'party reform' that had begun with the turmoil about the
'faceless men' in 1963. Whitlam and his supporters found
changing ALP policy easier than changing ALP organisation. The
social democratic 'rational radicals' had made policy gains
over Laborist 'instinctive conservatives' at the 1965 Federal
Conference (James Jupp, 'Radicals Find Room at the Top',
5 8Canberra Times, 9 August 1965). These policy gains
continued at 1967, 1969 and 1971. In 1972, Whitlam won office
with a 'programme' that was furnished by Australian Social
5 9Democracy, Mark 1. Whitlam's critics within the party saw 
the programme as a shift to the 'right', and an 'adaptation' to
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changes in Australian capitalism. However, these critics often 
lapsed back into Laborist assumptions that, were far from 
'left' .
In organisational matters, the 'instinctive 
conservatives' were more stubborn. At Adelaide, they accepted 
some of Whitlam's 'managerial' arguments, but the party 
structure was not changed much. Leading politicians were added 
to the federal bodies. This did not make the ALP more 
pluralist or participatory. Intervention in Victoria and NSW 
in 1970-71, a realpolitik exercise which consolidated Whitlam's 
domination of the party and was deemed to boost his electoral 
prospects, did have the effect of increasing intra-party 
pluralism in these states.^
By 1972, the party had been won round to Australian 
Social Democracy, Mark 1 policies, although its organisational 
structure retained many recognisably Laborist features. 
Electoral success and reform euphoria further wedded the 'rank- 
and-file' to Whitlam's project, although the way things had 
worked out, there had been few participatory gains from all the 
earlier party reform talk. When the 1973-74 recession, the 
1975 Dismissal and, finally, the 1977 election defeat made 
Whitlam Labor reform euphoria a dim memory, the talk turned to 
party reform again ...
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PART II (1977-81)
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CHAPTER 10
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY : ESTABLISHMENT
10A Looking Back
After the party lost in 1977 a certain critique 
started to be argued by some Labor supporters.
They said the party had much to learn from the 
West German Social Democrats: mainly in acquiring
a reputation for good economic management. The 
party should pay attention to the outlying States 
of Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia where 
its representation had near vanished. The party 
should draw a clear line between itself and the 
totalitarian left: anything less would be
unacceptable in a middle-class western nation such 
as Australia. The party needed to make itself 
popular in rural Australia and, if it wanted to 
become the majority party, it had to start looking 
like it - not like a band of disaffected cranks 
alienated from their society.
Some wiseacres giggled uncomfortably in their 
seats over this kind of talk. The emphasis should 
be democratic socialist, not social democratic, 
they said, otherwise the party would become a pale 
copy of the Liberals. Some argued Labor could win 
power with another strategy: putting together a
coalition of single-issue enthusiasts, despite the 
lesson of George McGovern's defeat in 1972.
Senator Arthur Gietzelt invoked the thought of 
Spanish communist Carillo.
But instinctively, without acknowledging it, the 
ALP moved in the direction laid out in the social 
democratic critique. It gave priority to economic 
management, developed a marginal seat strategy, 
cultivated rural voters and steadfastly rejected 
Left policy prescriptions at the 1979 and 1982 
national conferences. The Socialist Left was 
locked away like a mad Victorian relative hidden 
in the east wing. Senator Gareth Evans redesigned 
a democratic socialist objective for the party 
platform but the ALP won power with less 
commitment to public ownership than any other 
party in the Socialist International (Bob Carr, 
'Words of Some Wisdom on the Hawke Win', The 
Bulletin, 12 April 1983).
... It rather reminds me of the hypochondriac who 
died and had written on his tombstone, see, I was 
sick, and the Labor Party in a sense, when a 
national committee of inquiry considered the 
matter [in 1978], seemed to us to be in that state
246
... (Senator John Button, introducing the National 
Committee of Inquiry proposals at the Special ALP 
Conference in Melbourne, July 1981, ALP 
Transcript, 1981:135).
Hindsight can be deceptive. It seemed easy for 
someone contributing 'Words of Some Wisdom' in April 1983, 
the month after the Hawke-led Labor Party of national 
reconciliation had won a famous victory, to discern a clear and 
unilinear pattern of ALP 'adaptation' dating back to 1977. The 
relationship between defeat in 1977 and victory in 1983 was, 
however, considerably more complex and contradictory. As in 
the 1960s case, ALP reorganisation in the period 1977-1981 
makes more sense within the 'complex arena' model rather than 
'adaptation' or leadership 'strategy'. Labor's Realpolitik 
electoral reorientation was only tangentially related to the 
great debates arising from inquests on the 1977 defeat.
Bob Carr himself had been a significant participant 
in those debates. The 'social democratic critique' he refers 
to was his own. It emphasised 'economic rationalism' (or 
'sound economic management'), attention to provincial 
electorates, strdng affirmation of the Australian/US alliance 
and avoidance of radical stances that might alienate middle 
Australia. It was by no means the only 'social democratic 
critique' on offer at the time. More popular within the party 
was Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, which articulated a 
post-1975 Labor radicalism. In its hypochondriac mood, the ALP 
was prepared to listen to all sorts of diagnoses. The post­
mortems were as much about party renewal as about what the 
electoral traffic would bear. Labor sought to link up with 
'new social movements' as well as reassure dominant elites. 
Under the rubric of Australian Social Democracy, social
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transformation projects were considered. Instead of 
’instinctive’ adaptation to 'middle-class' voters there were 
ongoing intra-party conflicts, factional divisions and 
shifting coalitions.
Labor's 1972-75 experience had raised many questions 
about 'the nature and prospects of reformist parties in 
advanced capitalist states' (Duncan, 1983:9). There were 
'serious attempts' to define the party's identity and its 
prospects. These examined the perils and peculiarities of the 
Australian Constitution in the wake of the 'High Noon at 
Yarralumla' (Turner, 1976). They also re-examined the 
welfarist assumptions underlying Australian Social Democracy, 
Mark 1 in the wake of international recession and 'the fiscal 
crisis of the state' (O'Connor, 1973). Given the dissolution 
of the Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 paradigm, various 
'lessons of 1975' were drawn. There was considerable 
intellectual interest in an adventurous Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 2. The parliamentary leadership were happier 
reaching back to a.cautious Labor Managerialist strategy 
(rationalised in Carr's 'social democratic critique').
Ian Turner ( 1976 : 18) had hoped for a broad debate.^- 
He saw Hugh Stretton's Capitalism, Socialism and the 
Environment (1976a) as a hopeful portent. Stretton examined 
the topical issues of inflation, the environment and resource 
depletion (all of which had contributed to the collapse of 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1) within a carefully 
restated social democratic egalitarianism. Stretton defended 
the 'public sector' from 'free market' attacks, increasing with 
recession and stagflation. The impact of Stretton's tract on
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the ALP was rather indirect.2 It influenced some Labor 
intellectuals.
Inflation and unemployment had persisted under the 
Fraser regime. Labor waited for the 'pendulum' to swing.^
The 1977 failure was thus particularly demoralising. People 
wondered what Labor could do to win office again (Weller, 
1979:85; see also Butler, 1979:9-10). There was much debate 
on regaining electoral support, new policies, party structure 
and ideology. The official National Committee of Inquiry was 
established by the National Executive in January 1978 as a 
direct response to the December 1977 defeat. Outside the 
party, the Australian offered its pages to various individuals
4including NSW ALP right-wingers Bob Carr and Joe Thompson.
Both drew 'moderate' lessons for the federal party from Labor's
5NSW success under Neville Wran. The lively Nation Review had 
its own symposium. Nation Review was interested in the 
'counter-culture' and 'new social movements'. Contributors 
debated whether Labor's defeat signified entrenched Australian 
cultural conservatism. Strategies were considered for 
challenging the cultural-political status quo.
Carr and Thompson had called for Labor 'adaptation' 
to voter conservatism. Senator Susan Ryan thought the 
election exploded certain Australian egalitarian myths. She 
called on left-wing and new social movement activists to come 
under the ALP umbrella ('What Chance for the Left', Nation 
Review, 22 December 1977). In turn Labor should cease 
dismissing feminists and environmentalists as 'trendies'.^
Bob Carr had gestured to some Nation Review concerns, 
only to dismiss them. It would be 'churlish to deride Jim
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Cairns as an infatuated loony' ('What Chance for the Left', 19
QJanuary 1978). The most interesting branch Carr had attended
was in Lismore. Traditional country unionists and alternative
lifestylers worked together. But the 'greening' of Australia
was a long way off. It would only grow out of Labor rule, 'the
politics of the possible' (i.e. 'dull social democracy'). Carr
held up the West German Social Democratic model - 'moderate',
9managerial, efficient and electorally successful.
The debates culminated in the Special National 
Conference (July 1981). It considered both the NCI proposals 
and the 'socialisation objective'. The debates were fairly 
intense for a party where manoeuvring for the 'numbers' did not 
always require much philosophising. There was even a revival 
of pamphleteering. In NSW, Bob Carr (nd) committed his 'social 
democratic critique' to print, while Bob Connell (1978) married 
traditional socialist concerns to arguments for an ALP 
alignment with 'new social movements', especially feminism.
1977-81 saw many initiatives. A theoretical journal, 
Labor Forum, was launched in 1978 in Adelaide (with a national 
focus). The Victorian Branch launched the first of an annual 
series of Labor Essays in 1980.10 The first annual National 
Conference of Labor Economists was held in Brisbane in 1977.
The second NCLE11 focussed on one of the key areas of strategic 
debate: 'Sound Economic Managers or Agents of Social Change?'.
While Labor economists examined the recession, Labor lawyers 
drew up plans for constitutional reform. The first National 
Conference of Labor Lawyers was held in Adelaide in 1979. The 
NCLE and the NCLL vindicated Whitlam's 1960s concern with 
'professional' support for the ALP, although they went oeyond
250
his deference to ideologies of professional elitism. This
12was particularly true of the NCLE. In January 1981, the
first in a series of National Labor Women's Conferences was
held in Sydney. This fed into the party debate more directly
than the professional conferences. In the late 1970s the party
began, ponderously, to respond to the women's movement.
Concern with party renewal took Labor beyond 'sound
economic management' and 'adaptation' to a conservative
electorate. Mick Young commented:
Idealism brings people into the Labor movement and 
belief in the need for a successful social democratic 
party in Australian politics should not be distorted by 
election results. If it is true that Australians 
are apathetic about politics it is Labor's task ... 
to change the attitudes ('Labor Has to Face the Facts', 
Australian, 24 December 1977). 13
Hayden's speeches and National Conference policy decisions
emphasised 'sound economic management', but in matters such as
uranium mining and women's rights a new Labor radicalism was
emerging. Party president Neil Batt told the 1979 National
Conference that 'the Hayden experts' had to replace 'the Fraser
amateurs' as 'the natural party of government' but also
emphasised the importance of party renewal and the NCI's call
for National Conference to be broadened beyond the party elite,
so that 'ethnics', women and country people could be better
represented (ALP Transcript, 1979:9-10).
Instant histories recounted the 1975 trauma. More
analytical contributions canvassed major strategic issues.
Michael Sexton (1979) documented the intractability of the
forces opposed to Labor and reform. Andrew Theophanus (1980)
outlined a 'participatory' socialist project to resolve what he
14discerned as an Australian 'legitimation crisis'. Altman
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(1980) championed Labor/'new social movement' links. Connell
(1977) attempted to account for the 'hegemony' of the
Australian ruling class and suggested 'counter-hegemonic'
. . 15projects.
10B Responses to 1977 Defeat
Bill Hayden was elected FPLP leader on 22 December 
1977. Labor was distancing itself from 'Whitlamism'. Whitlam
(1978) warned that it should not throw the baby out with the
16bathwater. He revived some of the 1960s reorganisation
17agenda, including FEC delegates at National Conference.
Hayden had his own ideas. He balanced Carr-style 
18'adaptation' with party renewal concerns. He wanted a
larger ALP membership (Michelle Grattan, 'Restoring Faith in
19Labor', Age, 10 January 197'8). Responding to the 'community'
could conflict with responsiveness to the party membership.
Hayden (1980:241) believed party reform could exemplify 'the
sort of evolutionary changes' Labor was advocating in economic
management and public administration.
There were expectations of increased consultation
20and delegation under Hayden. Whitlam would always be a Labor
folk hero, but his style had grated on many colleagues.
21Hayden's low-key approach might be more productive. ~ It
helped rally a dispirited party (Kelly, 1984:70; Murphy,
1980:170ff). In December 1977, as Hayden himself recalled:
Morale was on the floor, people were milling about 
in a confused, numbed state. That three years 
had to be a period of regrouping, consolidating 
and trying to lift the confidence of the troops 
(Paul Kelly, 'How Hayden Plans to Overtake Fraser 
and Hawke - in the Left Lane', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27 June 1981).
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One reason for poor morale was the feeling that Labor
had lost its way and was out of touch with the electorate.
Nation Review editor Peter Manning mourned a lost Laborism:
Before the Whitlam bandwaggon leaders like Eddie 
Ward and Ben Chifley, Calwell and Curtin knew 
their following. Class identifications were 
strong and the ties were tribal, not primarily 
rational. Class then relied on need (largely 
defence against the bosses and the elite) and 
on tradition and habit. Whitlam, over a decade 
of intellectuality, 'updated' the party, watered 
down the anti-capitalist heritage ('Labor's New 
Directions', 15 December 1977). 22
Labor veteran Fred Daly thought people in December 1977
'seemed to be different'. Manning's 'golden age' imagery is
misleadingly romantic. His sentimentality documents a
confusion in Labor circles about who supported the party and
why. The widespread publicity given to David Kemp's research
showing the declining usefulness of class as a predictor of
vote helped reinforce this feeling, which sought refuge from
23confusion and despair in nostalgia.
Kemp's (1978) book, Society and Electoral Behaviour 
in Australia, came out with the Labor reappraisal in full 
flow.24 Kemp discerned 'egalitarian' and 'individualist' 
crystallisations of values which correlated with voting 
choices. He located this value-conflict within a matrix of 
core consensus values, more likely to favour Liberal-Country 
rule. Kemp saw this as a consequence of the continued 'middle- 
classing' of the electorate. Other writers drew comforting 
signs for Labor in the way 'new social movement' concerns 
fragmented 'middle-class' political allegiances (McGregor, 
1983:96-105) .
Before the NCI was set up, there were various calls
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for an official post-mortem.2  ^ Bill Hayden moved the motion
commissioning the NCI, although Combe (1978:14) notes that it
2 6was Mick Young's idea. The committee was asked:
... to inquire into and report upon - (a) the 
changing social economic and demographic structure, 
particularly in respect of the aspirations for a 
better society; (b) the most effective 
functioning of the party in terms of maximising 
the involvement and satisfaction of Party members 
and of communicating the policies and ideals of 
the Party to the Australian community (ALP, 1979:1).
The National Executive also asked state Branches to conduct
recruitment drives and increase opportunities for membership
involvement, especially in 'community activities' (Michelle
Grattan, 'Change ALP Role: Hayden', Age, 21 January 1978), a
form of membership 'participation' party managers did not find
threatening. National secretary David Combe said Labor had to
reach out to the 'community' and improve the quality of branch
membership (to redress 'rank-and-file' alienation). ALP
membership was 'not always a terribly satisfying experience'
(quoted, 'ALP Moves to Broaden Base', Canberra Times, 21
January 1978). The possible tension between a party-managerial
focus on membership 'quality' and more assertive
'participatory' concerns in the branches was ignored.27
Placating members, supporters and voters is par for 
the course in such post-mortems, a ritual reaffirmation after 
an embarrassing experience. Those familiar with ALP history 
can be excused a feeling of deja vu. Victorian socialist left 
figure Tom Ryan dismissed Nation Review contributions 
(presumably including his own) as 'a mirror image' of 'other 
analyses of former electoral disasters' ('What Chance for the 
Left', 19 January 1978). Dcomsayers' diagnoses that Labor 
was a terminal case were not new. Such pronouncements were
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common in the 1920s and 30s, only to be refuted in the 40s 
(Rawson, 1966a:18). The NCI was 'the usual motherhood gesture 
of defeated parties', which 'frequently fall back on faith in 
better communications and new committees' (Michelle Grattan, 
'Labor Gets Down to the Business of Adjusting to the Times',
Age, 21 January 1978).
The cynics and sceptics had plenty to be cynical and 
sceptical about. Many Whitlam-Wyndham ideas, forgotten since 
1967, were resurrected and recirculated by the NCI, which 
merely:
... introduced some new sub-plots for further 
development, into what is surely one of the 
longest-playing dramas of Australian politics: 
the struggle within the ALP for reform of 
itself ('Reform of the ALP', Canberra Times,
12 April 1979) .
However, post-mortem rituals have a wide range of purposes and 
meanings.
The Labor debate of the late 70s also saw a re-run of
Wyndham1s rhetoric about Labor 'adaptation' to 'affluence' and
'the end of class', despite the changed economic outlook.
Wyndham had dismissed Labor references to the 'working class'
and the 'underprivileged' as 'meaningless and sometimes
offensive jargon' in a society where the bosses did not own all
30the cars, boats and holiday homes. In 1978, Bob Carr used
almost identical imagery:
One union secretary points out that every second 
car in factory parking lots has a tow bar for a boat 
or a caravan, that the union office is inundated with 
inquiries about the best deal for holidays in Fiji,
New Zealand, Singapore ('What Chance for the Left',
Nation Review, 12 January 1978). 31
These 'end of class' stories looked at surface changes in
leisure and lifestyle patterns, while ignoring the workplace.
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In line with the Kemp thesis, they emphasise the 
instrumentalism and individualism of Australian workers.
The Kemp thesis set much of the NCI's intellectual 
context. The committee was asked to look at the impact of 
'social change' on 'aspirations' for a better Australia. This 
gave it scope to look at 'changing community values', which 
allegedly made life difficult for the ALP. Kemp's 'end of 
class' story gained enough credence (partly through media 
acclaim) 'to influence thinking in the labour movement itself' 
(Connell and Goot, 1979:3). Two NCI academics, Encel and Logan 
(1980:3) argued that while commitment to 'the working classes' 
and 'the poorer and weaker groups in society' was Labor's 
raison d'etre, the party could appeal to all sections of 
society. Egalitarianism was 'not the only important social 
value in Australia'. It was matched by 'an equally strong 
belief in individualism'.
The impact of the Kemp thesis was largely a matter of
temporal coincidence, itself amplified by media dramatisation.
Some commentators thought grappling with the Kemp thesis was
32the best thing the NCI could do. Labor would have to avoid 
its tendency to let:
... its own preoccupations influence its reading 
of research material. The committee's work will 
be, as much as anything else, a test of Mr 
Hayden's intellectual rigour (Michelle Grattan,
'Labor Gets Down to the Business of Adjusting to 
the Times', Age, 21 January 1978).
However, post-mortem debates cannot be quarantined from ongoing
intra-party conflicts. Competing groups 'explain' defeats in
different ways. The NCI was always going to be more than a
stage for selected Labor intellectuals to grapple with the Kemp
thesis, while Hayden demonstrated his intellectual rigour.
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Lsft-wingers feared the emphasis on accommodating to 
changing electoral 'aspirations' implied an abandonment of the 
party's own socialist aspirations. Victorian MHR Peter Milton 
thought the NCI's terms of reference put the cart before the 
horse:
Surely we should start with an ALP definition 
of what society should be like and then devise 
a means of creating that society ('The Future 
Direction of the Labor Party', Labor Star,
19 May 1978 ) . 33
In its submission to the NCI, Bundeena branch (NSW) shared this
emphasis on a socialist horse in front of the reappraisal cart:
... a restatement of the fundamental raison d'etre 
of the Australian Labor Party should precede any 
attempt to understand the changing nature of 
Australian society (Submission 225).
The left cast itself in an embattled position, defending its
34concept of 'Labor tradition'. The popularity of the Kemp 
thesis and 'adaptation' talk increased its fears for the 
party's soul.
South Australian MHA Peter Duncan (1978:26) argued 
that 'far too often’ calls for 'a reassessment of the Party's 
role and that sort of thing' had been aimed at changing the ALP 
'from being a democratic socialist party into something 
else' ,35
3 6The leading FPLP left figure Tom Uren agreed a
post-mortem was necessary, but feared Labor self-examination
was being distorted by panic calls for a shift to the right:
... dictated more by conservative political motives 
than by a sound analysis of the past successes 
and failures of the Labor Party, of the limitations 
of the present party structure and of the changing 
political and economic context in which the party 
is operating (Submission 171). 37
The NSW Labor Women's Committee could not accept the terms of
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reference (Submission 194):
Implicit in the enquiry's aims is an assumption 
that the Australian electorate has changed 
and that such change is towards conservative 
politics, and ... that the Party must placate 
such conservatism ...
While worrying many on the left, the NCI's brief 
provided opportunities for Labor radicals. The emphasis on 
changing aspirations for a better Australia allowed for a 
dialogue with the 'new social movements'. These emerged in 
Australia (see Horne, 1980; Altman, 1980), as in other advanced 
capitalist countries, out of the radicalisation of the '1968' 
generation around the Vietnam war and student rights. This 
radicalisation had belied earlier pronouncements about the 'end
of ideology' in 'affluent' societies.
*Labor left-winger Jim Cairns had led the movement for 
a moratorium on Australian involvement in Vietnam. Underlying 
'new social movement' diversity was a common thread of anti­
authoritarian, participatory themes and an expressive emphasis 
on personal experience and direct action (see Habermas, 1981; 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1981; Offe, 1982). The women's movement, 
itself very diverse, became the most enduring and well- 
entrenched 'new social movement'. In Australia, the concerns 
of both the ecologists and the revived peace movement fused in 
the Movement Against Uranium Mining. The 1977 ALP National 
Conference cautiously endorsed an anti-uranium line (see 
Weller, 1979:77). Other issues were raised by gay
liberationists and by new forms of aboriginal and ethnic 
politics. We should also note agitation around issues like
housing and transport by 'urban social movement' (Castells,
3 81977; see also Stretton, 1976:73).
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Labor and social democratic parties had complicated
relationships with 'new social movements'. They shared some
common ememies. The parties' pursuit of an electoral majority
and their attachments to dominant social forces distanced them
from the movements. Proponents of liaison with the movements
cited the dramatic rebirth of the French Socialist Party in the 
391970s. Conservative Labor strategists preferred to note 
George McGovern's huge 1972 US presidential defeat. They 
dismissed 'single-issue enthusiasts' and 'disaffected cranks'.
The NCI offered an arena for Labor to respond to the 
new politics. The left was suspicious, although alignment with 
the movements offered possibilities for a new Labor radicalism. 
The left could have used the NCI to draw lessons from various 
developments in social democratic politics overseas. .The long 
Swedish Social Democratic reign had come to an end in' 1976, but 
there were exciting possibilities attached to its Meidner Plan 
which innovatively sought to use collective 'wage-earner' funds 
to fuel simultaneous growth, redistribution and social control 
of the economy (see Korpi, 1978; J. Stephens, 1979). In 
Britain, the 'alternative economic strategy' (selective 
nationalisation plus import controls) plus constitutional and 
democratic reform (open government, abolition of the House of 
Lords) package articulated by Stuart Holland and Tony Benn won 
considerable support among Labour activists, although it hardly 
influenced Labour in government. The 'Euro-Communist' 
phenomenon in the 1970s also offered new possibilities for left 
re-alignment. Old social democratic formulae were being 
questioned and new paradigms were being explored. No wonder 
social democratic leaderships, torn between demonstrating
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economic respectability and responding to new membership
demands, found a 'crisis of manageability' (Hine, 1986) on
their hands (see also Therborn, 1984). They faced difficult
choices (Paterson and Thomas, 1986:14). They could pretend
nothing was happening, present themselves as austere crisis-
managers or move leftwards. The first was problematic, the
second would involve conflict with party members40 and the
third was electorally doubtful:
The choice between these strategies was often 
a very painful one which encouraged factionalism 
and dissent within the parties and made them much 
harder to manage than in the past ...
These were the ALP's dilemmas; cling to the 'Whitlamist'
wreckage, swallow the bitter medicine of Labor Managerialism
or explore the possibilities of Australian Social Democracy,
Mark 2.
The Labor left could draw some comfort from evidence 
of renewed radicalism in some social democratic parties long 
thought to have made their peace with capitalism. The 'Swedish 
line' (see McFarlane, 1981), 'Bennism' and 'Euro-Communist' 
alignments (see Arthur Gietzelt, 'What Chance for the Left', 
Nation Review, 2 March 1978) all had their ALP admirers. The 
NCI provided scope for Labor to explore a new radicalism and a 
socialism suitable for Australian conditions. It also promised 
possibilities of medium- and long-term strategic thinking and 
serious analytical discussion at local branch and FEC level. 
Left rhetoric often denounces short-term electoral opportunism. 
'Rank-and-file' and 'grass-roots' were amongst its favourite 
buzz-words. Yet there was considerable suspicion of the NCI 
on the left, particularly in Victoria, where it was strongly 
represented.
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IOC Dramatis Personae
Hayden said he wanted to tap the ’collective wisdom 
spread throughout the party' (Malcolm Colless, 'I am "Tough 
Enough" for Victory - Hayden', Australian, 15 March 1979). The
NCI gestured to this notion. The party's 'collective wisdom' 
could assert itself in submissions. Labor intellectuals could 
also contribute. Hayden was conscious that the ALP had never
41been 'rich in political theory' (quoted, Patience, 1981:286). 
The NCI's genesis reflected some general changes in Australian 
political practice. The speechwriter/adviser/consultant type 
had become:
... an integral part of ... the modern process of 
policy-making, presentation of leaders, and 
exposition of ideas ... (Tiver, 1983:20).
In the 1970s, the parties:
. . . began to take more notice of the ideas raised 
by community groups and also to hire academics to 
serve on advisory committees and to advise 
ministers (see also Walter, 1986).
The initial announcement promised the NCI would
include a sociologist, an economist and a demographer (Michelle
42Grattan, 'Labor to Examine Electorate', Age,20 January 1978). 
The sociologist appointed was Sol Encel (Professor of 
Sociology, University of NSW); the economist Geoff Harcourt 
(Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide) and the 
demographer Mai Logan (Professor of Geography, Monash 
University). The three professors were joined by eight party 
and union figures including Neal Blewett MHR (formerly 
Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, Flinders 
University). The others were joint chairpersons Hayden and 
Hawke and their proxies John Button (deputy leader in the 
Senate) and John Ducker (president NSW ALP and NSW Labour
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Council); front bencher Mick Young and two less prominent
figures, Ken Turbet (general secretary, Australian
Telecommunications Employees' Association and president,
Council of Australian Government Employees' Organisations) and
David Hamill (Queensland Young Labor).
Encel (1979:1) found the process whereby the National
Executive chose the committee members, including himself, quite
baffling, although some state balance had been sought. CAGEO
president Turbet represented the growing public sector unionist
constituency. Hamill was a voice from Queensland, that was not
tied to the dominant 'old guard' line. This was under
challenge from a reform group within the Branch, occasionally
4 3supported and encouraged by Hayden (himself a Queenslander).
Apart from the symbolic appointments Hayden and Hawke, who took
little part in the NCI (see Encel, 1979:1), the committee
initially included three professors, one professor-turned-MHR,
two senior federal parliamentarians, a trade union/party heavy
from NSW and a Queensland Young Labor activist.
The all-male nature of the initial NCI line-up
aroused considerable controversy. It stood rather uneasily
alongside the committee's brief to examine changing aspirations
in the electorate, demonstrating 'an extraordinary lack of
sensitivity' (Duncan, 1978:26). Even the Queensland Branch,
not noted for sympathy to feminism, complained. Of course, the
Queensland 'old guard' had its own fears about the NCI becoming
. 4 4a focal point for supporters of federal intervention. The 
'middle-class' and academic composition of the committee also 
attracted criticism. A Sydney Morning Herald letter-writer 
lamented:
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No wharfies, garbos or tram conductors ... The 
ALP is no longer a labouring man's party 
(6 March 1978).
Two women were co-opted by the first NCI meeting:
Ann Forward (federal vice-president, Administrative and
Clerical Officers Association) and Fran Bladel (an activist
from Tasmania, which had no initial representation). Two men
were added also: John Garland (joint secretary, Amalgamated
Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union) and Ken Bennett (ALP
assistant national secretary). Garland brought a blue collar
unionist perspective. He was from the left, which was not
represented as such in the original selection. His union was a
4 5major force in the Australian left. Bennett linked the NCI 
to the National Secretariat.
The NCI's federal parliamentarians were all part of 
Hayden's loose centrist coalition in the FPLP: Hayden himself,
Button (from the Victorian Independents) and Blewett and Young 
(both from the SA Branch, itself run by a centrist 'consensus' 
coalition). Dunstan's SA Labor Government found many admirers 
for its mixture of reformist activism and cautious electoral 
calculation, in the wake of Whitlamism's demise (see Parkin and 
Patience, 1981). SA was also characterised by an unusual 
degree of integration between the parliamentarians and the 
party organisation.
Of the academics, both Blewett (who became the 
committee's secretary) and Encel had written on the ALP. Their 
writings anticipated many NCI themes. Encel keenly observed 
trends towards 'professionalisation' and 'academicisation' in 
Australian politics, which he saw as a consequence of 'social 
change' (in particular, the rise of a 'new middle class'). We
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should also note the views of Hayden's proxy, John Button, who
46became the committee's key federal parliamentarian. As 
Hayden and Hawke took little part in the proceedings, Button 
became de facto NCI chair and the salesperson for NCI ideas in 
the party's key echelons.
Blewett's research interests gave him the background 
to look at long-term strategies for Labor 'hegemony'. His PhD 
thesis analysed the 1910 British General Election as a key 
moment in the rise and decline of British Liberalism, noting 
Lloyd George's constitutional battles and social reform 
strategies. In Australia, he studied patterns of long-term 
electoral alignment (see, e.g. Blewett, 1971). He explored 
constitutional and political strategies for achieving a series 
of Labor governments in Canberra to secure social democratic 
reforms (Blewett, 1978).
Blewett'believed that even a low-key ALP could
attempt a serious reform project, rather than simply managing
4 8the system (ABC Four Corners, 1980:441). Whitlam Labor 
pursued 'relatively moderate policies, sometimes perhaps too 
moderate' with a flourish of 'radical panache'. Blewett hoped 
for a Labor pursuit of 'radical policies with a moderate 
style'. Only one year after the Whitlam Government was 
elected, Blewett (1973a:358) berated its paradoxical 
combination of policy timidity and stylistic excess. It was 
likely to be one more 'short-lived Labor interruption' to 
conservative hegemony, 'a brief interglacial break in the Ice 
Age'. Blewett shared the Labor Managerialist disdain for the 
Whitlam Government's lack of political professionalism; the 
lack of discipline, order and solidarity in the Cabinet and
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the Prime Minister's prima donna tendencies. But he also
lamented its lack of vision. He favoured:
... a renewed attack on the commanding heights 
of the private economy. One tactic would be 
deliberately to extend the socialization of 
the functions of private property; generally to 
replace private decisions on investment, property 
distribution and retention, and the utilization 
of capital resources with communal decisions ...
(Blewett, 1973a:365-6). 49
Blewett (1973a:361) wondered whether the ALP could
transform itself into the sort of party he wanted. It would be
hindered by its anti-intellectualism.^ Blewett conceded his
project may have been beyond Australian Labor. His critique of
the Whitlam Government embodied a radical 'technocratic
Laborism' (see Blewett, nd).^^ He was scathing about
Calwellian 'paleo-Laborism' (Blewett, 1973b:392). Calwell
would have had little time for 'new social movements'
(despite his participation in anti-conscription protests).
Blewett noted Calwell's morbid fear of 'permissiveness'.
Despite eventually aligning with the Victorian left, Calwell
rejected their notions of 'participatory democracy' as 'a close
relative of anarchy' with 'no place under the Australian
constitution' (quoted, Blewett, 1973b: 393 ) . ~" ^ In SA, Blewett
was a critic of the 'card vote', which enabled affiliated
53unions to dominate preselections and state conventions.
The NCI was to look at issues which Encel had 
examined many times before January 1978. He was one of 
Australia's leading sociologists and a long-suffering Labor 
intellectual. He had a long-standing interest in the 
peculiarities of the Australian state and polity (Austin, 
1984:152. See Encel, 1960 and 1962a). Australian state,
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society and politics were segmented, sectoralised, federalised
and fragmented (Encel, 1962a). The polity was over-determined
by the demands of competing interest groups. Competing
administrative satrapies pursued immediate advantage for their 
54clientele. The parties were creatures of this context.
Labor wanted 'Ten Bob a Day' for its clientele, not social 
transformation. Encel rejected the 'initiative'/'resistance'
model, which attributed Australian statism and welfare to Labor
, . 55design.
Encel's (1970) major work further explored the
5 6distinctiveness of the Australian polity. It also emphasised
5 7'social change' after World War II. Osmond (1972:4) aligned
Encel with modernisation theorists, who explored inevitable
effects of 'inexorable' processes (industrialisation,
bureaucratisation, urbanisation). They left little autonomous
scope for politics, and sometimes fell back on technological
determinism. Parties could only 'adapt' to changing 
5 8circumstances. Encel sailed close to such a view at
59times.
His concern with Australian political peculiarities
and his stance as a Labor intellectual modified this 
6 0tendency. He looked at Australian society from within the 
Post-War Reconstruction ideology of 'Canberra Fabians ... for 
whom history stopped in 1949' (Osmond, 1972:5 and 50). He 
stressed the relationship between war-time Labor governments 
and their bureaucratic advisers (Chiflev's 'official family') 
in accounting for 'social change', as did other 'Canberra 
Fabians' (e.g. Crisp, 1961:254-63; Coombs, 1981:1-104). Encel 
(1971:63) almost reverted to the 'initiative'/'resistance'
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model in castigating Menzies for failing to maintain this
momentum. He lamented the virtual freezing of political change 
61in 1949. That would have been remarkable:
... even in a period of social and political calm.
In a period full of political drama and social 
change, it is both remarkable and deeply 
puzzling.
Certainly deeply puzzling, if we expect political alignments to 
dance to 'social change' tunes!
In the 1960s, Encel urged Labor to come to grips with 
'social change'. 'Affluence', welfare capitalism and changes 
in the class structure posed new problems (Encel, 1962b:5). 
Bureaucratisation was double-edged. There were new types of 
administered inequalities (Encel, 1965:17; Connell and Irving, 
1980:303; Macintyre, 1985:96), alongside the strengthened 
welfare 'safety net'.
Intellectuals were incorporated into 
'professionalised' forms of public policy formulation. This 
made it easier for electorally pragmatic socialist governments 
to resist intra-party pressure. Critics could be dismissed as 
'insufficiently informed' (Encel, 1962b:6). Intellectuals were 
seen here as prisoners of industrial mass society (Osmond, 
1972:51). Encel also saw intellectuals as social critics,an 
anti-bureaucratic opposition and policy advisers to Labor 
governments (Osmond, 1972:48-50). There were problems with 
intellectual incorporation into the emerging Australian 
'bureaucratic ascendancy', but Encel welcomed the stalled 
'bureaucratic revolution' as an advance on the parochial 
sectionalisms of the old 'operative concept of the state'.
The ALP owed its fragmented structure to that older 
'operative concept' of the Australian state (Encel, 1962c:6-7).
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In this spirit, Encel (1964a; 1964b) endorsed the 1960s party
reform proposals. Labor had to mobilise support, develop
policy and harness 'rank and file' enthusiasm (Encel,
1964b:21). Encel was sceptical of Labor responding to his
diagnosis. Analysing the ALP's organisational defects required
a monograph (Encel, 1964b: 14). He provided only a few 
, 62paragraphs.
Almost as an aside, Encel (1964b:32-3) asked Labor to 
recognise women's changing economic status. By 1978, this was 
very topical. Feminism had made an impact. Encel (1971:66-7) 
linked the resurgence of Australian feminism to other attacks 
on inequalities (see also Encel et al., 1974). Encel was open 
to learning from 'new social movements'. His 'new left' critic 
conceded his closeness to student radicalism on civil 
liberties, Vietnam and censorship (Osmond, 1972:49).63
While supporting Whitlam's party reform agenda, Encel 
(1972:10) had his doubts about the 'new revisionism'. It 
lacked vision and failed to foresee implementation problems 
(Encel, 1972:12). Ten years earlier, he had warned that Labor 
needed more than short-term expediency to. extricate itself from 
the political wilderness (Encel, 1962b:8). A new 'image' 
should be a substantial one, 'not an electronic illusion'.
Encel was not impressed with the Kemp thesis, 
although he was prepared to draw on it ('The Seven Questions 
Labor Has to Face', National Times, 9 January 1978). It was an 
ahistorical re-run of 1960s 'end of class' arguments, which 
failed to give due weight to white collar radicalism. 
Interpreting Labor's 1975 and 1977 defeats brought Encel back 
to politics and 'social change'. As well as a constitutional
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crisis, 1975 represented an Australian inflection of social
democratic difficulties in the face of intractable economic
problems and social tensions (Encel, 1978b:149). The
difficulties included 'stagflation', ecological crises and the
64domination of national economies by giant corporations. The
'end of ideology' prognoses had been falsified by the swing to
the left in the late 1960s:
... and by the accumulating evidence that the 
economic boom was slowing down and that its 
social costs were becoming unacceptably high 
(Encel, 1978b:155-6. See also Therborn, 1984).
6 5The process took longer to unravel in Australia than in other
OECD countries. The coalition in support of the Whitlam
programme was fragile. Like other such social democratic
coalitions, it was vulnerable to recession and tax revolt
(Encel, 1978b:196. See also Esping-Andersen, 1985). Its
political objectives were confined to 'the distributive aspects
6 7of the neo-capitalist economy' (Encel, 1978b:196). Encel
felt that conservative and social democratic problems with
crisis-management of neo-capitalist contradictions would lead
to electoral volatility. Perhaps excessive timidity had
brought social democracy to this impasse (Encel, 1978b:167.
See also Stretton, 1976a; 1976b). Encel's retrospective
evaluation of 1960s-style social democracy (including
Whitlamism) was similar to that of Stretton (1976a:114):
Through the mid-century summertime which had once 
promised to last forever, many social democratic 
leaders had lost hope of ever again winning 
majorities for the old programme of workers' 
rights and socialist reconstruction. So in the 
1960s they tried to attract more middle class 
support by running as classless, consensual 
parties of progress soft-pedalling socialism and 
offering progressive theories of education, 
technological change and personal liberation 
instead. These might have been a good addition to
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the old blue collar programme, but they did not 
prove to be a sufficient replacement for it.
Blewett and Encel were likely to endorse a new Labor
6  Qradicalism, as long as it was presented professionally. John 
Button was more cautious, but his allegiance to a minority 
faction and his intellectual curiosity meant he would go some 
way with adventurous strategies, at least rhetorically.
Button's high-profile NCI role won kudos and criticisms. Bob 
Carr argued Button turned what might have been 'a forgettable 
whitewash' into Labor's 'boldest revisionist foray' ('A
6 9Reformer Right on the Button', Bulletin, 27 June 1978).
Against that, Button's detractors claimed he used the committee 
for personal aggrandisement (Russell Schneider, 'A Radical the 
Traffic Will Bear', Australian, 9 October 1978). They 
questioned the worth of public soul-searching by a relatively 
academic group. Such critics had an air of injured innocence. 
The NCI's front man could hardly avoid media attention and some 
self-aggrandisement.^
What was Button's NCI agenda? He had been a founder
71member of the Victorian 'Participants'. Later, as the
'Independents', they carved out a distinctive position between
the two major Victorian blocs ('Centre-Unity' and 'Socialist
Left'), evolving a curious alliance with the latter (R. Smith, 
721974:58-9). In Caucus, Button, 'a clever politician' (Kelly, 
1984:335) pursued:
... the creation of a centre group to give more 
intellectual weight and political clout to the 
ALP.
He was a Hayden lieutenant with many ideas of his own. Button 
supported the old Whitlam/Wyndham goal of direct FEC and 
federal union National Conference representation. In the
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1960s, he criticised Labor amateurism. Labor was hindered from
communicating an image of unity and competence by Victorian
Branch authoritarianism ('Way to a New "Image” Labor Comment, 
73June 1967). Button found the NCI a congenial arena for 
canvassing some old 'Participant' ideas. He had less success 
with ALP power-brokers.
Button was not simply recycling 1960s ideas. He
wanted Labor to develop in a 'post-Whitlamist' direction. The
party was trying too hard to recreate the past (John Hurst,
74'The Shiny Button', Nation Review, 28 December 1977). Social
reform had to be subordinated to 'sound economic management'.
Admitting his views were unpopular within the party, Button
argued Labor was too keen 'to listen to the strident voices of
articulate minorities'. Many members thought it was all about
'women's issues or conservation or civil liberties or all of
these things'. Button would only endorse Labor support of 'new
social movements', insofar as the logic of 'sound economic
management' would permit:
While adopting a genuinely compassionate interest 
in these things, they should be subordinated to the 
gut issues of what industries this country can viably 
support and will employ people.
The electorate was looking for 'low key, competent,
compassionate management'
Perhaps Button was recycling the old 'Participant' 
projection of Labor as the best managers of the 'new corporate' 
state. After the 1975 defeat, former Labor Comment editor Bob 
Murray (1976:35) wanted to bury 'Whitlamism'. Despite its 
'better polish', it was very similar to Calwellism. Both 
emphasised increasing Commonwealth expenditure. Murray 
articulated an emerging Labor Managerialism. Thrs responded to
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recession and the 1975 trauma by reassuring dominant elites
that, above all, Labor would not transgress prevailing canons
7 6of 'sound economic management'. The cultural radicalism that
had attached itself to 'Whitlamism' (see Little, 1986) would be 
77disowned. Labor had to 'pull its horns in' (Murray,
1976:38). The Australian social and economic climate did not
7 8allow 'all that much difference between the parties'.
This 'new realism' guided much Labor practice. It
was not often proclaimed as such in the debates. Whitlam's
programme assumed continued economic growth would underpin
painless social reform. When this was dashed, many moved in
the Labor Managerialist direction, buoyed by Wran's 1976 NSW
success. They did not use the term Labor Managerialism. Bob
Carr spoke of a 'social democratic critique'. But there are
many varieties of social democracy. The retreat from public
expenditure involved the rejection of some key social
79democratic ideas. The demise of 'Whitlamism' also led to the 
development of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 as a 
potential ALP project. It was distinguished from Australian 
Social Democracy, Mark 1 by its readiness to go beyond the 
parliamentary-bureaucratic emphasis of the Whitlam programme.
John Button was a Labor Managerialist politician, but 
he was prepared to explore Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. 
The NCI facilitated debates on Labor identity and ideology, as 
well as organisational matters. Considerable confusion ensued. 
In March 1982, Button lamented Labor's lack of a vision for the 
1980s:
Since the Chifley Government went out of office, 
perhaps the nearest the ALP has got to establishing 
a perception of an alternative vision was in the 
early 1970s. In 1972 we won. The vision was
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perhaps too splendid - impossible to implement in 
haste by a Government of mortals ... In the ALP 
all sorts of tensions and confusions arise as to 
how the alternative programme or vision is to 
be developed and articulated ... (quoted, Kelly,
1984 : 218-9).
Party managers feared fanning factional flames. Furthermore,
talk of 'vision' ruffled the Labor Managerialists. For Button,
Labor in 1982, after all the debates, still only had:
... a series of disaggregated policies in various 
stages of development; plenty of trees, but no 
Burnham Wood to take us to Dunsinane (quoted,
Kelly, 1984:219).
The development of such 'vision' in a 'complex arena' like the 
ALP is a tricky process 1
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CHAPTER 11
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY : PROCESS
11A Submissions: 'Garbage Can' Smorgasbord
Having introduced some key dramatis personae and 
their favourite party reform scripts, we can watch the NCI plot 
unfold. Hayden and Hawke, the committee's figureheads, suggest 
the NCI set about its 'somewhat daunting task' by seeking 
written submissions and attending special party meetings (APSA, 
1979:4. See also ALP, 1979:3). Submissions came from within 
the party and from the general public. According to the NCI 
Report, there were 320. I located 314 (see analysis in 
Table 1).^
Table 1
NCI Submissions
Extra-Party 
'General public' and
party supporters * 110 ( 35% )
Intra-Party
Individual members 74 ( 23% )
Parliamentarians, their staff 
and parliamentary candidates 11 (4%)
Affiliated unions ** 8 ( 3%)
Local Branches 80
Federal Electorate Councils *** 20 111 ( 35% )
Other Party Units 11
Intra-Party Total = 204 ( 64% )
Total = 314
Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.
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* Differentiation between party supporters and individual 
members on basis of evidence internal to texts of 
submissions as well as other available information.
Partly based on informed guesswork. These figures must be 
taken as approximations only.
** As well as formal submissions from unions (3), this also 
includes those sent by people qua officials (4) or 
activists (1) within the relevant unions.
*** These bodies are sometimes known by other names (e.g. 
Federal Electorate Assemblies in Victoria, Federal 
Division Executives in Queensland. For convenience, I 
shall apply the term FEC Australia-wide).
Table 1 demonstrates the paucity of submissions from 
affiliated unions. The ratio between intra-party and extra­
party submissions (approximately 65/35) should be noted. 
Extra-party submissions were very heterogeneous and, of course, 
did not indicate anything about ALP thinking. The NCI claimed 
it wanted to tap (and distil) 'grass-roots' ALP wisdom. It 
could find this in submissions from branches, FECs and 'other 
party units' (about 35 percent of the total, analysed in 
Table 2).
These 'grass-roots' submissions were also quite
heterogeneous, but had some coherence. Certain themes recurred
(see Table 3). 'Rank-and-file rights' was mentioned in almost
half these submissions. This included assertions of branch-
level alienation, expression of 'participatory' aspirations and
specific 'party democracy' suggestions. The next most common
2themes, 'Educate the electorate' and 'Defend Labor 
socialisation ideology', indicated some 'grass-roots' 
resistance to the notion of 'adaptation' to electorate 
conservatism. 'Organisational housekeeping' suggestions 
included membership induction programmes, less boring branch
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Table 2
Party Unit NCI Submissions
Branches
NSW 44 (37)**
Vic 23 (23)
Qld 6
SA 4
WA 0
Tas 1
ACT 2
NT 0
National -
FECs Other * Total
10 (8) 4 (3) 58 (48)
9 (9) 4 36 (36)
1 0 7 ( 7)
0 0 4 ( 4)
0 1 1 ( 1)0 1 2 ( 2)
0 0 2 ( 2)
0 0 0 ( 1)
- 1 1 ( 1)
Total 80 (73) + 20 (18 ) + 11 (10) = 111 (101)
These other party units included some NSW State Electorate 
Councils, NSW Labor Women's Committee, the Labor Resources 
Centre in Victoria, the Education Policy and Socialist 
Education Committees of the Victorian Branch, University 
of Melbourne ALP Club, Australian Young Labor in WA, Head 
Office of the Tasmanian Branch and Italo-Australians for 
Labor.
Some branches and FECs sent more than one submission. 
Others sent joint submissions. The bracketed figures 
represent adjustments to these 'double entries' where 
necessary (in Victoria, they cancelled out) and refer to 
the number of branches and FECs making submissions rather 
than the number of submissions sent from branches and 
FECs .
meetings, regional organisers and more professional 
administration. 'Labor/"new social movement" liaison' mainly 
focused on feminism. Affirmative action could redress the 
party's historic neglect of its women members. Confusion on 
the 1977 election trail provided plenty of material for
3'Campaign comments', which also picked up more general matters 
(advertising, politeness outside the polling booth etc). The 
'Local "community presence strategy"' suggested some inter­
election projects for local branches.
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Table 3
Major Themes Submitted by Party Units (101) *
Rank-and-File Rights 49 
'Participation ideology' 23 ’
FEC delegates to National Conference 18 
Open up policy committee process 10 
Preselection Rights 8
Educate the Electorate
Party Newspaper 19 
General electorate education 17 
Other Labor media outlets 16
39
Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology
Socialisation Objective 16 
'Social justice'/party ideals 10 
Socialist economic policy 8
34
Organisational Housekeeping
Intra-Party communication 21
Branch maintenance 11
26
Labor/'New Social Movement' Liaison
Women/feminism 20
(Affirmative Action) (11)
Environmentalism 7
26
Campaign Comments
Campaign mechanics (miscellaneous) 9
'77 campaign confusion (payroll
tax etc) 8
Preselection timing 8
25
Local 'Community Presence Strategy' 20
Number of party units making submissions, not a number of 
submissions from party units (see Table 2 for this 
distinction). Former chosen rather than latter as better 
indicator of 'grass-roots' sentiment and used throughout 
Table 3).
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Look a t  t h e  ' g r a s s - r o o t s ' p r i o r i t i e s .  I n t r a - p a r t y  
d e m o c r a c y  a n d  i d e o l o g i c a l  e n t h u s i a s m  r a t e d  a b o v e  r o u t i n e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  a n d  e l e c t o r a l  c o n c e r n s .  The s u b m i s s i o n s  f r o m  
i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t y  m em bers  w e r e  n o t  a s  c o h e r e n t  o v e r a l l  and  h a d  
d i f f e r e n t  p r i o r i t i e s  ( s e e  T a b l e  4 ) .
T a b l e  4
Ma j  o r Themes S u b m i t t e d From W i t h i n  P a r t y
P a rty
u n i ts
In d iv id u a l
members
P a rlia m e n ta r ia n s  
t h e i r  s t a f f  and 
p a rlia m e n ta ry  
can d id a te s
A f f i l i a t e d
unions
T o ta l
(101) (71)* (10)** (8) (190)
Rank-and -  F i le
R ights 49 19 1 2 71
Educate th e
E le c to ra te
Defend Labor 
S o c ia l is a t io n
39 13 3 3 58
Ideology 34 8 4 4 48
O rg a n is a tio n a l
Housekeeping 26 18 2 2 48
Campaign Comments 25 20 5 2 45
Labor/'New S o c ia l
Movement' L ia iso n 26 13 2 0 42
Local ' Community
Presence S tra te g y ' 20 12 4 0 36
* I n  t h e  c a s e o f  t h e 3 m em bers who e a c h  s e n t  2 s u b m i s s i o n s f
b o t h  s u b m i s s i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  a m a l g a m a t e d .
** One p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n  s e n t  tw o  s u b m i s s i o n s .  T h e s e  h a v e  b e e n  
c o u n t e d  a s  o n e .
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Support for 'party renewal' can be gleaned from the 
intra-party submissions as a whole (especially those from 
'grass-roots' units). There were hopes a revitalised ALP could 
help change 'community values'. Then Labor would not have to 
'adapt' to a conservative electorate. Drummoyne branch (NSW) 
wanted the 'socialisation objective' reaffirmed, alongside real 
policy and organisational changes (Submission 232). Adopting a 
'safe' image for electoral purposes would be 'disastrous'.
While an implicit 'party renewal' project can be
pieced together, the general coherence of the intra-party
submissions should not be over-estimated. They often contained
items apparently extraneous to the committee's terms of
reference. It is the fate of committees investigating
institutional reorganisation options to become 'garbage cans'
4for all sorts of concerns (Olsen, 1976:314). The 'choice 
opportunities' they provide link 'an assortment of loosely 
connected problems, solutions and participants'. Participants 
can graft 'solutions to almost any current problem' onto a 
reorganisation. It is precisely this 'garbage can' 
characteristic that makes reorganisation attempts privileged 
points of access to the study of what happens within 'complex
5arenas' like the ALP. Rules about access are not precise and
an assortment of concerns are thrown up, so reorganisations
become embroiled in symbolic issues and short-term happenstance
(March and Olsen, 1983:286). Reorganisation projects:
... attract numerous otherwise unoccupied participants 
and otherwise unresolved issues. Any particular 
reorganization proposal or topic for discussion is 
an arena for debating a wide range of current 
concerns and ancient philosophies.
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Within an arena like the NCI, a host of mini-arenas are
generated, linked to ongoing intra-organisational conflicts.
The defence of Labor socialisation ideology became central to
many NCI submissions, because the NCI was a typical 'garbage
can' reorganisation collecting loosely-linked:
... solutions looking for problems, ideologies 
looking for soapboxes, pet projects looking for 
supporters and people looking for jobs, 
reputations or entertainment ...
NCI solutions looking for problems and ideologies looking for
soap-boxes tend to overlap. They included 'participation',
'party democracy' and 'community involvement' alongside 'Labor
socialism'. Committee members could develop their reputations
and push pet projects. Symbolic issues came to the fore and
took on a life of their own. Reorganisation attempts
facilitate organisational self-interpretation and the discovery
of new organisational values (Olsen, 1976:315). The new values
may affect organisational mythology more than organisational
practice, often being quickly forgotten, once the
reorganisation report is completed (see Kaufman, 1971:76). The
emergence of a 'participation ideology' in NCI submissions was
not surprising. The NCI's pet project, National Conference
reform, was specifically presented as a 'symbolic' response to
the 'problem' of intra-party alienation (ALP, 1979:22).
'Participatory ideology' and the resurrection of 
'Labor socialism' were themselves 'garbage cans', embodying 
further concerns that were very much influenced by short-run 
happenstance. This can be seen in the 'Defend Labor 
socialisation ideology' submissions. Some were blunt 
resolutions. Mt Druitt branch (NSW) delcared its total support 
for 'the socialist concepts, aims and ideals of the ALP'
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(Submission 286). Table 5 shows interesting differences 
between NSW and Victorian 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' 
submissions.
Table 5
'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology' Submissions:
Further Analysis
NSW Vic Other
Party Units Sending Submissions 48 36 17
'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology'
Socialisation Objective 10 1 4
'Social justice'/party ideals 5 2 4
Socialist economic policy 1 6 1
TOTAL 16 9 9
Both 'Defend Labor Socialisation 
Ideology' and 'Rank-and-File
Rights' mentioned by same unit 11 1 3
NSW submissions couched 'socialist' sentiments in 
more declaratory terms. Victorian submissions touched on
fldebates about economic policy. The NSW left felt itself in a
7besieged position. NSW ALP president, John Ducker, argued 
'socialism' was a bugbear (Peter Terry, '"Bogy" of Socialism 
Haunts Big Debate', Australian, 6 June 1978). Labor had to 
make up its mind whether 'socialism' was what it really was 
about. Otherwise, it was 'needlessly losing votes' in 
opposition when it could be in government, implementing the
g
reform programmes 'we'd be pursuing anyway'. The NCI was an 
arena, where the NSW left could challenge the Ducker line. 
Proportionately more submissions from the 'right-wing' NSW
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Branch defended Labor socialisation ideology than from 'left-
wing' Victoria. Out-groups welcomed the NCI's open access.
Party officials were more wary. A Victorian official warned
Encel (1979:2), the NCI was dominated by the right. NSW,
however, saw the committee as 'a left-wing attempt to upset the
9local apple cart'.
More than two-thirds of the NSW party units
supporting 'Labor socialism' also supported 'Rank-and-file
rights'. The NSW left was more sympathetic to the notion of
'branch rights' than the Victorian left.^ The way the
differences between NSW and Victorian 'socialist' submissions
reflected short-term happenstance is typical of what happens in
reorganisation attempts.^^  The 'political bargaining'
processes they generate are:
... sensitive to contextual fluctuation and to 
short-term changes in political attention ... 
the course of events surrounding a reorganization 
seems to depend less on properties of the 
reorganization proposals or efforts than on the 
happenstance of short-run political attention, 
over which reorganization groups typically have 
little control (March and Olsen, 1983:286).
What are mini-arenas within a reorganization attempt 
may be more central to organisational processes than the 
reorganisation attempt itself. This can be seen when we look 
at another illustration of the impact of short-term 
happenstance on the NCI. Submissions from individual 
Queensland members had a high emphasis on 'Organisational 
housekeeping' and 'Campaign comments' (see Table 6). They 
reflected turmoil in that Branch. Assorted opponents were 
challenging the 'old guard' administration. Allegations of 
mismanagement and incompetence became 'Organisational
12housekeeping' submissions and 'Campaign comments' to the NCI.
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Table 6
'Organisational Housekeeping' and 'Campaign Comments': 
Individual Member Submissions
NSW Vic Qld Other TOTAL
Individual Members 19 14 14 24 71
'Campaign Comments' 3 3 8 8 22
'Organisational 
Housekeeping' 2 5 7 5 19
Pressures were building up for federal intervention. Control
of the Branch would then change hands, directly affecting the
composition of Queensland delegations to the national bodies. •
Apparently further-reaching NCI pet projects seemed like
shadow-boxing in comparison.
Some NCI members were heavily involved with the
Queensland controversy on the National Executive. Ducker,
Hawke and Young defended the 'old guard', fearing left gains
from any upheaval (Bob Carr, 'Why Ducker is Quitting',
Bulletin, 11 September 1979). They felt the 'old guard'
provided 'moderate ballast', keeping the ALP 'closer to the
13Centre ground of national politics'. Preserving 'moderate 
ballast' was not necessarily compatible with 'party renewal'. 
Hayden was sympathetic to the reformers, but proceeded 
cautiously (Murphy, 1980:172-3; Stuart Simson, 'Why Bill 
Hayden Backed Quietly Off', National Times, 17 March 1979). 
Provoked by 'old guard' obduracy, the National Executive 
intervened in 1980 (see Swan, 1983:123-4).
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While Hayden, Hawke, Young and Ducker took a high
profile on the Queensland dispute they ignored the NCI. As key
party figures and National Executive members, they were able to
take their NCI membership lightly. Hayden 'took very little
part in the committee's proceedings' (Encel, 1979:1). Hawke
'rarely appeared'. Ducker 'even more rarely'. Young's
involvement was only cursory (Anne Summers, 'ALP's Hand Up for
Reform - Or Was It?', Australian Financial Review, 12 April 
141979). In this, too, the NCI was typical of reorganisation 
attempts, where it is often difficult to sustain 'the attention 
of major political actors' (March and Olsen, 1983:286). Such 
an 'attention vacuum' allows 'less central actors move to the 
forefront'. The final NCI Report was the product of four 
authors (Blewett, Encel, Garland and Forward) rather than the 
committee as a whole (Anne Summers, Australian Financial 
Review, 12 April 1979). The balance of forces and opinions
represented in the NCI Report (ALP, 1979) did not reflect that 
of the National Executive. The NCI was prepared to explore 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. The National Executive 
was more inclined to Labor Managerialism.
While the NCI was distributing its occasionally 
controversial Discussion Papers (henceforth referred to as 
DPs), a state election was being held in NSW. It resulted in a 
'Wranslide' Labor victory. One NSW Labor official suggested 
Wran's practice provided a better model than NCI theory and 
hoped for 'a lot less tomfoolery of position papers' and grand 
new organisational projects (quoted, Malcolm Colless, 'What 
the Labor Party Must Learn from Wran's Landslide', Australian, 
14 October 1978). Electoral calculation and 'party renewal'
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could point in different directions.
With many of the party 'patrons'll m0re interested
in maintaining 'moderate ballast', winning state elections
and such matters, various ALP out-groups gravitated towards
the NCI. In particular, feminists and sections of the
branch membership (especially in NSW). The 'garbage can'
nature of reorganisation projects is accentuated by the
ambiguity of the problems and solutions thrown up (March and
Olsen, 1983:287). What the reorganisation is about is
defined differently by different participants. They:
... may try to attach their pet projects to a 
reorganization ... to make it something they 
can support ...
The NCI offered out-groups some legitimation in various intra­
party struggles. Labor women's groups helped tie affirmative 
action to the NCI agenda. The NCI became an arena for the
registration of positions on issues such as the 'conscience
16vote' (on abortion) and the 'socialisation objective'. The 
NCI itself was partly a consequence of a temporary loss of 
confidence by the party 'patrons'. Such committees can be seen 
(in Michelsian terms) as concessions to 'rank-and-file' 
concerns so oligarchical rule can be legitimated. Michels 
(1962:71-2) was adamant that members were unable to conduct or 
even supervise party administration. The 'rank-and-file' had 
to content themselves with 'summary reports' and 'occasional 
special committees of inquiry'. Michels' 'oligarchical' model 
over-simplifies what goes on within 'complex arenas', but 
rightly emphasises important power asymmetries within such 
organisations. Special committees of inquiry, given their 
'attention vacuum', may temporarily reduce some of these
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asymmetries.
NCI submissions contained a 'garbage can' smorgasbord
of issues, ideologies, problems and solutions, often little
related to each other or the committee's terms of reference.
This was particularly true of submissions from the 'general
public' and party supporters. The NCI served almost literally
as a garbage can for the receipt of letters to Bill Hayden from
'concerned citizens', Labor supporters and party members
(labelled Submissions 97-113).^
The extra-party submissions are difficult to
generalise about. Some observations can be made. 'Concerned
citizens' and party supporters did not worry about 'rank-and-
file rights'. Nor were they enthused about 'educating' the
electorate. They were more sympathetic to two diagnoses of
Labor's woes, favoured in the mainstream press, but unpopular
within the Party: (1) Labor should modify or abandon its
socialisation ideology in a determined move towards the
18electoral 'middle ground'; and (2) Labor should distance
19itself from affiliated unions to improve its 'image'.
Many 'concerned citizens' used their NCI access to
pursue particular Labor policies and stances. Some, however,
tied particular interests to the NCI's concern with changing
aspirations for a better Australian society. This was
particularly so in areas related to 'Labor/new social movement
liaison' such as environmentalism, feminism, sexual liberation,
20multi-culturalism and 'alternative lifestyles'. Contributions
21from Fraser Island Defence Association, Women's Electoral
2? 23Lobby (ACT), ~ Campaign Against Moral Persecution (NSW), the
24Australian Greek Welfare Society, the Cannabis Research
286
Foundation of Australians and 'The Falls' community
2 6(alternative lifestyle, NSW) complemented calls for 'new
27social movement' liaison from within the party.
Hayden and Hawke claimed the NCI DPs were guided by
submissions from party members (APSA, 1979:2). The NCI itself
said its submissions did much to structure its subject matter
(ALP, 1979:3). Some commentators criticised the NCI for
2 8dependence on its submissions. Gay Davidson alleged DP 1 (on
National Conference) got bogged down in internal mechanics
because of a reliance on intra-party submissions that somehow
had to be used, ignored or incorporated ('The ALP Seeks Ways to
Improve its Electoral Appeal', Canberra Times, 12 July 1978).
While the press criticised the NCI in this manner,
some sections of the party worried about the impact extra-party
submissions could have. Don Bowman (secretary, Shortland FEC,
NSW) feared such submissions might override 'democratically
made' state conference decisions. Agents provocateurs might
deliberately submit 'spurious feedback'. It would be safer to
rely on FECs 'as cross-sectionally representative of 
29Australians'. The establishment of the NCI suggested the 
National Executive believed the party's ordinary mechanisms 
were not working effectively (Submission 55, G. Clark, SA).
The NCI seemed unsure whether it should listen to 'the 
community' or ALP members. Formal submissions worked better 
with regard to membership views, although even here there are 
severe 'representativeness' problems. Local branch and FEC 
submissions were the most coherent, but one wonders how 
representative they were.^
As well as waiting for submissions, the NCI could
287
have organised its own research. Some submissions criticised
the NCI's failure to undertake systematic research. Victorian
ALP member Chris Bain criticised NCI ad hocery (Submission
237). Waiting for written submissions was 'not an effective
way of.gaining representative views'. The NCI could have
visited a variety of branches and examined practices in other
31organisations. NSW member B. Keon-Cohen wanted the NCI
institutionalised as a non-factional focus for research and
discussion, which otherwise might be dismissed:
... in some circles, as subversive. Such debate can 
only be fruitful and lead to questioning and 
perhaps change on a local basis (Submission 138).
This was traditional reorganisation 'rationalistic idealism'.
32Queensland academic R.H. Leach doubted the worth of
#
submissions (Submission 7). 'A series of pub opinions' at 
one branch meeting would not solve Labor's problems. It was 
'amazing' to expect serious theoretical analysis from such a 
process. Leach suggested a National Theoretical Analysis 
Committee. This could draw on intellectually high calibre ALP 
members: 'rank and file could be used for research'. The NCI
was not simply a seminar for Labor intellectuals. Its own 
'participatory' aspirations could hardly countenance such 
openly elitist suggestions.
The NCI faced constraints of time, money and major 
actor 'attention vacuum'. It touched on 'a very wide range of 
subjects' with a 'somewhat scatter-gunned' approach (Les Carr, 
'Committee of Inquiry - A Background', Challenge, October 
1978). 'Self-scrutiny' was alien to most branches. The party
elite had little interest in remedying this. Debates were 
mainly confined to the committee itself and leadership groups.
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The Socialist Workers' Party alleged that right wing Labor
leaders did not want any wider discussion (Richard Ungram,
'Right Threatens Purge of NSW Labor Party', Direct Action, 11
May 1978). Given the electoral defeat, there had to be some
debate, but the Labor leadership:
... tried to confine the study of the 1975 and 1977 
debacles to a handful of highly paid 'experts' - 
who know very well who hired them.
Some of the NCI 'experts' were well-paid, but not by the ALP
for being on the committee.
Perhaps in lieu of its own research, the NCI got some
assistance from outside experts (APSA, 1979:5). NCI members
met the 'rank-and-file' at some specially arranged meetings,
generally at 'intermediate' party levels rather than lgwer
down. State head office non-cooperation was often an obstacle
(Encel, 1979:2). There was no systematic NCI discussion with
or research on the 'grass-roots' ALP. There was no Australian
Labor equivalent of the 1977-78 West German Social Democratic
'communication study' of membership composition, attitudes,
involvement etc. (see Braunthal, 1983:37-60; Kolinsky,
1984 :7 4 f f).33
1IB Agenda: NCI Autonomy from 'Chiefs' and 'Masses'
The NCI was no grandiose agent for wholesale 'party 
renewal'. Nor was it simply the passive instrument of its 
submissions, as it modestly claimed. Newspaper editorialists 
need not have worried about it being swept along by party 
activists. Their support for 'party renewal' was too diffuse 
to sweep anything along. Nor need the activists have worried 
about extra-party agents provocateurs. The disparate intra-
289
party submissions were a model of clarity and cohesion, 
compared to the bewildering array of concerns canvassed from 
outside the party. The NCI members' own party reform 
prescriptions were as significant as anything that could be 
distilled from the 'grass-roots' submissions in determining the 
committee's conclusions. It set its own agenda. Intra-party 
pressure had some impact, as in the resolution of the row over 
the original all-male committee. Formal submissions were, 
however, a clumsy way to apply pressure. Eleven 'grass-roots' 
ALP submissions favoured affirmative action, endorsed by the 
NCI. Nineteen favoured a party newspaper, dismissed as 
'unrealistic'.
NCI support for National Conference reform probably 
had more to do with its own preferences than any pressure from 
below. 'Rank and file' submissions legitimated these 
preferences. The NCI and the National Executive had many 
opportunities to shape the debate. The Executive defined the 
terms of reference, appointed the NCI and could effectively 
veto proposals, before National Conference considered them.
The NCI had a free hand in conducting the inquiry. Attention 
vacuum gave the report authors further autonomy. Special 
committees can offer some scope to 'rank-and-file' members.
This was severely limited, in the NCI case.
An extensive organisation is clumsy to operate 
(Michels, 1962:78-9). With a mass distributed over a wide 
area, consulting the 'rank-and-file' on every issue 'would 
involve an enormous loss of time'. Furthermore, Michels 
implied, 'rank-and-file' contributions to special committees of 
inquiry would be 'summary and vague'. Party oligarchs and
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committee members would have plenty of latitude. Michels 
(1962:310) viewed intra-party referenda in a similar light.
The chiefs could 'lead the masses astray' by phrasing questions 
cleverly and reserving to themselves the right to interpret 
replies. In the case of special committees of inquiry and the 
'garbage can' collection of issues they gather up, the power of 
interpretation seems more pertinent than the wording of the 
terms of reference.
'Grass-roots' ALP submissions showed enthusiasm for a 
'party renewal' project, but vaguely enough for the NCI to 
pursue its own project, unhindered. This project, including 
National Conference reform, was not fully acceptable to the 
National Executive. The NCI had autonomy from the 'chiefs' as 
well as the 'rank-and-file'.
The NCI project can be deduced from its ten DPs
(reprinted, APSA, 1979). An early NCI document set out the
rationale for the DPs ('Notes on the ALP Committee of
Inquiry'). As midwife for a Labor strategy to regain office
with workable policies, the NCI was aiming for the kind of
press coverage that would give:
... the impressions of a reformed party, putting 
behind the worst images of the past ... If the 
party's image is lousy, we may as well face up 
to it.
The DPs would suggest a 'new broom' was sweeping the ALP. Bill
Hayden told the 1981 Special Conference the NCI process had
been 'a valuable exercise' in projecting the ALP to the general
34public (ALP Transcript, 1981:332). Some thought washing 
dirty linen in public was a strange way of projecting a better 
'image'. Victorian secretary Bob Hogg thought the DPs got the 
wrong sort of publicity (Letter to NCI). The electorate
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distrusted the ALP in 1975 and 1977:
We are now confirming their prejudices by telling 
them we never had a competent, representative, 
democratic organisation ... To be agonising over 
internal reform does nothing but diminish our 
standing.
The press should not be given chances to put egg on Labor's
face, with headlines like 'Labor Bureaucrats Reject Committee's
Work'. Overdue change should proceed 'organically'. Hogg
believed raising expectations beyond the practicable was
counter-productive. Similar objections had been raised to
35Whitlam's crusade in 1967.
Some feared the public relations fanfare accompanying 
the DPs pre-empted proper debate. The Victorian administrative 
committee was so disgruntled that it asked the National 
Executive to ensure the party review process was 
'representative of the movement and its aspirations' (Malcolm 
Colless, 'Hayden Takes Queensland Problem to Executive', 
Australian, 29 July 1978).
The NCI saw itself as more than a PR exercise. It 
used 'participatory' rhetoric, but did not relinquish control 
of its agenda and expected little from 'grass-roots' 
submissions. The DPs, as hoped ('Notes on the ALP Committee 
of Inquiry') helped set the agenda. 'Much debate and 
familiarisation' was needed to really change 'an 
organisationally conservative party'. The 'rank-and-file' had 
to get 'a sense of participation'. The DPs were envisaged as 
'White Papers', that could deflect criticisms about an 
appointed committee. Proposals should not seem to be 'handed 
down' from above. Material circulated to branches 'could 
provide a focus for analytical debate', apparently often
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lacking at that level. Encel told his fellow NCI members that 
asking the 'rank-and-file' what they thought would be a 
valuable exercise, irrespective of its results ('ALP Review
(LCommittee: Some Preliminary Observations'). In its attempts 
to promote analytical debate, the NCI hoped to defuse 'the 
silly dichotomy growing up' between 'the true road of socialism 
and we will be right at all costs' and 'selling out, just 
trying to manage the system' ('Notes on the ALP Committee of 
Inquiry').
The DPs were released at press conferences and 
circulated within the party. Responses were requested. 301 
were received (ALP, 1979:4). Given the time factor, the 
responses were skewed towards the papers that were released 
earlier (see Table 7). The DPs were all released in the second 
half of 1978 (ALP, 1979:3-4). They were on 'Composition of 
National Conference' (DP 1, July); 'The ALP and the Media' (DP 
2, August); 'The Role of the Local Branch' (DP 3, August); 
'Women in the ALP' (DP 4, September); 'Social Change and the 
Future of Australia' (DP 5, September); 'Economic Issues and 
the Future of Australia' (DP 6, September); 'Regional 
Australia: Issues in Non-Metropolitan Australia' (DP 7, 
November); 'Electoral Strategies for the ALP' (DP 8, November); 
'Unions and the ALP' (DP 9, November); 'Ethnic Communities and 
the ALP' (DP 10, December).
The DPs incorporated the committee's own agenda, but 
covered major 'grass-roots' themes. 'Rank-and-file rights' and 
the 'Local "community presence strategy"' were considered in 
DPs 1 and 3. 'Grass-roots' wishes to 'educate the electorate'
and 'defend Labor socialisation ideology' were given
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idiosyncratic treatment in DP 6, where the NCI economist linked
Labor policy dilemmas and ideological disputes to a 'Post-
Keynesian' economic paradigm, suggesting a way out of the
'silly dichotomy' between 'socialism' and 'selling out'/
'managing the system'. NCI endorsement of affirmative action
in DP 4 echoed some of the concerns embodied in the 'Labor/
3 7"new social movement" liaison' submissions.
Table 7
Responses to DPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 - Origins
DP 1 DP 2 DP 3 DP 4 DP 6
Branches 45 23 23 17 6
FECs 10 7 3 4 3
Other Party Units 1 0 0 1 0
Unions 3 0 0 0 2
Parliamentarians 1 2 1 0 0
Individuals 33 29 13 11 19
Total (257) 93 61 40 33 30
The April 1979 National Executive meeting gave the
NCI Report a somewhat frosty reception. Controversial
proposals were shuffled onto the Branches:
Every traditional tactic was employed to delay, 
defuse and refer on virtually every proposal which 
challenged party orthodoxy. Motions were rushed 
through, whole motions were not discussed and 
votes were taken without ensuring executive 
members knew the substance of the motion (Anne 
Summers, 'ALP's Hand up for Reform - Or Was It?', 
Australian Financial Review, 12 April 1979).
3 8Publication had only a bare majority. Anne Summers believed 
Labor would remain unreformed, until someone did a Gough 
Whitlam and tried to 'crash through' with the NCI proposals. 
Affirmative action proposals were the subject of 'much ribald
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comment' before being referred to the states. They could
'disappear into the nether regions of the Party bureaucracy'.^9
Encel (1979:2-3) was outraged:
It was remarkable to see a collection of middle- 
aged gentlemen so alarmed that they might be 
superseded by energetic and effective women 
party workers.
As it turned out, the National Executive's initial lack of 
enthusiasm did not mean the end of affirmative action.
At the 1979 National Conference, in Adelaide, David 
Combe recommended holding over the NCI proposals until 1981. 
Tasmanian delegate John Coates thought the inquiry's momentum 
would be lost if that happened (ALP Transcript, 1979:631), but 
Conference did not accept his argument. Jim Roulston (Vic) put 
preparation for the 1980 election as a higher priority. As in 
the 1960s, the left could embrace electoral pragmatism when 
opposing party reform. The left was not ruling out party 
reform altogether. Bob Hogg wanted a Special Conference 'when 
appropriate' (ALP Transcript, 1979:635). Encel (1979:3) took 
the rejection of the Coates amendment as a bad omen.
The Adelaide Conference also considered a Victorian 
motion on the 'socialisation objective'. The reorganisation 
debate had spilled over into the area of party ideology. The 
National Executive would convene a Platform Review Committee to 
identify 'the main strands of current thought with regard to 
democratic socialism' (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1979:677). 
This would be another arena where ideological conflicts could 
be played out (and other concerns 'dumped'), although it took a 
considerably lower profile than the NCI.
Labor did make preparing for the election its main 
priority. After the election, in which Labor had reduced
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Fraser's majority (see Horne, 1981), the National Executive
decided to divide the biennial Conference due in 1981. A
Special Conference in 1981 would deal with NCI proposals and
the objective. The ordinary policy-making Conference would be
held in 1982. The 1981 Conference explicitly focussed on
organisation and ideology. The 1977-81 reorganisation debate
was broader than the debate in the 1960s. The earlier debate
did not re-examine the objective. Nor was there an arena like
the NCI. Whitlam wanted an inquiry, but was unsuccessful.
Even if he had been successful, his inquiry would probably have
4 0been more narrowly organisational than the NCI. Between 1977 
and 1981, organisational and ideological concerns could have 
informed each other productively. Yet the two were 'rarely 
discussed at the same forum' (Johns, 1983:119). Few bothered 
to link the party's objectives 'with its methods for achieving 
them'. The NCI lamented that Labor debates on 'socialism' 
neglected structural/organisational matters (APSA, 1979:83). 
Implicit support for participatory 'socialism', influenced by 
'new social movements' as well as traditional economic 
considerations, was part of the 'party renewal' project, that 
can be distilled from 'grass-roots' NCI submissions.
Party reform and the 'socialisation objective' 
remained separate at the 1981 Conference. There was much 
'grandstanding' on the objective. As John Coates, whose 
earlier attempt to maintain NCI momentum had failed, feared, 
delegates got 'bogged down' in 'past methods of wording' and 
'semantic arguments' (ALP Transcript, 1981:28).
The NCI partly endorsed 'party renewal' and
41Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. It stressed membership
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participation (through National Conference reform), 'grass­
roots' revitalisation (through a 'community presence 
strategy'), affirmative action for women and more professional 
campaigning. It assumed such 'party renewal' was necessary for 
electoral revival. Labor had governed federally for less than 
twenty years since 1901. The NCI described this as one of the 
worst electoral records of any social democratic party (ALP, 
1979:2). It saw this poor record as a consequence of 
relatively small membership, inadequate finance and Labor's 
relative failure 'to permeate the institutional framework' of 
Australian society, as well as 'the parochial horizons of too 
many Labor chieftains'. Concentration of media ownership and 
the resultant hostility to the ALP meant only 'a mass party' 
could secure 'a lasting tenure of power' for the national ALP. 
Some of the NCI's assumptions were doubtful. The ALP's record
in gathering votes compared favourably with comparable parties 
4 2overseas. Its governmental occupancy record was another
story. Electoral revival was possible without 'party 
4 3renewal'. As we shall see, the NCI itself stressed the
irrelevance of much branch activity to electoral outcomes.
'The parochial horizons' of Labor chieftains may have resulted
from Labor success in permeating 'the institutional framework'
44at state government and local authority level. There were,
however, arguments for 'party renewal' if Labor was to become
45an agenda-setting 'hegemonic' party.
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CHAPTER 12
PARTY RENEWAL : NCI RHETORIC
12A 'Rank-and-File Alienation' : Problems and Solutions
The NCI was asked to look at ways of maximising
membership 'involvement and satisfaction' (ALP, 1979:1). In
early 1978, there were many calls for Labor 'renewal' and
branch revitalisation.''' Bill Hayden endorsed National
Conference reform, including direct FEC representation
(Michelle Grattan, 'Change ALP Role: Hayden', Age, 21
January 1978). 'Rank-and-file rights' was the most prominent
2theme in 'grass-roots' party NCI submissions. These 
submissions embodied a 'participation ideology'. This was 
partly called forth by the nature of the NCI itself, a fairly 
obvious 'solution' to the sort of 'problems' it was exploring. 
'Participation ideology' also pointed to significant 
developments within the ALP. There was a new assertiveness on 
the part of branch members. Many commentators saw this as a 
direct consequence of a 'middle-classing' of the ALP (Parkin, 
1983:27-8; Crisp, 1982. See also Howe and Howe, 1984). This
3was somewhat simplistic, but widely accepted within the party. 
ALP researcher Gary Johns (1983:124-7) hoped the party could 
combine a new 'participatory' ethos with an older emphasis on
4'solidarity'. 'Participatory-critical' orientations had
become more important in the ALP in the 1970s. 'Participatory-
critical' conceptions of party membership went beyond the
electoral support role, that had seemed to satisfy many imbued
with the older 'solidarity' ethos, whose attitude to party
5membership was often one of 'passive loyalism'.
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'Participatory-critical' submissions suggested
institutional mechanisms for intra-party democracy. They also
called for a more meaningful role for branch members, including
a 'community presence' between elections. The following
examples illustrate this 'participation ideology':
In December 1977, the Party membership was keen, 
motivated and dedicated. The party has always 
been able to rely on its members, but it has not 
done much for them in return. Nor is the energy of 
the members channelled as efficiently as it might 
be (Submission 299, East Sydney branch, NSW).
... even where Party officials are conscientiously 
endeavouring to involve as wide a range of members 
as possible, the manner in which the Party is 
structured prevents meaningful rank-and-file 
involvement in decision-making ... (Submission 
266, Blackburn North branch, Vic.). 6
Rather than attempt to increase the number of 
branch members ... the first thrust should be 
towards increasing the level of active involvement 
among existing branch members (Submission 69,
Eltham branch, Vic.).
... discussion of ideology [should] be encouraged 
[in the branches] so as to break the idea that ALP 
members' only function is to hand out how-to-vote 
cards etc. (Submission 270, Bronte branch, NSW).
The role of 'ordinary members' is too often 
confined to listening passively to the routine 
trivia of branch meetings and performing the 
menial tasks of election campaigns (Submission 
282, Drummoyne branch, NSW).
The party must develop its presence at the local 
level ... this implies a far greater recognition 
and promotion of the role of sub-branches and EECs 
(Submission 235, Mitcham North branch, SA).
... the Party must do more to allow its members 
to feel truly part of the organisation (Submission 
166, Randwick North branch, NSW).
... the role of a well-informed membership 
involved in a wide range of community 
organisations is under-estimated (Submission 290,
Macarthur FEC, NSW).
Such submissions indicated widespread 'participatory-
7critical' sentiment, but not necessarily a groundswell of
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membership opinion. By its nature, the NCI was likely to tap 
'participatory-critical' rather than 'passive loyalist' 
attitudes. Furthermore 'participation ideology' is one thing, 
party transformation another.
'Passive loyalists' had their own complaints. MPs
8did not attend branch meetings often enough. Some lamented
the loss of branch conviviality. Former party and union
organiser J. Mutton commented that:
... fifty years ago people looked forward to going 
out to attend a union or ALP meeting as something 
to look forward to in a drab existence. Today we 
expect to entice their counterparts to leave nice 
comfortable homes in the suburbs to attend 
sometimes drab, uninteresting meetings and 
uncomfortable surroundings (Submission 208).
The old Labor 'solidarity' involved strong social bonds.
Perhaps these compensated for the restricted role prescribed in
'passive loyalism'. WA MLA Arthur Tonkin thought the old
formula could be re-worked:
You and I may enjoy continuous rounds of policy­
making ... but you and I are atypical. Mankind 
in general is far more a social than a political 
animal. We have ignored this ... The commitment 
of the older generation, tenuous though it may 
be, was developed from a social matrix in which the 
'working man' identified with the party. This 
was partly because of the acceptance of 'working 
class' solidarity. But it was also through social 
interaction: picnics, social cricket matches,
debates, dances and the like (Submission 236).
Invoking old solidarities was not enough. Those who enjoyed
'continuous rounds of policy-making' were a growing force. A
few games of social cricket would not deflect them.
The admission of FEC delegates to National Conference 
was the specific institutional measure mentioned most often 
(eighteen times) in 'participatory-critical' submissions. The 
appropriate formula was disputed. Further mechanisms opening
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up National Conference and the national policy committees were
also suggested. The old Wyndham proposal for FEC access to the
9party's national bodies (through agenda items) was revived.
NSW Labor Women's Committee wanted national policy committee
drafts circulated to all branches and affiliated units, six
months before National Conference (Submission 194).^ Annual
National Conferences was another recycled Wyndham 'solution' to
the 'problem' of membership alienation.^^  As well as FEC
representation at National Conference, Manly branch (NSW)
wanted the national officers and the national policies to be
elected by National Conference, rather than appointed by the
National Executive, which should, in turn, be elected by the
12reconstructed National Conference (Submission 157). The hope 
was that.such measures would enable Conference reform to play a 
significant part in reorienting the party's internal dynamics. 
NSW left-winger John Birch stressed that Conference reform, by 
itself, would not make the party more 'participatory'
('National Conference - A Background, Challenge, October 
1978). It all depended whether FEC representation at National 
Conference would be articulated to more thoroughgoing party 
democratisation.
Some sought to by-pass National Conference. Cobar
branch (NSW) thought Labor could learn from an Australia Party
and Australian Democrat practice; membership policy ballots
13(Submission 232). Two other rural NSW branches, Lithgow and 
Byron Bay, contrasted cumbersome Conference procedures with the 
direct ballot. Lithgow branch complained that 'in the present 
hierarchical structure', most branch members did not know who 
their state conference representatives were (Submission 154).
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Byron Bay extended the critique to National Conference 
(Submission 276). ^
'Participatory-critical' submissions were unhappy 
with traditional branch 'routine trivia' and 'menial tasks'. 
Their abstract desire for 'more participation' was often 
combined with severe confusion about what branches might do 
between elections if they abandoned 'passive loyalism'. This 
makes one wonder what 'participation ideology' actually meant.15 
Some submissions noted the dilemma. The party's hierarchical 
structure left little for the branches other than the boring, 
if necessary, electioneering grind and endless fund-raising 
(Submission 266, Blackburn North branch, Vic.). Party member
Chris Bain noted the same 'problem' of branch aimlessness
*
(Submission 237). He thought branch functions should be
defined more specifically. However, authoritative
clarification could hardly programme branch activity from on
high. Bain's 'solution' invoked a Labor 'community presence
strategy' (CPS). Branches could be 'ginger groups' in their
communities instead of presenting:
... a closed system ignoring community concerns.
Associated with this a study needs to be done of 
the current operation of local branches. 16
There were various versions of the CPS. It was an 
inherently ambiguous concept. 'Community' had become 'a vogue 
word' in Australia in the 1970s (Macintyre, 1985:109). Its 
meaning was difficult to pin down. It could be invoked in 
conservative ideologies of social harmony, as well as in 
radical critiques of capitalism. Support for a Labor CPS often 
rested on the dubious assumption that Labor electoral support 
was dependent on the amount of local community work done by
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branch members and MPs.^ while some stressed the putative 
electoral benefits of a CPS, others thought a CPS could enable 
branches to transcend their traditional electoralist confines.
The CPS concept ran along a 'passive loyalist'/ 
'participatory-critical' continuum, depending on whether it 
developed or challenged traditional branch practices (see Table 
1). CPSs can be noted, beginning with the more conservative.
CPS 1 simply involved informal supplementation of the election­
eering grind, with branch members spreading the word to
neighbours and workmates. CPS 2 extended this to activity
18in local community groups and branch community service 
projects. CPS 3 suggested research work on local policies.
CPS 4 called for 'grass-roots' Labor/'new social movement' co­
operation and Labor involvement in extra-parliamentary politics.
Table 1
Labor 'Community Presence Strategies'
'Passive Loyalist' 
Membership
'Participatory-Critical' 
Membership
CPS 1
('informal electoral 
supplementation')
CPS 2
('community group 
involvement')
CPS 3 
('local 
research')
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CPS 4
('extra-parliamentary/ 
"new social movement"')
CPS 1 was seen as a remedy for Labor's loss of
support between 1972 and 1975. Dr Denis Murphy emphasised:
. .. the inability of Labor Party members and 
supporters ... to explain at smokos, in the pub 
and over the fence just what was being done 
(Submission 175).
This sort of argument seemed nostalgic for Labor 'solidarity' 
(see Crisp, 1982). CPS 1 had a strongly electoral focus. 
Unsuccessful candidate for Dundas (NSW) Russell Rollason told 
the NCI:
When ALP members can and do argue policy points with 
workmates, friends and neighbours, our chances of 
winning will be far higher (Submission 197).
This may have occurred spontaneously in the past. Now it would
have to be organised. The electoral argument for 'community
presence' runs into the reality of 'safe seats'. Ocean Grove
branch (Vic.) conceded that local campaigning seemed to have
little impact (Submission 49). Nevertheless:
... members should have had a role in publicising 
the platform more with their acquaintances.
CPS 1 might need official support. Canterbury North branch
(NSW) suggested a national policy bulletin would assist branch
members discussing such matters in the workplace, in clubs and
elsewhere (Submission 310).
CPS 2 was also primarily presented in electoral
terms. A presence in local community organisations could
provide a sounding board for the presentation of ALP policies
19and the assessment of 'community attitudes'. CPS 2 was an
apologetic CPS aimed at re-establishing ALP credibility with a
conservative electorate. Branch community service projects
20could legitimate ALP respectability. CPS 2 could involve 
some reorientation of branch activity. Randwick North branch
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(NSW) suggested the party should consider mechanisms whereby
community organisations could affiliate in a manner akin to
unions (Submission 166). Branches should be represented in
each local group. Labor had 'to promote the idea' that it was
'representative of the whole community'. Eltham branch (Vic.)
suggested ALP members active in community groups should report
back at branch meetings (Submission 69).
CPS 3 offered some 'participatory' roles, although if
this was confined to research assistance for local MPs, it
would revert to narrow electoralism. Randwick North branch
wanted local branches to undertake specialised research tasks
21(Submission 166). Seaford Pines branch (Vic.) suggested FEAs 
should:
... identify the local issues of concern, also the 
need to stimulate the public interest in those 
issues (e.g. lack of sewerage, school, transport 
etc.) (Submission 132).
More recently, Howe and Howe (1984:174) have suggested that 
branches should make:
... a much more sustained effort to investigate 
and consider the changing nature of the Australian 
economy, and the impact of this on particular 
electorates and regions.
CPS 2 and CPS 3 recalled the sort of redefinition of
ALP membership activity promoted by Whitlam and Wyndham. It
suggested a limited break with 'passive loyalism', but offered
little challenge to hierarchical patterns within the party.
Indeed, it was coupled with a new emphasis on the autonomy of
the parliamentary leadership. CPS 4 involved a more drastic
break with previous Labor assumptions. Thus, it marked an
important line of demarcation between Australian Social
22Democracy, Marks 1 and 2.
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12B CPS 4: Ironic 'Lesson of 1975
Some branches mentioned the 'problem' of high
membership turnover in their submissions. Membership attrition
was topical in 1978. In the wake of the 1975 events, many
Labor supporters took out membership tickets. Donald Horne
(1976:81) wondered whether Labor could capitalise on the 'new
consciousness' arising from indignation at the Dismissal:
Would it be ridiculous to imagine that party 
branches and sympathetic independent organisations 
could play a greater community role? And that the 
party could find new sources of energy and new 
approaches to deal with an increasingly strange 
world? 23
However many from the 1975 influx made an almost-as-rapid exit. 
Perhaps they found branch membership did not help them 
'maintain their rage'. Reflecting on this 'lost opportunity', 
Race Mathews emphasised the deficiencies of traditional branch 
life:
One of the most disheartening experiences of 
recent months has been the way in which the great 
tide of eager, enthusiastic supporters who flocked 
into ALP branches in November and December were 
allowed to flow away again by the early months of 
the new year ('Campaigning to Win', Labor Star,
16 April 1977).
This was partly because of the off-putting ways in which
branches conducted their business. But Mathews insisted that
although the 1975ers wanted to work for the ALP, no work was
24given to them on any 'continuing, purposeful basis'.
CPS 2 and CPS 3 would have solved the 'problem' of 
the 1975ers having nothing to do. Mathews recognised this, but 
his reassessment of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, which 
he had helped put together, went further. Labor would have to 
look at what we have termed CPS 4, if it was to draw the 
correct 'lessons of 1975':
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The Party's whole reason for existence as a 
mechanism for social reform has been brought 
into question ... There is no point at present 
in using Parliament to promote a social democratic 
programme as was done so brilliantly by Whitlam 
between 1967 and 1972, when everyone knows that 
Labor Governments are allowed to hold office only 
so long as they forget about giving effect to 
their programs ... ('Getting Labor Back on the 
Rails', Labor Star, 23 May 1977). 25
Labor had to assemble a new coalition of the groups that were
'left outside Mr. Fraser's Australia'. This was where CPS 4
came in. The new coalition would require a new approach.
Labor had to go beyond its 'familiar routine' (adopting
policies, endorsing candidates, electioneering). Assembling
the new coalition required:
... not simply a majority of voters but the sort 
of informed commitment ... which will survive 
setbacks such as '75 ... It entails creating a 
warm bond of identification between great 
numbers of Australians who have come to feel that 
all their political parties are remote from their 
interests and a Labor Party which demonstrates 
its capacity for caring to them in strictly 
practical terms.
The new coalition could include women, environmentalists, 
Aborigines, the unemployed, pensioners and Housing Commission 
tenants. There was a tension in Mathews' analysis between 
accepting the full CPS 4 logic (with Labor embracing the 'new 
politics') and simply adding some new categories to an older- 
style electoral shopping list. Even the latter approach would 
require considerable party reform.
Was such reform possible? Not without official
encouragement and support:
Every branch member is familiar with the sort of 
meeting where general business is the signal for 
a strained silence, while people grope around 
desperately for something worthwhile to talk 
about ... Clearly, if members are going to gain 
opportunities of becoming better informed on 
policy ... and of developing their capacity
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to contribute to the ALP and represent it in the 
wider community, there will have to be plans 
prepared, resources gathered and leads given ...
(Race Mathews, 'Put Politics First', Labor Star,
14 March 1977).
Marshalling members in this way might not be the best way of
building the new coalition. Mathews thought 'acute political
2 6malnutrition' contributed to membership attrition.
Mathews was not the only architect of Australian 
Social Democracy, Mark 1 to have second thoughts, given the 
'lessons of 1975'. Another former Whitlam aide, Peter Wilenski 
(1980a:62) called for more careful Labor analysis of the forces 
it had to overcome. The party would have to ally more closely 
and, to a degree, share power with groups which pursued similar 
obj ectives:
This means, at the least, the development of a new 
party structure with a large and well-educated 
membership ...
Such a party could rally support for a reformist government.
Wilenski also called for 'the development of a partnership with
a reformed trade union movement' and careful attention to
policy development and co-ordination. A new partnership with
the unions and a carefully co-ordinated package of cautious
reforms were possible without 'party renewal'. Wilenski
(1980b:399) argued that the extent of change in the ALP's
'structure, approach and methods' was an important determinant
of the extent to which reform of state and society in Australia 
27could proceed.
He called for a reorientation of ALP activity towards
'wider community education', countering 'the dominant
2 8ideological values' (Wilenski, 1980b:411-2). This was 
another 'lesson of 1975' . The problem had not been poor PR or
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the Cabinet's failure to 'explain' the programme:
The problem lies in the very nature of the Labor 
Party ... whose raison d'etre lies primarily with 
the selection of candidates for political office 
and in organising campaigns at election time, 
and secondly (and fairly far behind) in the 
formulation of policies ... Unlike the great 
European parties of the left, the ALP has never 
seen as one of its primary purposes the political 
education either of its own members or of the 
population as a whole (Wilenski, 1980b:412).
Submissions to the NCI drew similar 'lessons of
1975'. Mt. Druitt North branch (NSW) thought the 'Canberra
party' lost touch with Labor's 'mass popular base' (Submission 
30311). Labor's structure was not geared towards 'influencing
public debate outside Parliament' (Chris Bain, Submission 237).
It was highly centralised and heavily bureaucratised:
... hierarchical, rule-bound, preoccupied with 
preserving internal positions of power, 
inflexible. The consequences of this are low 
membership involvement, low recruitment, poor 
public image, and often policies inappropriate 
to the current generation of members and voters.
Bundeena branch (NSW) wanted a thoroughgoing CPS to counter
'big business' power:
A well directed campaign conducted by local 
branches in their communities over a number 
of years will undoubtedly ensure the 
permanence of reforms (Submission 225).
There was some irony in these 'lessons of 1975'.
Whitlam had crusaded for 'party reform' and 'membership
participation' in the 1960s. Yet, notwithstanding later myths,
Labor's 1972 policies were worked out under Whitlam's aegis, by
a small coterie gathered around him, which included both
Mathews and Wilenski (see Walter, 1986). The party was
largely by-passed. The policies:
... were not fully absorbed by the party as a 
whole, often not fully understood and rarely 
deeply felt ... (Freudenberg, 1977:111).
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Labor in government failed to make use of 'the policy 
contributions dormant among rank-and-filers' (D. Stephens,
1979:490-1). The Whitlam approach privileged 'expertise' over 
'common sense' and user experience of community services.
ALP mythology presented the '1972 policies' 
differently. Perhaps the events of 1975 gave the '1972 
policies' a spurious retrospective radicalism. Tom Uren 
invoked the '1972 policies' myth (Submission 171). He thought 
Labor lapsed into an elitist approach in 1974. This left it 
incapable of resisting the Dismissal and the subsequent 
Fraserist regime:
Labor has yet to fully commit itself to a 
political practice that involves the 
mobilisation of its own membership and the 
broader public. 31
The '1972 policies' myth was invoked in arguments
which went beyond the logic of Australian Social Democracy,
Mark 1 (which did not suddenly become elitist in 1974). CPS 4
had not been part of the '1972 policies'. The left emphasised
CPS 4 as a 'lesson of 1975'. This can be seen in a submission
32signed by thirty Caucus members (Submission 70). This argued
that major corporations and financial institutions determined
3 3Australian development. Parliamentary control could only be
restored in tandem with a strong commitment to involvement in
extra-parliamentary social and political movements:
Conscription struggles (1917 and 1960s), the 
struggle against War, particularly in Vietnam, and 
racism, the ecological movements, the movements 
against uranium mining and the women's movement 
are some of the more notable grass-root activities
Such activities were 'an essential ingredient' in the process
34of 'defining a new strategy for the Labor Movement'.
310
Left support for CPS 4 was ambiguous. In the 1960s,
the left had opposed party reform to protect its 'numbers' on
the federal bodies. The Vietnam Moratorium campaign infused it
with new elements. 'New social movements' began to transform
35its constituency. However, the left's own political practice,
including its continued fondness for 'numbers' manoeuvres,
was vulnerable to 'new social movement' critique. The left
under-estimated the extent to which CPS 4 required it as a
faction, as well as the ALP as a party, to find new ways of
practising politics. 'New social movements' embodied a
critique of 'mechanical thinking and manoeuvring practice'
in established political institutions (Williams,
1983:250). Crouch (1976:2) had referred to a general
'movement away from established institutions of
participation' (especially parties) to alternatives
including 'ad hoc community level or unofficial 
3 7groupings'. 'Participatory-critical' orientations might
lead to an alienation from political parties as
institutions. Participatory values encourage:
.... self-directed political behaviour and 
independence from elite-controlled hierarchical 
institutions, such as political parties 
(Flanagan and Dalton, 1984:16).
The post-1968 'new urban sociology' (e.g. Castells, 1977)
romanticised 'urban social movements'. It relied on a crude
dichotomy between (incorporated) formal and (radical) extra-
formal politics (see also Hindess, 1971:152-5). Other writers
insisted that 'new' informal styles of politics could be
articulated to party activity (see, e.g. Rustin, 1981).
For the Labor left the articulation of 'new social
movement' activism to internal party factional conflicts was
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immerse itself in 'real economic and political struggles'
(Uren, 1978:34-5). Labor activists should draw on their 
experience in the workplace, community groups and 'action 
groups like the anti-uranium movement' to fashion 'a socialist 
role and a socialist set of policies' for itself. In this 
version of CPS 4 'our community groups' and 'our action groups' 
save Labor's 'socialist' soul. What would 'new social 
movements' think about being tacked on to an 'anti­
transnational-corporation coalition', already defined by the 
3 8Labor left, which assumed their specific concerns could be 
subsumed into the grand project? Were there contradictions 
between the left's apparent openness to 'new social movements' 
and its practice inside the ALP?
The Victorian Branch combined its endorsement of 
CPS 4 with a rejection:
... of the planned and orchestrated campaign to 
attack Labor's nexus with the unions and to 
identify the party with a style of European social 
democracy whose traditions and aspirations are 
not identifiable with the Australian movement, 
and who, in some instances, now stand for the 
worst features of transnational penetration and 
foreign intelligence manipulation (Resolution 
forwarded in Submissions 250 and 251, Auburn branch 
and Ballarat FEA). 39
Such an approach failed to distinguish between the Labor 
Managerialism of Carr and Button (wary of CPS 4) and Australian 
Social Democracy, Mark 2, as explored by Mathews and Wilenski. 
Both were rejected as alien 'social democratic' infections 
attacking a healthy, socialist ALP, a strange picture, to say 
the least, given the party's record (see Love, 1984).
Was CPS 4 beyond the ALP? Macquarie University
4 0sociology professor Bob Connell (1978) thought not. Drawing 
his own "'lessons of 1975', Connell (1978:14) advocated future
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Labor government pursuit of 'socialist initiatives' through the
'capitalist state', backed up by mass mobilisation outside.
This had proved beyond Labor in the past. The ALP was:
... generally better adapted to fighting a 
defensive struggle within capitalist society 
than to transforming it (Connell, 1978:16). 41
Labor Party members dissipated energy and enthusiasm 'just
keeping the machine ticking over', with 'boring branch
meetings' and 'remarkably cumbersome' policy-making procedures.
Parliamentary activity 'should be simply the tip of the
iceberg'. Connell absorbed 'new social movement' priorities
4 2into a 'class conflict' model of society, urging the ALP to
concentrate on 'the point of immediate class conflict' at work
and in neighbourhoods. This glossed over the way 'new social
movement' politics defied easy 'class' categorisation. Connell
believed the ALP could learn a lot from the women's movement
(see also Magarey, 1983).
Alongside Labor's post-mortem there was a big
internal debate in the Communist Party of Australia. It
culminated in the adoption of Towards Socialism in Australia
4 3(CPA, 1979) at the CPA's National Congress in June 1979. The
CPA and ALP debates covered some common terrain. Towards
Socialism in Australia placed great emphasis on 'new social
movements', linking their emergence to developments in
capitalism such as consumerism and the consolidation of the 
44welfare state.
The CPA criticised the ALP's remoteness from 'new 
social movement' politics. Labor Party branches were 'almost 
wholly geared for electoral work' (CPA, 1979:34). However, the 
CPA grudgingly conceded that:
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... a significant proportion of the activists 
of most mass movements as well as the trade 
unions is made up by members of the Labor 
Party.
ALP members who were also 'new social movement'
activists sometimes found the two roles conflicted. This could
be resolved by 'exit1 from the ALP as well as by the 'voicing'
45of movement concerns within the party. It was quite likely
that many left the ALP:
... to move into groups that provide a more 
immediate feedback and offer a more dignified 
and involving role. The environment movement, 
civil liberties groups, the women's movement, 
community action groups and so on contain 
some of the most active and skilled 'politicians' 
in the country (Johns, 1983:123-4).
This 'problem' was brought to the attention of the NCI.
Randwick North branch hoped special ALP projects
might 'stop the drain of active, concerned citizens into one-
issue groups' (Submission 166). Jena Hamilton (Carlton North
branch, Vic.) went-one step further (Submission 259). Local
branches could be abolished altogether and replaced by various
4 6membership special interest groups. Drastic change was 
necessary:
There is a ... consensus ... that the ALP, to be 
effective in gaining electoral support should have 
more of a 'seen presence' in the community ... 
this cannot happen given the current structuring 
of the local branches.
The branches were not fulfilling 'the roles ascribed to them'.
They did not engender 'any emotional commitment'. Revamped
FEAs could carry out electoral tasks and co-ordinate the
47special interest groups.
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12C 1 Grass-Roots' Revitalisation: 'Legitimation' versus
Manageability, NCI Dilemma
National Conference reform and 'community presence'
were the party revitalisation measures favoured by the NCI.
DP 1 presented an expanded National Conference (with direct FEC
and federal union representation) as a 'solution' to the
'problem' of 'membership alienation' (APSA, 1979:8). The ALP
claimed to be a mass party but its National Conference involved
'a relatively small group of Party leaders'. This was a re-run
of Whitlam's 1960s rhetoric, as was the NCI's dismissal of
Labor's 'horse and buggy' federalism. There were newer
arguments. Conference reform could reflect the growth of
4 8multi-culturalism and changes in women's aspirations. The
*
NCI also noted 'changed expectations' in the community with
regard to 'participation in public life' (APSA, 1979:8).
4 9Australian apathy was declining (Aitkin, 1982:273).
Affirmative action for women (in particular), 'ethnics' and 
youth should be built into the new Conference structure. The 
diversity of affiliated unions should be recognised. DP 1 also 
advocated some state Branch and FPLP representation. Various 
Conference reform formulae were noted. DP 1 concluded that 
further developments would depend on the active participation 
of all interested ALP members (APSA, 1979:12). The electorate 
would judge the ALP on the quality of the subsequent debate.
One wonders whether the committee was more naive on the party 
or on the electorate.
Groupings within the ALP took a while to respond to 
the NCI suggestions. The question about which faction would 
control a reformed Conference eventually became uppermost (John
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Button, 'National Conference Structure', Challenge, November
1978). Button complained that such 'interested traditional
thinking' distrusted the party membership. It was a powerful
force within the party, powerful enough to cool left-wing
enthusiasm for unpredictable new 'participatory-critical' ways,
over tried and trusted practices.
Labor Managerialism had its own party reform
dilemmas. An expanded Conference could be a PR spectacular,
but it might be harder 'to manage than the present one' (Bob
Carr, 'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 
50June 1978). Some ALP managers feared 'party renewal' as a
threat to 'moderate ballast' on the National Executive and an
5 1obstruction in state election campaigns. The impression of
*'party reform' might improve the party's PR, with assumed
attendant electoral benefits. Its substance, on the other
hand, could threaten party manageability, a supreme value to
party managers. State head offices frowned on 'too much
unsupervised or unusual' activity at the branch level (Walker,
5 21980:332). On the other hand, party managers had to offer:
... incentives to keep the members interested 
enough to perform the routine tasks at election 
time. 53
This dilemma is a general one for competitive western parties 
(Wolfe, 1977:308-9). The logic of maintaining party 
manageability leads to membership de-activation and de­
politicisation. Maintaining party morale and internal 
'legitimation', on the other hand, requires some mobilisation 
of members and supporters. Although parties generally 
sacrifice 'legitimation' for 'depoliticisation', Wolfe 
insists, this tension gives them 'a schizophrenic character'.
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Party reformers try to iron out the inconsistencies, striving 
for managerial 'depoliticisation' or participatory 
'legitimation':
Whether proposals to 'reform' the parties will 
succeed in restoring to them a working de­
politicisation or whether their delegitimation 
will constitute a breakthrough for genuine 
politics are questions that are being fought 
out now. 55
Political struggles 'in late capitalism' were 'not between the 
parties, but over them'. Within the ALP, depoliticising 
'managerial' change tended to proceed incrementally, without 
explicit debate. 'Participatory' reforms were talked about 
more (and they were talked about in 'rationalistic idealist' 
terms). Such was the way of party 'legitimation'.
The NCI's review of local branch performance was 
unsentimental and showed some 'depoliticising' managerialist 
assumptions. Indeed, one review of DP 3 was headlined 'ALP 
Inquiry Blasts Grass-Roots Lethargy' (Gary O'Neill, Australian, 
26 August 1978). DP 3 noted that branches contributed little 
to policy-formulation or general campaigning. Their fund­
raising was tied to the electoral cycle. They bored the few 
members they managed to attract. Their activity had little 
effect on electoral outcomes, but objective assessment of their 
overall performance was difficult. The NCI was unsure whether 
branch members were actually interested in policy matters.
Party 'legitimation' myths had to assume they were. Yet branch 
members were remonstrated with for their poor knowledge of ALP 
policy and Australian political events (APSA, 1979:24).
The NCI wavered between resignedly ascribing this 
'problem' to inherent membership ignorance and seeing it as a 
consequence of weaknesses in the party structure. Branch
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debate, the committee admitted, could sometimes be
'stimulating', but subsequent motions had 'nowhere to go'.
State secretaries and policy committees rarely told branches
how their resolutions fared. The NCI's recognition of such
limitations suggests its Conference reform project involved
symbolic rather than substantial party 'legitimation'. Local
units were represented at state conferences. This facilitated
some discussion, but branches could hardly:
... function for 11 months of the year gearing 
themselves for the annual conference elections 
(APSA, 1979:25).
Could FECs spend 23 months of every 24, holding their breath 
for the election of their National Conference delegate? The 
NCI failed to pursue this question. Complementary measures 
that could integrate Conference reform with a thorough 
'legitimation'/'re-politicisation' exercise were ignored.
DP 3 did, however, float the suggestion of abolishing 
traditional branches (APSA, 1979:26) so that the 'grass-roots' 
ALP could:
... liberate the same level of energy, enthusiasm 
and dedication found in women's rights, black 
power, anti-conscription, anti-uranium, civil 
liberties, anti-freeway groups etc.
Serious pursuit of such a project would require a more thorough
reorientation of the party than the NCI envisaged.
However managerial its logic, a committee set up to
investigate ways of facilitating 'grass-roots' party renewal
could hardly conclude that campaigning should be left to the
professionals, leaving the 'grass-roots' to wither away. The
NCI's core concept for branch revitalisation was the gloriously
ambiguous notion of 'community presence through community
«
involvement' (APSA, 1979:27). Although targeted towards branch
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fulfilment of electoral, financial and policy communication 
goals, the CPS favoured by the committee seemed reasonably 
radical. It entailed 'community group involvement', but also 
suggested an infusion of 'new social movement' activists could 
enliven the branches:
There is the basis within the existing local 
branch/federal electorate organisation unit 
to accommodate single-issue groups, whether 
concerned with policy issues or public 
consciousness type activities (APSA, 1979:27).
Such groups could be given formal ALP recognition. Activity
within them could count towards ALP 'membership attendance
requirements' (for eligibility to participate in party
ballots). This was a rather pious hope. Whether the groups
implied would want to link up so formally with even a vastly
transformed ALP was extremely doubtful. Allowing activity in
such groups to count towards ALP preselection requirements
could have considerable nuisance potential for both the party
and the movements.
As a symbol of Labor CPS aspirations, and an 
incidental indication of the committee's tendency to rather 
mechanistic thinking about organisational 'problems', the NCI 
called on ALP branches to work towards the purchase of 'a 
permanent headquarters and meeting place' (APSA, 1979:26). Old 
Wyndham stand-bys (better servicing from state head offices, 
courses for branch officials etc.) were invoked to help 
branches with the CPS. The NCI also endorsed the calls for 
more 'social' activities in the branches. The Victorian 
experiment with 'ethnic' branches (see Allan, 1978) was 
praised. The NCI also endorsed rotation of officers and 
affirmative action at branch level. Wyndham's 'modernisation'
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rhetoric was revived in the NCI's attack on branch ritualism.
The NCI was confident that reformed local branches
could revitalise the party (APSA, 1979:30). For branches to do
this, they had to be better integrated within the party's
'management structure'. This was where contradictions emerged
in the NCI's 'legitimation' project. The very 'culture of
apolitisme' at the branch level made it easier to integrate
the party management structure. Full-scale 'legitimation' was
anathema to the party managers, who were quite happy when the
logic of 'depoliticisation' dampened down membership
expectations. Insofar as parties concentrated on providing
personnel for the key elected positions within 'the state',
such 'depoliticisation' seemed to make sense. But parties were
also arenas for the articulation of concerns that arose within
5 7'civil society'. Here 'legitimation' could not be ignored so
. , 58easlly.
12D Conference Reform: 'Pseudo-Legitimation'
Responses to DPs 1 and 3 were generally supportive,
often effusively so. Various formulae for FEC representation
59at Conference were considered. Hughes FEC was prepared to go
further than the NCI, suggesting two federal delegates for each
federal union delegate (DP 1, Response 60). Muswellbrook
branch (NSW) revived the idea of regular membership ballotting
on policy matters, which DP 1 had ignored (DP 1, Response 9).
There were discordant voices. Some opposed 
6 0affirmative action. Greystanes branch (WA) thought
Conference enlargement would still leave only an elite 
61represented. Colin Jamieson MLA (WA), a long-serving Labor
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politician also prominent on the organisational side,62
challenged NCI rhetoric head-on, with a realpolit-ik note:
There is no way, repeat no way, where rank and 
file can possibly be included in a National 
Conference (DP 1, Response 6).
63There were fewer responses to DP 3, but they were
much more detailed. DP 1 was more amenable to treatment/
mistreatment by 'resolutionary' methods. DP 3 responses seem 
64more informed. But their tone, too, tended to vary only from
65the supportive to the enthusiastic.
Responses tended to prefer CPS 2 ('community group
involvement') to CPS 4 ('extra-parliamentary/"new social
movement"'). Mt. Colah/Berowra branch, from safe Liberal
territory in Sydney proudly proclaimed its members' 'leading
role' in the creation of a community centre, a local high
school and old age pensioner assistance schemes (DP 3, Response
17). Diamond Creek branch (Vic.) thought Labor could
rehabilitate itself with the electorate through non-partisan,
non-controversial community .service projects:
If the community recognises the ALP ... as a 
positive force, then the acceptance of our 
controversial policies may be enhanced ...
(DP 3, Response). 66
Carrying this further, and echoing an older Laborism, D. King 
(Tas) attacked the whole idea of liaison with 'new social 
movements':
If branches were replaced by groups who are 
generally involved in some controversial matter 
such as uranium, women's lib etc., this would 
only cause dissension and failure (DP 3, Response 3).
Rejection of any suggestion that local branches should be
abolished recurred in the responses. The idea seemed to touch
some raw branch nerve.
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Given its wide-ranging criticisms of local branches, 
the NCI received surprisingly few brickbats. Wentworthville 
branch (NSW) complained that the NCI exercise exemplified 'poor 
communication' within the ALP, between 'a far-removed
f) 7bureaucratic structure and the grass roots'(DP 3, Response).
In a classic illustration of the clash between the imperatives 
of short-term routine and aspirations for a long-term 
reorganisation, Macquarie FEC pointed out that NSW branches had 
been 'heavily involved in a state election' during the period 
allotted for discussion (DP 3, Response). Randwick North 
branch (NSW) thought negative NCI attitudes indicated a low 
evaluation of so-called 'traditional' branch activities. It 
feared that the NCI, like NSW head office, favoured 'the 
complete de-politicisation of branches'. Randwick North 
weakened its critique, however, by conceding that its own 
members were 'ignorant of all but local political scenes'.
Chris Bain (Vic) was more critical (DP 3, Response
20), arguing DP 3 misunderstood the real dynamics of local
branches. Its recommendations were 'vague and wishy washy'.
The NCI's CPS was 'well-intentioned waffle'. Bain made some
telling criticisms of poorly researched and poorly thought out
6 8NCI suggestions. Most branches could not afford to rent, let 
alone buy, their own buildings. Bain wanted branches' policy 
input upgraded, although he believed many members had little 
interest in policy-formulation. 'A balance between elite and 
populist forms of decision-making' was needed. Interaction 
between parliamentarians and the party membership was important 
for those who had 'little reinforcement for their views 
elsewhere'. It was 'possibly the major role of branches at
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present 1.
The relevant sections of the NCI Report (ALP, 1979)
re-traverse ground covered in DPs 1 and 3. The NCI was
pursuing its own agenda. Its main arguments had been outlined
in the DPs. Subsequent 'dialogue' had little effect. The
final Report did contain some subtle differences of emphasis.
National Conference reform was explicitly presented as a way to
counteract members' feelings of being 'cut off', of having
little impact (ALP, 1979:3). The extension of Conference
reform to the national policy committees and circulation of the
agenda had already been filtered out, by being omitted from 
69DP 1. The Report did make one interesting new suggestion to
overcome the potential unwieldiness of an enlarged Conference. 
Plenary sessions could be restricted to 'major controversial 
items’ (ALP, 1979:22). Committee sessions could cover 
remaining topics. Even more strongly than DP 1, the Report 
presented Conference reform as a matter of symbolic rather than 
substantial party 'legitimation' (ALP, 1979:24). We could call 
this 'pseudo-legitimation'.
The Report preferred one delegate from each FEC to 
'grass-roots' representation in enlarged state delegations. 
Affirmative action would be easier in the latter case, but the 
NCI invoked 'a rank and file fear' that indirect election 
'would permit manipulation and encourage factionalism'. DP 1 
had canvassed fairer representation of the major factions in 
each state as one advantage of an enlarged but still indirectly 
elected Conference, especially with proportional representation 
(APSA, 1979:11). The NCI's 'rationalistic idealism' generally 
led it away from acknowledging internal ALP vealpolitik. It
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either studiously ignored factionalism or condemned it. The
NCI's allusion to anti-factionalist sentiment in the
submissions was slightly misleading. The reference justified
the NCI's own preconceptions. 'Anti-factionalism' was not a
70major grass-roots' theme, although it did surface in some
submissions. East Sydney branch called on all ALP members to
continually examine whether they were 'concentrating too much
on internal matters and private empire-building' at the expense
of expounding Labor's 'broad and worthwhile ideals' to 'the
71community at large' (Submission 299). The submissions, like
the NCI, tended to forget the realpolitik conflicts that always
co-existed with grand designs in a 'complex arena' like the
ALP. Parties examining themselves are prone to the curse of
over-simplification (Blondel, 1978:186).
The NCI's simplistic 'rationalistic idealism'
accounted for its assumptions that factionalism varied in
7 2inverse proportion to party democratisation and that 
Conference reform could transcend factional divisions. Its 
contrast between 'factional polarisation' and 'judging issues 
on their merits' (ALP, 1979:24) begged many questions. As 
political scientist Andrew Parkin (1983:15) points out, one 
cannot fully understand the ALP without appreciating 'the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and impediments' caused by 
its 'organisational complexity'. This complexity 'produces a 
jumble of levels, lines and linkages', often sorted out only by 
factional alignments. The interstices of 'complex arenas' like 
the ALP often provide breeding-grounds for factionalism!
Alongside 124 FEC delegates, the NCI favoured equal 
representation for federal unions (see Table 2). This might
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revitalise the party-union relationship at the national level 
(ALP, 1979:24) and thus 'relegitimate' the union affiliation 
mechanism. The NCI was also quick to point out the PR benefits 
of a public display that affiliated unions were not monolithic 
and represented a diversity of interests. Table 2 sketches out 
how the NCI built in a federal component, FPLP representation 
and Australian Young Labor into its plan for a 310-delegate 
Conference.
Table 2
NCI Conference Reform Formula
FEC delegates 124
Federal union delegates 124
State Branches 40 *
FPLP 20 **
Australian Young Labor 2
Total 310
* 6 from each state, 2 from each territory
(with statutory places for each state and 
territory parliamentary leader).
** From the FPLP Executive.
Source: ALP, 1979
The NCI provided for a bloc of FPLP delegates but 
federal parliamentarians would be ineligible for FEC 
delegateships (ALP, 1979:26). This was a concession to 'Rank- 
and-file rights' sentiment. When Wyndham and Whitlam talked 
about FEC representation in the 1960s such an exclusion of 
federal parliamentarians was never mentioned. The NCI took
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party 'legitimation' more seriously than Whitlam and Wyndham
did. 'Participatory-critical' demands within the party had
increased in the meantime. 'New social movements' had made
their mark. The NCI Report insisted that 'at the very least',
the ALP had to respond to demands from women 'for more
effective representation' (ALP, 1979:25-6). It recommended
that, at least once in every three Conferences, each FEC should
be represented by a woman. The Report backed away from
affirmative action to secure more 'ethnic' balance. Its
affirmative action proposal was rather mild. Union, state and
FPLP delegates would not be affected. One-third of the FEC
delegates accounted for only about 13 percent of the envisaged
Conference. The Report left responsibility for branch
revitalisation and the CPS in the hands of the National 
73Secretariat. The suggestion that 'community' and 'new social 
movement' activity could count for preselection requirements 
was dropped.
Political parties, as 'complex arenas', can seem 
rather Janus-faced institutions. Particularly in parties with 
pretensions to internal democracy, contradictions often occur 
between managerial preferences for a 'depoliticised' membership 
and projects aimed at internal 'legitimation', through 
organisational renewal. Social democratic parties found their 
normally complex internal situations made even more complex in 
the 1970s. Previously successful formulae were challenged with 
economic difficulties and 'participatory -critical' membership 
demands:
In the 1970s, policy-making and policy-implementation 
in all parties, but particularly those on the Left, 
became a far more complex, intricate process 
involving the reconciliation of a greater number of
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contradictory objectives and a far wider range 
of actors throughout the party. (Hine, 1982:51.
See also Hine, 1986).
Increased factionalism often ensued from this intensification 
of the contradiction between 1depoliticisation' tendencies and 
new 'legitimation' projects.
This was particularly true in the ALP. Different 
sections of the party drew different lessons from the trauma of 
1975. Those who regretted the alleged 'too far, too fast' 
excesses of the Whitlam era embraced Labor Managerialism and 
the logic of 'depoliticisation' . In a party as racked with 
crises of morale as the ALP was in early 1978, such an approach 
was advocated in coded language. A body like the NCI, 
accessible for party out-groups, was bound to be presented with 
the makings of a new 'legitimation' project in the 'problems' 
and 'solutions' thrown before it. And it was. What we have 
called Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 crystallised a 
widespread mood within the party at this time, albeit one which 
lacked secure Realpolitik anchorage.
The NCI responded to this mood,, while pursuing its
own agenda. It explored 'legitimation', but tended to endorse
the symbols rather than the substance. To that extent, it
pursued 'pseudo-legitimation' rather than full-scale
'legitimation'. In many ways Australian Social Democracy,
74Mark 2 was a still-born project. In Realpolitik terms,
however, even NCI-style 'pseudo-legitimation' would disturb 
established ALP practices, which left the 'rank-and-file' 
membership fairly 'depoliticised'.
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CHAPTER 13
PARTY RENEWAL : NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
REALPOLITIK
13A National Conference Reform: The Calculus of Factional
Advantage
National Conference was a crucial symbol of Labor's 
organisational values in the NCI's project to 'legitimate' the 
ALP as a dynamic, mass party. As such a symbol, it had several 
deficiencies. Fifty indirectly elected delegates seemed rather 
elitist. Strict federalism contradicted Labor's official anti­
federalist aspirations and compromised Conference's democratic 
legitimacy. Male monopolisation of Conference obstructed 
attempts to redress the electoral 'gender gap'. The NCI wanted 
to resolve these inconsistencies. The Special Conference 
delegates in Melbourne in July 1981 were less worried about the 
symbolic significance of the institution they were attending. 
Their debates, at times almost brutally frank, acknowledged 
internal realpolitik considerations that the NCI had glossed 
over. Home truths emerged. State Branch and factional 
'heavies' thoroughly scrutinised each proposal, often reading 
extensively between the lines to detect hidden dangers.
Except on affirmative action, debate on Conference
reform had narrowed considerably since the completion of the
NCI Report. The National Executive gave a lower priority to
'grass-roots' revitalisation than the NCI.^ The 'community
presence strategy' only emerged at the Special Conference in a
delegate's amendment to the draft new 'socialisation
objective'. The key NCI idea, direct FEC and federal union
2representation, had been dismissed by 1981. Conference, on
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the other hand, emphasised PR in the election of state 
delegations, which the NCI had given only cursory 
consideration and then rejected (APSA, 1979:11; ALP, 1979:24).
PR was important in the factional calculus. The
NCI's 'rationalistic idealist' discourse discounted factional
divisions and state rivalries. The Special Conference could
not ignore 'numbers' realities. A lengthy debate on how the
additional delegates should be allotted was a classic mini-case
study of Sartori's (1976:72) dictum:
Whatever the organisational - formal or informal - 
arrangement, a party is an aggregate of individuals 
forming constellations of rival groups.
Sartori echoed Weber's earlier observation about 'parties'
3living in a house of 'power' (Gerth and Mills, 1976:194).
*
Within such houses of power, some lived "for" politics and 
others lived "off" politics (Gerth and Mills, 1976:84). The 
contrast was not exclusive. Those who lived "for" politics 
made politics their life 'in an internal sense', either because 
they enjoyed 'the naked possession of power' or derived meaning 
from service to a 'cause'. Both those who lived "off" politics 
and those who lived "for" politics-as-power would be at home 
with vealpolitik conceptions of party life, although they could 
speak 'rationalistic idealism' if that seemed appropriate.
Factions involve interests and ideologies as well as 
individuals (see D. Stephens, 1980:43-4). Changes in formal 
organisational arrangements affect the fortunes of rival 
groups, however constituted. Realpolitik analysis emphasises 
this and offers a useful corrective to 'rationalistic idealist' 
blindnesses. 'Realpolitik realism', however, whether in the
4 .high academic Weber-Michels tradition or in the maxims of
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party figures, has its own blindnesses. Conflicts within party 
elites over 'spoils', pace Michels (1962), do not constitute 
the totality of intra-party conflicts. 'Rationalistic 
idealism' does not simply play 'false consciousness' to the 
'truth' of 'realpo litik realism'.
John Button pleaded with Special Conference delegates
to consider the NCI proposals, in principle at least (ALP
Transcript, 1981:134). They were based on the submissions
5received (ALP Transcript, 1981:135). This was disingenuous. 
The committee pursued its own agenda, which involved more than 
'participation ideology'. Its party-managerial concerns raised 
questions about whether it was pursuing cosmetic reform 
('pseudo-legitimation') rather than comprehensive party renewal 
('legitimation'). Was Button using 'legitimation' rhetoric in 
the service of a 'pseudo-legitimation' project?
Many ALP organisational practices offered sitting 
targets for 'legitimation' rhetoric. Button detected 'great 
signs of nerves on all sides' about who would control a 
Conference reformed along NCI lines (ALP Transcript, 1981:137). 
Factions and state Branches feared direct FEC and federal union 
representation. They could not predict directly elected 
delegates' alignments. There was also some fear that the NCI 
proposals would turn Conference into a mass rally, easily 
disregarded by the FPLP (see Lucy, 1979:79). If Conference 
reform really was a public relations 'pseudo-legitimation' 
exercise, this was a possible outcome.
The NCI plan had no chance. Three proposals to 
enlarge Conference were considered seriously. Bob McMullan (WA 
secretary) advocated 75 delegates; David Combe, 100 (the
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National Executive option) and Bob Hogg (Victorian secretary),
150. Combe and McMullan retained the existing 'base' of six
delegates for each state (one for each territory). Additional 
7delegates would be allotted according to size of state.
Hogg's formula was slightly different. In a Conference of 150 
delegates, he would extend the 'base' to ten for each state
g(three for each territory). The ensuing debate was confusing. 
McMullan pushed a 'small costs less' line. Hogg used NCI 
rhetoric. Combe's plan was extolled as a suitable compromise. 
Despite Hogg's rhetoric, Combe's proposal was a slightly larger 
break with strict federalism (see Table 1). It left 50 percent 
of Conference places in the new 'residual' category. The 
comparable Hogg figure was 48.6 percent.
The three proposals each grafted some movement 
towards a new national concept onto the existing federal
9basis. Delegates represented state-based factions, some of 
which had national networks. Hogg spoke for the national left, 
as well as being Victorian secretary. His high 'base' figure 
contradicted his NCI rhetoric, but maintained generous 
representation for the smallest state, Tasmania, where the left 
was strong (see Max Walsh, 'How the Left is Winning the 
Numbers', Bulletin, 28 July 1981). Yet his rhetoric was not 
completely misplaced. He specifically provided for a wide 
range of affirmative action measures in the state 
delegations.^ Furthermore, the larger Conference was, the 
less the bloc of parliamentary leaders counted for 
proportionately (see Table 1). This bloc accounted for 22 
percent of the 1981 Conference. McMullan would reduce it to 
14.66 percent; Combe, 11 percent and Hogg, 8.32 percent.^
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Table 1
Conference Reform Proposals (WA, National Executive
and Victoria)
Percentage Comparison with 1981 status quo
1981
(50)
WA
(75)
Nat Exec 
( 100)
Vic 
( 150)
State/Territory 
'Base' 76.00 50.67 38.00 44.00
State/Territory 
'Residuals' 0.00 33.33 50.00 48.67
Australian Young 
Labor 2.00 1.33 1.00 0.00
SPLP Leaders 14.00 9.33 7.00 4.67
FPLP Leaders 8.00 5.33 4.00 3.67
PARLIAMENTARY
LEADERS 22.00 14.67 11.00 7.33
OTHERS 78.00 85.33 89.00 92.67
'FEDERALISED'
('Base' + SPLP
Leaders) 90.00 60.00 45.00 48.67
'DE-FEDERALISED' 
('Residual' + AYL 
+ FPLP Leaders) 10.00 40.00 55.00 51.33
Source: ALP Transcript, 1981 and ALP Conference
Documents, 1981.
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Two federal union contributions were placed before
Conference. They received even less consideration than the NCI
proposals. The AMWSU wanted to increase Conference size, while
12retaining strict federalism. The BWIU praised the NCI 
proposals, especially direct federal union representation, but 
recommended proceeding cautiously. Button suggested that the 
way these contributions were ignored further demonstrated 
affiliated union alienation from National Conference, which the 
NCI had tried to rectify (ALP Transcript, 1981:138-9). ^
Hogg's proposal first appeared in a draft document 
for the NCI, when there was considerable publicity about what 
the committee's first DP, on Conference reform, would contain. 
The committee's preference for direct representation had been 
gleaned (Bob Carr, 'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', 
Bulletin, 6 June 1978). News had also filtered through that 
affirmative action was on- the agenda. Hogg wanted to retain 
state Branch channels of representation (Alan Reid, 'Hawke 
Again in the Gun', Bulletin, 6 August 1978). Enlarged state 
delegations could cater for branches, unions and Labor's
14'alienated' constituencies (migrants, women, blacks etc.).
Hogg noted that, in ethnic and sexual terms, Labor's power
structure resembled the most conservative forces in Australian
society. Even blue collar workers had become a 'minority
group' in the ALP, whose representation had to be guaranteed
(Laurie Oakes, 'Labor Call to Cut MPs' Puli', Sun News-
1 6Pictorial, 7 July 1978). Party policy was largely determined 
by the articulate, the educated and the middle-class. Direct 
FEC representation would reinforce that trend.
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Hogg drew on a widespread 'alienation' of the 'rank-
and-file' from the Labor hierarchy, a feeling that also
nourished the NCI's participation ideology. Hogg infused this
with his faction's conception of the ALP as a 'working-class'
party. He was more suspicious of the FPLP leadership than the 
17NCI had been. National Conference had to build up as 'a form 
of counter pressure' on the FPLP (Alan Reid, Bulletin, 8 August 
1978 ) .
At the Special Conference, Hogg claimed his plan
worked towards desirable NCI objectives, while recognising ALP
complexities and the political constraints of Australian
federalism (ALP Transcript, 1981:197). It was:
... not simply a question of numbers game or ... 
a convenient solution to the fact that we set up 
a national committee of inquiry or set up a 
national conference, we have to do something 
because we cannot say 50 or we will have egg all 
over our face .. .
The state Branch channel could secure adequate
'ideological representation' (ALP Transcript, 1981:198).
Delegates elected, one by one, from FECs might not match the
prevailing factional balance in a Branch. 'Ideological
representation' was a code word for factional balance, an
important consideration, although Hogg protested his proposal:
... had nothing to do with questions of factional 
advantage which may or may not last (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:199).
Veteran Victorian Socialist Left battler Bill Hartley suggested
the Hogg plan could transform the party, breaking down the
remaining rigidities which occasionally prevented National
Conference from really representing:
... the rank-and-file thrust of the Labor movement 
in general, the trade union movement and Labor 
Party branches (ALP Transcript, 1981:203).
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Hartley brought out the concern with 'working class' interests 
and the suspicion of the parliamentary leadership shown in 
Hogg's earlier document, but not emphasised in Hogg's own 
speech.
Bob McMullan was less concerned with elaborate
18ideologies of intra-party democracy. His case was a simple 
managerial one. Some increase had to be agreed on or Labor 
would indeed get egg on its face. But cost was important. 
McMullan made no apology for 75 being the smallest possible 
number that could achieve some 'equitable representation' for 
the larger states (ALP Transcript, 1981:204). Of course, the 
smaller the increase, the more diluted the 'equitable 
representation'. McMullan envisaged only a small reduction in 
the clout of smaller states such as WA (see Table 2).
In the general debate, John Cain from the minority 
Victorian 'Independents' declared he was 'a direct 
representation man all the way' (ALP Transcript, 1981:208). 
Federalism made Conference a 'rotten borough'. The NCI plan 
had no chance, but the Hogg scheme would make things 'less 
rotten'. In the complex internal politics of the Victorian 
ALP, the Independents often aligned themselves with the 
Socialist Left. With Hogg, Hartley and Cain all supporting the 
150-delegate Conference, it was not surprising that Centre 
Unity 'numbers man' Bill Landeryou opposed it. What was 
somewhat surprising was his apparent enthusiasm for the NCI 
approach. Himself a formidable factional chieftain, Landeryou 
thought the Special Conference was a ridiculous meeting of 
'tribal chieftains' (ALP Transcript, 1981:209).
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Table 2
How the Branches Would Fare Under the
Different Conference
%
Proposal
1981 WA Nat Exec* Vic Electorates Members
(50) (75) ( 100) ( 150)
NSW 12.00 20.00 23.20 23.33 34.40 40.71
Vic 12.00 17.33 19.20 19.33 26.40 24.98
Qld 12.00 13.33 13.60 14.00 15.20 14.09
SA 12.00 10.67 10.40 10.67 8.80 9.24
WA 12.00 10.67 10.40 10.67 8.80 8.36
Tas 12.00 9.33 8.00 8.67 4.00 1.84
ACT 2.00 1.33 1.80 3.33** 1.60 0.41
NT 2.00 1.33 1.40 2.67 0.80 0.37
Total 76.00 84.00 88.00 92.67
* These figures assume electorates rather than membership as 
basis for residual delegates. This issue will be examined 
separately, although the final two columns above show why 
only NSW and SA were keen on membership-based allocation. 
The National Executive figures show why the 100-delegate 
proposal ended up producing a 99-delegate Conference (by 
rounding up percentages to nearest whole number).
** See Note 3.
Sources: Conference proposals - as Table 1. Membership
and electorates: Warhurst, 1983:258-9 and
McKerras, 1980.
'The various power-brokers' worried about how
proposals would affect their own position. Landeryou noted
that unions were less federalised than the ALP. His own union,
the Federated Storemen and Packers' Union, had operated very
successfully in ACTU politics. Perhaps he saw possibilities in
19the NCI combination of federal union and FEC representation.
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John Garland, one of the NCI Report's authors,20 
championed the Hogg plan. It wen general support from the 
left, wary of the unpredictabilities of direct representation. 
Garland was not averse to drawing on NCI rhetoric. Conference 
delegates should:
... give meaning to all the things that confronted us 
in 1975 and 1977 about the people's role, about the 
desire of the membership to be involved at a more 
representative and more democratic conference (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:213).
For the NSW right, Branch secretary Graham Richardson
supported the Combe amendment. Like other party professionals,
he emphasised that Labor had to avoid getting egg on its face:
After three years of investigation by a committee 
of inquiry, after referring to the rank and file 
over the last couple of years ... if all we do at 
this conference is increase its size from 50 to 75, 
we will look ridiculous.
75 was not enough of a break with federalism for the largest
state. NSW also worried about cost. It contributed about 43
percent of Labor's national finance (Graham Richardson, ALP
Transcript, 1981:214). Whatever happened, it was not about to
get 43 percent of the delegates. Richardson queried the NCI
argument that increasing the number of delegates made for more
democracy. To strengthen his case, he debunked myths about
state conferences. In NSW, only 'the "heavies" of the place'
got to the microphone for any length of time (ALP Transcript,
1981:214). Something similar would occur at a 150-delegate
National Conference. Richardson overlooked the NCI's proposal
for plenary and committee Conference sessions.
Richardson suggested 100 delegates would allow 'a
wider cross-section' to be represented without reaching 'the
21stage of being unmanageable'. 'Manageability' was a key word
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for the NSW right, in the way 'ideological representation' was
for the Victorian left. The NSW right wanted a Conference
where it could continue to buttress 'leadership coalitions',
holding the electorally pragmatic line against 'innovation and
adventurism' (Lloyd, 1983:245). As former NSW Branch research
officer Tom Wheelwright (1985:1) has suggested:
In so far as the Right differs from the Left in 
Labor politics, policy is the driving force 
of the Left and leadership is the driving 
force of the Right.
The logic of manageability and leadership coalitions is the 
logic of membership 'depoliticisation'. Policy-driven 
'ideological representation' could lead to membership 
mobilisation and internal party 'legitimation'. It could also 
be diverted into intra-elite 'numbers' games. 'Depoliticis­
ation' could be seen as a game for those who, in Weber's terms, 
lived off politics or lived for politics-as-power.
'Legitimation' would satisfy those who lived for involvement in 
a 'cause'. In July 1981 the managerial 'leadership coalition' 
held the line on Conference enlargement. In a debate dominated
by paid party officials, Richardson and Combe were 
2 2victorious. For the major factions, even 'pseudo­
legitimation' was incompatible with ALP vealpolitik.
13B Beyond a 'Who Gets What' Analysis
Presenting the doomed NCI proposals, Button stressed
their 'rational base' (ALP Transcript, 1981:196). He could not
find 'any other rational bases' being proposed. Encel (1979:2)
saw the NCI Report as 'a feasible and rational alternative' to
2 3Labor's 'living fossil' of an organisation. Labor's 'machine' 
crudities often offended intellectual observers. Emy
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(1974:388) complained that endemic factionalism in the ALP:
... complicates the problem of devising rational 
electoral strategies for gaining power. 24
Encel (1979:2) suggested the rationality and feasibility of the
NCI proposals did not commend them to the Executive: 'Indeed,
they may have had the opposite effect'.
The arguments and, more particularly, the alignments
in Melbourne recall the operating maxim of famous Labor 'fixer'
Pat Kennelly:
You may have the 1-1-logic, brother, but give me 
the numbers any time (see Geoffrey Barker, 'Labor 
Kingmaker Looks Back', Age, 22 May 1971). 25
Button proclaimed the logic of the NCI proposals, but the
'numbers' for this were very slim. Analysing the prospects of
the Wyndham Report, Don Rawson (1965:25) had pointed out that
in 'intra-party affairs organisational and constitutional
principles were 'usually, and perhaps reasonably, subordinated
to factional advantage'.
Party debates on rules and organisational procedures
are usually accompanied by manoeuvres by different groups to
maintain or expand their 'numbers'. New arrangements might
advantage some groups and disadvantage others. The manoeuvring
is generally not advertised as such:
In the struggle which the various groups of leaders 
carry on for the hegemony of the party, the 
concept of democracy becomes a lure which all alike 
employ ... It is easy to see this when we read 
the discussions concerning the system to be 
employed for the appointment of the party 
executive. The various tendencies manifested in 
this connection all aim at the same end, namely, 
at safeguarding the dominance of some particular 
group (Michels, 1962:183).
Debates on the method of electing party conference delegates 
can easily be read in this way. However the disjuncture
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between high-blown rhetoric and mundane manoeuvring is more
complex than Michels allows. Talk about democracy and party
reform often is 'a lure', but it is not only a 'lure'. In the
ALP, incidentally,little shame attaches to acknowledging the
importance of 'safeguarding the dominance of one particular
group'. Party conflicts over federalism, centralisation and
decentralisation were 'of great scientific importance' to
Michels (1962:200). They generated 'a notable array of
theoretical concerns' alongside occasional 'valid appeals to
moral conceptions'. Students had to be disabused of any notion
that such conflicts were ever really for or against
'oligarchy', 'popular sovereignty' or 'the sovereignty of the
party masses'. American political scientist Austin Ranney
(1972:61) has argued along similar lines:
... to understand fully any particular conflict 
over party reform we must consider not only 
what the contestants said but also who they were 
and what they stood to gain or lose in the 
dispute. 26
Such a 'who gets what' analysis taps important 
realpolitik dimensions, but has its limitations. To go beyond 
them, we can draw on March and Olsen's (1983) analysis of 
federal bureaucratic reorganisation projects in the USA. In 
the US federal bureaucracy, formal reorganisation attempts 
accounted for only a small proportion of change. Change was 
generally incremental. However, the idea of comprehensive 
reorganisation was constantly resurrected. There were thus 
many such attempts. They generated two recurring 'stories': 
orthodox administrative theory and realpolitik. A story of 
planning, efficiency, economy and control and a story of 
conflicts, coalitions, deals and pay-offs:
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... the litany of interests, politics, 
bargaining and power is as stylized as the 
litany of coordination, chains of command, 
authority and responsibility ... Most 
knowledgeable administrators and other political 
actors as well as students of administration and 
organization know both rhetorics and recite one 
or other when appropriate (March and Olsen, 1983:284).
There are parallels and divergences in party 
reorganisation. In many parties, the equivalent of orthodox 
administration seems to be intra-party democracy. Its litany 
invokes 'rank-and-file' rights, membership sovereignty and 
'grass-roots' participation. This yields a participatory 
'rationalistic idealism', a rhetoric of 'legitimation' for a 
would-be mass party. If pursued inconsistently this may be 
only 'pseudo-legitimation'. Parties have a second equivalent 
to orthodox administration. This focusses on electoral success 
rather than membership aspirations. Thus party reorganisations 
also generate a managerial 'rationalistic idealism'. As its 
litany directly resembles orthodox administration proper, it 
has a 'depoliticising' logic. Planning, efficiency, 
co-ordination and chains of command are invoked in the name of 
professional electoral campaigning.
While having very different logics, both 
participatory and managerial 'rationalistic idealisms' assume 
internal party goodwill, a preparedness to work together 
(whether to formulate policy or to win elections). Both 
downplay intra-party struggles, particularly struggles for 
power and spoils. Inside parties vealpolitik talk balances the 
picture, but it does not always dare to speak its name, even in 
the ALP. The vealpolitik standards by which a proposal may be 
judged are often not articulated as such, although they may be
341
alluded to. They are not difficult to infer. Delegates at the 
ALP Special Conference displayed an awareness of factional and 
inter-Branch Realpolitik, but did so apologetically or to 
accuse opponents. Such considerations seemed to have a slight 
air of illegitimacy about them.
Gerald Houseman (1971:54) found it interesting that 
few were prepared to publicly defend the ALP's 'seemingly 
irrational structure' with any pride. The structure had strong 
roots in Labor history:
The unrepresentative character and other problems 
of the structure were readily admitted even by 
those who would not want it changed. No one 
offered, even when questioned, any defence ...
(Houseman, 1971:55).
Despite this, the structure offered 'some advantages' to
'special interests in the ALP'. The federal bodies provided
'an area of relative intimacy and discretion' for 'compromise
27and bargaining'.
Special interests in the ALP are very concerned with 
their own advantage, but this cannot always be stated openly. 
Sartori (1976:77) has noted the problem of 'camouflage' in 
intra-party debate:
A faction of interest does not declare to be such, 
to be nothing but a power or spoils group 
manoeuvring for place and emolument ... There are 
many recipes for obfuscating the real motivations 
(see also Michels, 1962:176; Zuckerman, 1979:108-9 
and Hine, 1982:41-2).
Party reform rhetoric is not just camouflage for the manoeuvres
of factions, special interests and ambitious individuals. As
March and Olsen (1983:292) point out:
... the long-run development of political 
institutions is less a product of intentions, 
plans and consistent decisions than incremental 
adaptation to changing problems within 
gradually evolving structures of meaning. 28
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This is how change occurs within 'complex arenas'. Social 
change may throw up new 'problems' for parties, but the 
diagnosis of those 'problems' and the 'solutions' offered are a 
matter of internal conflict. Much of that internal conflict 
can be explained in realpolitik terms, but 'rationalistic 
idealist' argument can affect structures of meaning within 
parties. Party debates are limited by available forms of 
political calculation and evaluation (Hindess, 1984:272). 
'Rationalistic idealism' can introduce new forms of evaluation.
Those who calculate the 'numbers' cannot completely
ignore reorganisation proposals:
Reorganization studies provide concepts and ideas; 
they keep theories and proposals alive. They 
create precedents. They develop a logic of 
argument that is carried over to subsequent 
reorganization efforts. They develop 'solutions' 
waiting for 'problems' and circumstances ...
Each of these occurs over relatively long time 
periods, and the relevant ideas evolve in a subtle 
way over a series of experiences (March and Olsen, 
1983:288-9).
The Wyndham Report and the NCI Report, which recycled many of 
its recommendations fourteen years later, had some impact on 
the terms of debate within the ALP. At the 1967 and 1981 
Conferences, this took second place to shorter-term vealpolitik 
considerations and contingent circumstances.
Incremental decisions can account for more 
organisational change than specially commissioned 
reorganisation projects. The case of PR in the election of 
state delegates to ALP National Conference exemplifies this. 
Wyndham had not considered it and it was very peripheral to the 
NCI, which rejected the idea. The adoption of PR as a new 
official party norm in 1981, a substantial organisational 
change, was the culmination of a series of incremental steps.
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In the previous eleven years, incrementally 'solving' various
'problems', PR had been institutionalised in four states.
To understand the 1981 debate, we have to look at
these episodes. PR was part of a package imposed by the
Federal Executive on Victoria and NSW in 1970-71 (see Walker,
1971). Intervention was mainly aimed at Whitlam's old
Victorian foes. The Victorian 'machine' was sacked. Key NSW
personnel held their positions, but had some constraints
imposed. Intervention was a classic Realpolitik exercise,
consolidating a new dominant coalition on the Federal 
29Executive and removing what was seen as an electoral 
30embarrassment. As is usual with such exercises, there was an
accompanying 'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric. This justified
new arrangements in the two biggest Branches in terms of:
... greater rank and file participation, lessening 
of executive authority and greater representation 
for differing points of view ... (Walker, 1971:33).
The 'legitimation' such rhetoric could offer was somewhat
compromised. Those who deployed it outside Victoria and NSW
31tended to assume it had no relevance in their own states.
The Realpolitik exercise of 1970-71 made the ALP safe 
for Whitlam's Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. In that 
respect, it was more significant than the Adelaide compromise 
on 'party reform' in 1967. Some commentators thought Labor 
factionalism was declining in the early 1970s (see, e.g. Emy, 
1974:405).32 Emy (1974:391, 443-4) suggested that the ALP, 
like other Australian parties, was 'modernising' in response to 
'social change'. Labor factionalism was not dying, however, 
but finding new forms.
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The deposed Victorians became an 'out-group'
reconciled to PR (see R. Smith, 1974). Soon Hartley was
welcoming an emerging disregard for state borders 'within the
ALP theatre' (quoted, Laurie Oakes, 'Will the Cure be Worse
than the Disease?', Sunday Mail, 20 June 1971).^ In 1976,
the Tasmanian Branch accepted PR, when an extensive internal
reorganisation followed considerable turmoil (Davis,
341983:191). PR was secured in Queensland, by federal
intervention, in 1980. The NSW right were the main defenders 
of the Queensland 'old guard'. They had never fully reconciled 
themselves to PR. They tried to circumvent its implications 
whenever possible (see Lucy, 1985:343-4; Tom Wheelwright, 
1985:4).
NSW officials argued PR would institutionalise
factional divisions in Queensland (see Stuart Simson, 'The New
Hayden: Party Strongman and Vote Getter', National Times, 1 
35October 1979). Whether PR 'causes' factionalism has been
debated academically. Sartori (1976:93-7) suggests PR creates
structural incentives for 'factions of convenience' fighting
for places on tickets (see also Zuckerman, 1979:111-2).
'Factions of convenience' existed in the ALP before 1970-71.
They revolved around the dominant 'machines' in each state, who
drew up their own tickets. 'Out-groups' could expect little.
Objections to PR usually rested on a yearning for the winner-
3 6take-all days of unfettered Branch 'machines'.
With equal-sized delegations and four states divided 
by PR, the two non-PR states could be decisive, acting in 
concert as blocs. The 'socialisation objective' debate was 
largely determined by such orchestrated SA and WA 'machine'
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manoeuvres. The PR debate focussed on these states. The
National Executive accepted PR in principle. Implementation
could be negotiated. The left wanted a tighter timetable.
This worried SA more than WA. Its much vaunted 'consensus' was 
37fraying. Losing state government in 1979. began a traumatic
period. The National Executive formulation allowed SA to buy
time. Against that, Bob Hogg insisted that anything less than
PR in time for the 1982 Conference would not satisfy 'a lot of
3 8delegates around here' (ALP Transcript, 1981:146).
Assurances that SA and WA would fall into line were not enough.
'Good faith' could not be assumed. Talk of 'consensus' was
suspect. It was a form of 'paternalistic' PR. Why not have PR
proper? Delegates agreed to PR by 1982, following an
9indication that WA could live with the idea. This was an 
important decision, facilitating the emergence of national 
factions (see Lloyd and Swan, 1987), although such factions 
could still fragment along state lines (Lucy, 1985:347). PR 
was adopted incrementally. The fact that the final step was 
taken at a Conference ostensibly called to deal with NCI 
proposals was largely coincidental.
13C But Who Did Get What? (Case Study)
Two formulae were on offer for the allocation of the 
additional delegates to the states; one based on the number of 
federal electorates in a state, the other on fees paid to the 
National Executive. These fees were calculated according to 
membership (direct and indirect). Realpolitik factors 
dominated the alignments, which can largely be deduced from the 
cost-benefit analysis for each Branch outlined in Table 3. The
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major exception, again easily explicable in Realpolitik terms, 
was when an 'out' faction opposed additional representation for 
its Branch (as did the NSW left).
Table 3
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Branches of Basing Increases 
on Membership rather than Federal Electorates
Percentage * Conference Places **
NSW
Vic
Qld
SA
WA
Tas
ACT
NT
+
+
6.31
1.42
1 . 1 1
0.44
0.44
2.16
1.19
0.43
+ 3 
- 1 
- 1 
+ 1 
same 
- 1 
- 1 
same
* Calculated from figures in Table 2 
** Calculated from figures in note
The left supported the federal electorates formula.
Victorian secretary Hogg claimed it was closer to the spirit of
4 0the NCI (ALP Transcript, 1981:249). For historical reasons
going back to the 1954-55 Split, Victorian membership was
4 1proportionately lower than that in NSW. 'Marginally
wealthier' states should not be able to buy extra
representation (Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981 :250).^2 Fee-
based allocation would not inspire membership recruitment or
4 3new union affiliations.“ Intra-state factional manoeuvres
provided sufficient incentive:
The numbers game is played out at the state 
level, every day of the week, 365 days a year - 
not every two years at a national conference.
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Organisational maintenance was assured. Of course, union
affiliations that threatened the balance of power within a
Branch were not encouraged by dominant factions (see Rawson,
441981 :35 ) .
Opponents of the fees proposal stressed that it was
open to abuse. Branch records could be manipulated. Federal
electorates, set outside the party, could not be 'rorted' (see
Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981:252). John Green from Tasmania,
4 5another relatively low-membership state, took up this theme. 
There was no uniformity in the way states counted members (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:257-8).
Wyndham's plea for standardised national procedures
had gone unheeded. It was not even revived by the NCI. State
secretaries were still reluctant to hand over membership data
to the National Secretariat (Solomon, 1980:322).
'Rationalistic idealist' expectations about the use of
information in organisations can be misleading:
Most information that is generated and processed in 
an organization is subject to misrepresentation. 
Information is gathered in a context of conflict 
of interest and with consciousness of decision 
making (Feldman and March, 1981:176). 46
Some kinds of information can be over-supplied, other kinds
withheld. State executives controlled the flow of much
information in the ALP. Standardised national procedures
seemed beyond the pale of Labor Realpolitik. In 1979, David
Combe dismissed Tasmanian calls for such procedures as being in
4 7the 'if pigs could fly' category (ALP Transcript, 1979:648).
Apart from the problems of 'rorted' membership data, ALP
'membership' was a rather elusive category:
A member of the Labor Party can be everything 
from that precious person who goes along to the
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twelve branch meetings a year, is an electorate 
council delegate and gives up almost all of 
their free time - to the detriment of their 
health and happiness - to further the cause of 
Labor. You could also go to the person who is 
nothing more than a digit on a branch membership 
book, who makes no contribution at all (Rod 
Cavalier, ALP Transcript, 1981:260).
That was only the direct membership. The 'indirect' membership
included many Liberal voters 1 Cavalier, from the NSW left, was
alluding to another aspect of ALP vealpolitik, the 'stacking'
of branches with phantom members for preselection ballots. The
fee-based proposal might encourage state head offices to
'stack' branches with passive members, by-passing the
activists.^  ®
Only NSW and SA stood to gain from fee-based
allocation (see Table 3). All the speakers supporting SA
secretary Chris Schacht's amendment came from these two states.
SA had the highest direct membership/electors ratio of any
4 9Branch (Warhurst, 1983:258). This was ironic. SA was the
most 'union-dominated' Branch. Schacht argued that the
50principle of membership sovereignty was at stake. Statistics 
could not be 'rorted':
If there are crook affiliation fees in any state, 
obviously some forces in those states could lay 
complaints or charges to the national executive 
(ALP Transcript, 1981:254).
Such good faith in ALP due process was not shared by all 
delegates.
In reply, Hogg returned to his 'lead us not into 
temptation' theme. Under Schacht's proposal, National 
Executive delegates from state A might be tempted to manoeuvre 
for federal intervention in state B, where factional rivals 
held sway. This could destabilise Branch B. Some unions might
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dis-affiliate. State B's representation would then be reduced. 
Such a scenario seems far-fetched; in 'rationalistic idealist' 
terms literally inconceivable. Hogg insisted it reflected an 
accurate appraisal of ALP realities. Such things could occur 
on the 'narrowly-based' 18-member National Executive (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:264);
I can imagine people jockeying around for the 
numbers to say 'well, Jesus, if we can knock off 
a branch and cause a bit of disarray, we can halve 
their component at the national conference or at the 
national executive because we will certainly reduce 
their affiliation level' ... Do not believe that 
people do not think like that, because they do.
People who thought like that often found it difficult 
to talk like that. Factional realpolitik was often a logic 
that dared not speak its name. When a party finds itself faced 
with electoral laws which disadvantage it, it can publicly 
complain. Factions inside a party faced with new rules which 
weaken their position are often more circumspect in presenting 
their case. This is ironic. Rules can be more critical in the 
intra-party arena. Sartori (1976:95-7) contrasts 'visible' 
politics (electoral competition) to 'invisible' politics 
(factionalism). This distinction has some uses. Factional and 
party discourses do differ. The distinction is only relative, 
however. Factionalism is 'semi-visible' rather than 
'invisible'. This very 'semi-visibility' contributes to the 
muffled and oblique way in which factional realpolitik 
considerations are publicly alluded to. Factional 'semi­
visibility' was one reason why Conference would not be 'led 
into temptation' and accepted the Hogg amendment.
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13D Still No Place for the 'Rank-and-File1?
An ill-prepared David Combe proposal genuflected to 
some NCI concerns. In the new Conference structure, a segment, 
say a quarter of each state delegation, could be directly
5 1elected through the branches (see ALP Transcript, 1981:195).
When first put forward, this was ruled out of order as
Conference size had to be settled first. Then, Combe
discovered logistic flaws. Version 2 merely requested the
5 2National Executive to investigate his idea.
A very confusing debate followed. Even version 2 won
little support, after being pursued half-heartedly. Schacht
was not sure what it meant, but seconded it anyway (ALP
Transcript, 1981:266). A reference to postal ballots in
version 1 provided a red herring, to compound the confusion.
Garland, who was fond of deploying NCI rhetoric, found postal
5 3ballots irksome. They were controversial in union circles.
In the ALP, the NSW Steering Committee feared measures which
would swamp activists with passive members. Mick Young noted
the mischief-making potentialities of postal ballots:
... God help us, as John Garland says, if we should 
ever fall for the trap of having postal ballots ... 
because that means that you will not be concentrating 
on building the party; you will be door-knocking ... 
to get votes to send your delegates along to the 
federal conference .. . just imagine the turmoil 
and the chaos ... (ALP Transcript, 1981:267). 54
Young, the originator of the NCI idea, did not want any more
organisational introspection. July 1981 was not December 1977.
Young, unhappy with PR, opposed further new requirements for
the Branches. Delegates agreed, clearly rejecting Combe's
reformulated proposal.
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Without any formal mechanism for 'rank-and-file' 
representation, the branch sector had been improving its 
position at Conference anyway. At the Special Conference
itself, 11 delegates out of 50 (22%) came from this sector
(see Table . x 55 T 4 ) . In 1979 , there had been eight such
delegates out of 49. Back in 1965, only one out of an
allegedly 'faceless' 36.
Table 4
Distribution of Delegates, 1965 and 1979-82
Parliamentary Party Union Other
FPLP SPLPs Officials Officials ('Rank
File
% % % % %
1965 25 11 14 42 3
1979 20 25 10 28 16
1981 26 26 4 22 22
1982 20 22 6 21 30
Sources: ALP, 1965: 15-7; Oakes, 1979:215-9 and ALP
Conference Documents, 1981 and 1982.
Combe warned delegates that without something like
his proposal, Conference reform would be meaningless (ALP
Transcript, 1981:195). All that would happen would be
that the same people would choose more delegates:
The same people, putting on their tickets under 
proportional representation, more people than 
they have had to put on their tickets in the past.
This was partly borne out in 1982, as Table 4 shows, although
there was some reduction in parliamentary representation.
Rawson (1966a) noted a long-term inverse relationship between
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'lay' domination of Conference and electoral success. This
trend held up for the Whitlam Government (see Table 5).56 A
notable increase in parliamentarians at the 1969 Conference
5 7coincided with an electoral upturn. In 1982 the pattern was 
broken. A year before the Hawke Government was elected, the 
first 99-delegate Conference saw a relative decline in 
parliamentary representation. Conference dynamics had altered 
considerably since the 1960s.
Table 5
Parliamentary and 'Lay' Delegates, 1955-1984
Parliamentary ' L a y ' Total
Delegates Delegates Delegates
% %
1955 47 53 19
1956 (Special) 36 64 36
1957 - 39 61 36
1959 33 67 36
1961 28 72 36
1963 (Special) 25 75 36
1963 25 75 36
1965 36 64 36
1966 (Special, March) 44 56 36
1966 (Special, June) 42 58 36
1967 39 61 36
1969 54 46 46
1971 53 47 47
1973* 53 47 49
1975 59 41 49
1977 49 51 49
1979 45 55 49
1981 (Special) 52 48 50
1982 42 58 99
1984 44 56 99
* Compiled from incomplete list of delegates plus press
reports, possibly slightly inaccurate •
Sources: 1955-65: ALP,1965:11-7. 1966 (M a r c h ): A L P ,1966a:5-8
1966 (June): ALP, 1966b:2- 6. 1967: ALP,1969:105.
1969: Alan Reid, 'How to Win the Election after
Next', Bulletin, 9 August 1969 . 1971: Lucy , 1979:75
1973: Bulletin Conference supplement, plus newspaper
reports. 1975: Lucy, 1979 : 75 . 1977: Lucy, 1979:76-
1979-82: As Table 4. 1984 : A1P Conference Documents
1984 .
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Improved branch representation was related to a 
reduction in women's under-representation. In 1981, there were 
six women delegates (12% ) , a higher proportion than ever 
before. Five of these came from the branch sector. In 1982, 
following affirmtive action, there were 28 women (out of 99 
delegates). Eighteen came from the 'rank-and-file'. This was 
not surprising. Males monopolised parliamentary positions and 
union officialdom. After affirmative action, the faction 
leaders were likely to find the women for their tickets from 
the branches
Table 6 documents the occupational profile of 'rank-
and-file' delegates. It suggests increasing branch input was
part of a wider shift from older 'labourist' patterns (see
5 9Jupp, 1982:97-100). These changes at Conference mirrored
changes in the caucuses. There, members of non-manual, non-
affiliated unions (teachers, public servants, other
professionals and semi-professionals) had rapidly increased
6 0their representation (Rawson, 1981:42).
Conference reform allowed for a slightly broader
range of 'rank-and-file' delegates (see Table 7). In 1979,
only the Young Labor delegate had never been a parliamentary
candidate, local government representative, union official or
ALP bureaucrat. In 1981, there were four such delegates (out
of 50).61 In 1982, 16 (out of 99).62 Most of these
6 3'inexperienced' delegates in 1982 were women. Such 
'political inexperience' was relative. Eight of the 16 (the
three men and five of the women) were on their state
. . 64executive.
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T able 6
O ccu p a tio n a l Background, ' R an k -an d -F ile ' D e leg a te s , 1981-82
1981 1982
11 d e le g a te s 30 d e le g a te s  
(d a ta  on 26)
LAW Lawyers 2 (m) * Lawyers 4 (2 f , 2m)
Law s tu d e n t 1 (m)
EDUCATION L e c tu re r 1 (m) Teachers 5 ( 4 f , lm)
Ph.D. s tu d e n t 1 (m) L e c tu re rs 2 ( I f ,  lm)
E ducation 1 ( f ) Ph.D. s tu d e n t 1 (m)
re s e a rc h e r E ducation 1 ( f )
re s e a rc h e r
CLERICAL/ PS A ccountant 1 ( f ) P ro je c t 1 ( f )
ADMINISTRATIVE CES O ff ic e r 1 (m) O ff ic e r
OTHER S o c ia l  Worker 1 ( f ) S o c ia l Worker 1 ( f )
PROFESSIONAL J o u r n a l i s t 1 (m) J o u r n a l i s t 1 (m)
Economist 1 ( f )
COMMERCIAL A d v e rtis in g  
and S a les  Rep
1 (f )
Company Rep 1 (f )
FAHVI Farmer 1 (f )
OTHER C abinet Maker 1 ( f ) S tuden t Union 1 (f )
Housewife 1 ( f ) O rg a n ise r
S tuden t 1 (f )
Housewife 1 ( f )
R e tire d  union 2 (m)
o f f i c i a l s
* m: m a le ;  f :  f e m a le
S o u r c e :  ALP c o n f e r e n c e  D o c u m e n ts , 1982 ( s u p p le m e n t e d  by
n e w s p a p e r s ,  e l e c t o r a l  r o l l s  an d  ALP C a n d i d a t e s ,  1 9 8 3 ) .
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Table 7
'Rank-and-File' Delegates to National Conference, 1979-82
Parliamentary Local Former Other Total
candidates government* Officials**
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
1979 4 1 (5) 1 0 (1) 1 0 (1) 1 0 (1) 7 1 (8)
1981 2 3 (5) 1 0 (1) 1 0 (1) 2 2 (4) 6 5 (11)
1982 4 4 (8) 2 0 (2) 3 1 (4) 3 13 (16) 12 18 (30)
* Includes Mayor of Brisbane (1979); Act House of Assembly 
member (1981); former ACT MHA (1982, same person) and 
Townsville city councillor (1982).
Includes former Victorian ALP secretary (each conference); 
two retired union officials (1982, both former delegates) 
and one former union official turned Industrial Relations 
lecturer (1982, female).
Sources: Oakes, 1979:215-9; ALP Conference Documents,
1981 and 1982.
NCI rhetoric spoke of increased Conference 
representation for local branches, affiliated unions, women, 
rural and regional Australia and the ethnic communities (see, 
e.g. John Button, 'National Conference Reform', Challenge, 
November 1978; Neil Batt, ALP Transcript, 1979:9-10). 
Conference reform accelerated the trend for more branch 
representation and allowed a slightly wider range of such 
delegates in terms of party experience, if not social class. 
Conference enlargement meant more union officials could become 
delegates,^5 but the proportion remained almost identical. In
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part, union losses were the corollary of branch gains.
Changing career patterns in the ALP were also involved. Union
officialdom was less of a prerequisite for a Labor political
career than before (see Weller and Fraser, 1987:78). Unions
themselves were employing research staff, often interested in
this career structure.^
The NCI wanted the full diversity of affiliated
unions reflected at Conference. Enlargement allowed a slightly
wider range of affiliated unions to secure representation in
1982. No officials from non-affiliated unions became 
6 7delegates. The NCI also noted that union officials who did 
make it to the indirectly elected Conference tended to be 
already part of the ALP elite (Branch presidents, National 
Executive delegates etc.). Table 8 shows Conference 
enlargement enabled some union officials who were not already 
ALP 'heavies' to become delegates. This was partly because of 
affirmative action. In 1979 and 1981, the union officials were 
all male. In 1982, there were four women, none of them party 
'heavies'.
Table 8
Union Officials at National Conference, 1979-82
Party 'Heavies'* Other
1979 8 7
1981 7 4
1982 9 12
* National Executive delegate, MLC, state Branch 
president or vice president, secretary or other 
paid official.
Sources: Oakes, 1979; ALP Conference Documents, 1981 and 1982; 
Parkin and Warhurst, 1983.
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Conference enlargement facilitated increased rural
69and regional representation, but the 1982 delegates were as
ethnically mono-cultural as ever. Special speakers had to be
injected on multi-cultural television. Bill Hayden told 1982
delegates they constituted the most representative Conference
in ALP history (^ ALP Transcript, 1981 : 231). However, Conference
reform meant that those drawing up tickets in the states listed
more names. The insistence on PR in all states was an
important change. Factional leaders drawing up tickets had to
include more women and drew on a slightly wider pool of branch
and union representatives. 61 percent of 1982 delegates were
first-timers (as full delegates) compared to 48 percent in 1981
and 22 percent in 1979. Stability quickly re-asserted itself.
70The 1984 figure was 39 percent.
1982 delegates were proportionately less 'high party 
profile' than delegates at previous Conferences (see Table 9) .7 
This slight reduction in elitism was partly because of 
affirmative action. In 1982 women comprised 28 percent of 
total delegates; 38 percent of first-time delegates and 55 
percent of the delegates without a 'high party profile'.
Table 9
National Conference Delegates, 1979-82
'High Party Profile' * Other
1979 42 ( 84% ) 8 (16%)
1981 44 ( 88% ) 6 ( 12%)
1982 70 (77% ) 29 ( 29% )
* MP or endorsed candidate, local government representative, 
National Executive delegate, state Branch president or 
vice president, state Branch secretary or other paid party 
official.
Sources: As Table 8.
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13E The Haphazard Politics of Party Reform
Even if only as part of a 'pseudo-legitimation' 
exercise, the NCI integrated Conference reform into a 
reasonably coherent and consistent party reform project. The 
Special Conference took up party reform as a set of discrete 
issues, reduced its scope and tore it from its NCI context. NCI 
rhetoric was deployed to support rather un-NCI-like 
propositions:
While they fell so far short of the proposals of 
the committee of inquiry as to bear no worthwhile 
relationship to them, they are being heralded 
by the proponents of change as ushering in a 
new era of flux within the ALP (Mike Jacobs and 
Rod Wise, 'After the Talks: Hayden Invincible,
Hawke Invisible', Australian Financial Review,
31 July 1981).
#
There had been a similar disjuncture between the Wyndham Report
7 2and the 1967 Adelaide compromise. In the array of discrete
issues raised, however, some issues related to the NCI project
did surface. National policy committee reform, suggested to
the NCI but not taken up by it, was one such issue.
Reform of the national policy committees and related
measures were raised in a set of recommendations from the 
73AMWSU. In practice, the committees set the Conference
agenda. Elected by the National Executive and dominated by
parliamentarians, they were remote from the bulk of the party
membership (Walker, 1975:178; D. Stephens, 1980:39-40; Lloyd,
1983:242). They dated back to 1960, ready for the 1961
Conference (Dunstan, 1962). They were the instrument through
which Whitlam overhauled the Labor platform, in Australian
74Social Democracy, Mark 1 directions.
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Before the 1977 Conference the committees were opened
up a bit. This was to assist extra-party lobbies, not to
facilitate referral back to the 'rank-and-file' (see Michelle
Grattan, 'Labor Shuffles a Step Forward', Age, 1 February
1976; D. Stephens, 1980:41). The AMWSU wanted to amplify
Labor's internal dialogue. Draft committee proposals should be
circulated (John Garland, ALP Transcript, 1981:307). Responses
could feed into further drafts. Such a 'sifting process' would
respond to a new 'participatory' climate within the party and
the Australian community which was evident to the NCI (ALP
75Transcript, 1981:305-6). Without policy committee reform,
Conference enlargement could not lead to any nett gain in
membership involvement (John Green, ALP Transcript, 1981:308).
The committees were the least representative part of the ALP.
7 6Their recommendations were the party's 'best kept secret'.
Conference went along with Combe's suggestion for better
liaison with state policy committees (ALP Transcript, 1981:309)
77rather than any wider dialogue. The Metal Workers succeeded
in widening FEC and union opportunities to contribute to the
7 8Conference agenda but the policy committees, by and large, 
would continue as before. They would remain a rather 
technocratic forum. Garland had neither convinced his NCI 
colleagues nor the Conference otherwise.
NCI proposals that were filtered out by the National 
Executive had minimal chances of being considered by 
Conference. Proposals for branch revitalisation were thus not 
debated as such. The 'community presence strategy' did manage 
to surface. A successful Tom Uren amendment to the new 
'socialisation objective' provided a convenient 'garbage can'.
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OngoingUren added 'principles of action' to the objective.79 
action by organised community groups' was listed as an 
important avenue for pursuing 'democratic socialism', which 
involved more than installing Labor governments (John Garland, 
ALP Transcript, 1981:25-6). This implied CPS 4 should be an 
important dimension of Labor activity.
Tribune presented the amendment as an insufficiently 
publicised left gain (Mark Taft, 'Labor Debates its Aims and 
Changes its Structure', 5 August 1981). It shifted the 
emphasis:
... from words on a piece of paper to popular 
campaigning for social change embracing a broad 
coalition of forces.
This was wishful thinking. The amendment could facilitate CPS
8 04, but its reference to community action was vague. It was
another form of words on another piece of paper. Concerted
local ALP involvement in anti-uranium, disarmament, feminist,
gay rights, and other 'new social movement' causes would hardly 
8 1follow. All the amendment meant was that those ALP branches
already pursuing such involvement could now cite official ALP
approval. As the NCI emphasised, Conference activity was often
decidedly symbolic. If the amendment was a victory for the
left it was definitely a symbolic victory. Perhaps the only
kind possible without the 'numbers'.
The disjuncture between the NCI and the Conference
illustrates the process of change within 'complex arenas' like
the ALP. Parties are made up of different arenas, each with
8 2their own particular features. Some are relatively transient 
(like the NCI). Others are thoroughly institutionalised (e.g. 
National Conference). An 'attention vacuum' meant key party
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figures treated the NCI as an irrelevant side-show. Open 
access threw an array of 'problems' and 'solutions' before it. 
The committee could deal with these as it saw fit. Concern 
with party morale and a good press helped the NCI ignore 
vealpolitik factors. Conference was a more tightly structured 
body. Its credentialled delegates were integrated into 
established factional and Branch alignments. Debate focussed 
on the ALP platform and its internal rules. Key party figures 
paid the Conference assiduous attention. The organisational 
debates in 1981 were dominated by paid party officials (Combe, 
Hogg, Richardson, Schacht and McMullan). Their work immersed 
them in vealpolitik considerations. The different discourses 
of the NCI and the Special Conference reflected their nature as 
different arenas within the party.
In the USA, Ranney (1972:139) argues that, in 
conflicts over party reform there, the 'expressive' values of 
'purists' (participation, intra-party democracy) have generally 
overshadowed the 'competitive' values of 'professionals' 
(manageability and, above all, electoral success). But parties 
can change in ways not considered in formal party reform 
efforts. When parties formally examine internal reform 
(setting up special committees, commissioning reports etc.), a 
temporary arena may emerge for the registration of 
'participation ideology'. This happened with the NCI, although 
it had plenty to say about 'competitive' matters as well. In 
such temporary arenas, 'participation ideology' protagonists 
may secure the odd symbolic victory. In day-to-day party 
practice, however, involving many undebated and unannounced 
incremental changes, participatory hopes for 'legitimation'
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often run aground on the rocks of realpol-Ltik, manageability 
and, ultimately, 'depoliticisation' (confinement of debate to a 
narrow range of formal and informal arenas with restricted 
access).
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CHAPTER 14
THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
A CASE STUDY IN LABOR/'NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT' RELATIONS
14A Transforming the Party?
Labor responded to 'new social movements' 
ambiguously. The NCI hoped 'new social movement' activism 
could help re-invigorate the branches. The 'new social 
movement' organisational form, however, embodied its own 
critique of political parties. If Labor was to learn from 
these movements and build an alliance with them, considerable 
overhaul (of practices, priorities and policies) would be 
required.
In the early 1970s the distance between the ALP and
the emergent 'new social movements' was surprisingly narrow:
The convergence of 'new wave' feminism and the 
election of a social democratic government after 
so long a period of conservative rule is perhaps 
unique in contemporary western democracies (Dowse, 
1983:203-4. See also Altman, 1980:161-2; Simms,
1981a). 1
The collapse of 'Cold War liberalism' had facilitated Labor's
2revival (Simms, 1982:119-22). The emergence of 'new social 
movements’ at this time left its mark on Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 1:
At its most ambitious, the Whitlam government 
sought to cater to their aspirations with programmes 
aimed at specific disadvantaged groups which would 
allow their full and equal participation in public 
life. In each case, accommodation was incomplete 
(Macintyre, 1984:12. See also Horne, 1980 and 
Little, 1986).
Despite talk about 'participatory democracy' and 'community 
development' (Game and Pringle, 1978:131; Brugger, 1986:12), 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark l's attempt to extend the
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scope of effective citizenship to groups neglected by
traditional Laborism was developed from above. It had a
legislative, parliamentary focus. Australian Social Democracy,
Mark 2 wanted to go beyond that sort of elitism. The NCI was
considering these questions when Labor appeared to be
disavowing the Whitlam vision. It was trying to demonstrate
its 'sound economic management' credentials and its political
respectability. This made for a confusing picture, because
'new social movements' were making gains. Jupp (1982:111)
argues Labor hardened its resistance to pressures from women,
intellectuals, homosexuals, ethnics and Aboriginals in the
3post-Whitlam period. Yet affirmative action was not addressed 
until the NCI was set up and Labor's opposition to uranium 
mining began in 1977, at the end of the Whitlam era.
The diversity of the ALP was a major factor in its 
ambiguity towards 'new social movements' (Altman, 1980:160). 
There was some support for 'new social movements' amongst 
leftists and those Altman calls 'moderate reformers'. The 
latter tended:
... to have assimilated in varying degrees some of 
the main ideas of feminism, ecology, etc., although 
in practice they are too wary of electoral reality 
and too wedded to traditional power games to take 
these ideas to their logical conclusion. 4
Some submissions to the NCI did take such ideas to
their logical conclusion. East Sydney branch thought Labor
should try to promote 'realistic new values', overcoming
consumerism and materialism (Submission 299):
There is now a greater awareness of urban and 
environmental issues. More importantly attitudes 
towards women and migrants are changing ...
Belmont branch (Vic) also stressed the importance of ecological
365
issues in building a new Labor coalition (Submission 177). In 
a general endorsement of what Inglehart (1977) calls 'post­
materialist radicalism', Belmont branch also championed
egalitarian socialism, minority rights and the promotion of
5women within the party.
It was through the notion of affirmative action, 
especially for women, that 'new social movements' had real 
impact on the NCI. It was only in the 1970s that the notion of 
'demographic representation' made inroads in Australia (Sawer 
and Simms, 1984:17). Women, blacks and ethnic groups developed 
strong collective identities. The notion of 'representative 
bureaucracy' had been on Australian Social Democracy, Mark l's 
public service reform agenda (see Hawker, 1981). Now the ALP 
was being asked to heal itself.
Even at branch level, the ALP was dominated by
middle-aged Australian-born males (Submission 282, Drummoyne
branch, NSW). This problem was compounded by the weight of
affiliated unions within the party structure. Significant
socially and economically disadvantaged groups were not
represented by unions (Submission 148, Berwick branch, Vic):
It is essential that representatives of disadvantaged 
groups be elected to the governing bodies of the 
party, not appointed by formal organisations ...
Berwick proposed an elaborate 'positive discrimination' plan to
include 'working class' party members, women, Aboriginals and
first-generation immigrants in conference delegations directly
elected from the branches.^
Not all affirmative action advocates wanted to 
undermine the special position of affiliated unions. The 
Victorian ALP wanted greater representation for 'the more
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militant section of the community' (Alan Reid, 'Hawke Again in 
the Gun', Bulletin, 8 August 1978). 7 This included 'women, 
union affiliates and ethnic and black minorities'. Reid saw 
affirmative action as a crude 'numbers' ploy by the left. He
under-estimated the nature of cross-factional support for the
0principle. Nor was the left unanimously behind accommodating 
'new social movement' concerns.
Victorian Centre Unity member Ann Forward took up the 
affirmative action torch within the NCI. Her own late 
inclusion, following the outcry over the original all-male 
committee, had an element of affirmative action about it. She 
wanted places for Aborigines, women's groups, migrants and 
environmentalists built into the party structure (Bob Carr, 
'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 June 
1978). This inclusive concept of affirmative action would 
institutionalise Labor/'new social movement' links. However, 
'demographic representation' was not applicable to 
environmentalists in the same sense that it was to women, 
Aboriginals and migrants. 'Demographic representation' is 
appropriate for 'new social movements' affirming ascriptive 
'naturalistic' collective identities (see Offe, 1982:60). 
'Demographic representation' is not the only way in which 
parties can accommodate 'new social movement' concerns.
Various 'networks' could be developed inside a pluralist party 
(see Rustin, 1985:70). They could be combined with 
'demographic representation' in various ways. 'Demographic 
representation' by itself may be a minimal adjustment, an 
attempt to assimilate 'new social movement' aspirations to 
traditional party practices. 'New social movements' stress
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autonomy and self-activity rather than delegation and 
representation (Offe, 1983:60). They cannot easily be absorbed 
into competitive party politics (Offe, 1982:59. See also Ross 
and Jenson, 1986:32; Berger, 1979:33). Parties, for their 
part, may not be all that welcoming anyway. Berger (1979:45) 
argues that parties of the left missed a great opportunity by 
failing to connect with 'the new interests and emergent values'
9articulated by the movements.
14B No Place for Women in 'a Working Man's Party'?
Feminism was the most popular theme in NCI 
submissions from 'grass-roots' party units favouring Labor/'new 
social movement' co-operation (20 submissions). Environment­
alism was referred to in seven submissions; youth and migrants 
in four each. There was support for 'demographic 
representation' of women (11 submissions). Pro-
environmentalist submissions mainly referred to policy
4- 4- 10 matters.
Pro-feminist submissioris took up a range of issues.
Eltham branch (Vic) thought the 'conscience vote' for Labor
parliamentarians (on abortion) disillusioned more party members
than it placated members of the public (Submission 69).^
There was considerable regret that Labor's apparent openness to
12feminism in 1972 had not been followed through.
The lack of women candidates in winnable seats was
symptomatic of the Labor sexism. It was remediable by
13affirmative action. More women MPs and more women branch 
presidents'^ would not be enough, by themselves. Party 
discourses and mythologies had to be re-cast. Anne Field and
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Ros Kelly (ACT) urged the party to reconsider its 'trade union
dominated ... confrontationist and divisive' male image
(Submission 241). The problem was more the way Labor's ethos
occluded certain concerns rather than confrontation or
divisiveness per se. It was not only women's concerns that
were occluded in this way. The traditions of 'a working man's
party' left little space for Aboriginals, the aged, the
handicapped, immigrants, prisoners and the 'new poor'
generally, as well as women to articulate their interests and
assert their identities (Submission 182, Ms. M. Nicholson,
NSW). The working man's party pursued reforms for women and
15children in a family context only. 'New social movement'
concerns were difficult to present in familiar ALP discourses.
Much Labor discussion was:
... couched in the jargon inherited from the 
party's past and/or is concerned with internal 
struggles for power.
This was an important point. Full-blown Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 2 would require changes in the terms of 
internal ALP debate and party practices as well as 'demographic 
representation'.
A number of the submissions suggesting Labor feminist
links advocated CPS-2-style community campaigning among women:
The key to success in increasing women's support 
for the ALP lies in long-term continuous campaigning 
throughout the community (Submission 241, Anne Field 
and Ros Kelly).
A network of Labor women could encourage and train:
... female party members to use the community groups 
to which they belong as sounding boards for ideas.
Kooyong FEA also seemed to give priority to CPS 2 methods of
changing women's voting patterns over the articulation of
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f e m i n i s t  c o n c e r n s  ( S u b m i s s i o n  268 ) .^-^
The  i d e a  o f  a  L a b o r / ' n e w  s o c i a l  m o v e m e n t '  c o a l i t i o n
a p p e a l e d  t o  r a d i c a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  ( s e e ,  e . g .  A l t m a n ,  1 9 8 0 ) .
H o w e v e r ,  we h a v e  t o  d i s - a g g r e g a t e  t h e  c a t e g o r y  ' n e w  s o c i a l  
17m o v e m e n t s ' .  Of  t h e  t w e n t y  p r o - f e m i n i s t  s u b m i s s i o n s ,  o n l y  o n e  
i s  a l s o  p r o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t  ( s e e  T a b l e  1 ) .  Of  t h e  s e v e n  p r o ­
e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t  s u b m i s s i o n s ,  o n l y  o n e  ( B e l m o n t )  i s  a l s o  p r o ­
f e m i n i s t .  T a b l e  1 d o e s  s how s i g n i f i c a n t  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
f e m i n i s m  a n d  ' r a n k - a n d - f i l e  r i g h t s '  a n d  some  f e m i n i s t  L a b o r  
s u p p o r t  f o r  d e f e n d i n g  s o c i a l i s a t i o n  i d e o l o g y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i n  
NSW) .
T a b l e  1
( a ) P r o - f e m i n i s t  s u b m i s s i o n s  f r o m p a r t y  u n i t s
A lso p ro - A lso  ' Rank-and- A lso ' Defend Labor
environm ent F i l e  R ig h ts ' S o c ia l i s a t i o n  Id e o lo g y 1
NSW 11 0 7 6
Vic 8 1 6 2
SA 1 0 1 1
T o ta l 20 1 14 11
(b ) P ro -e n v iro n m e n ta l is t sub m issio n s  f r a n  p a r ty  u n i t s
A lso  p ro - A lso  ' Rank-and- A lso 'D efend Labor
f o n i n i s t F i l e  R ig h ts ' S o c ia l i s a t i o n  Ideo logy
NSW 3 0 1 1
Vic 2 1 1 0
SA 2 0 0 0
T o ta l 7 1 2 1
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Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 is partly 
defined by its general receptiveness to 'new social movements'. 
Nevertheless Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 put 
'demographic representation' on the agenda. Whitlam wanted 
the ALP to cease being:
... a male-dominated party in a male-dominated 
parliament in a male-dominated country (quoted,
Coxsedge, 1981:6. See also Sawer and Simms,
1984:109-110).
The Whitlam Government established the Human Relations
Commission after the failure of David McKenzie's private
member's bill on abortion law reform. The commission
recommended, among other things, that parties should take
steps to have more women activists and parliamentary
candidates and to allow more scope for women's perspectives
18in policy formulation.
Women's Electoral Lobby (ACT) reminded the NCI of the 
commission's recommendation (Submission 176). WEL had emerged 
on the Australian political scene in time for the 1972 election 
(see Glezer and Mercer, 1973). It was encouraged by some early 
Whitlam Government decisions, before conflict on abortion law 
reform and child care (see Game and Pringle, 1978; Simms, 1981b 
and Dowse, 1983). Australian women's aspirations had been 
changing before the 'It's Time' election. Senator Susan Ryan 
(1980:4) noted that:
... towards the end of the 60's a new public 
consciousness developed about the condition of 
women in Australian society.
Attitudes were changing. Labor's response was ambiguous. 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 made some attempts to 
redress gender inequalities with legislative programmes, but 
the ALP remained a profoundly sexist institution.
7 7 1
DP 4, 'The ALP and Women', endorsed 'demographic 
representation'. This chapter is focussing on Labor and
feminism as a case study in Labor/'new social movement'
19relations. The NCI was wary of 'new social movement'
radicalism and equivocal about Australian Social Democracy,
Mark 2. DP 9 (on Union links) made this clear:
In predominantly capitalist societies such as 
Australia, Canada and the USA, 'radicalism' is 
usually a middle class, and single issue related, 
phenomenon, or a manifestation of the views of a 
vociferous minority. It can be argued that, in 
the Australian context, the union connection has 
kept the Labor Party in touch with fundamental 
'bread and butter' issues; and the concerns 
and aspirations of the vast majority of the 
Australian workforce (APSA, 1979:87).
DP 1, on National Conference, looked at
* 'demographic representation' fairly generally. Women,
ethnics and rural-dwellers were seen as the most obvious
groups vital to Labor's future, with little or no Conference
2 0representation (APSA, 1979:8). Later, it became clear.
that the NCI was cautious about 'demographic representation'.
John Button defended DP 4 ('National Conference Structure',
Challenge, November 1978). Labor should be 'in the vanguard
of change' with regard to women's involvement. There was 'a
strong case' for positive discrimination for women, 'at
least for a trial period'. Button signalled the NCI was
21wary of further 'demographic representation'.
DP 4 documented women's second-class status within
the ALP. Only about 25 percent of the membership were women
22(APSA, 1979:31). When it came to parliamentary
representatives and party functionaries, the situation was
2 3considerably worse. Labor seemed off-putting to many women 
(APSA, 1979:33). Those who did join were discouraged from
372
seeking advancement. This compromised Labor's aspirations as a
representative mass party. To reverse this, the NCI asked
women to increase their involvement in unions and the party.
But that would not be enough:
Positive discrimination in favour of women for 
a fixed period of say 7 to 10 years would overcome 
the barriers imposed by existing attitudes and 
practices (APSA, 1979:35).
Various formulae could achieve this at National Conference. In 
the states, unions could be required to include women in their 
delegations in proportion to their membership, but the 
mechanisms whereby they would comply with such a rule would be 
left up to the unions themselves (APSA, 1979:35-6). Local 
branches would also have to promote women.
Preselection of candidates for safe Labor seats was
*
a crucial arena for affirmative action:
Each State Branch ... might be required to endorse 
a woman candidate for one safe seat at each 
federal election until women are represented in 
Federal Parliament in proportion to their
membership of the Party in that State (APSA, 1979:36). 24
The Human Relations Commission had recommended each party 
should pre-select more women in safe seats. Furthermore, the 
major parties should sign an agreement guaranteeing women fair 
representation. They could agree to have at least 10 percent 
of their candidates women and progressively increase that 
figure at successive elections.
Such bipartisan suggestions come more easily to royal 
commissions than party committees. The NCI endorsed the goal, 
but not the bipartisan approach. Labor should carve a position 
for itself as the party more prepared to advance women. The 
'gender gap' had diminished significantly between 1967 and 1979 
(Aitkin, 1982:326-33). This long-term swing to Labor amongst
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women:
... was in part caused by the entry of young Labor 
women into the electorate and in part by a notable 
conversion to Labor of the young female voters of 
the 1960s, whose behaviour in this respect was 
quite unlike that of their male counterparts 
(Aitkin, 1982:330).
Work experience and feminism played their part in this 
conversion. For newly mobilised women, Labor seemed 'the 
lesser of two evils' (Aitkin, 1982:332).
The 'gender gap' increased in 1977 (Bacchi, 1984:11).
The newly-formed Australian Democrats attracted more ALP women
than ALP men (Sawer and Simms, 1984:158). In 1980, Labor
attempted to capitalise on its record 23 women federal
candidates (Sawer and Simms, 1984:108). Some of the DP 4
analysis had been digested by then, but affirmative action was
75not seriously considered-until 1981.
The workings of Labor 'mateship', through overlapping
union and party networks, made it difficult for women to find
sponsors and 'build up the necessary power connections' (APSA,
1979:34). Women were under-represented in union officialdom,
particularly in affiliated unions. In 1978, one-third of
Australian unionists were women, but in a sample of 489 union
officials, there were only 12 women (Sawer and Simms, 1984:37.
See also Clarke and White, 1983:88-103). Labor Party culture
was weighted against women:
Traditionally party men considered that in-fighting 
was too dirty a game for women to play. The 
reverse side of that attitude was that one would 
not be able to trust women to stick with the tribe 
or faction (White, 1981:4. See also Clarke and 
White, 1983 :70-1) .
The 'numbers game' alienated many women, and indeed many ALP
2 6men (see Johns, 1983:123; 'Connell, 1982:58-60). Susan Ryan
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(1979:24) saw 'machines, steering committees, complicated
trade union connections' as major obstacles to Labor women:
These antiquated, unrepresentative, male-dominated 
hierarchies with their mysterious and indirect ways 
of gaining the numbers for preselection and the 
election of party officers deter many women who 
are otherwise attracted to Labor policies.
The absence of such hierarchies in the Australian Democrats
27appealed to women, she suggested.
Traditional macho intra-ALP politicking favoured
authoritarian and aggressive characters and gave little
importance to issues 'which primarily concern the welfare of
women and/or children' (APSA, 1979:34). The consequences of
this could be seen in the priorities displayed in the Labor
platform. The NCI asked Labor to integrate feminist
insights into its 'democratic socialist' ideology (APSA,
2 81979:38). The conjunction of arguments from electoral
utility with the notion that Labor ideological renewal had
to include an opening to feminism recurred in the subsequent
debate. The electoral utility argument was:
... particularly attractive to men at the top 
echelons of the party at the national level.
Women have been more attracted by arguments of 
distributive justice and the need for more direct 
representation of a feminist viewpoint (Sawer and 
Simms, 1984:118).
The NCI also agreed that Labor had to modify inherited 
terminology, assumptions and images (APSA, 1979:38).
'New social movements' focused on power and 
decision-making rather than economic exploitation. They 
criticised the notion that growth would solve problems of 
inequality and poverty (see McQueen, 1984). Recognising 
distinctive group identities involved an extension of Aust­
ralian Social Democracy, Mark l's notion of legislation
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equal citizenship rights (Macintyre, 1985:118-137. See also 
Ryan, 1983). Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 accepted the 
implications of this critique. But as the NCI's response to 
feminism shows, Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 was often 
embraced very cautiously, even by those who were critical of 
Labor's remoteness from 'new social movement' politics.
Responses to DP 4 were generally supportive, despite
undercurrents of opposition to and/or scepticism about
affirmative action, especially 'reserved safe seats'. Senator
Jean Melzer disputed the view that increasing the status of
women within the party would increase female electoral support:
I don't believe the ordinary suburban mum, whose 
vote could make us or break us, knows or cares about 
the make up of the local ALP branch or even the 
State Executive (NCI Documents). 29
'Reserved safe seats' ignored ALP realpolitik. Melzer asked
rhetorically: 'Whose safe seat? Over whose dead body?'. The
following year her own safe Senate seat, over her own 'dead
body', was effectively handed over to a male by her faction
(Victorian Centre U n i t y ) . H e r  demotion 'mobilized women
members of the ALP to an extent not previously witnessed'
(Jupp, 1982:86). This did not reverse the decision, but it fed
into the continuing campaign for affirmative action.
Some responses to DP 4 echoed Melzer's scepticism.
Thirroul branch (NSW) supported a higher profile for Labor
women, but thought reserving safe seats ignored 'the reality of
31the ALP structure' (Response 13). The left-wing Manly branch 
(NSW) opposed affirmative action (Response 29). Low female 
participation reflected 'sociological factors evident in the 
community generally'. Bundeena branch (NSW) agreed (Response 
22). Despite enthusiasm for CPS 4, it felt 'a structural
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solution' was 'not the correct answer'. The ALP was 'a party
of social change' as well as 'a vehicle for democratic
practices'. Expending energy in 'simply practising certain
rituals' might reduce Labor's effectiveness:
... in promoting more fundamental social changes 
which will ultimately ensure equality for all 
regardless of sex, colour or country of origin.
Was there a contradiction between being 'a party of
social change' and 'a vehicle for democratic practices'? The
Bundeena dichotomy rested on the assumption that 'correct'
economic policies (of a 'socialist' nature) were the key to
reducing inequality all round. Pursuit of such policies was
more important than redressing internal ALP inequalities
through 'democratic practices' such as affirmative action.
This can be turned on its head. Could Labor achieve
'fundamental social changes' if it was not 'a vehicle for
democratic practices', particularly if 'fundamental social
changes' involve more than 'socialist' economic policies?
3 2 33Victorian ALP members Shirley Ambrose, Eric Young and Susan 
Edwards suggested Labor's democratic inadequacies weakened its 
capacities as a party of social change (Response 26). Women's 
views were not adequately reflected in ALP decisions. 
Affirmative action was not simply a ritual, distracting Labor 
from pursuing fundamental social changes that would ensure 
equality for all.
The NCI Report insisted affirmative action was
necessary if the ALP was to be an effective party of social
change (ALP, 1979:11). It was also necessary for electoral
reasons. In general, the Report replicated the substance of
DP 4, although it did not repeat the earlier list of women's
34grievances on the 'conscience vote' and other matters. On
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reserved safe seats', the National Executive was new asked to
advise the state Branches to take 'positive steps' to move the 
party progressively towards the goal of women being represented 
in the FPLP in rough proportion to their membership of the 
party (ALP, 1979:11).
14C Putting Affirmative Action into the Rule-Book
NCI endorsement, by itself, did not mean affirmative
action would be seriously considered. The National Executive
seemed hostile. Some saw its referral of affirmative action on
35to the Branches as a way of burying the idea. In 1979, there 
were seventeen men and one woman (Joan Taggart, ACT) on the 
National Executive.
Affirmative action was kept alive by a combination of
sustained pressure from Labor women's groups and the gradual
recognition by Labor electoral strategists that the ’gender
gap' could be closed if the party played the right cards.
Labor women's groups were in ferment in the late 1970s. They
pushed for renewed Labor radicalism on a range of issues. The
old 'ladies' auxiliary' style of organisation was being
7 6discarded (Moore, 1985:36). In states where separate 
organisations were retained, such as NSW and WA, they were 
transformed. Labor women's committees were strongly 
influenced by the women's movement (see Sawer and Simms, 
1984:147). They established an affirmative action lobby that
crossed factional lines.
Senator Susan Ryan, shadow minister for Women's 
Affairs, Aboriginal Affairs and the Arts, championed Labor 
women's concerns in the FPLP. She convinced her colleagues
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that Labor could close the 'gender gap' by appropriately
3 8responding to the women's changing aspirations. As an 
individual, she seemed interested in Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 2. She stressed the importance of women in the 
anti-Vietnam-War movement and the anti-uranium movement (Ryan, 
1979:23. See also Ryan, 1981a:5). She had been drawn into the 
ALP by enthusiasm for Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. A 
newly active feminist and founder of Canberra WEL, she took the 
view in 1971-72 'that you could change things through the 
parliamentary system' (Ryan, 1981b:26). She was 'very 
influenced by Whitlam'.
After the 1977 election, she reminded party
strategists that Labor would be in government if women voted
for it in the same proportion as men. Ryan's (1979:25)
strategy was aimed at 'particular groups of women, including
those whose experience of marked changes in their personal
lives led them to reject or at least question 'establishment
values and stereotyped concepts of "women's role"' (Ryan,
1979:25). Labor did make gains amongst women in 1980. Ryan
(198la:4) told the National Labor Women's Conference that 'a
modest but effective effort' aimed at women would pay
significant electoral dividends. Official Labor adoption of
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 was too much to hope for.
The male leadership could not be converted to a
feminist/socialist ideology. However, Labor could base its
policies for women on fact rather than fiction. Women were not
impressed by a health policy, which seemed to assume they spent:
39most of their lives pregnant.
The NLWC was held in Sydney in January 1981. 300
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women attended. Activists from Labor women's groups canvassed
affirmative action and other topics. The National Executive
contributed $5,000 for travel expenses. This indicated a more
conciliatory attitude to women's claims than had been shown in
April 1979 (see Summers, 1983:132). In a further gesture by
party chiefs, Senate leaders John Button and Don Grimes spent
the weekend making tea and coffee for delegates.
The NLWC strongly supported the NCI proposals on
affirmative action. It established a working party, chaired by
Ann Forward, to work out recommendations for the Melbourne
Special Conference, six months later. NLWC organisers were
pleased with delegates' agreement:
... that the only way forward in a male-dominated 
ALP is through a viable national rank and file 
women's movement (Sandra Nori, 'Show of Political 
Strength, Principle and Purpose', Challenge,
10 February 1981).
The working party lobbied the Executive.40
In a series of workshops and plenary sessions, the
NLWC supported other 'new social movements' (anti-uranium, land
rights, environmentalism).41 Also in the spirit of Australian
Social Democracy, Mark 2, the NLWC grafted its exploration of
'new social movement' concerns onto a reformulated Labor
'socialism'. It endorsed a strong 'socialisation objective',
which included the 1921 wording, adding:
... a statement to the effect that any system 
based on the exploitation of individuals within 
households cannot be truly egalitarian (NLWC,
1981 :30 ) .
The NLWC also registered strong opposition to the 'conscience 
vote' and agreed on policies for women at work, in education and 
in the community.
The Special Conference examined the application of
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affirmative action to the revised National Conference structure.
There was also a general debate on further affirmative action
and ancillary measures. The National Executive recommended
requiring state Branches to include women to the extent of at
least one quarter of their delegations. Labor women's groups
had won official endorsement of affirmative action principles,
but there was considerable debate about their application.
National Executive responsiveness to the women's groups did not
extend to challenging powerful intra-party interests. Its
recommendation recognised 'the forces that exist in the party'
(Mick Young, ALP Transcript, 1981:176), particularly affiliated 
42unions.
The preferred NLWC figure for affirmative action at
National Conference was 30 percent. It was seen as reflecting
4 3the percentage of women in the party. Victorian proxy 
delegate Joan Coxsedge moved an amendment for 30 percent 
affirmative action. She accepted that women's under­
representation reflected social attitudes (ALP Transcript, 
1981:178), but a democratic socialist party could not just 
reflect such attitudes. Women would bring 'a new vitality and 
fresh ideas'. Susan Ryan also argued in terms of democratic 
socialism and party renewal (as well as electoral utility). 
There was:
... a new spirit to express what we are about as 
democratic socialists and sex equality, of course, 
is the most obvious area where our house should be 
in order and where our house is not in order (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:179).
Conference accepted the lower figure (25 percent).
The very fact that there was any further debate on 
affirmative action was largely thanks to NLWC pressure. The
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Special Conference was originally going to be confined to those 
sections of the NCI Report 'relating precisely' to party 
structure (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1981:282). A general 
debate was added in response to 'expectations which had been 
built up'. The general debate looked at (a) the broad 
application of affirmative action throughout the party, 
particularly to the preselection of parliamentary candidates; 
and (b) complementary measures to counter sexism within the 
party. The Executive commended the NLWC working party document. 
It would refer it to the Branches. It promised to monitor 
implementation. Joan Coxsedge (ALP Transcript, 1981:286) 
preferred direct Conference endorsement of the document, which 
recommended 'reserved safe seats' for Labor women, until they 
made up at least one third of each Labor parliamentary party.
Graham Richardson (NSW) strongly objected to 'reserved
safe seats' (ALP Transcript, 1981:293). It would lead to
difficulties in NSW, with its tightly-contested 'rank-and-file'
44preselection ballots. Which safe seats should be reserved?
For this electoral strategist, the ensuing turmoil might 
outweigh the potential gains in closing the 'gender gap'. Of 
course, the NSW right had been slow to promote women within its 
own ranks. Susan Ryan insisted that the Coxsedge amendment 
would not cause turmoil (ALP Transcript, 1981:295). See also 
Ryan, 1981b:27). The impetus for party renewal had to be 
maintained.
David Combe asked delegates to trust the Executive 
(ALP Transcript, 1981:296). Conference did not accept such 
assurances. Coxsedge's specific guidelines were endorsed, 
albeit by a narrow margin. Opponents included Mick Young, Bob
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Hawke and Bill Hayden (Jan Burnswoods and Sandra Nori, 'Women
Get a Foot in the Door1, Challenge, August 1S81. See also
Kelly, 1984:147). Anne Pengelly (SA) successfully proposed
adoption of NCI ancillary measures to underpin affirmative 
4 5action. Conference also endorsed the National Executive
decision to have at least one woman on each policy committee.46
The affirmative action debates touched on a wide range
of issues. David Combe suggested that they involved
considerable 'grandstanding' (ALP Transcript, 1981:297).
'Commitment to a faction' could outweigh 'commitment to
affirmative action'.^1 However, the rhetoric was important.
The debates were an arena for the deployment of Labor feminist
ideology, just as the NCI had been an arena for the registration
of 'participation ideology'.^ A large number of proxy
delegates were introduced for these debates. Five of the seven
women speakers in the first debate (Coxsedge, Ryan, Barbara
Wiese, Anne Warner and Janet Hunt) were proxy delegates. Wiese
49and Hunt defended the National Executive figure. Jan
Burnswoods suggested Conference could easily be seen as 'a
glossy sort of window dressing' (ALP Transcript, 1981:183).
50Delegations sent in proxies is an exercise in tokenism.
' - “N
Delegates also emphasised the importance of 
affirmative action at the 'grass-roots' level. Women's concerns 
had to be at the heart of any restatement of democratic 
socialism (Janet Hunt, ALP Transcript, 1981:290-1). Women's 
experience of life was different to men's. Thus they looked at 
government policies differently. Labor could not tap into that 
perspective without going out of its way to facilitate women's 
participation:
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How often women have said to me, 'I was going 
to suggest so-and-so during the meeting but I 
didn't know if I should' and another good idea 
has passed the meeting by (ALP Transcript, 1981:291). 51
Another strong theme was that affirmative action
should forge a new progressive coalition of support for Labor.
Queensland left-winger Anne Warner underlined this rationale for
affirmative action as a process:
... where we can effectively make up for the oppression 
which has been inflicted upon women by an uncaring, 
exploitative, discriminatory capitalist society 
(ALP Transcript, 1981:185).
Pat Giles (WA) suggested affirmative action would have policy
implications in issues such as abortion. As the French
Socialist Party began listening to its women it began developing
policies that were immediately seen as being 'a great deal more
5 2relevant to women' (ALP Transcript, 1981:302).
Bill Hayden suggested Joan Coxsedge would enjoy some
sort of footnote in ALP history for her successful amendment
(ALP Transcript, 1981:332). He wondered whether state and
federal Labor MPs would be queueing up to surrender their seats.
His scepticism was justified. Conference's 'guidelines' could
not abolish the party's state-based structure nor eliminate male
domination of parliamentary positions. The amendment's
importance lay more in its official legitimation of Labor
women's aspirations than its concrete contents:
The whole thrust of what women within the party 
have been doing is legitimising their participation.
Women have always been important in the Party but 
haven't been acknowledged, and now there are a 
number of signs that we are being acknowledged 
(Ryan, 1981b:27).
In Melbourne, Ryan had reminded delegates the guidelines were 
'flexible' and would not force Branches to do anything 
'impracticable' (ALP Transcript, 1981:295). The degree of
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accommodation to sexist traditions and practices such 
'flexibility' would entail, and the definition of what was 
'practicable' would depend on further debate and further 
struggle. Party chiefs had accepted affirmative action 
following intra-party pressure and their own electoral 
calculations. Whether affirmative action would lead to more 
than tokenism was indeterminate, but Labor women had won a 
significant victory.
Affirmative action advocates assumed an increased
women's presence would help the causes favoured by Labor women's
5 3groups (see Ryan, 1981b:26). Australian Financial Review
journalists Mike Jacobs and Rod Wise implied the reformed
Conference would be more sympathetic to 'new social movements':
The difficult task now confronting the parliamentary 
leaders and their machine allies will be how to 
graft an integrated program for an alternative government 
from a conference whose centrifugal nature will tend 
to produce a loose collection of fragmented special 
interest proposals ( 'After trhe Talks - Hayden 
Invincible, Hawke Invisible', 31 July 1981).
Such expectations were not borne out in 1982. The 
'conscience vote' survived (with some female support), despite 
predictions that affirmative action would lead to its demise.
The party's anti-uranium stance was modified, although Labor 
women's groups strongly opposed the mining and export of 
uranium. Table 2 shows there was a slight majority among women 
delegates for the anti-uranium policy. To this extent, the 
'progressive effect' of affirmative action did materialise. The 
significant female support for the Hogg amendment, however, did 
not reflect the strength of anti-uranium feeling in the Labor 
women's groups. Five women spoke in the debate. Only one 
(Barbara Wiese) supported the change.
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Table 2
1982 National Conference Uranium Debate
Men Women Total(a) Voting
Supporting Hogg Amendment 42 11 53Defending 1977 Policy 31 15 46
(b) Speakers
Supporting Hogg Amendment 10 1 11Defending 1977 Policy 7 4 11
Source: ALP Transcript, 1982. Opponents of the Hogg amendmentcalled for a division, which recorded each individual 
delegate's vote (see ALP Transcript, 1982:478-9). 
However, although the official tally was 53-46, the 
transcript only records 51 pro-Hogg-amendment votes. 
Overall the list is short one Qld and one WA delegate. 
As the non-listed Queensland and WA delegates and 
proxies were all male, I have included the two 
'missing' delegates in the 'men' column.
Affirmative action was grafted on to an evolving 
balance of Branch and factional interests. The women were 
elected by state conferences, still predominantly male, not by 
women's groups. In many cases, their alignments reflected 
factional patronage rather than feminist allegiance. As David 
Combe predicted, Conference reform mainly meant state faction 
leaders added more names to their tickets. The debates were
dominated by male speakers. Many of the women delegates were 
treated as voting fodder for the faction that sponsored them. 
Their inexperience lessened their impact (Hutchison, 1982:10).
Labor women's groups supported ALP alignment with 'new 
social movements' and hoped for an appropriately renewed Labor 
socialist vision. They expected a 'progressive effect' from 
affirmative action. ALP managers worked to dis-articulate 
affirmative action from generalised endorsement of 'new social 
movements'. They accepted the electoral logic of 'demographic
representation', but wanted minimal adjustments in party
54practices.
55Labor national women's co-ordinator Kate Moore 
attributes disappointments in the working out of affirmative 
action to the subversion of feminism by factionalism. 
Factionalism can be seen as a form of macho politics.
Affirmative action was won by a united women's movement (Moore, 
1985:33). Later, 'intense suspicion and dislike' divided these 
women (Moore, 1985:50). It was not factional division per se 
which frustrated Labor feminists. Rather it was the particular 
forms of increasingly disciplined and nationally co-ordinated 
factions in a party where Labor Managerialism was on the 
ascendant. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, closer to the 
women's groups' aspirations, was a still-born project. There 
remained space within Labor Managerialism for anti- 
discrimination policies developed by the women's groups. This 
combination of factors caused the strain. Some women wanted to 
get involved in anti-discrimination policies. Others were 
disillusioned by the way the 'new social movements' had been 
disregarded. The change of policy on uranium was particularly 
traumatic.
Labor has always been made up of conflicting sub­
coalitions. The acceptance of affirmative action, like most ALP
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decisions (see D. Stephens, 1979:389), expressed the goals of
sub-coalitions, adjusted to the goals of other sub-coalitions,
registering a temporary balance of forces. Interpretation and
5 6implementation would be fought over. After 1982, the 
hardening of other sub-coalitions into factional blocs and the 
changing balance of forces fragmented Labor women's groups and 
reduced their room for manoeuvre.
Socialist Workers Party journalist Sue Reilly saw 
affirmative action in the ALP as a direct result of the general 
ferment on the question of women's rights ( 'What's at Stake in 
Affirmative Action', Direct Action, 12 August 1981). How the 
ALP responded to this ferment depended on complex intra-party 
conflicts. Reilly recognised the indeterminate policy 
implications of affirmative action. It enabled women to fight 
discrimination and inequality. Whether this eventuated 
depended on further struggle inside the party. The changes 
might only assist 'female careerists' to secure more rapid 
promotion within the party. However, given that 'careerism' had 
been such a male preserve, such a change would still be 
significant. Affirmative action, although indeterminate in its 
implications, did make some difference.^ Crisp (1982:79-80) 
was wrong to see affirmative action as simply a zero-sum gain 
for 'middle class' Labor women at the expense of 'working class' 
Labor men.
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CHAPTER 15
'MAKING SOCIALISM IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY'?
15A Socialism, Economic Policy and the NCI
Among the ’ancient philosophies' and 'current 
concerns' surfacing in the NCI were the 'socialisation 
objective' and the parameters of economic policy. The NCI set 
out to defuse a 'silly dichotomy' between 'socialism at all 
costs' and 'selling out'/managing the status quo, that was 
'growing in Labor argument' in 1978 ('Notes on the ALP 
Committee of Inquiry'). It hoped to mediate within a very 
divided party. Submissions indicated some 'grass-roots' 
support for radical initiatives, or at least radical rhetoric 
(see Catley and McFarlane, 1980:303). Labor responses to 
recession and electoral defeat in the 1970s ranged all the way 
from attempts to demonstrate economic respectability by laying 
the ghost of the Whitlam programme to talk of tackling the
ltrans-nationals with a new wave of public ownership.“
The relationship between Labor ideology and Labor
policy had always been remote (Rawson, 1966a:72; Jaensch,
1983:171-2; Lucy, 1985:47-8). Labor's objective; 'the
socialisation of industry, production, distribution and
2exchange'; dated from 1921. The same Conference added the
Blackburn Declaration, which limited collective ownership to
the extent necessary to prevent exploitation. This was later
incorporated into the objective proper (Reeves and Evans,
1980). Despite the objective's confusion and ambiguity it
enshrined grandiose hopes which contrasted with Labor's
3cautious 'empirical' practice (Crisp, 1978:15-6). Bruce
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O'Meagher reminded the NCI that Labor had never resolved the
conflict between 'its weak philosophical commitment to a vague
ideal of socialism' and its pragmatic policy parameters
(Submission 223). The 'silly dichotomy' had a long history.
To defuse it, short-term 'empirical' policy parameters would
have to be linked to long-term 'rationalistic' aspirations.
Some dismissed the possibility of linking economic
policy to Labor ideology in this way. Economics professor Fred
Gruen (1980:225) stressed the imperatives of short-term
economic management in a mixed economy:
Socialism - either in the sense of the public 
ownership of the means of production or in the 
newer sense of participation, decentralisation 
of control and decision-making - is largely 
irrelevant to coping adequately with such major 
economic problems as inflation and unemployment 
(see also Gruen, 1983).
By and large, this was the position taken by the FPLP 
leadership (Higley et al., 1979:61; Walsh, 1979:219).4
Some on the left counterposed 'mobilisation', 
'struggle' and 'direct action' to the compromises of the policy 
game, which could lead to entrapment in the logic of capital
5and the capitalist state. Critics of 'Technocratic Laborism'
(see especially Catley and McFarlane, 1974; Beresford, 1975)
rejected 'reform' as 'revisionist' and abstained from 'current
policy discussion' (Groenewegen, 1979:203). They too appeared
to believe that 'empirical' policies could not be linked to
'rationalistic' aspirations.
The sort of 'socialism' advocated in NCI submissions
was short on policy content. 'Resolutionary' recommendations
£
advocated little more specific than abstract audacity. Thus 
Double Bay branch (NSW) declared:
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The ALP must present itself to the Australian 
people as a Socialist Party intent on innovative 
social change in the community and at the same 
time educating the electorate as to what 
socialism is (Submission 41).
Voters were 'bloody little capitalists', who had to be educated
out of their 'cargo cult mentality' (Submission 37, Hotham FEA
7and Cheltenham branch, Vic.). The emphasis was on the 
expressive pursuit of a 'correct line'. Gellibrand FEA hoped 
for policies that would eradicate 'the injustice, inequality 
and inefficiency of modern capitalism' rather than being bound 
by 'the parameters of office in 1980' (Submission 60).8
'Resolutionary' politics may have little direct 
implications for policy-formulation but it has its own logic 
and its own rationale, particularly in relation to factional 
manoeuvring. 'Resolutionary' politics is constantly 
complicated by its 'garbage can' characteristics. Debates 
about 'socialism' may be no more about 'socialism' than debates 
about 'reorganisation' are about 'reorganisation'. Indeed, the 
'silly dichotomy' between extravagant declarations of the 
party's aspirations and a practice of 'muddling through' also 
has its own rationale. Philosophical declarations have often 
served as tests of factional strength (see Alan Reid, 'How to 
Win Votes and Lose Influence', Bulletin, 31 July 1979). 
Political scientist Peter Loveday (1980:74) notes that debates 
about the objective have usually been about other things as 
well: the policies it might legitimise, the power and
authority of different factions etc.^
DP 6, written by the NCI's economist Geoff Harcourt, 
described major problems facing Australian economic policy­
makers and sketched out options for a democratic socialist
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party tackling such problems, as it worked towards 'a more just
and equitable society' (APSA, 1979:61). DP 6 transcended the
timid approach of the front bench, which had been mesmerised by
the changing terms of Australian economic debate since 1973-74
(Sheehan, 1980:59; B. Hughes, 1980:50-1). Labor only quibbled
with the details of Fraser's 'fight inflation first' strategy:
Hayden defined his own position by reference to 
Fraser's economics. If Fraser stood for, say, 
deficit D, Hayden's policy would always be D+l 
(Kelly, 1984:71. See also B. Hughes, 1980:38,
53 and 132; Abbey and Catley, 1980). 11
DP 6 complained that Australian economic policy had been
dominated by short-term ad hocery (APSA, 1979:57). Governments
(and, presumably, oppositions) overlooked the changing
international context. Capitalism was now 'dominated by
internationally operating corporations' (APSA, 1979:56).
Harcourt (1977), a leading international figure in 
the 'Post-Keynesian' school of political economy, felt policy­
makers were hampered by inappropriate 'bastard Keynesian' and 
'monetarist' models. In response to 'stagflation' in the 
1970s, the 'Post-Keynesians' reinterpreted the master and 
revived his maverick Marxist contemporary Michael Kalecki.
They emphasised relationships between class struggle, inflation
12and shares in the national income. The range of policies
Harcourt (1977) grouped under the 'Post-Keynesian' label was
catholic to the point of confusion. That might have been a
help rather than a hindrance in stimulating economic debate in
a factionalised party. 'Post-Keynesianism' subsumed:
... a wide range of political attitudes and 
ideologies from Keynes plus compassion through 
Crosland's socialism and Wedgewood Bennery to 
a Marxist restructuring of the whole society 
(Harcourt, 1977:46-7).
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In more concrete discussions, Harcourt drew his 
boundaries more tightly, seeing 'Keynes plus compassion' and 
Croslandism as too compromised, while 'Bennism' (let alone 
Marxist restructuring) was too adventurous. 'Post- 
Keynesianism' was attractive to Labor economists who wanted to 
re-establish the ALP's 'economic management' credentials 
without selling the pass on serious social reform. They wanted 
to combine prices and incomes policies with new redistributive 
tactics. The Whitlam Government had increased social expend­
iture, but failed to develop planning institutions and made few 
inroads on private sector decision-making discretion. Social 
democratic thinkers overseas were radicalised in devising
responses to the same problem - simultaneously securing wage
13restraint and advancing reform (Panitch, 1986:55).
Labor's 1972-75 experience made Harcourt (1977:48) 
sceptical. The Whitlam Government had been constrained by the 
political and economic structures of Australian capitalism as 
well as its own incompetence. It had failed in terms of
14economic management and in terms of social transformation.
In endorsing a more transformtive approach, Harcourt (1977:49)
was cautious. Grasping 'the socialist nettle' along lines laid
down by Stuart Holland (1975) with suitable modifications for
Australian conditions seemed:
... far from being an election winner, or at least 
being perceived as such by those who make policy 
and political decisions in the ALP. 16
Harcourt (1977) advocated a 'real social contract', trading
money wage restraint off against more control over work,
security against redundancy and more comprehensive social
service provision. DP 6 raised the further issue of re-mixing
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the economy and gaining more social control over the private
17sector (APSA, 1979:59). Market mechanisms could not be
trusted. New institutions and a new kind of state intervention
in the economy were required, which went beyond 'just
organising capital more efficiently' (APSA, 1979:58) through
the indirect juggling of demand management targets and tariff
levels. Major firms should be taken into public ownership.
'Socialisation' was put on the policy agenda, alongside plans
for a revitalised export-oriented manufacturing industry
(without dismantling tariffs hastily) and an indexation-based
incomes policy (tailored to Australian Arbitration procedures).
The strategy implicit in DP 6, gradually socialising
investment decisions through a series of social contracts with
the union movement, was one which was gaining support in
certain Labor circles. Some saw Swedish-style moves towards
'economic democracy' through the deployment of wage earners'
funds as an alternative to taking major private firms into
public ownership (see, e.g. Wilenski, 1980a:62). Stretton
(1976a) saw capital redistribution to boost the 'domestic
sector' of the economy and reorganisation in the public
sector as the way to secure worker consent to anti-inflationary
19policies and avert ecological crises. Turner (1976:18)
advocated social contracts directed towards an equitable
distribution of wealth and power. There was some sympathy for
20such an approach on the Labor front bench (see Willis, 1979).
Generally, leading Labor politicians were wary of 
policy proposals that could be construed as advocating 
'socialisation'. DP 6 led to a 'minor furore' (Graham Dunkley, 
'National Inquiry: That Nationalisation Problem Again', Labor
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Star, 11 December 1978). State and federal parliamentarians 
rushed 'to reassure the public' that this was a proposal 'they 
fully intended to ignore'. Defensive Labor politicians 
stressed the NCI was not an official party policy committee.21
DP 6 was released with the NSW election campaign in 
full swing. Labor premier Wran was not impressed (Laurie 
Oakes, 'Nationalisation: A Clash of Principles and a Poll - How 
the Party Upset Wran ...', Age, 7 October 1978). There were 
complaints from NSW Labor. Harcourt replied robustly that Wran 
and NSW Labor should face up to what Labor was about. This 
little vignette symbolises the clash between Harcourt's 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 approach and NSW Labor 
Managerialism. Indeed eclectic 'Post-Keynesianism', with all 
its vagueness, was the ideal economic theory for advocates of 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 1 had presumed too much on capitalist co­
operation and the continuation of economic growth. Labor 
Managerialism eschewed social transformation altogether. It 
cut the party's cloth to suit its measure in hard times.
Defending DP 6 from press criticism Neal Blewett
argued the NCI would have been 'intellectually dishonest' to
side-step questions like nationalisation (letter, Canberra
22Times, 21 October 1978). It was charged with advancing long­
term considerations for a democratic socialist party and was
23confronted with 'the malaise of the capitalist order'.
Blewett articulated the committee's 'rationalistic idealist' 
self-image. Quests for organisational improvement cannot avoid 
being tangled in factional struggles, policy debates and a 
range of other concerns. The NCI did more (and less) than
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develop rationally appropriate policy-making procedures for 
subsequent adoption. However, its official self-interpretation 
precluded it from trespassing on the prerogative of formal, 
specialised policy committees. There were no official NCI 
recommendations on economic policy. No section of the Report 
corresponded to DP 6.
DP 6 stimulated debate, especially among Labor
economists. The NCI received only thirty formal responses,
24mainly from individuals rather than party units. Perhaps
this was because of DP 6's 'unnecessarily complex academic
style' (Marc Robinson, 'Economic Issues and the Committee of
Inquiry', Lobby, February 1979) and occasional obscurity. Its
advocacy of both incomes policy and nationalisation cut across
existing factional alignments! Abstract economic theory was
becoming more embedded in mainstream Australian political
debate (as elsewhere, see Przeworski, 1985:205ff; Clegg et
al., 1986:274). Harcourt had a point spelling out the
theoretical foundations for his proposals, 'Keynes-Minsky
instability thesis' (APSA, 1979:62-3) and all.
The CPA journal, Australian Left Review, welcomed
DP 6 as a surprisingly vigorous attempt to change the terms of
Australian economic policy debate (0'Shaughnessy, 1978).
0'Shaughnessy praised DP 6 for putting a transition to
socialism on the agenda, but criticised its advocacy of incomes
policy and its failure to couple public ownership with
2 5democratic self-management. DP 6's sketchiness led to 
further criticisms, even from those who were sympathetic to its 
general argument. Graham Dunkley criticised its failure to 
examine the operational dimension of its proposals (Labor Star,
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11 December 1978).^6 DP 6 said nothing about Treasury
2 7dominance of federal economic policy advice.
The ALP had always found it difficult to 
operationalise its rationalistic aspirations. Debates on 
Labor's objectives were 'full of mythologies and
misconceptions' and 'in desperate need of clarification' (Graham 
Dunkley, Labor Star, 11 December 1978). The 'garbage can' 
nature of such debates amplified the confusion and made 
clarification difficult. Indeed, Loveday (1980:86) predicted 
that Labor 'socialism' would inevitably remain 'undefined and 
unelaborated', because factions found it difficult to link 
'socialism' to day-to-day politics.
In an earlier article, Dunkley noted that, within the
ALP, ideological clarification, policy formulation and party
solidification were compartmentalised ('Making Socialism - or
Whatever - Work', Labor Star, May 1978). Labor had only scored
well in all three areas, he suggested, in the 1940s (through
the emergent Labor-Keynesian reconstruction programme).
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 updated that programme
within the confines of the public/private sector mix settled in 
2 81949. Recession in the 1970s provoked new arguments:
The collapse, in the face of stagflation, of 
popular faith in Keynesianism as a governmental 
regulatory policy and a guarantor of full 
employment has sharpened the dilemma for 
democratic socialism. Without a distinctive 
economic alternative it runs the risk of 
degeneration in practice (whatever its rhetoric) 
into a party based on interest-group politics 
(Wilenski, 1983:58).
Such degeneration might mean 'legitimation' deficit 
within the party, but was quite compatible with electoral 
success. Labor Managerialists feared a distinctive economic
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alternative might upset dominant elites and lose votes. DP 6 
postulated party unity around a policy framework, that could be 
linked to long-held (if usually dormant) ideological 
aspirations and sold to the electorate. Such was the promise. 
The debate around DP 6 did not link up with debate on the 
'socialisation objective', let alone seriously influence Labor 
economic policy.
15B Reformulating the 'Socialisation Objective'
The formal 'socialisation objective' debate focussed
on matters of ideological clarification. The main bone of
contention was whether four words, 'to the extent necessary',
29should be retained at the head of the objective. In 1955,
clarifying an 'interpretation'- adopted in 1951, the ALP said it
sought socialisation of industry, production, distribution and
exchange 'to the extent necessary' for the elimination of
'exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields'
30(Reeves and Evans, 1980:161). The National Executive (in 
1981) wanted to retain the gist of the 1955 formulation, 
fleshing it out with 21 points of contemporary application.
The SA amendment would delete the phrase 'to the extent 
necessary'. It was seen as the main alternative and became the 
focal point of the debate. Hopes that the debate would help 
integrate future policies or solidify the party around a 
consensual objective were misplaced.
The old Labor formula of believing in some 
'socialisation' as a distant goal, but not talking, let alone 
doing, anything about it had been disturbed in 1975. There 
were some suggestions that Labor should not even believe in
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'socialisation' any more. Some who felt the Whitlam Government 
had moved 'too far, too fast' explored making the Whitlam 
programme the party's ultimate objective. Elsewhere in the 
party a new post-1975 radicalism and the collapse of the long 
post-war boom led to a renewed interest in Labor 'socialism'. 
These divisions shaped the background to the 'socialisation 
objective' debate. Circumstances and complications narrowed 
the range of issues discussed and papered over real 
differences. The debate served as a 'garbage can' for other 
concerns (e.g. factional disputes in SA, the consolidation of 
Bill Hayden's leadership and the reorganisation itself.
The debate had its farcical elements. The phrase 'to 
the extent necessary' was in danger of being deleted. State 
conferences in Victoria, SA, WA and Tasmania all passed motions 
to that effect. Without PR, SA and WA delegations were bound 
by such votes. The SA and WA blocs, plus the left in the other 
states, added up to a majority. Dire electoral consequences 
were predicted if such a majority materialised. Considerable 
last-minute lobbying ensured that it did not (Peter Baldwin, 
'More a Form of Words than an Ideology', Challenge, 28 August 
1981). SA and WA voted for their own 'socialisation' formulae 
exclusively. When both formulae were defeated, they fell in 
behind the National Executive. Party professionals Mick Young 
(SA) and Bob McMullan (WA) worked hard for this result (Rod 
Wise, 'Left Backs Off at ALP Conference', Australian Financial 
Review, 28 July 1981). By such manoeuvres, a leadership 
coalition triumphed. The party hierarchy defeated restive 
elements in the ranks. In both SA and WA, the words 'to the 
extent necessary' had been deleted against the advice of senior
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party professionals.-^
Young chaired the National Executive sub-committee, 
which drafted the proposed new objective. All five sub­
committee members were federal MPs, four of them on the front 
32bench. It received submissions from within the party
('Hayden Outlines His "Socialisation" Ideal', Sydney Morning
Herald, 1 June 1981) but generally proceeded in a rather top-
down manner. Perhaps that made Young's manoeuvrings at the
Conference ironically appropriate. In analysing the Conference
vote, we should note the role played by the parliamentary
leaders' bloc. In the 28-22 votes against both the SA and WA
amendments, there was only one vote each time from this bloc
against the National Executive line. That one vote was only
because John Bannon (SA leader) and Dave Evans (proxy for WA
leader Ron Davies) went along with the Young/McMullan
manoeuvre. Excluding the parliamentary leaders, there was a
3 3slight majority (21-18) for deleting the contentious words.
There was widespread 'Defend Labor socialisation 
ideology' sentiment in the ALP. Many union officials suspected 
that reformulation was a way of watering down the objective. 
This had been important in SA and WA. Those holding such views 
were unconvinced by claims that the new language- was not part 
of a 'sordid bourgeois defence of pragmatism' over principle 
(Evans, 1980:173).
In the 1960s, people like Calwell, Cameron and 
Chamberlain were more successful deploying 'socialist' rhetoric 
to defend their positions within the party than in developing 
'socialist' strategies. What was the story in 1981? Why did 
the left put such hope in the SA amendment (see Michelle
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Grattan, 'Debate on Socialist Objective a Test for ALP Left',
Age, 27 July 1981)? The left was divided. NSW leaders felt
hardening other sections of the platform was more important
than deleting the qualification (Russell Schneider, 'Labor Left
Defeated on Nationalisation Move', Australian, 28 July 1981).
Elements of the left 'ran dead' because they did not want to
embarrass Bill Hayden or leave him vulnerable to a challenge
from Bob Hawke (Rod Wise, Australian Financial Review, 28 July
1981). This muted the left's clamour, but the factional
fluidity associated with reorganisation made clearly
differentiated and stridently articulated ideological stances
attractive. Wise suggests the question of reformulating the
objective was first addressed in a 'rather comradely' manner
('Labor Wrestles with Its Aims', Australian Financial Review,
27 July 1981). As the Conference approached:
... the issues and personalities became inextricably 
embroiled in the log-rolling and manoeuvring over 
the restructure ... The debate became more symbolic 
and thus nastier ...
All this said more about the ALP 'than any theoretical treatise 
could ever begin to say'. Looked at differently, 'garbage can' 
theory on organisational processes tells us more about 'running 
dead' and nasty manoeuvring on 'symbolic' issues (which mingle
'current concerns' and 'ancient philosophies') than such
i
phenomena tell us about the ALP. The 'socialisation objective' 
debate, however, was another interesting case study of ALP 
processes.
Labor federalism complicated the left's dilemmas. In 
some states, the left became locked into the 1921 language as a 
badge of radicalism (see Peter Baldwin, Challenge, 28 August 
1978). This enabled a centre-right bloc to coalesce around the
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National Executive draft:
A superb opportunity to swing the ALP's ideological 
position in a leftward direction was lost as a 
result of the way the debate developed.
What the consequences of such a swing might have been is
another matter. Baldwin's analysis of both the left and the
debate contains elements of 'rationalistic idealist' optimism.
The Conference alignments were contingent. Baldwin pointed to
the sort of political calculations that would have been
involved in producing a more favourable alignment for the left.
In analysing the 1981 alignments, we have to look at
how the debate had unfolded since 1975. Senator Gareth Evans
(Vic.) was the main champion of reformulation. He objected to
the old objective's exclusively economic focus.
'Socialisation' had been identified with nationalisation, which
was electorally unpopular and constitutionally difficult.
Evans (1980b) presented 'socialism' as a set of inter-related
34values: liberty, equality and democracy. In June 1978, the
Victorian Branch endorsed Evans' declaration of Labor's goals
in terms of 'democratic socialist' values. Ten areas were
listed where these values could be applied, beginning with
democratic control, where necessary by 'social ownership', of
production, distribution and exchange (Evans, 1980:179).
Points mentioned included social justice and 'equality of
respect', constitutional reform, cultural diversity (including
Aboriginal land rights), conservation and world peace.
Evans had codified the goals of Australian Social
Democracy, Mark 1. 'Democratic socialism* could be pursued
35without a substantial 're-mixing' of the economy. 'Equality 
of respect', cultural diversity, conservation and peace could
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be integrated with Labor's economic concerns. Evans was keen 
to differentiate his 'democratic socialism' from 'social 
democracy'. The distinction is difficult to sustain. The 
terms are sometimes used to distinguish left and right wings in 
labour parties, but usage varies considerably. It is more 
pertinent to distinguish Australian Social Democracy, Marks 1 
and 2. Evans (1980:178) painted his draft in 'democratic 
socialist' colours because he wanted to proceed consensually. 
Victoria was 'the most consistently socialist' Branch (Jupp, 
1982 : 148) .
Despite the nostalgia for the Whitlam years and the
way the '1972 policies' were brandished against the drift into
Labor Managerialism, Evans was optimistic in expecting the
party could accept Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 as its
3 6ultimate objective. How the reformulation would be challenged 
and the terrain on which battle would be joined were open 
questions. The answer came with the second thoughts of the 
Victorian Branch. In November 1978 it decided that in any 
reformulation:
... the wording of the Objective should be the 
original wording ... this ... separately stated, 
should precede any other contemporary analysis of 
Labor philosophy (quoted Evans, 1980b:180).
The Victorian Branch had earlier rejected any identification of
the ALP with 'European social democracy'. Signals from the NSW
machine that it was unhappy with the objective provoked 'Defend
Labor socialisation ideology' submissions to the NCI. The fact
that the NSW signals coincided with Evans' initial success
encouraged a 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' response to
his proposals as well.
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The National Executive sub-committee sought a balance
between the Evans line and 'Defend Labor socialisation
ideology' sentiment. The Conference debate focussed on the
»
National Executive draft. There was some press speculation 
that an alternative formulation, written by Neal Blewett and 
supported by Bill Hayden, might be presented to Conference as a 
fait accompli. This did not materialise. The Blewett draft 
seems to have been a fail-back position for the party 
leadership, if the National Executive line was in trouble. The 
two versions largely overlapped, but Blewett added a paragraph 
replete with 'the buzz words of the left' (Geoffrey Barker, 
'Hayden Bid for Deal on Socialist Objective', Age, 25 July 
1981) :
... without a significant degree of social ownership 
and control, equality is unattainable, freedom is 
the property of the privileged and not the 
possession of the people and the interests of the 
national and international community are sacrificed 
to an exploitative, materialistic and imperial 
capitalism.
The Conference got bogged down in the old Labor game
of playing off rationalistic reform aspirations against
empirical electoral realpolitik considerations (see Altman,
1980:59; Slee, 1980:22). Correct analysis of capitalist
crisis was played off against 'the exigencies of the political
process' (Johns, 1983:38-9). The debate had a confused format.
There was a plethora of alternative short objectives to the
National Executive draft. These generally sought a return to
1921-style language. Opponents of the Executive draft rallied
around the SA amendment. The National Labor Women's Conference
emphasis on having the objective reflected directly in
37electoral programmes hardly surfaced. There were many
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amendments to the National Executive's 21-point contemporary 
list. The debate lacked focus. Delegates talked at cross 
purposes. Some fell asleep.
15C 'Capitalist Crisis' or 'Winning the Next Election':
The Great Non-Debate
1921-style language was presented as a symbol of 
Labor identity. SA wanted to delete the qualification because 
the concept of democratic socialism had not changed 'since it 
was first established as a political theory' (Bob Gregory, ALP 
Transcript, 1981:19). The 1921 wording had been a response to 
perceived capitalist crisis after World War I. Now delegates 
returned to it, in response to another capitalist crisis. Bill 
Hartley was confident that economic crisis would eventually 
force Labor to take a more radical stance (ALP Transcript, 
1981:63).
There are problems with the assumption that
capitalist crisis produces an automatic majority for socialism:
Political support for socialism must be constructed 
on the basis of existing conditions, and what 
these are can be determined only by analysis and 
investigation ... Socialists must come to terms 
with existing political concerns, organizations 
and forms of struggle (Hindess, 1983:10-11.
See also Cutler et al., 1978:269).
Those who invoked the 1921 language as the appropriate response
to capitalist crisis did not specify any process of transition
to socialism in Australia. Hartley admitted his goal was to
'get some rhetoric out of this conference' (ALP Transcript,
3 81981:22). Left wing delegates insisted there was no 'social 
democratic' solution to capitalist crisis. The policy 
implications of this were vague, particularly as it often 
implicitly relied on forms of Marxist economic theory that
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offered little guide to administering a mixed economy or 
addressing workers' distributional claims in such a context 
(Przeworski, 1985:296).
John Garland was adamant that Labor had to derive its
objective from a correct economic analysis. Devising and
discussing blueprints for a better society was 'at best a
sterile exercise' without first understanding 'the real power
relationships and the new division of capital and labour' (ALP
Transcript, 1981:56). Thus he stressed transnational
corporation domination of the Australian economy, invoking a
thesis with wide circulation on the left (see, e.g. Crough et 
39al., 1980). Just as the banks symbolised the dreaded 'money
power' in the 1930s, the transnationals did so for many on the
left in the 1970s (Love> 1984 : 194 . See also Groenewegen,
1979). The implied preference for autarchic policies was
generally not spelled out (Dunkley, 1983:98). Tom Uren spoke
of the need to develop a coalition of forces to take on 'the
real enemy ... corporate capital' (ALP Transcript, 1981:59-60).
40There was a 'real struggle' against 'foreign capital'. Labor 
had to choose sides.
However, economic struggles do not transparently
translate themselves into political divisions. There are
problems with this economically reductionist analysis. The
Australian left was impressed with Stuart Holland's (1975)
analysis of the culpability of the transnationals in British
4 1'de-industrialisation', but did not develop programmes with 
the degree of concreteness which Holland produced in Britain. 
There were, however, problems with Holland's detailed British 
programmes, partly because of their almost exclusive reliance
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on nationalisation (Cutler et al., 1978:269).42 There were 
problems with the notion that 'monopoly', a distillation of 
capitalist concentration and centralisation, produces an 
instantly compatible alliance of victims (Cutler et al., 
1978:268). The search for correct economic analysis displaced 
the development of a socialist political project.
Three special Victorian speakers (Brian Howe MHR, a
former sociology lecturer; Andrew Theophanus MHR, a former
politics lecturer; and political scientist Joe Camilleri) also
focussed on a correct analysis of capitalist crisis, but
introduced some further themes. Howe (ALP Transcript, 1981:66)
thought 'socialisation' measures could resolve the 'fiscal
crisis of the state' (O'Connor, 1973), torn as it was between
4 >subsidising capital and providing adequate public services. 
Whether returning to the 1921 language was the best way of 
articulating Labor socialist commitments in a 'post-Keynesian' 
era was not addressed.
As well as a response to capitalist crisis, support 
for a strong objective was presented as a badge of 
identification for the left. Ian McLean (Qld) suggested the 
qualification should be deleted because the media had focussed 
on those words (ALP Transcript, 1981:96). This gave the party 
an opportunity to re-establish its identity. Using the word 
'socialism' was an old Labor way to express 'intransigent 
emotions' (Rawson, 1966a:61. See also Evans, 1976:6).
Those motivated by political exigencies rather than 
analysing capitalist crisis were primarily concerned with 
avoiding an electorally embarrassing objective. That is why 
they stressed the words 'to the extent necessary'. The
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National Executive draft was not written for Don Quixote, or 
starry-eyed idealists, but working politicians, ALP members and 
potential supporters (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1981:15). 
Most contributions from senior politicians were reminiscent of 
the scramble for cover in the wake of DP 6. Working 
politicians preferred the National Executive formulation (see 
Table 1). Those defending the Executive draft included the 
FPLP leader and deputy leader, the leader in the Senate, three 
other federal front benchers and a prominent Victorian state 
politician. Only one of the four parliamentarians presenting 
alternatives was a federal front bencher.
Speakers in general
Table 1 
' socialisation obj ective'
Nat Exec Other
Draft Drafts
Federal Politicians 6 4
State Politicians 1 0
Union Officials 0 3
Party Officials 2 0
Other 1 4
This does not include three speakers who moved draft objectives 
but did not take part in the general debate (one union 
official, one party official, one other). It does include 
David Combe who moved national Executive draft and contributed 
general summary at the end of the debate. It does not include 
two speakers (one federal politician, one other) who spoke on 
one of the 21 points (the Australian republic) rather than the 
short objective. Inclusion of the five extra speakers would 
have strengthened the contrast.
(b) Federal politicians in general 'socialisation 
objective' debate
Nat Exec Other
Drafts Drafts
Frontbenchers 
Backbenchers
408
NSW Premier Neville Wran, whose electoral success had 
been seen as a rebuff to DP 6 radicalism, did not take part in 
the debate proper. His presidential address, however, left 
little doubt about his sympathies. The ALP had been formed for 
and existed for:
... quite specific, positive and concrete 
purposes. Politics is not theology and policies 
are not semantics. We are not here as a college 
of cardinals or a council of Trent (ALP Transcript, 
1981:8). 44
There was 'one permanent principle of politics': Achieving
government was the fundamental factor in implementing any part 
of the objective or platform. Defenders of the National 
Executive gave considerable priority to this 'one permanent 
principle'. They had little time for philosophical debate on 
the purposes Labor governments might pursue.
FPLP deputy leader Lionel Bowen was quick to get to 
what he saw as the political nitty gritty. The objective could 
be misrepresented by Labor's opponents (ALP Transcript, 
1981:51). The 'socialist tiger' was an old scare tactic (see 
Crisp, 1978:270-98). Labor responded to the Cold War chill in 
the 1950s with 'ideological withdrawal' (O'Meagher, 1983:24).
In 1981, speakers like Bowen and Keating were still wary voters 
might confuse 'democratic socialism' with Soviet or Chinese­
style communism. If the SA amendment was passed, Labor could 
'kiss the next federal election goodbye' (Paul Keating, ALP 
Transcript, 1981:70).
Bill Hayden presented similar arguments in a less 
abrasive manner. The debate was not one between 'democratic 
socialists' and opponents of 'democratic socialism' (ALP 
Transcript, 1981). It was a discussion amongst democratic
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socialists about the word structure which would most 
effectively state the philosophy by which a Labor government 
would:
... wish to establish those values and that 
atmosphere appropriate for a democratic 
socialist party.
For all his conciliatory tone, Hayden was quick to suggest
electoral disaster, if delegates preferred the 'warm inner
glow' to the practicable 'light on the hill' and the party was
lumbered with an objective that had it 'flailing about,
disabled and on the defensive' (ALP Transcript, 1981:81-2).
The National Executive draft offered an umbrella to shelter the
broad Labor spectrum (Graham Richardson, ALP Transcript,
451981:95). John Button doubted where there was really much
labour movement enthusiasm for 'socialisation' measures (ALP
46Transcript, 1981:71).' Another argument was that
'socialisation' measures were constitutionally impossible
anyway. Against delegates who invoked the name of Mitterand,
Graham Richardson stressed constitutional differences between
47France and Australia (ALP Transcript, 1981:94). Compensation
costs were another obstacle. Paul Keating suggested that, far
from solving the 'fiscal crisis of the state', new public
ownership would overburden a Labor Party that would be:
... flat out trying to manage a modest budget 
deficit to put some humane make-work programmes into 
the last election campaign (ALP Transcript, 1981:69).
The 'heavyweight' defence of the National Executive
draft lends some support to models of party- change which stress
'adaptation' to social change, voter preferences and the norms
of the prevailing political system. In theory, parties have a
number of responses when faced with electoral unpopularity and
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constitutional difficulties. There are alternatives to
abandoning one's objective. Electoral perceptions and
4 8constitutional provisions are not immutable. As Hindess
(1983:141) argues (with regard to the British Labour party):
Considerations of how Labour might take account 
of popular concerns must bring questions of 
political priorities together with questions of 
the organizational capacities of the party, 
the constraints it operates under and the 
room for manoeuvre open to it.
Answering such questions is difficult, but involves intra-party 
debate. Considerations such as these influenced the 
'socialisation objective' debate, but were obscured by the 
rhetorics of capitalist crisis and electoral 'adaptation'. In 
assessing whether the debate exemplified 'adaptation' to the 
political market (Downs, 1957; Kircheimer, 1966), we should 
remember that Realpolitik advocates were constrained in the 
extent to which they could reformulate the objective. They did 
not have everything their own way. We should also remember the 
sort of coincidences and contingencies emphasised in 'garbage 
can' theory, when analysing the debate and the production of 
its incomes.
Many Realpolitik advocates thought the whole debate 
was over-played. This view was echoed by Australian Financial 
Review journalist (and former NSW ALP official) Rod Wise. The 
obj ective's:
... essential irrelevance to the ALP is manifested 
by the party's winning and losing elections with it 
at both State and Federal levels throughout the 60 
years since 1921 ('Labor Wrestles with its Aims',
27 July 1981) .
Gareth Evans thought the debate had been dominated by:
... the politics of the armchair, the politics of 
the bar-room and the politics of self-indulgence 
(ALP Transcript, 1981:89).
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The left insisted on an argument:
... because they could not go away from an ALP 
Conference on a matter such as this without 
having an argument.
Bob Hawke dismissed opponents of the National Executive draft
as ’intellectual wankers' ('Hawke is Hissed by Party',
4 9Australian, 28 July 1981).
Kim Beazley jnr (WA) gave the concept of 
'socialisation' more consideration than most of his right-wing 
colleagues. His contribution partly escaped the 
nationalisation/non-nationalisation impasse. He noted a vast 
array of possibilities under the rubric 'socialisation', from 
British union/government/management 'planning agreements' to 
Swedish plans for 'economic democracy' (ALP Transcript, 
1981:79).^ Of course, Beazley's contribution was partly 
tongue-in-cheek. He went along with the WA/SA charade (voting 
against each other's motions to protect the National Executive 
draft). His invocation of Swedish social democracy hinted at 
alternatives to large-scale nationalisation and stumbling 
through in the 'mixed economy'. Proponents of the latter 
course, like previous generations of Labor politicians, wanted 
an ambiguous and innocuous objective, which was somehow 
supposed, mysteriously, to fulfill long-term aspirations (see 
Ross, 1934:54-5). Beazley's separation of ultimate objectives 
from day-to-day policy (ALP Transcript, 1981:76) brought him 
back in line with his right-wing colleagues.
The Swedes tried to link short-term policies to 
longer-term aspirations. This approach had a long pedigree in 
their party (Tilton, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1985:20-4; Clegg
et al. , 1986 : 331 ). Plans for 'economic democracy' in the 1970s
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(see Meidner, 1978) continued a tradition of 'provisional
utopias' which bridged day-to-day politics to a project of
social transformation (Korpi, 1983:232).51 In this regard the
*
Swedish social democrats had been more successful than parties
like the ALP and British Labour Party (see Korpi, 1983:50-1).
Parties with a 'socialist objective' usually proclaim it as 'an
empty slogan having no bearing at all on their strategy or
tactics' (Heller, 1982:1).52
John Stephens (1979:206) thought the Meidner Plan:
... which essentially calls for socialisation of 
economic growth is almost certain to replace 
nationalisation as the primary path to gradual 
socialisation of the economy in the programmes of 
most socialist parties attempting to move beyond 
the welfare state towards socialism.
It was 'a brilliant solution to the political and tactical
problems of social democracy' (J. Stephens, 1979:190. See also
5 3Esping-Andersen, 1985:297). Interestingly, Australia and New
Zealand were among the few countries where, Stephens (1979:199-
200) felt, labour movement 'ideological renewal' and a Swedish-
style approach, were on the agenda. The ALP, however, was not
keen to move beyond Australia's limited and peculiar form of
welfare capitalism (see Stretton, 1980, 1981; Castles, 1985).
Those who favoured a more combative approach seemed more
interested in British strategic nationalisation than Swedish
54'economic democracy'. Stuart Holland was their most likely 
guru.
Beazley (ALP Transcript, 1981:80) insisted there were 
'political democracy' battles still to be won in Australia. 
'Economic democracy' was a more remote prospect. The events of 
11 November 1975 had convinced many Labor supporters that 
'political democracy' battles were still relevant in Australia.
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The Australien Constitution was found lacking (see Patience,
5" 5 61978). Labor explored constitutional reform strategies.
Linking a constitutional reform campaign for ’political
democracy’ to a longer-term struggle for ’economic democracy’
57raised many strategic imponderables.
’Economic democracy’ concepts of ’socialisation’
could reconcile some competing Labor rhetorics. Brian Howe was
keen to distinguish public ownership from ’state capitalism’
(ALP Transcript, 1981:67). Industrial democracy, important in
1921, had been neglected by the Australian labour movement
since then, yet no issue was more crucial ’if we are to talk
about a socialist society’. Lionel Bowen suggested unions
could marshal capital and re-orient ownership ’back to the
people who produce the wealth’ (ALP Transcript, 1981:54).
In the intellectual debate before the Conference,
Wilenski (l°83:58-9) championed ’economic democracy’ as a way
of transcending sterile disputes about nationalisation and non-
5 8nationalisation. The intellectual debate was far-ranging.
Conference had a more restricted focus. Honour was satisfied
with an inevitable compromise and Labor returned to more
5 9comfortable topics (Evans, 1983:83).
Many of the Realpolitik advocates were happy to leave
the wording of the objective to ’intellectual wankers' as long
as electoral damage was avoided. Their criteria were 
6 0negative. The left, on the other hand, by abstractly 
deriving the case for 'socialism' from 'capitalist crisis', and 
by not considering Labor's organisational capacity to pursue 
'socialist' goals, also divorced the objective from policy 
matters. To this extent, the debate exemplified Winton
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Higgins' (1983:136) analysis of 'organisational under­
development' in labour parties. Policy-making was left to 
shadow ministers and their staff:
Most left oppositions don't tackle this problem, 
but rather engage the right in factional battles 
over positions in the hierarchy and over symbols 
like resolutions of principle about nationalisation.
He believed this 'permanent crisis of pointless factionalism'
could be overcome by policies which promoted long-term goals
while filling gaps in the party's electoral programme. The
criticism of the combination of 'socialist' rhetoric and policy
abstentionism is pertinent (see Hindess, 1983:107-8 and 119;
Hirst, 1985). However, 'garbage can' theory gives us many
reasons why 'pointless' factionalism, with its attendant
symbolic debates on 'ancient philosophies', should be so
persistent.
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CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 16
POST-MORTEM RITUALS AND CHANGE IN THE ALP
According to the Canberra Times, the NCI merely 
introduced 'some new sub-plots' to 'one of the longest- 
playing dramas in Australian politics', Labor's struggle 
to reform itself ('Reform of the ALP', 12 April 1979). 
Many of Whitlam's and Wyndham's earlier arguments, and 
some even older ones,  ^ re-surfaced in 1978-79. In both 
1963-67 and 1977-81, a changing Australian society was 
invoked as a reason for reforming the ALP. Party 
reformers in the 1960s thought Harold Wilson's 
description of the British Labour Party as 'a penny 
farthing bicycle in a jet age' was applicable to the ALP. 
The NCI saw both the Australian Constitution and the ALP 
structure as remnants of a 'horse-and-buggy' era.
Analysis of the ALP's attempts to reform itself in 1963- 
67 and 1977-81, including the various sub-plots in each 
episode, suggests that, despite the similar language and 
the recycling of some proposals, Labor did not stand 
still. Such analysis also raises more general questions 
about the relationship between 'social change' and change 
within parties. 'Adaptation', 'strategy' and 'complex 
arena' models of this relationship were noted in Chapter 
1, alongside arguments that Australian politics became 
more 'professional' in the 1960s and Jaensch's (1989) 
suggstion of a continuous ALP 'revolution' from 1967 on, 
in a process of 'adaptation' spurred on by a determined 
Labor elite's 'strategy'.
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Compared to earlier post-mortems, the scope of 
the NCI exercise and the prominence within it of social 
scientists stand out. As far back as the 1950s, party 
reformers had hoped a Federal Secretariat with a capable 
research wing could enlist the services of 'modern' 
thinkers. The ill-fated National Organising Committee 
(1960-61) and the independent, but sympathetic, 
commentator Brian Fitzpatrick urged Labor to keep abreast 
of developments in public relations techniques and survey 
research. Others wanted to improve Labor's 'image', 
particularly on television, which had been introduced to 
Australia in 1956. Calls for official inquiries and 
grand debates tended to fall on deaf ears. When Whitlam 
became leader, he came into conflict with the Federal 
Executive, 'the twelve witless men', as he once called 
them. He sought a thorough inquiry into party structure 
in 1967.2
Here Whitlam echoed the party's first full-time 
federal secretary, Cyril Wyndham. State Branches refused 
to provide membership statistics for Wyndham's (official) 
1964-65 investigation into party structure. Seeing his 
report as provisional, his very first recommendation was 
for a detailed inquiry (see Appendix I). In 1960, to no 
avail, Ted Wheelwright had called for an inquiry along the 
lines of the 1955 Wilson Inquiry into the British Labour 
Party (which concluded the party was a penny-farthing 
bicycle in a jet age) and Lloyd Ross demanded a grand 
debate on Labor's future. In 1961, with an election due, 
Brian Fitzpatrick gave the ALP six months to revolutionise
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its approach to policy, research and public relations.3 
No such revolution transpired, but Labor only lost by the 
narrowest of margins.
Party reform advocates often stress electoral 
imperatives, but the relationship between party 
structure and electoral outcome is complicated. 
Organisational change is important to organisers (and 
writers on such topics) and raises 'some fundamental 
questions' about party purposes, but may not be 
required for electoral success (Rawson, 1965:25). The 
use made by Menzies of the notion that Labor 
parliamentarians were in thrall to 'the thirty-six 
faceless men' made reorganisation a prominent topic in 
the post-mortem on the 1963 defeat. The 'faceless men' 
tag was shaken off in 1967 with the allocation of 
special places at Federal Conference (and on the 
Federal Executive) to parliamentary leaders.
Party reform in the 1960s involved more than 
warding off 'faceless men' jibes. Critics within and 
on the fringes of the party argued for a more 
'professional' approach, which could draw on new 
campaign techniques to present a better 'image' to a 
changing (more 'middle-class' and 'white-collar') 
electorate. Federal Conference reform, increased 
autonomy for parliamentary leaders, intra-party 
pluralism, improved mechanisms for 'rank-and-file' 
participation and a more co-ordinated national focus 
were also often mentioned. The 'gender gap' in voting 
and the changing ethnic composition of the electorate
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were noted less often. Critics of prevailing ALP 
practices concentrated on boosting the party's 
electoral stocks, but were also concerned with party 
'renewal' and membership involvement, especially at the 
local level.
'Social change' as a reason for party reform 
had been cited earlier by those advocating a Federal 
Secretariat. They stressed the growth of 'the white 
collar, professional, and technical classes' (Crisp, 
1978:96). Brian Fitzpatrick called for an intelligent 
Labor response to the growth of 'the professional, 
technical and managerial class' ('Capitalist Social 
Revolution Poses Problems for Labor', Brian 
Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, February 1959). 
Fitzpatrick believed the 'young technologists' could be 
won to an 'articulate, educating, crusading Labor 
Party'.4
Whitlam thought 'wooing the white-collars' 
necessitated party reform. He specifically appealed to 
Australia's emerging professional and intellectual 
stratum (who were assumed to have special insights into 
the Menzies regime's 'anti-social features'). Whitlam 
wanted Labor to distance itself from the 'labour 
movement' and appeal directly to what he saw as the 
growing ranks of non-unionist citizens on the issues of
5the day. NSW ALP president Charlie Oliver suggested 
more and more workers were acquiring a 'middle-class 
outlook'. In NSW, Maurice Isaacs complained that 
'complete trade union domination' left little scope for 
'white-collar' participation in the ALP. In Victoria,
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Earry Jones argued that 'middle-class'members were
denied any effective say. Party change was thus argued
for both on the grounds of a more effective appeal to
an increasingly 'middle-class' electorate and more
effective scope for 'middle-class' participation within
£the party structure. Others emphasised certain 
skills. Victorian Branch president R.W. Holt thought 
the addition of an economist, a social worker and an 
educationist would help the state executive cope with 
'technological change'.
Race Mathews thought local branches had been
outstripped by 'social change'. Labor had to create
'an acceptable public image at the grass-roots level'
('Our ALP Branch Structure: The Need for a Remedy',
Fact, 20 August 1964). His Scoresby committee project
addressed this question, but state executive hostility 
7aborted it. Cyril Wyndham insisted that local branch 
and FEC revitalisation was important for electoral 
success. He also argued for Federal Conference reform, 
more in terms of 'professionalism' than intra-party 
democracy. Whitlam thought a reformed Federal 
Conference with direct FEC involvement would improve 
electoral campaigning and renew Labor energy and 
enthusiasm. He insisted reorganisation was more than a 
matter of improved public relations. Even Calwell 
agreed that Labor's federal structure, divided into 
'six watertight compartments' was unfortunate.
The circulation of party reform ideas in the 
1960s was often obstructed. The Victorian executive
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got many SECs to return their 'Scoresby letters' unread 
and hindered discussion of the Wyndham Report. In 
Victoria and WA, the 1964 NSW post-mortem was denounced 
as 'morbid self-analysis' and 'irrational hysteria'. 
After the 1966 defeat, many claimed the problem was 
'disloyalty', not party structure. Throughout this 
period, Labor figures regularly 'explained' defeat in 
terms of 'press bias' and the malevolent machinations 
of the party's opponents. The electorate's 'little 
capitalist' proclivities were denounced. There was 
widespread Labor 'refusal to tolerate critical support' 
(James Jupp, '15 Years in the Wilderness - What's Wrong 
with Labour', Canberra Times, 10 December 1964).
Arthur Calwell had assured the 1960 NSW conference that 
'intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals' would be kept 
at bay. Chamberlain felt disagreement between leaders 
would lead the 'rank-and-file' astray. He dismissed 
'party reform' as a gimmick, whipped up by the press and 
other opponents. Disruption and division would follow 
introspection. His watchwords were discipline, loyalty,
Qtradition and Labor principle. We need to be careful 
when talking about Labor 'debate' in the 1960s. Party 
reform advocates often had to present their ideas 
carefully. In Victoria, the Participants, founded in 
1965, felt they could not come out of the closet until 
1969. In NSW, the dominant faction championed federal 
reorganisation, but was not prepared to countenance 
reform within its own domain.
By 1978, there was an openness and a 
willingness to explore controversies and to draw on
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social-scientific advice that had been rare in the
g1960s. The party was also less federalised. The NCI 
was set up a month after the December 1977 defeat. The 
Wyndham Report was not commissioned until eight months 
after November 1963. The NCI provided a national focus, 
invited submissions and included social scientists. In 
contrast, Wyndham had an almost impossible task, 
particularly with so little state Branch co-operation. 
His report was commissioned after a hotch-potch of post­
mortems (especially in NSW) and what we might call anti­
post-mortems (especially in Victoria and WA) in the 
states. ^
Some of the things that party reformers had 
been arguing for in the 1960s had come about by 1978. 
There was more intra-party pluralism. The old winner- 
take-all practices in Victoria and NSW had been 
eliminated with the imposition of proportional 
representation in 1970-71. This intervention heralded 
an increase in National Executive authority. The 
parliamentary leadership had increased its autonomy.
The complaints in the 1960s had been about 'middle- 
class' members being made feel unwelcome. Now there was 
talk of 'working-class' members being alienated (see 
Crisp, 1982 ).■*■■*■ The 'It's Time' campaign in 1972, which 
won an advertising industry award, demonstrated the sort 
of Labor mastery of public relations, advertising and 
polling techniques that earlier party reformers had 
hoped for. By 1978, Labor was less suspicious of
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intellectuals. The party had become 'more receptive to 
critical advice' (Jupp, 1982:112).
Some things stayed the same. State Branches
were unwilling to hand over membership details to the
NCI. Federalism had only been slightly weakened. The
party reform rhetoric of the 1960s included some concern
with more intra-party democracy as well as more
'professionalism'. The intervening years saw little
progress with the former objective. To a considerable
extent, Whitlam by-passed the party structure, instead
12of transforming it. The NCI revisited submerged 1960s 
'democratisation' arguments. The 1975 trauma and the 
rise of 'new social movements', especially feminism, 
meant more radical 'democratisation' suggestions also 
surfaced. Some of Whitlam's closest advisers, such as 
Race Mathews and Peter Wilenski, now seemed willing to 
explore a new radicalism.
The NCI itself argued that, given concentrated 
media ownership, Labor had to become a 'mass party' anew 
to secure 'a lasting tenure of power' (ALP, 1979:2). It 
diagnosed Labor's poor electoral record in terms of low 
membership, inadequate finance, a failure 'to permeate 
the institutional framework' of Australian society and 
the 'parochial horizons' of party chieftains. National 
Conference reform, a 'community presence' at the local 
level, and affirmative action would revitalise the 
party. Deficiencies in Labor 'professionalism' were 
also noted,but the NCI Report emphasised 'party renewal' 
(although, as we saw in Chapter 12D, this had its own 
ambiguities).
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The argument that a renewed 'mass party' of
the sort envisaged by the NCI was electorally necessary
seems dubious. Of course, there are other reasons,
besides electoral ones, why a party might want to reform
itself. Here we could note Peter Wilenski's (1980b:399)
contention that, to a significant degree, the extent of
reform a federal Labor government could secure in
Australian state and society depended on the degree of
change in the party's 'structure, approach and 
13methods'. Within the ALP, conceptions of the party as 
the basis of 'a broad social movement' struggling for 
far-reaching social and political changes have always 
jostled with conceptions of the party as an 'electoral 
machine' aiming at government and modest reforms 
(Houseman, 1971:2-3). In 1977-81, there was 
considerable exploration of the sort of reform Labor 
would require, as a 'social movement' in Houseman's 
sense. Thus the concern with 'democratisation', 'grass­
roots' revitalisation, Labor 'socialism', affirmative 
action and more general Labor/'new social movement' 
liaison. The three most popular themes in 'grass-roots' 
ALP submissions to the NCI were 'Rank-and-file rights', 
'Educate the electorate' and 'Defend Labor socialisation 
ideology'. The National Executive and Special 
Conference, however, were reluctant to disturb factional 
balance and showed considerable respect for what Neville 
Wran described as 'the one permanent principle of 
politics'; achieving government was the fundamental 
factor in implementing any part of Labor's objective or
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platform (ALP Transcript, 1981:8).
Wran had been unimpressed with the release of 
the NCI's lively discussion paper on economic policy in 
the midst of the NSW election campaign. While the NCI 
explored party renewal, many pointed to the 'Wran model' 
of cautious, competent management as the route to 
electoral revival. One NSW Labor official saw Wran's 
practice as a better model than NCI theory and hoped for 
'a lot less tomfoolery of position papers' and grand new 
projects (quoted, Malcolm Colless, 'What the Labor Party 
Must Learn from Wran's Landslide', Australian, 14
October 1978). The focus here was very much on the 
party as 'an electoral machine'. In September 1987, NSW 
Branch secretary Stephen Loosely claimed the 'NSW model' 
as the blueprint for subsequent Labor success elsewhere. 
In other states, and nationally, the ALP, following 
NSW's example:
developed a corporate system of recruitment 
and promotion of party officers and officials 
... Moreover, to win, the party understood the 
need for absolute commitment to discipline.
In most instances, this meant self-discipline. 
But where necessary, this discipline was 
imposed (quoted, Stephen Guest, 'Labor Party 
Branches All Out of the Same Mould Now', 
Canberra Times, 18 February 1988). 14
There is an element of self-promotion here, but also a 
striking contrast with late 1970s hopes for 'party 
renewal'. The talk then was of participation, learning 
from 'new social movements' and the like. Those with 
other priorities only occasionally demurred at what they 
saw as 'tomfoolery'.
Some of the leading party figures on the NCI
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took little part in its proceedings. They were, 
however, quick to become involved in (ultimately 
unsuccessful) attempts to block federal intervention in 
Queensland, on the grounds that the 'old guard' there 
provided 'moderate ballast' (votes for the right on the 
party's federal bodies) which kept Labor closer to the 
middle ground in national politics (Bob Carr, 'Why 
Ducker is Quitting', Bulletin, 11 September 1979).15 
This did not show much concern for 'party renewal'. Nor 
was there much talk about why 'moderate ballast' was 
more important either. With an 'attention vacuum' from 
senior figures, access for out-groups and its own 'party 
renewal' agenda, the NCI set the terms for debate on 
party reform in the late 1970s. The 1981 Special 
Conference showed that (except on affirmative action) 
this did not necessarily mean an influence on official 
party decisions.
In the 'adaptation' model, parties change in 
response to changes in 'social structure' or voter 
preferences. There was considerable social change in 
Australia between 1963 and 1981, for example in 
workforce composition, gender relations, distribution of 
educational qualifications, patterns of immigration and 
official acceptance of cultural diversity. The 
intersection between such changes and changes within 
parties depends on how they become matters of political 
debate. 'Social change' does not translate into 
political change automatically. The notion of some 
all-encompassing 'basic' change in 'social structure' is 
problematic.
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The years between 1963 and 1981 also saw 
significant changes in electoral campaign technology, a 
factor which is stressed in Epstein's 'contagion from 
the right' theory, Kircheimer's 'catch-all' thesis and 
Panebianco's more recent argument on the rise of the 
'electoral-professional party' (and the demise of the 
'mass-bureaucratic party'). Television has become 
increasingly central in Australian elections. Party 
polling techniques have become increasingly 
sophisticated (Mills, 1986). The media and the 
political players themselves have become more familiar 
with political science perspectives. The sort of 
'professionalisation' that Davies, Emy and Encel wrote 
about has come to characterise Australian party 
competition. However, we have to ask whether, as Davies 
and Emy implied, such 'professionalisation' amounted to 
a 'de-ideologisation' or whether, as Encel sometimes 
suggested, it has had more ambiguous consequences. Many 
'adaptation' writers, and Jaensch in his 'ALP 
revolution' argument, suggest that parties which become 
more 'professional' in their approach (or more 
'rational' in their absorption of social-scientific 
perspectives) also become less 'ideological' and more 
'moderate'.^
Such a perspective might suggest that Australian 
politics became more 'professional' as Australian society 
became more 'middle-class', with Labor being forced to 
'adapt' or keep on losing elections. In post-mortems, 
groupings within the party could present recipes for
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recovery, based on shifting towards the ideology of the
rival, victorious party. Such recipes were put forward
within the ALP. In 1964, Charlie Oliver suggested
politics was more and more marginal to people's lives in a
full employment society. Elections were a competition
for the centre ground in an increasingly 'middle-class'
society. In 1965, Cyril Wyndham dismissed references to
the 'working class' and the 'underprivileged'. It was not
only 'the bosses' who owned cars, boats and holiday homes.
In 1978, Bob Carr and Joe Thompson, citing the 'Wran
model', called for Labor 'adaptation' to voter
conservatism. Both saw the prevalence of tow bars for a
boat or a caravan on cars in factory parking lots and
inquiries in union offices about overseas holiday deals as
being particularly symbolic. In places, the NCI went
along with this line of analysis (APSA, 1979:6, 43, 79 and
82). However, the assumption that changes in the class
composition of the electorate translate directly into
changed political attitudes is problematic. The 1960s
'end of ideology' expectation that 'middle-classing' made
for conservatism was belied by the upsurge in student and
'new social movement' radicalism at the end of that
decade. More 'professional' Australian politics in the
1970s did not mean duller politics. Polarisation in 1974
17and 1975 was considerable.
Post-mortems do involve the articulation of 
recipes for electoral recovery. Defeated parties 
sometimes do abandon controversial stances. Much of what 
happened in Labor post-mortems between 1963 and 1981 would 
not surprise Downs, but a lot else was going on. Electoral
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recovery recipes were often overshadowed by 'party 
renewal' projects. There was no one, right recipe for 
electoral recovery anyway. In the 1960s, party reform 
advocates stressed improving Labor's 'image' and 
'adapting' to 'social change', but also tried to boost 
'rank-and-file' enthusiasm. In the late 1970s, there was 
considerable interest in what the party (in conjunction 
with other political forces, including unions and 'new 
social movements') could do to shift 'community 
attitudes', instead of just 'adapting' to them. 'Social 
change' was seen as something achieved through struggle, 
rather than something driven by impenetrable 'structural' 
forces.
As parties became more 'catch-all' in style and 
'professional' in approach, perhaps they became more like 
other organisations, moving from what Gabriel called 
'parochialism' to 'cosmopolitanism', in another 'adaptation' 
argument. Some features of Labor change between 1963 and 
1981 fit such a picture. Labor did become more 
'professional', more receptive to social-scientific 
analysis and less suspicious of 'intellectuals'. Labor in 
1963 was 'parochial' in many ways. A long apprenticeship 
was needed to learn tried and trusted ways of doing 
things. 'Intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals' were 
suspect. Social and political rituals in modern societies 
tend to be 'organized around the consultation of expertise 
and the making of decisions' (March and Olsen, 1984:742). 
The 'consultation of expertise', however, was often-low 
down the list of Labor post-mortem priorities. Calwell
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favoured 'explanations' of the party's plight in terms of
malicious 'external' influences, although he did admit
that Labor did not know why it was losing and had to find 
18out. He himself had served a long apprenticeship in the 
ALP. He valued party experience over external 
'professional' criteria. Whitlam, on the other hand, 
surveyed the ALP with the eyes of a successful 
professional (he had been a lawyer) and found it wanting 
in many respects, not least in its unwillingness to accept 
critical advice from intellectuals and professionals.
Many commentators criticised this Labor 
parochialism in the 1960s. Rawson (1966a:124) suggested 
that the influence of 'the peculiar and deadly pseudo­
radicalism of many union officials' meant the ALP was 
'insufficiently mobile in a radically changing world'.
Labor 'pseudo-radicalism' was largely gestural (see also 
Rawson, 1964b:17). It worked quite happily within the 
restricted confines of Encel's older 'operative concept of 
the state' or Emy's 'producer group politics'. Within the 
ALP in the 1960s, 'instinctive conservatives' who had climbed 
to the top of the greasy pole by 'head-counting and head­
breaking' were being supplanted by 'rational radicals', 
who could claim national policy-making skills (James Jupp, 
'Radicals Find Room at the Top', Canberra Times, 9 August 
1965 and Jupp, 1965a:7). This sort of change fits in with 
Panebianco's emphasis on the importance of extra-party and 
extra-political skills in 'electoral-professional 
parties'. The rise of Labor's 'rational radicals' could 
be seen as appropriate 'adaptation' to 'social change' and 
changed electoral technology.
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In this perspective, the NCI could be seen as
the sort of crisis-induced opportunity for 'rational
diagnosis' that can lead to successful remedial action in
'cosmopolitan' organisations. This assumes unambiguous
performance criteria are available and that a party's
purposes are easy to define. John Paterson, a 1960s party
reform advocate with a strong managerial bent, argued that
Labor success depended on recognising 'the basic rule of
organisational theory'. The party would have to specify
its goals and 'rationally' adjust to changing
circumstances. These included changed 'authority beliefs'
in the electorate, which placed increased emphasis on
educational achievement and technical competence in
candidates for public office. However, stating the
party's goals and 'rational' adjustment to changing
circumstances were matters of political disputation, not
technical analysis. At the time, new forces drawing on
'knowledge' were challenging 'authority' in various
19Australian institutions (White, 1967). The harnessing 
of 'knowledge' involved political struggles. Parties 
could draw on 'knowledge' in different ways. A 
disinterested vantage point is hard to find on a 
reorganisation committee. As Cyril Wyndham, who had good 
reason to know, put it:
When you start talking reorganisation, you don't 
get a rational debate - you get a power struggle, 
and when that happens the chances of reorganisation 
are practically doomed (quoted, 'Wyndham Urges 
Shake-Up in Labor Branches', Australian, 8 April 
1968 ) .
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As the ALP became more receptive to critical advice, this 
still held good. Party reform debates became embroiled in 
tactical arguments as well as power struggles. The 'real 
issue', Wyndham believed, was often 'much deeper' than 
'just party reform' (quoted, Peter Smark, 'Wyndham, the 
Frustrated Reformer', Australian, 24 May 1967).
Different courses of action could be championed 
with different 'expert' arguments. The NCI was informed 
by various kinds of social-scientific 'knowledge' 
including psephology, neo-Weberian sociology and post- 
Keynesian political economy, although it did not organise 
its own research and matched preferred 'solutions' to the 
'problems' it discerned rather haphazardly. Like other 
such committees in other organisations, it became a 
'garbage can' for an array of concerns, that happened to 
be circulating at the time. Given the-impossibility of a 
disembodied purely technical-organisational vantage point, 
reorganisation will always involve more than just 
'rational diagnosis'. The NCI also shows that the 
incorporation of 'knowledge' does not necessarily imply 
'convergence' and the 'end of ideology'. 'Experts' can 
re-articulate old ideologies as well as pinpoint 
suggestions for a better 'image'. Academic political 
economy fed into Labor 'socialist' projects in the 1970s.
So much for 'adaptation' models. 'Strategy' 
models see party change as largely a matter of what 
leaders decide. In post-mortems, party leaders can assess 
previous strategies and decide whether new ones are called 
for. Much attention is paid to how parties respond to the
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strategies of their competitors. Change in the ALP could 
be seen as a response to successful strategies by the 
party's opponents. Here, the connection between Menzies1 
adroit use of the 'faceless men' image in 1963 and the 
addition of parliamentary leaders to Labor's federal 
bodies in 1967 could be noted, and the establishment of 
the Federal Secretariat in 1964 could be seen as a delayed 
response to the earlier establishment of a Liberal 
secretariat in Canberra. More broadly, Whitlam and his 
supporters could be seen as carving out a new path for the 
ALP from 1967 on. The disregarding of many party reform 
proposals in 1967 and 1981 could be seen as a matter of
elite choice. The case studies suggest a more complicated
*
picture. Rather than attempting to implement grand
projects, Labor leaders addressed particular 'problems' at
particular times. For example, intra-party pluralism was
an important Whitlam party reform theme. Federal
intervention in Victoria and NSW in 1970-71 enabled some
progress to be made in this area in those states. It was
not until 1981, however, that the principle of
proportional representation was accepted for the whole
party. The Special Conference agreed on proportional
representation, although it had not been recommended by 
20the NCI.
Change was more likely to come incrementally
than through formal reorganisation projects or grand 
21debates. Whitlam had to abandon much of his party 
reform programme in 1967, although he did secure 
significant changes:
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... a man who steers for Northern Territory and 
finds Tasmania instead may still have achieved 
something, though not a triumph of navigation 
('After So Much Labour', Canberra Times,
2 Augus t 1967 ) .
The introduction of new themes in 1977-81 (e.g. 
affirmative action) suggests Labor was not simply being 
forced to respond to the successful strategies of its 
opponents. What both case studies show is a pattern of 
reorganisation debate characterised by dispersed decision­
making, realpolitik power plays and the ubiquity of 
'garbage can' coincidences.
Dean Jaensch's picture of a 'revolution' in the 
ALP emphasises 'adaptation' to changes in the electorate 
and the determination of the party elite. Some 
qualifications in his analysis throw doubt on the 
'revolution' thesis. For all his claims about the party 
being hijacked, he suggests much of the party's 'basic 
ethos' has survived. Reforms since 1966:
... were intended to provide broader representation, 
greater internal cooperation and coordination and 
to overcome some of the intra-party tensions that 
had emerged, sometimes with disastrous electoral 
consequences (Jaensch, 1989:99).
More could have been made of these points. Calls for a 
Mass Conference pointed to flaws in the ALP as a 'mass 
party'. Reform was called for if the party was to be 
successful as some sort of 'social movement' as well as if 
it was to be a successful 'electoral machine' (see 
Houseman, 1971:40). Ambiguously, Whitlam stated his 
intention to convert the ALP, in the eyes of the public,
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into a 'mass party' again. More consistently, the NCI
implied the ALP never had been a 'mass party', but should
22become one to secure a lasting tenure of power. The 
story of change within the Labor Party was not just the 
story of a slow abandonment of distinct 'mass party' 
characteristics. Attempts were made, often, it is true, 
without much success, to provide mechanisms for increased 
'rank-and-file' participation. Furthermore, the limited 
'de-federalisation' which took place in 1981 could be seen 
as equipping Labor to be more of a 'mass party' than it 
had been. The 1981 changes:
... provided a greater opportunity for 'majority 
rule' within the national party, and hence a 
potential for a real and substantial increase 
in the powers of the national party (Jaensch, 
1989:107). 23
This 'de-federalisation' was partly a response to wider 
changes in Australian federal processes (Jaensch,
1989:103). It was also justifiable, as the NCI was well 
aware, in terms of Labor's 'mass party' ethos (Jaensch, 
1989:106). Jaensch notes all this, as he notes the 
complicated motives of 1960s party reformers. However, 
such considerations do not disturb the model of transition 
from 'mass' to 'catch-all' party that guides his analysis. 
Perhaps they should.
Jaensch (1989:41) sees the NCI, the 'most wide- 
ranging self-assessment of any party', as an important part 
of the Labor 'revolution'. Along with the 'Wran model', 
it helped set the stage for the Hawke-Keating hijack in 
the 1980s (Jaensch, 1989:159). The NCI noted the 
electoral significance of shifts, in class identification
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and Labor realists drew the appropriate inferences 
(Jaensch, 1989:159-60). 'A decision to proceed' with an 
'electoralist' strategy, whereby policies, practices and 
the platform itself would be made acceptable to 'middle- 
class', swinging voters, 'had obviously been made' by 1980 
(Jaensch, 1989:160). The turn to 'electoralism' began in 
1967 and picked up steam in the 1980s. Jaensch (1989:166-7) 
sees the smoothly managed 1988 National Conference as:
... a major step along the road begun by Whitlam, 
following the 36 faceless men episode in 1966 (sic). 
Whitlam set out to broaden the Conference base, 
specifically to grant Labor parliamentary leaders 
more representation, and to weaken the perception 
(and the reality) that the party was under the 
control of the machine. 24
In Chapter 9 we saw the ambiguities built into
Whitlam's reorganisation crusade. While emphasising
'professionalism', he also took up the theme of 'party
renewal'. The NCI explored 'party renewal' more
thoroughly. It hoped that, at least symbolically, a Mass
Conference would redress 'rank-and-file alienation'. By
1988, redressing such alienation seemed a lot less
important than avoiding 'media scenes of delegates abusing
each other, tearing up membership tickets and the like'
(Jaensch, 1989:167). We saw the NCI wrestling with the
dilemma of combining party 'manageability' with mechanisms
for 'grass-roots' revitalisation in Chapter 12. We noted
Alan Wolfe's theorisation of this sort of conflict in
terms of 'depoliticisation' versus 'legitimation' to party
activists. There are problems with Wolfe's formulation
25and his hankering for 'genuine' politics, but this
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analysis of party schizophrenia does help clarify how 
conceptions of party reform can differ.
In parties with pretensions to internal
democracy, leadership preferences for a 'depoliticised'
membership can often conflict with internal 'legitimation'
2 6projects. The NCI explored such tensions. It stressed 
'professional' presentation, but did not simply herald an 
'electoralist' approach, in the way that Jaensch suggests. 
In its own way, the NCI wanted to build Labor up as a 
'mass party'. Jaensch sees the 1988 Conference as the 
culmination of Labor's turn to 'electoralism'. Discussing 
what happened in 1988 is beyond our scope here, but 
Jaensch's highlighting of the NCI as a significant step in 
a unilinear 'electoralist' trend downplays significant 
aspects of its work. There are problems with Jaensch's 
picture of an ALP 'revolution' as an 'adaptation' to a 
changed Australian society, spurred on by a determined 
elite (including parliamentary leaders, party officials 
and NCI members). The NCI spiritedly disputed the 
proposition that Labor had to choose between its identity 
and ideology on the one hand and indiscriminately adapting 
to the electoral market on the other. It set out to 
defuse the 'silly dichotomy' between 'socialism at all 
costs' and 'selling out'/managing the status quo. Jaensch 
suggests that, encouraged by the NCI, Labor had firmly 
adopted the latter course by the 1980s.
Labor post-mortems and party change in the 
period 1977-81 raise questions for any 'strategy' model, 
not just one which assumes the NCI argued for unalloyed 
'electoralism'. Przeworski, for example, suggests post-
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mortems facilitate complicated trade-offs between identity 
maintenance and electoral imperatives. In his model, one 
could imagine a party leadership trying to overcome the 
sort of 'silly dichotomy' noted by the NCI. But what 
scope does a leadership have for settling on a 'strategy' 
in this way? We have to ask questions about the degree of 
leadership control of post-mortem processes and about the 
nature of these processes themselves. When post-mortems 
occur party leaders are likely to be on the defensive and 
the level of intra-party conflict is likely to be high. 
Secondly, post-mortem processes take place in a range of 
arenas, some temporary, some permanent. These processes 
are complicated by 'garbage can' coincidences in the 
various arenas. This makes the development of a coherent 
'strategy' difficult. Attempts at such coherent 
'strategy' can be discerned in the 'projects' different 
groupings put forward. 'Party reform' projects can be 
expected in temporary arenas exploring 'what went wrong'. 
Such projects may be linked with conflicts in other arenas 
(over new policies perhaps). 'Projects' are always 
compromised in their implementation, given the competition 
between them in a context of ambiguity. To say that a 
party is influenced by a new 'project' is not the same as 
saying that a party leadership has settled on a new 
'strategy', which redefines party discourses and practices 
in a mutually consistent and coherent manner.
Post-mortem rituals provide opportunities for 
possibilities besides the development of coherent new 
'strategies' by party leaders, who may be somewhat
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vulnerable after a defeat. Electoral defeat can lead to 
an organisational 'crisis'. Rather than providing a stage 
for 'rational diagnosis', as some 'adaptation' models 
assume, such 'crises' may lead to struggles over why the 
party has come to such a sorry state. Defeat can 
discredit a party's 'dominant coalition' (Panebianco, 
1988:246). Previously influential projects may be 
questioned as the dominant coalition's control over intra­
party communication is weakened. Insurgent elites cannot 
be held responsible for the 'crisis' and proffer their own 
recipes for resolving it (Panebianco, 1988:46 and 206-11; 
see also Ware, 1987:147; Chariot, 1989:360). Such
recipes, or new projects, can focus on party renewal as
2 7well as electoral revival. Kircheimer's suggestion 
(1969a), put forward before the formulation of his 'catch­
all' thesis, that post-mortems offer interesting 
opportunities for party gadflies and irregulars, may offer 
more purchase on post-mortem ritual dynamics than Michels’ 
brusque dismissal of the idea of expecting anything from 
special committees of inquiry.
Our case studies show examples of party leaders 
treading warily as they account for their stewardship in 
the wake of an unpleasant defeat. The NSW party officers, 
in their 1964 inquiry, wanted to retain the initiative, so 
dissentient elements would not call the tune at state 
conference (see Chapter 4A). The NCI worried about the 
'rank-and-file' getting 'a sense of participation' and 
deflecting criticisms about an appointed committee (see 
Chapter 11B). This sense of struggle, controversy and 
leadership uncertainty does not come through in images of
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post-mortems as occasions for calm deliberation on new 
strategies by party leaders.
Post-mortems are often justified instrumentally. 
The assumption is that, once 'what went wrong' is 
discovered, the party can set about rectifying its 
electoral problems. Subsequent electoral success might 
then be seen as a sign that the ritual had 'worked'. The 
case studies, however, suggest that in post-mortems 
different groupings proffer different 'solutions' to what 
they see as the party's 'problems'. Such 'problems' and 
'solutions' are often matched fairly haphazardly. 'Party 
reform' becomes enmeshed in other concerns. Looking at 
the 'problem' of recovering from electoral defeat tends to 
bring an array of (perhaps previously latent) 'problems' 
to the surface.
For 'strategy' models, post-mortems raise the 
question of intentional change within political parties.
Is change within parties explicable in terms of the 
intentions of party managers or do parties operate in a 
world of 'bounded rationality', where we have to expect 
'counter-intuitive effects' to follow formal
2 8reorganisation efforts (Panebianco, 1988:239-41)? The 
case studies show considerable disjunctures between party 
reforms in 1967 and 1981 and the preceding recommendations 
of the Wyndham and NCI reports. Proportional 
representation was gradually accepted in a series of 
discrete decisions that attempted to resolve particular 
sets of 'problems' rather than as part of a coherent 
'strategy'.
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The case studies show complex connections 
between temporary arenas, established in the course of 
post-mortem rituals, and more permanent, institutionalised 
arenas. The issues thrown up in the temporary arenas, and 
the reception of reorganisation recommendations in the 
permanent arenas, depend on various 'garbage can' 
coincidences and complications. Temporary arenas can be 
unpredictable. In 1964, the NSW officers approached the 
special post-mortem FEC meetings more circumspectly than 
the annual state conference. Within the Branch, a cycle 
of factional conflict yielded predictable manoeuvres and 
counter-manoeuvres. 'Institutionalised war-games' made 
the annual conference 'an organisational field par 
excellence' . The FEC meetings were more unusual events. 
Members were asked directly where they thought Labor had 
gone wrong. The officers left controversial proposals for 
the state conference. The dominant faction was sure of 
'the numbers' there. This kind of disjuncture between 
temporary and permanent arenas is also illustrated by the 
differences between NCI discourse on National Conference 
reform and the ways National Conference delegates 
themselves framed this question. We have also noted 
'attention vacuum' on the NCI, with key party figures 
apparently taking their committee duties rather lightly. 
Another example of 'attention vacuum' can be seen in the 
NCI submissions. Only 3 per cent of submissions came from 
affiliated unions, compared to 23 per cent from individual 
branch members and 35 per cent from 'grass-roots' party 
units (Table 1, Chapter 11). Yet it would be unwise to 
infer that affiliated unions were uninterested in the
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shape of the party structure. They could register their
views on such matters in other arenas.
The NCI worried about the decline in the
proportion of unionists in ALP-affiliated (mainly blue-
collar) unions. It recommended a task force to further
inquire into Labor/union relationships. No such task
force eventuated. In another arena, the Australian Labor
Advisory Council, significant developments were afoot.
The ALAC brought FPLP and ACTU leaders together for
29intermittent meetings. The ALP-ACTU Accord was 
negotiated in this arena, before the 1983 election. 
Arguments for trading-off money wage gains for 'social 
wage' improvements were floated in the late 1970s by
30people like Hugh Stretton and the NCI's Geoff Harcourt,
but the particular organisational and consultative
mechanisms associated with the Accord were not anticipated.
The durability and electoral benefits of the
Accord in the 1980s provided an ironic counterpoint to the
worries about Labor's union links, which beset earlier
party reformers. In the 1960s, there was a feeling that
unionism was in decline in an increasingly 'middle-class'
society. This was confounded by a growth in white-collar
unionism, especially in the public sector, from the late
311960s. Nagging doubts remained. The NCI worried that 
the growing sections of unionism were not affiliated to 
the party. By the 1980s, the ACTU encompassed many unions 
that were not affiliated with the ALP. The Accord 
consolidated a novel relationship between the ACTU and 
Labor in government. Whether unions were affiliated to
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the ALP (and some of the largest were not) seemed to 
matter little in this relationship. Party-union relations 
may well produce 'problems' in the future, but they are 
unlikely to be the particular 'problems' which preoccupied 
party reformers in the 1960s and the 1970s.
Labor's Accord approach was a consequence of
complicated processes inside and outside the party and in
the ALAC. This illustrates the disjuncture between
specific party reform arenas (in this case the NCI) and
the multifarious ways in which important 'strategic'
decisions are made by 'the party'. As the 'complex arena'
mosel suggests, 'the party' is often best seen as a set of
loosely connected arenas of struggle, held together by
certain procedures, which specify means of making
decisions. Recognition of this kind of complexity should
be incorporated into generalisations about change within 
32parties.
The intersection of different processes in 
different arenas is not completely controlled by the party 
leadership. It is difficult to explain change within 
parties in terms of shifts in 'strategy'. Party 
leaderships and insurgent groupings do promote new 
'strategies'. Such attempts or 'projects' can have 
significant effects, as they are taken up by competing 
forces in various arenas. The fate of different 
'projects' can tell us much about the state of a party. 
Chapter 1 noted three 'projects'; Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 1, put forward in the 1960s, and two rival 
versions of the 'lessons of 1975', Australian Social 
Democracy, Mark 2 and Labor Managerialism. Each project
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linked party reform to stances on economic policy and 
Labor/'new social movement' liaison. The 1977-81 debates 
touched on all these topics. The 1963-67 debates had a 
more narrowly organisational focus, but conflicts on party 
reform reached out into matters of policy and style as 
well.
In the 1960s, various groups in the ALP hoped 
the party would adopt a more contemporary 'social 
democratic' approach. Gough Whitlam championed such a 
project. As we saw in Chapter 9, Whitlam and his 
supporters found policy easier to change than party 
structure. At successive Federal Conferences from 1965 
on, Labor's platform was substantially rewritten. The 
1972 election was won on a recognisably contemporary 
'social democratic' programme. Labor also became more 
'professional' in drawing on 'expert' policy advice. The 
parliamentary leaders won places on the party's federal 
bodies, but other party reform concerns were dropped from 
the agenda with the 1967 Adelaide compromise.
Whitlam's 'project' helped reorient some Labor 
discourses and practices. Such reorientation contributed 
to electoral success in 1972. Party reform debate did not 
begin in earnest again until 1977. By then, different 
groupings in the party had digested very different 
'lessons of 1975'. Changed economic circumstances and 
Liberal success with 'small government' rhetoric damned 
further 'social democratic' public expenditure projects in 
the eyes of some, who began to see excess ideological 
baggage in the Whitlam 'programme' (Murray, 1976). In the
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post-mortem arena, those who hoped Labor could gather a 
new coalition of support, by rebuilding itself as a 
'movement' with new 'socialist' economic policies, took up 
the running. Support for such a project, which we have 
called Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, can be seen in 
many submissions to the NCI. In the temporary post-mortem 
arena, Labor Managerialism was a more shadowy entity, 
although we could note the committee's cautious approach 
to winning back support lost between 1972 and 1975. The 
way in which the NCI proposals were filtered by the 
Special Conference, trends in Labor economic policy and the 
outcome of the 'socialisation objective' debate also 
suggest some support for the Labor Managerialist approach.
While proponents of Labor Managerialism were 
generally fairly quiet in the post-mortem arena, the party 
was being reshaped in other arenas (e.g. ALAC). The 1980s 
became an era of Labor Managerialist ascendancy in ways 
that had not been anticipated. The dilemma of party 
manageability versus 'legitimation' to party activists, 
which had so preoccupied the NCI seemed to lose 
importance. Unprecedented electoral success seemed to 
make 'legitimation' in this sense dispensable. The NCI 
dilemma may yet return to haunt the ALP. Alongside Labor's 
strong discipline in the 1980s, the party's 'grassroots 
machinery', its 'traditional pride and strength' was 
progressively enfeebled (Lloyd and Swan, 1987:108-9; 
Jaensch, 1989:168). The NCI wanted to strengthen this 
machinery, through National Conference reform and a 
'community presence' in local areas. If the 'grass-roots' 
began to wither, as the party became more 'professional'
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and electorally successful, we can expect NCI ideas to re­
surface :
Old solutions do not go away but wait for new 
occasions on which they might be represented 
as answers to problems unresolved by current 
. practice (March and Olsen, 1989:134-5).
To understand change within parties, we have to understand 
this complex and ambiguous matching of 'problems' and 
'solutions'.
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CHAPTER 1
1. Dittrich (1983:266) argues that too much has been 
extrapolated from hypotheses about what 'rational' 
parties would do. We need 'to get inside the 
parties'.
2. In the earlier period, the terms Federal Conference 
and Federal Executive were used. In the 1970s,
National Conference and National Executive became 
preferred. There was an element of wishful thinking 
in the changed nomenclature: 'We changed our name to
national some years back - we have yet to change it 
in an emotional, psychological and political sense'
(Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981:197).
3. Although parliamentary representatives were added to 
the party's federal bodies in 1967, much party 
practice was left untouched (see Chapter 9C). The 
changes imposed on Victoria and NSW in 1970-71 were 
significant (see Chapter 13B). D. Stephens (1979) 
stresses the ways in which the policy committees by­
passed older party structures (see Chapter 12B).
4. 'Garbage can' theory was first presented by Cohen et 
al. (1972). Scott (1987:72-118, 134-6, 262-81) 
places 'garbage can' analysis- and related insights in 
their organisation theory context.
5. Stephens' application of 'garbage can' analysis to 
the ALP is particularly illuminating. He focussed 
mainly on the 'making' of Federal Executive 'decisions'. 
This thesis uses 'garbage can' analysis to examine 
Labor 'responses' to changing circumstances.
6. The exploration of this dilemma in Chapter 12C and 
12D relies on a modified version of Wolfe's (1977)
'depoliticisation'/'legitimation' dichotomy.
7. The NCI's response to these pressures was ambivalent.
See the discussion of 'pseudo-legitimation' in 
Chapter 12D.
8. Membership participation and voter concerns were 
treated 'ritualistically' when their acknowledgement 
was dissociated from changes in party practice.
9. Meyer and Rowan (1977) examine myth and ritual in 
modern organisations. Hindess (1971:95-110) looks at 
myth in the British Labour Party and Aronoff (1977) 
analyses ritual in the Israeli Labour Party.
Aronoff's study is ethnographically rich, but based 
on the theoretically dubious assumption that ritual 
serves as a mechanism for party 'adjustment' to 
'social change'.
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10 . Lukes derives his notion of the prevailing 
'mobilisation of bias' from Schattschneider (1960) 
and Barach and Baratz (1970). Rowley (1976) has seen 
elections, in a similar vein, as a 'political census' 
of the nation (quoted, Simms, 1982:4). See also 
Edelman, 1964 and 1971.
11. Election rituals can, Horne (1981:27) concedes, vary 
considerably, e.g. from the blandness of 1980 to the 
'cold civil war' of 1975. See also Horne, 1989:63-5.
12. Herzog applies Turner's theory of liminal rituals to 
the analysis of liberal-democratic elections. The 
term 'forest of symbols' is taken from a Turner title 
(Turner, 1967 ) .
13. Reorganisation committees often generate 'models for' 
new practices, although they may present them 
cautiously. Self (1978) suggests administrative 
reform committees 'tend to combine radical and 
critical diagnoses with relatively moderate 
prescriptions' (quoted Wilenski, 1986:173). See also 
March and Olsen, 1983). Radical diagnoses could 
generate one 'forest of symbols', moderate 
prescriptions another.
14. Hindess distinguishes 'social actors' which can do 
these things from collectivities like 'classes' and 
'society' which are often invoked by sociologists, 
but which have no identifiable means of making 
decisions, let alone acting on them. On political 
parties as 'social actors', see Hindess, 1986:115 and 
1988:5, 46, 67, 84.
15. For Rose and Mackie (1988), parties are always 
simultaneously 'extroverted' and 'introverted' 
organisations.
16. Semi-secret rather than secret in the sense that 
factional conflicts and other intra-party matters are 
not completely kept out of the media. For this 
reason, in Chapter 13C, Sartori's (1976:95-7) 
distinction between 'visible' (inter-party) and 
'invisible' (intra-party) politics is replaced by a 
distinction between 'invisible' and 'semi-visible' 
politics.
17. Janda's own photography, which uses a cross-national, 
quantitative approach, yields the fairly banal 
conclusion that 'modern' forms of 'external' socio­
economic organisation make for 'organisationally 
complex' parties. As with the early research on 
comparative welfare policies (such as Wilensky,
1975), attempts to be comprehensive in the number of 
countries studied make for uninteresting conclusions 
(see the critique of Wilensky in the more focussed 
research of Castles, 1978 and J. Stephens, 1979).
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18. This thesis mainly relies on internal ALP documents 
and press reportage for its account of the post­
mortem debates. For the 1963-67 period, much useful 
material was located in the records of the NSW 
Branch. Important sources for the 1977-81 debate 
included original submissions and other documents 
from the National Committee of Inquiry, as well as 
the transcript of the 1981 National Conference. 
Newspaper coverage of intra-ALP affairs has its 
limitations. Prevailing conceptions of a 'good 
story' lead to a focus on leaders and dramatic 
disputes. The press material does, however, help 
establish the context for the debates and 'decisions' 
recorded in the party documents. Press coverage 
often influenced these debates. The leading 
participants in the debates knew this. Senior Labor 
figures routinely deplored it, by complaining about 
'press bias'. They just as routinely fed it by 
judicious 'leaks' and general availability.
Comparison between the elite debate covered in the 
press with the 'grassroots' debate, recorded in the 
party documents, tends to confirm arguments about the 
oligarchic nature of the ALP!
19. Daalder (1983:2 and 22) suggests the absence of 
detailed empirical studies contributed to the 
emergence of sweeping generalisations like Epstein's 
'contagion from the right' and Duverger's earlier 
'contagion from the left' (with the 'mass party' of 
the socialist/'working-class' kind as the wave of the 
future.
20. These common features are worth noting at a time when 
public choice theorems prove attractive to political 
scientists as an alternative to what Barry (1978) 
calls the 'characteristically sloppy logic and flabby 
prose' of the sociologists (quoted, Dunleavy and 
Ward, 1981:351). Barry (1970) had earlier emphasised 
political science's theoretical dependence on 
economics and sociology (see also Huntington, 
1971:284; Therborn, 1975:426). Now he was 
suggesting economics alone was persuasive. The 
economic models, however, often read off the 
formulation of preferences from membership of 
particular social categories (Hindess, 1988:43, 107). 
For a good discussion of the complementarity of 
Parsonian sociology and neo-classical economics, and 
their shared neglect of organisational analysis, see 
Tomlinson, 1984:591. Simon (1947) criticised neo­
classical economics' organisational assumptions. Moe 
( 1984 ) tries to reconcile public choice theory and 
sophisticated organisational analysis.
21. To take the four key party functions listed by von 
Beyme (1985:362ff) Check-lists of party 'functions' 
can often be found in political science textbooks. 
See, e.g. Dowse and Hughes, 1972:339. For
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Australian examples see Emy, 1974:143 and Maddox, 
1985:229-36. The 'functions' of the local ALP branch 
are discussed in Crisp, 1982 and APSA, 1979).
22. Von Beyme (1985:360-2) notes the rise of the 
'critical-dialectical' school, concerned with issues 
like party 'legitimation' as an alternative to 
mainstream political science in West Germany. He 
accords their arguments respect, but concludes from 
his own empirical survey that talk of a 'party 
legitimation crisis' is>overblown (von Beyme, 
1975:372). Raschke (1983) criticises von Beyme's 
book from a ' critic.al-dialectical' perspective. This 
thesis makes use of some 'critical-dialectical' ideas 
(see the discussion of ALP 'legitimation' problems in 
Chapters 12C and 12D); but it rejects the 
assumption, which von Beyme (1985:362) attributes to 
'critical-dialectical' analysis, that parties should 
be considered 'as the organisational expression of 
classes'. This assumption seems central to Raschke's 
(1983) analysis. The 'societal guidance' that 
parties engage in (that he presents as their over­
riding 'function') serves the 'function' of 
maintaining social peace in a class-divided society. 
In other words, social democratic parties are 
criticised for failing to prepresent 'working-class' 
interests adequately.
23. As with Epstein and Duverger (see note 19), Raschke's 
formulation seems to involve the triumph of hasty 
generalisation over detailed analysis. In this 
context, Raschke's (1983:114) dismissal of single­
country case-studies, on the grounds that they 
substitute 'the persuasive power of the single 
example for the weight of complete evidence' seems 
premature. Indeed, given what little we know about 
intra-party processes, his assertion that 'internal' 
party factors can be explained in terms of 'external' 
'systematic functional imperatives' (Raschke, 
1983:110) seems shaky.
24. Interestingly, whereas the 'rational-efficient' model 
notes the limited nature of party activity and sees 
parties as rather weak social institutions (sharing 
the 'function' of interest aggregation with interest 
groups for example), the neo-Marxist account often 
seems to see parties as rather 'strong' institutions 
(doing all that 'hegemonic' work for the 'ruling 
class'). However, the Macpherson/Offe emphasis on 
the political party as social cement in a class 
society is displaced by other neo-Marxist writers 
onto a broader concern with the 'capitalist state', 
which subsumes the political parties into that 
structure. Althusser (1971) goes so far as to 
characterise conventional parties as 'Ideological 
State Apparatuses'. San Francisco Bay Area 
Kapitalistäte Group (1977:29-35) follow political 
party theorists in emphasising the way in which 'a
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smoothly functioning party system' plays its part in 
the reproduction of capitalism. They follow the 
'capitalist state' theorists by suggesting that party 
'functions' have been narrowing and lessening of 
late. Poulantzas (1978), the famous 'capitalist 
state' theorist, has some interesting things to say 
about the contribution of 'the dominant mass party'. 
Poulantzas (1978) is a more open text than Poulantzas 
(1973) and seeks to combine electoral politics with 
new forms of popular power, rather than pose a 
'revolutionary' alternative completely outside the 
'capitalist state'. Left-wing parties can play a 
part in the transition to socialism as long as they 
don't fall into the authoritarian 'dominant mass 
party' trap. By this roundabout route his analysis 
leads to similar dilemmas as Macpherson's analysis. 
For, after all he said about the supremely 
integrative and anti-participatory functions of the 
competitive political party, Macpherson (1977:112) 
tells us that in all probability the journey into the 
promised land of 'participatory democracy' will be 
made 'under the leadership of a popular front or a 
coalition of social democratic and socialist 
parties'. These parties will not wither away, at 
least for some years. Like Poulantzas, Macpherson 
simultaneously seems to acknowledge the 'complex 
arena' status of political parties, while denying the 
open-endedness that status implies, by formulating 
functionalist arguments about the essence of 
political parties residing in their contribution to 
the reproductive requirements of modern capitalism.
25. The paradoxical fondness of marxist writers for 
functionalist arguments is mulled over by Giddens, 
1981:15-22 and Turner, 1986:60-1. Its implications 
for an analysis of social democracy are taken up by 
Crouch, 1979:26-31 and Maravall, 1979:277-87.
Marxist writers have attempted to get around the 
related problem of 'class reductionism' by putting 
forward, with varying degrees of sophistication, 
concepts of the 'relative autonomy' of politics (see 
e.g. Poulantzas, 1973). These attempts to square the 
circle seem to be ultimately self-defeating (Cutler 
et al., 1977, 1978; see also Mouzelis, 1980, 1984).
26. Parsonian sociology sees convergence politics in the 
electoral marketplace as the culmination of 
'political development' and a lengthy process of 
'social change' (Almond, 1956). Panebianco (1988) 
explicitly rejects evolutionist arguments of this 
type, but there are interesting parallels between his 
discussion of the contemporary trend towards the 
'electoral-professional' party and evolutionist 
analysis.
27. Kircheimer was ambiguous on the catch-all party. He 
had his misgivings about the phenomenon (La 
Palombara, 1966:6, note 5), but he thought it was an
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inevitable consequence of the 'modern' division of 
labour, which made political representation a 
specialised activity (see also Jupp, 1968:38-9). 
Kircheimer's ambiguity has meant that some left-wing 
critics of social democracy have uncritically 
endorsed the catch-all thesis (e.g. Offe, 1982).
There are parallels between the catch-all thesis and 
Keane's (1988:106-45) characterisation of the 
'compromise party'.
28. Giddens (1981:21) wants 'to erase the notion of 
"adaptation" (or any synonym) from the vocabulary of 
the social sciences, just as thoroughly as that of 
function'. Here we could note Elster's (1979) 
distinction between organisms adapting functionally 
and people acting intentionally (Lash and Urry, 
1984:37). Ascribing intentions to 'social actors' is 
problematic (Hindess, 1988), but Elster makes 
important criticisms of functionalist notions of
'adaptation'.
29. Panebianco's analysis of the 'electoral-professional 
party' seems to discount some of his own argument 
about different patterns of institutionalisation and 
internal conflict in different parties. He makes 
some qualifications, but tends to present the 
'electoral-professional' trend as a general one, 
produced by increased rates of 'social change' and 
'social turbulence'.
30. See also Gouldner's (1957, 1958) distinction between
'local' and 'cosmopolitan' career orientations in US 
higher education. This distinction was 'potentially 
fruitful for the study of intra-organisational 
tensions and conflicts' (Gouldner, 1958:467).
Concern about 'loyalty', a key value for 'locals', 
might surface during 'outbursts of organisational 
conflicts and crises' (Gouldner, 1957:208).
31. Wright (1971) lists both Downs and Schumpeter as 
theorists of the 'rational-efficient' party 
responding to the market signals provided by voter 
preferences. Downs presented a perfect competition 
model, but Schumpeter (1987) emphasised the 
oligopolistic nature of the electoral marketplace. 
This meant parties did not simply reflect voter 
preferences (Macpherson, 1977:91; Ware, 1979:34; 
Dunleavy and Ward, 1981:356-7; Miller, 1983:141-6).
32. Weick (1985) suggests that, in many organisations, 
'managerial rationality' emerges in practice as 
currently dominant coalitions surf on the waves of 
events and decisions rather than from any grand 
strategy. See also Greenwood, 1984. In this 
context, formal reorganisation efforts offer 
researchers interesting intra-organisational 
'natural experiments' (see Starbuck and Nystrom, 
1981:xviii).
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33. Schumpeter provides a better guide than Downs, but 
pays little attention to how supplier 'strategies' 
are formed.
34. After quoting Gramsci's observation that "the 
counting of votes is the final ceremony of a long 
process", Przeworski and Sprague (1986:7) note the 
multiplicity of actors involved in forging collective 
identities and defining terms of political debate - 
political parties, churches, armies, newspapers, etc. 
The implications of this insight are ignored when 
Przeworski and Sprague privilege the role of 
political parties and the question of whether they 
represent 'class' interests. For comments on the 
range of social forces involved in the electoral 
arena, see Hindess, 1983:76 and 139-40.
35. In the end Przeworski is only interested in the 
formation of 'working-class' identity. 'Non-class' 
identities are seen as 'bourgeois' by definition.
See L. Johnston, 1986:107.
36. For a general discussion of the problems involved in 
the theorisation of 'social change', see A. Smith, 
1973 .
37. Thus Gustafson (1976:46) acknowledges the 'complex' 
and 'dynamic' nature of the New Zealand Labour Party, 
but sees change within it 'organically' generated
by 'social change'.
38. 'Social conditions' in this sense involve the 
'complex intersection of a variety of specific 
practices' (Hindess, 1986:120). They have no overall 
unifying principle or centre.
39. Menzies, nicknamed 'Ming', retired in 1966. Holt 
continued his Cold War Liberal approach, winning the 
1966 election very easily. By 1969, the old formula 
had become shaky.
40. These articulations are even more complex for a 
party in government, when Cabinet is at the 
centre of the 'capitalist state' and the centre 
of the party. Rose (1964) suggests we should 
distinguish between (a) party qua government or 
opposition; (b) party qua organisation; and (c) 
party qua set of 'policy parties' (i.e. factions, 
tendencies). Articulations between different
party arenas go along a continuum from participatory/ 
democratic to managerial/authoritarian. Cabinet's 
role may make for a more managerial/authoritarian 
pattern, as well as a more complex one, although 
it would be defeatist to argue intra-party 
democracy is only possible in opposition.
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41. See also Higley et al., 1979:149). The 
proposition has literally acquired textbook 
status (e.g. Woodward, 1985:163).
42. Jaensch (1989:20, 126, 157) specifically draws on 
Kircheimer. Jaensch's time-frame (1967-88) 
partly overlaps with mine. His 'revolution' 
thesis provides one grid for reading the debates 
analysed in the case studies. How useful a grid 
will be examined in Chapter 16.
43. Ware (1985:8) notes that in American political 
science, an inappropriate concern with 
quantification in the study of political parties 
has sometimes meant that 'trivial research' has 
been pursued 'at the expense of more interesting 
subjects'. More seriously, intra-party processes 
which are not easily amenable to quantitative 
analysis have simply been neglected. See Kertzler, 
1988:7.
44. See also Don Aitkin, 'The Subtle Problems That 
Labor's Experts Have Missed', National Times, 17 
June 1978.
45. See Emy, 1978:625; Maddox, 1978:203; Plowman et 
al., 1980:207.
46. See also Kemp, 1978:xviii.
47. For Jaensch (1989:91), 1967 was 'a turning point' in 
Labor's shedding of 'not only socialism, but ideology 
itself' as well as an organisational watershed.
48. Professional research in sociology and political
science was establishing itself in Australian 
academia at this time (Alomes, 1980). One reason for 
the assumption that the incorporation of social 
scientific knowledge would lead to 'convergence' 
politics was the pervasive 'orthodox consensus' 
(Giddens, 1987:54-9; 184-91) which spanned the
prevailing forms of Keynesian economics, Parsonian 
sociology and the dominant paradigms in political 
science. On the 'convergence thesis', see Head and 
Patience, 1979; Head, 1985.
49. Pre-professional 'intimate'/oral' politics held sway 
in 'the 1930s' which could be 'seen elastically as 
running, say, from the mid-twenties to the coal 
strike in 1947' (Davies, 1958:150).
50. See the comments on the politics of sectional 
pressures in Jupp, 1961.
51. There were disputes as to whether this 'de- 
radicalisation' was a consequence of 'modernisation' 
or the logic of political competition (F. Parkin,
1972:98ff).
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52. See also Brugger and Jaensch, 1985, Chs 1 and 2;
Rowse, 1978; Melville, 1986.
53. McQueen (1972:357-8) notes the distance between Labor 
racism and 'social democracy'. Connell (1987:177) 
sees 'social democracy' as a category specific to the 
culture and politics of north-western Europe, with 
little application to Australia.
54. The peculiarities of Australian Laborism are further 
explored in Castles, 1988.
55. This dilemma provided a focal point for German social
democratic debate at the turn of the century 
(Lichteim, 1970:283; see also Bernstein, 1961; Gay, 
1952; Salvadori, 1979). 'Revisionists' and 
'fundamentalists' have constantly argued in social 
democratic parties (J. Stephens, 1979: Ch 3; Warde,
1982:10-11 and 197; Hindess, 1983:Ch 3; Lichbach, 
1984 ) .
56. For good overviews of this debate, see Kesselman,
1982 and Shalev, 1983.
57. The same game goes on in the international 
literature. Maravall (1979) attempts to distinguish 
(potentially transitional) 'parliamentary socialism' 
from (incorporated) 'social democracy'.
58. Constitutional difficulties and federal complications 
meant Whitlam had to pay great attention to the means 
of implementing these policies (e.g. by extensive use 
of tied grants to the states, as allowed in Section 
96 of the Australian Constitution).
59. See also Connell and Irving, 1980:305. The Whitlam 
approach had 'a cosmopolitan dimension by Australian 
standards', a 'European ambience' (Beilharz,
1986a:211. See also Beilharz, 1986b).
60. Maddox's (1989) thesis that the shattering of Labor's 
psyche by the 1975 crisis explains the party's 
subsequent rush into consensus politics ignores the 
diversity of 'lessons of 1975' that were drawn within 
the ALP. For an earlier argument similar to 
Maddox's, see Anne Summers, 'Behind the Bravado Lurks 
the Spectre of 1975', Australian Financial Review, 7 
October 1983.
61. Change within complex organisations more often takes 
place in this way rather than as a result of explicit 
'reorganisation' debates (see Lindblom, 1959). The 
new Labor Managerialism was not often spelled out in 
the debates, but it came to dominate the reorientation 
of Labor practices (see Kelly, 1984; Mills, 1986).
62. See B. Hughes, 1980; Robinson, 1987.
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63. See L. Johnston, 1986:13-4. In Australia, there are 
many references to 'managerialism' in discussions of 
public service reform in the 1980s (e.g. Yeatman,
1986; Wilenski, 1988).
64. See Keane, 1984:2-3 and 14ff.
65. More recently, Head (1989:487 and 492) has referred 
to a 'new managerial' style of Laborpolitics 
involving the sophisticated marketing of policies and 
a rhetoric of fiscal responsibility and efficient 
management, the origins of which he locates in the 
late 1960s.
66. At this time, many social democratic parties were
torn between pressures for economic responsibility in 
a changed climate and pressures for membership 
participation and liaison with 'new social 
movements'. See Wolinetz, 1988:306-10; 315-6. This
dilemma will be explored in Chapter 10B and generally 
in the NCI case study.
67. Thus there are problems with Gerritsen's (1986) 
argument that the consolidation of a 'strategic 
elite' in the early 1980s enabled Labor to transcend 
the 'garbage can' decision-making processes of the 
Whitlam era, with its Caucus revolts and its 
undisciplined prima donnas. This suggests 'garbage 
can' theory only applies to mismanaged organisations. 
However, 'garbage can' decision-making is an 
analytical category, not a term of abuse. It is 
inherent in a 'complex arena' like the ALP. There 
are, of course, many kinds of dispersed, 'garbage 
can' decision-making processes.
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CHAPTER 2
1. Vietnam and Whitlam's leadership were not issues in the 
early 60s, but the general relationship between 
organisational disputes and left/right clashes is worth 
noting.
2. The ALP at this time was a strictly federal organisation. 
Each state had two Federal Executive delegates and six 
Federal Conference delegates. In practice, the state 
Branches had substantial autonomy. Much of their 
attention was focussed on state rather than federal 
politics. In his famous 1957 Chifley Memorial lecture at 
Melbourne University, Gough Whitlam suggested that this 
states 1 rights approach had conservative implications in 
the ALP, which mirrored its effects in Australian society 
generally. It protected vested interests associated with 
the disposal of state government patronage at the expense 
of broader Labor aims (Whitlam, 1957:14).
3. The 'Technocratic Laborist1 thesis argued older Labor 
concerns with 'socialisation' and 'egalitarianism' were 
being replaced by a new emphasis on 'economic planning' 
and 'meritocracy' in the 1960s. Although this might be 
taken to imply nostalgia for 'paleo-Laborist' principles, 
the proponents of the 'Technocratic Laborism' thesis (e.g. 
Rowley, 1972; Catley and McFarlane, 1974) thought Labor 
had never been the hypothetical 'working-class',
'socialist' party of their dreams. Thus the 'Technocratic 
Laborism' thesis could be re-stated in Poulantzasian terms 
as an argument that Labor had shifted from being a party 
dominated by 'old petty bourgeois' concerns to one in 
thrall to 'new petty bourgeois' ideology (see Poulantzas, 
1974 ) .
4. Where Whitlam (1957) noted the constitutional obstacles to 
Labor's aspirations, Whitlam (1965a), a Curtin Memorial 
Lecture, put forward suggestions for 'Socialism within the 
Australian Constitution' (Evans, 1980:28), although this 
involved a redefinition of Labor 'socialism' along lines 
that the 'Technocratic Laborist' thesis would suggest.
5. See 'Labor Expected to Choose Mr Calwell', Age, 7 March 
1960; Calwell, 1978:221.
6. See, e.g. Lloyd Ross, 'Labor Should End Economic 
Confusion', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1955.
7. As his father, R.S. Ross, had been.
8. On the 'Groupers', see Rawson, 1966a, Chapter 6.
9. He had earlier trodden on some toes, when his 1956 Chifley 
Memorial Lecture (Arndt, 1956) called on Labor to drop its 
'socialisation objective'. See 'Labor Told to "Drop Old 
Socialist Aim"', Age, 28 July 1956; 'Labor Urged to New 
Thinking on Policies', Mercury, 4 August 1956.
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10. In the sense argued by Bell, 1960 and Lipset, 1960. They 
theorised what was a common assumption in political debate 
at this time.
11. See ’Labor Call for More Trade Unionist MPs’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 March 1963; Calwell, 1963:44; Rawson, 
1966a:33; Chris Anderson, 'Calwell's Story: 50 Years in 
the ALP', Sun Herald, 12 December 1971.
12. Earlier that year, Harry Jensen, Labor Lord Mayor of 
Sydney, sent a submission to the NSW executive ('Economic 
and Social Research within the Australian Labor Party') 
calling for better organisation and research (NSW ALP 
Records, ML Mss 2083/452/1170). Jensen noted that 
television, which had arrived in Australia in time for the 
1956 (Melbourne) Olympics, posed new campaigning challenges 
for Labor. His memorandum was referred on to an 
apparently bemused Federal Executive, which in turn sent 
it, in August 1958, to the federal publicity committee
(D. Stephens, 1979:31). The federal elections were held 
on 22 November.
13. See 'Plan for Federal ALP Secretariat', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 January 1959. Ormonde was a prominent 'anti- 
Grouper' Catholic who won a place on the partly 
reconstructed NSW executive after the Split (see Murray, 
1970:122-3).
14. WA Branch secretary, 'Joe' Chamberlain's attitude was seen 
by observers as a key factor in whether the Secretariat 
would go ahead. As Federal President, he was a key player 
in Labor 'machine' politics.
15. In Canberra.
16. Jack Schmella, the Queensland secretary, who had been 
part-time Federal Secretary since June 1954, died on 
18 July 1960.
17. In Melbourne.
18. Much of Wheelwright's argument was built around 
comparisons between the ALP and the British Labour Party, 
emphasising the relative wealth of the British Labour 
Party, and, particularly, the degree of central control 
over that wealth. Wheelwright argued that excessive 
internal federalism made the ALP organisationally 
inefficient. More generally, Wheelwright (1974:242) 
believed Labor made insufficient use of policy
'expertise'.
19. The response to the Wilson Inquiry in Britain was half­
hearted. Many who supported 'revisionist' policy 
prescriptions 'were opposed in principle to the use of 
mass advertising techniques' and obsessive about keeping 
'a careful watch on party funds' (Howell, 1976:218. On 
the latter, see also Drucker, 1979:15-6).
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20. This meeting was held in Melbourne. The plan involved 
reduced contributions from Victoria and WA, and an 
increased contribution from Queensland (where there had 
been an increase in membership).
21. Research facilities and access to federal parliament were 
seen as out-weighing Canberra's 'removal from ordinary 
political life' and its 'undesirable public service 
atmosphere'. Liaison with Labor's Sydney-based PR firm 
would be easy and the interstate tensions that a Melbourne 
or Sydney location could provoke would be avoided.
22. See, e.g. 'ALP Executive Will Avoid Action on Victorian 
Labor Leaders', Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1962;
'Why Labor Will Not Grasp the Victorian Nettle', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 16 January 1962. Pressure for 
intervention had built up because Labor's near-victory in 
the 1961 federal election was marred by a poor performance 
in Victoria (see Mathews, 1986:114).
23. Melbourne, July 1962.
24. See 'ALP to Set up Permanent Secretariat', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 3 July 1962 and ALP, 1963:96.
25. See, e.g. 'The ALP Secretariat', Sydney Morning Herald,
6 July 1962.
26. This was ratified by the 1963 Federal Conference (ALP,
1963 :10) .
27. Ormonde hoped the committee would reach out to sections of 
the community not normally seen as pro-Labor. He also 
said the committee would collate material from Labor 
canvassers and rally 'idle talent' in the Labor movement 
to organise surveys.
28. They were Don Rawson, Max Poulter, Clyde Holding, Ian 
Wilson and Creighton Burns. Some of these had studied 
party campaigns in particular electorates. See Rawson and 
Holtzinger, 1958; Wilson, nd and Burns, 1961. Poulter 
was a Brisbane academic and Holding a Melbourne solicitor 
(who went on to have a long career in state and federal 
parliaments).
29. Fitzpatrick was a maverick left-wing intellectual. He had 
been a member of the ALP between 1942 and 1944, when 
critical comments about 'Catholic-Tammany' leaders of the 
Victorian Branch led to his expulsion (Watson, 1979:257). 
He argued they had sabotaged Labor's campaign in the 
referendum on extending Commonwealth powers. With the 
Split in 1954-55, many of Fitzpatrick's former antagonists 
joined the DLP. Fitzpatrick's first Newsletter appeared 
in August 1958, devoted entirely to 'Lessons of the 
Victorian Legislative Assembly Elections'.
30. See Chamberlain statement, 26 November 1960, NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/455 1184.
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31. This makes one wonder whether the reorganisation 
Fitzpatrick called for was electorally necessary, whatever 
its desirability on other grounds.
32. To this end, the NOC recommended discarding various 
'clogging' membership restrictions and , initiating 
provision for associate membership ('Opposition to ALP 
Facelift', Mercury, 13 April 1961).
33. Even though NOC member Ormonde had been a prominent 
participant in that debate.
34. See the discussion of Wyndham's arguments in Chapter 
7A-C.
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CHAPTER 3
1. For an earlier example see ' Calwell Tells Labor Not to 
Bicker', West Australian, 12 February 1959. For a general 
survey of the post-mortem mood induced by the November 
1963 loss, see C. Burns, 1964.
2. Calwell's book was written after the near-miss in 1961, at 
a time when he thought he would be Australia's next Prime 
Minister. It was 'ghosted' by Graham Freudenberg (see 
McQueen, 1974:110).
3. Senator James Ormonde argued the term 'faceless men' had 
been invented by a professional journalist whose job it 
was to wreck Labor (CPD, Vol S25:94).
4. The advertisement in the Bulletin asked voters to remember 
the night 'when Labor "leader" Calwell waited for hours in 
the street to receive his orders'. Menzies conjured up a 
picture of what the 'faceless men' might do to Australia; 
leaving its alliances broken and export industries ruined 
(Hughes, 1964b:100). 'National security through 
alliances' would be abandoned for 'a species of impotent 
isolation'; 'steady growth' for 'a spectacular decline'.
5. As well as 'filthy and scandalous' DLP advertisements, 
Calwell mentioned anti-Labor indoctrination in church 
schools and argued the assassination of US President 
Kennedy, while the Australian election campaign was in 
process, had damaged Labor 'especially among women voters' 
(Hughes, 1964b:104).
6. See also '"Stronghold of Labor's Enemies": Leader Attacks 
Extremists', Age, 2 March 1964.
7. For a colourful version of the argument that 'affluence' 
had rendered ALP attitudes out-of-date see Alan Reid, 
'Beaten ALP is Living in the Past', Sunday Telegraph, 8 
December 1963. Reid argued the proletarian possessing 
nothing but his labour was becoming as rare as the 
Tasmanian marsupial tiger. Homes, cars, furniture, 
washing machines and televisions were as valuable to their 
owners 'as the steel furnaces are to BHP'.
8. See Rawson, 1966a:71.
9. In Townsville. These conventions were held triennially. 
Thus this was the first one since 30 November 1963.
10. State president R.W. Holt, new secretary Bill Hartley and 
T. Doyle. The other members were Xavier Connor (lawyer 
and Catholic Worker contributor), Val Doube (former state 
parliamentarian), R. White (candidate against Menzies in 
Kooyong) and E. Scott (full-time campaign organiser in 
marginal Maribyrnong).
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11. The Australian Financial Review added that Holt,
Doube and Scott had all worked in marginal seats 
where Labor had lost ground.
12. The article in the WA Labor paper was based on 
Hartley's first broadcast on 3KZ 'Labor Hour'.
13. See also 'The ALP Under Fire', Western Sun, May 1964.
14. State Branch president V.S.C. Williams wanted an 
'all-out membership drive' aimed at 'the young 
people, the ladies and the New Australians'.
15. Section 92 had been crucial in the High Court 
rejection of Chifiey's bank nationalisation 
legislation. On the Section 92 problem see Whitlam, 
1957 and 1965a.
16. At the declaration of the poll in his Hindmarsh 
electorate, Cameron suggested the Kennedy 
assassination was as much a boon for the DLP as the 
Reichstag fire had been for the Nazis in Germany in 
1933 ('DLP Alternative Not the Solution', Western 
Sun, February 1964). At his Yarra declaration, Jim 
Cairns said the election had been determined by fear, 
especially 'the vague fear of superstitious and 
impractical people ... easy victims to the "big lie'' 
(quoted, 'The Great Debate', Tribune, 18 December 
1963). Calwell was another who invoked the Kennedy 
assassination/DLP propaganda/fear of Communism 
'explanation' for Labor's woes (see note 5).
17. All among the supposedly 'facelessmen'. There were 
only six other parliamentarians at the Special 
Conference (three WA state parliamentarians and one 
federal and one state representative from Tasmania).
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CHAPTER 4
1. NSW Labor had held state government since 1941, making it 
the most successful Branch at this time. The poor federal 
result in NSW in 1963, however, signalled a change in its 
fortunes. It lost the NSW election in 1965.
2. Joint tickets between ALP members and members of 
another party, usually the Communist Party, in union 
ballots.
3. It had, however, welcomed his defeat of a Communist 
opponent to get his union position (to succeed Communist 
Jim Healy).
4. Fitzgibbon warned those 'from both extremes of thought' in 
the party who showed signs 'of wanting to use the election 
result to service their own desires'. He called for party 
unity, playing his part in the post-mortem ritual.
5. Both fed into the Whitlam/Calwell conflict. See Oakes, 
1974:18-9.
6. Haylen was a key figure in the NSW left, but his self- 
proclaimed 'radicalism' had serious limitations. See 
McGregor, 1966:196 and 365; Horne, 1967:181-2 and 
McQueen, 1972:356, note 11.
7. Colbourne was reported as referring to a meeting, attended 
by an interstate parliamentarian, calling for the 
destruction of the NSW Executive.
8. See, e.g. John Garland, 'Editor's Notes', AEU Monthly 
Review, April 1964.
9. In this analysis, the Sydney Morning Herald was seen as a 
front for this group which was said to include the Bank of 
NSW, CSR, AMP, Breweries, Herald Sun and others 
dissatisfied with Menzies' preference for Collins House 
(Melbourne) and heavy industry (see also 'Attempt to 
Hoodwink ALP Members', Tribune, 22 January 1964).
10. This was a shorthand term for 'head office' or the 
dominant faction in the NSW ALP. The NSW ALP office was 
located in Room 32 of the Labor Council building.
11. On which see Cooksey, 1976; Rawson, 1954: Chs 6-7.
12. See also J.T. Lang, 'Labor's Futile Post-Mortem',
20 February 1964.
13. He expressed his preference for a British-style first- 
past-the-post system.
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14 . The federal officers seemed to assume that they would be 
treated as 'clay pigeons' by the capitalist press whatever 
they did. Reid was often the journalist who broke ALP 
stories and he took considerable interest in the NSW post­
mortem. Rawson (1961:106) noted the Daily Telegraph's 
unswervingly Liberal orientation. For that paper 'Reid 
specialised in "insider" stories, usually of events within 
the ALP, which were always plausible and very frequently 
confirmed by events' (Rawson, 1961:110). Reid had been an 
ALP member, but, in 1957, the NSW executive directed 
Canberra South branch not to renew his ticket. Murray 
(1970:178) describes Reid as a 'well-informed, though at 
times melodramatic' writer. Within the ALP, the original 
'faceless men' story was seen as a classic Reid exercise.
15. Rawson and Holtzinger (1958:54) referred to the ALP FEC in 
the electorate they studied as 'an organisational dead-end'.
16. Their favourite son Senator Armstrong was relegated to the 
unwinnable fourth position behind two relatively unknown 
candidates supported by the left, Lionel Murphy and Doug 
McClelland (Campbell, 1960:237).
17. The other one was Hume. The remaining five losses were to 
the Liberals in Sydney (Evans, Mitchell, Parkes, Phillip,St. George).
18. In Coffs Harbour on Sunday, 15 December 1963.
19. Cowper FEC warned ALP politicians against 'ill-considered 
and hasty statements' which caused them to be branded as 
'extremists' ('Pressure for ALP Reform', Daily Telegraph,
16 December 1963).
20. Macquarie MHR Tony Luchetti and defeated Mitchell MHR John 
Armitage were both aligned with the dominant faction.
21. Monday,*20 January 1964.
22. Shortland MHR Charlie Griffiths expressed support for 
FPLP representation on federal bodies.
23. Clearly Parkes FEC was more worried by the 'faceless men' 
taunt than Haylen himself had been.
24. Ironically, Dixson's analysis of voting patterns in the 
stratified Parkes electorate found a uniform swing 
against Labor.
25. In line with the views of local MHR Allan Fraser (1964:16). 
He thought Federal Conference should meet annually in public 
and have at least 300 delegates (including direct FEC 
representatives).
26. Hughes FEC complained that Labor left its financial policy 
unexplained and did not put enough emphasis on countering 
'the growth of big business, monopolies and combines'.
Taxes on capital gains, undistributed profits, mergers
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etc. could have been pushed. Hughes FEC presented 
'socialism' in populist 'tax the wealthy' terms. 
Neighbouring Cunningham FEC agreed, complaining that 
Labor's criticisms of the monopolies such as BHP, which 
dominated the Cunningham electorate, were not aired 
adequately during the campaign ('Labor Bodies Rebuff Plan 
of Rightists', Tribune, 12 February 1964). Reid FEC
endorsed local MHR Tom Uren's view 'that the ALP must 
remain a radical party not afraid to espouse its socialist 
objective'. On the other hand, Parkes FEC, generally 
aligned with the left, argued that Labor's November 1963 
policy was 'financially impossible without sky high 
taxation' (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).
27. He was executive delegate to seven FEC meetings (NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). The only other 
person scheduled to attend more than two meetings was 
country organiser Don Sullivan (down for four meetings).
28. In the event, Mulvihill was duly preselected and got 
elected to the Senate in 1964. The preselection ballot, 
however, again confounded the officers and upset their 
careful plans. Les Haylen squeezed out their preferred 
candidate (Senator Arnold) for the potentially winnable 
third place on the Labor ticket (Patrick Nilon, 'Haylen 
the "Has-Been” is Back in Triumph', Australian, 28 July 
1964). As it turned out, only the first two on the Labor 
ticket (Ormonde and Mulvihill) were successful in the 1964 
half-Senate election.
29. The officers did not seek endorsement for such a blitz 
from the FECs. They were wary of stirring factional 
discord in the post-mortem arena (see 'Blitz on Reds,
Split Fear', Sun-Herald, 19 January 1964).
30. On 19 January.
31. Wagga Wagga, the major provincial city in the Farrer 
electorate, had been one of the few places in NSW where 
the DLP Split had bitten into the ALP (see Murray, 
1970:340). Wagga Wagga branch had to be re-formed in 
1956. A circular from NSW Branch assistant secretary 
Mulvihill referred to 'the insistent political warfare' 
that had become 'a feature of Party activity in the 
Riverina' at that time (ALP NSW Branch Records, Ml Mss 
2083/450/1171. Circular 56/20).
32. See also 'Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial 
Labor, February 1964. In a letter to Mulvihill, Mackellar 
FEC delegate Jack Wishart asked whether it was an offence 
against ALP rules 'to give an interview to Tribune giving 
details of a ruling by Executive officers ..'(NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).
33. Bennelong was another deadlocked FEC (Tribune, 12 February 
1964 ) .
34. e.g. Cowper and Mitchell.
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35. The main focus of complaint was a decision increasing 
taxation on private motorists.
36. Who saw the Whitlam document as evidence of gross 
disloyalty on his deputy's part (Calwell, 1978).
37. See note 2, Chapter 2.
38. This was the major concern of Whitlam's colleague Eli 
Harrison MHR who complained that parliamentarians were 
being reduced to 'robots' in the party, a situation that 
would not be really changed by adding six of them to 
Federal Conference (quoted, Alan Reid, 'What Must Happen 
at the June Conference', Bulletin, 6 June 1964). He 
clearly felt frustrated, suggesting that policy should be 
formulated by the state executives rather than by Federal 
Conference. This would hardly have got around the 
difficulties in FPLP/'machine' relations.
39. This would have involved radical changes in internal ALP 
workings, yet Isaacs did not seriously canvass its merits.
40. Isaacs (1964:14) suggested Labor should accept that 
nationalisation was blocked by Section 92 of the 
Constitution and explore the possibilities contained in 
Section 96, authorising tied federal grants to the 
states, an argument pioneered by Whitlam (1965). The 
topic was not mentioned in Whitlam's report. The 
deputy leader's contribution was considerably more 
focussed than the North Sydney candidate's.
41. Left-wing unions were more likely to produce their own 
election leaflets. Some left-wing unions were involved in 
Communist Party 'Menzies Out' campaigns. The NSW officers 
shared Whitlam's concerns about unsupervised and 
unofficial union activity (Officers' Report, NSW ALP 
Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).
42. However, we could note that Alan Reid presented Isaacs' 
report under the heading 'Revealed Streak of 
Irresponsibility - ALP Man Attacks Calwell' (Daily 
Telegraph, 28 April 1964). In general, there was not much 
criticism of Calwell in the post-mortem. Richmond and 
Parkes FECs mentioned his unfortunate remarks on the 
electoral system (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/ 
397/1016). Mitchell FEC noted his poor television image 
and Parkes FEC also suggested that he erred in making his 
policy speech before Menzies, which at the time was taken 
as an index of Labor confidence.
43. See also 'Facing the "Faceless Men"', Age, 15 April 1964;
'The Winds of Change in the Labor Party', West 
Australian, 21 April 1964.
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CHAPTER 5
1- The motion instructing Colbourne not to make a press
statement was moved by Australian Journalists' Association 
president, George Godfrey.
2. Oliver, Colbourne, Mulvihill and vice-presidents Jim 
Bale and Fred Bowen.
3. Recommendation 1 suggested an interim arrangement pending 
adoption of Recommendation 2.
4. Socialist and Industrial Labor later signalled NSW left 
willingness to accept FPLP Conference representation, 
provided federal unions and FECs were accepted as well ('The 36 Faceless Men', April 1964).
5. See also 'The Splitting Role of the Daily Press', same issue.
6. The proposals mentioned included calls for an 'anti- 
monopoly' programme linking ALP economic policy to its 
'socialisation objective'. L. Aarons (1964:41-9) sketches 
out a CPA view of what such an 'anti-monopoly' programme 
should contain. This was in a pamphlet produced in February 
1964 1 as a contribution to the keen discussion which has 
arisen following the 1963 Federal Elections on the way 
forward for the labour movement' (L. Aarons, 1964:9).
7. Parliamentarians would also now be permitted to become 
Federal Executive delegates.
8. Harking back to Chamberlain's contentious 'state aid' 
visit to Sydney.
9. Reid described the fist fight as 'a wild outbreak ... 
between rival factions'. The brawl, involving about 
twelve people, involved delegates from the building trade 
group of unions (Courier-Mail, 16 June 1964).
10. 'Tempers started to mount ...' at this point. On the debate 
see also 'New Rightwing Attack on Union Unity', Tribune, 17 
June 1964; 'State ALP Plan to Combat Reds in Union 
Ballots', Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 1964; Alan Reid, 
'ALP: It's Really Two Parties', Sundav Telegraph, 21 June 
1964 .
11. Oliver's speech was characterised by judicious quotation 
from Whitlam's post-mortem report.
12. Oliver suggested the 'middle-classing' of Australian society 
was a consequence of reformist legislation by wartime 
federal Labor governments. On this Labor myth see Howe and 
Howe, 1984:159.
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13. Oliver had canvassed these themes at the NSW ALP Women's 
Diamond Jubilee conference the weekend after the official 
post-mortem recommendations were released ('Attack on "Out 
of Date" ALP', Sunday Telegraph, 23 February 1964). His 
views were endorsed by NSW Labor Women President, Edna 
Roper.
14. Committee members were Chamberlain, Branch president Colin 
Jamieson MLA, Ron Davies MLA, J.M. Berinson and J.M. 
Wheeldon. Wheeldon had been an advocate of greater local 
branch input (Mitchell, 1983:178). The committee received 
forty suggestions from fifteen party units (including calls 
for more opinion polling and an age limit for candidates).
15. In WA itself the committee saw little prospect of Labor 
improving on its three (out of nine) House of 
Representatives seats. In WA Labor won 39.2 percent of 
House of Representatives first preference votes, compared 
to 47.6 percent in NSW. Labor lost seven seats in NSW, 
none in WA. See Table 1, Chapter 4. Different Branches 
had different electoral expectations.
16. Charging him with granting endorsement to a federal 
candidate with insufficient membership continuity and 
arranging electoral co-operation with the Country Party. 
Chamberlain's earlier nomination for Senate preselection 
had proved controversial. So he withdrew, on the grounds 
that opposing the sitting Senator was being represented as 
a breach of party tradition. The two charges brought 
against Chamberlain were completely dismissed by the WA 
executive.
17. The essay's characteristic Chamberlain title was 'Labor: 
Principles or Expediency?'.
18. Chamberlain was addressing the Political Science Club at 
the University of WA, giving his response to post-November 
1963 party reform suggestions.
19. Without clear distinctions between Labor and Liberal, 
Australian parliamentary democracy was vulnerable to 
Communist threat, he thought. His hostility to the press 
was long-lasting. He told the 1959 Victorian conference 
that Labor's critics wanted the party to embrace the 
conservative attitudes of those who controlled the media. 
If they fell out with Menzies, they could then feel secure 
in supporting 'a conservative Labor Party, led by some 
person who is prepared to rat upon the party which gave 
him political recognition combined with personal profit' 
(Chamberlain, 1964:35). In 1962, he asked what attention 
was being given to the drugging of the mind by the 
Australian press ('The Press and the Double Standard', 
Western Sun, September 1962).
20. In a letter to the Western Sun branch member Ian Hills 
warned that it would be fatal for Labor to be stampeded 
into a flurry of witch-hunting (December 1963).
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21. As a former state and federal parliamentarian, he saw no 
reason to expect superior wisdom from MPs.
22. Those on the ticket included John Button, Xavier Connor, 
Gil Hayes (Boot Trades), Barney Williams, Barry Jones,
Dick McGarvie and R. White as well as Mick Jordan. Connor 
and White had been members of the official Victorian post­
mortem committee (see note 10, Chapter 3).
23. The Australian described the Jordan group as a coalition 
of unionists close to the ACTU leadership and 'branch 
intellectuals' ('Fight Over ALP Lead', 15 July 1964. See 
also 'Labor Heads for a Major Showdown', 16 July 1964).
24. Holt argued Labor should accept 'the wholesome clash of 
"left" and "right"', as long as it remained within 'the 
bounds of legitimate compromise'.
25. See Chapters 6A and 8C.
26. Jones was a Fuel and Fodder Union conference delegate. 
Credentialled branch members filled out many union 
delegations. This was a common practice (see Rawson,
1966a:21, note 1) .
27. Although when three places were made available for branch 
representatives on the executive, they were easily won by 
supporters of the ruling faction. The practice of 
autonomous SEC representation had hardly been established, 
when it was abolished. Thus there was only one such 
election (in 1965). See Chapter 7D.
28. Traditionally, enrolled affiliated unionists, as well as 
branch members, had been allowed to vote in Victorian 
preselection ballots. Executive preselection was, 
initially, an 'emergency' expedient. It was not formally 
regularised until an investigatory committee's report was 
received in 1960 (Allan, 1980:92). The token local 
representatives were added then.
29. Jones angered left delegates by arguing the Victorian 
press gave Labor a 'fair go', while Fact avoided 
controversy ('Barry Jones Upsets Vic ALP Talks', Sunday 
Mail, 26 July 1964 ) .
30. Although see Carol Wilder, 'Parliament Needs the Influence 
and Ideas of Women', Fact, 20 February 1964 and Julie 
Dahlitz, 'Victorian MPs are All Men', Fact, 16 April 
1964). Jones' concern that Labor should simultaneously 
appeal to 'middle class' voters and women was echoed in a 
letter to Fact (16 November 1964) from 'a professionally 
employed woman'. She argued that swinging voters should 
be reassured they were not losing status by supporting 
Labor. Perhaps the party should change its name and call 
itself the Democratic Party? It was losing touch with the 
generation that 'despite Beatlemania' was breaking away 
from old Australian habits and embracing new tastes in 
dress, music, drinking, eating and reading. Perhaps Labor
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should have 'an elite corps' like the Young Liberals.
More women were entering the paid workforce. This 
'encouraged them to be individuals in their own thinking 
rather than echoes of their men' (see also the reply from 
another professional woman, 'Labor's Image is Defended',
14 December 1964-) .
31. Although Jones did call on the party to develop closer 
relations with organisations such as the Association of 
Professional and Salaried Workers, the Victorian Teachers' 
Union and the Victorian Secondary Teachers' Association.
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CHAPTER 6
1. Canberra, 4-7 August 1964.
2. The Executive had a wide and varied agenda to consider. 
Calwell was congratulated on his Order of St. Gregory the 
Great Award, the NSW Branch was thanked for its 
contribution to the Federal Secretariat fund, Branches 
were asked to be more diligent about press leakages and 
NSW 'state aid' proposals were considered (NSW ALP Branch 
Records, ML Mss 2083/459/1191). Wyndham was also asked to 
investigate the NCC, which according to Fact was closely 
allied with Fascist ideology ('Federal Executive Report: 
Full Scale Probe Ordered into NCC', 20 August 1964). 
Federal Executive agendas tended to include this sort of 
haphazard collection of overt issues, combined with 
diverse motivations and disputes. 'Garbage can' analysis 
is appropriate (see D. Stephens, 1979).
3. Oliver complained that 'half-a-dozen Communist-influenced 
unions were more effective at the Federal level than the 
NSW ALP which comprises half the labour movement'.
Compare J.R. Hughes, 'ALP Decision Will Win Support in 
Trade Unions', Tribune, 17 August’ 1964.
4. The NSW Branch hit back at the federal regime with a
defiant resolution. A spokesman commented that NSW had 
been getting 'anything but a fair go. There's been one 
thing after another - blame for the Federal loss, charges 
of post-mortem hysteria, disloyalty. The lot' (quoted, 
'Bucking the Machine: State versus Federal Row Hits ALP', 
Australian, 17 August 1964).
5. This was the sort of service advocates of a Secretariat 
had hoped it would provide. See Chapter 2B.
6. See note 2, Chapter 2.
7. For full text of Wyndham Report, see Appendix I.
8. Biographical details on Wyndham from 'Gang Gang', 'The
Wyndham Report- or Educating the ALP', Canberra Times, 29 
July 1965; 'Steeped in Labor Tradition: ALP Selects Young 
Official', Canberra Times, 8 May 1963 and Who1s Who in 
Australia, 1965. Wyndham was familiar with labour
movement politics in many countries. He had been seconded 
to the Swedish Social Democratic party for a while in 
1951.
9. Indeed, Wyndham was unwittingly responsible for Calwell's 
attack on intellectuals at the 1960 NSW conference ('Cyril 
Stanley Wyndham - The New Broom for an Untidy Labor 
Party', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1964). He included 
a hostile reference to 'pseudo-intellectuals' in the 
speech he drafted, which Calwell expanded.
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10. Jupp noted that while Whitlam and Cairns differed on many 
issues they shared an openness to new ideas. He had 
earlier commented on a lack of idealism and reforming zeal 
in the ALP that cut it off from the growing stratum of 
Australian intellectuals (Jupp, 1959:13-4).
11. This was in a lecture to the Australian Institute of 
Political Science summer school. Press reports bore
• headlines like 'Expert Hits at ALP Policy', Sunday
Telegraph, 27 January 1963). Jupp believed that Labor 
intellectuals who did not criticise the party were doing 
it a disservice (Canberra Times, 10 December 1964).
12. See also Arthur Burns' (1965:358) view that Australian 
intellectuals looked 'with envy to London and the 
opportunity for debate, influence and power in the British 
Labour party'. For criticisms of this sort of argument 
see Dixson, 1969 and McQueen, 1976:198.
13. With the Austrian Social Democrats, behind only the 
Swedish Social Democrats and Norwegian Labor.
14. Idealised images of the British Labour Party often 
surfaced in critical press commentary on the ALP (e.g.
Alan Reid, 'Reorganising the Federal ALP', Daily
* Telegraph, 6 August 1964). See Chapter 3A.
15. Wyndham's own occasional comparisons of Australian and
British Labour were very diplomatic and formal. They 
mainly registered the complications of Australian 
federalism and the geographical sources of those 
complications. See 'ALP Secretary Moves to ACT', Canberra 
Times, 7 January 1964; 'Wyndham Predicts a Space-Age 
Labor Party', Age, 17 September 1965.
16. Wyndham was pleading with the 1965 Federal Conference to 
reconsider its decision to put his recommendations on ice.
17. Melbourne poet Vincent Buckley described Labor 
factionalism as 'wilful and confused ... A man who was 
prominent in one "camp" in June might be found in another 
one in October' ('Labor and the Split', Sunday Review, 17 
January 1971). See also Rawson, 1954:180 and Murray,
1970 :284 ) .
18. Labor factionalism 'was more often desperate than it was 
nice ... "matters of principle" could be settled over a 
beer, the personal differences last for a long time ...' 
(Cavalier, 1976:25 and 70). See also Vincent Buckley's 
interesting comments on the psychology of this phenomenon, 
in his review of Murray (1970) (Sunday Review, 17 January 
1971) .
19. For example, his reminder to the 1965 NSW conference that 
independent research showed voters saw apparent disunity 
as Labor's greatest vice ('"One Voice" Urged for ALP', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1965).
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20. The pamphlet reprinted Wyndham's speech to the Queensland 
Young Labor Association (at Noosa Heads), 5 December 1965.
21. Wyndham added that such a view denied state Labor 
achievements. Encel (1964), however, saw state 
experiences as ‘irrelevant in the federal arena and he 
explicitly rejected the 'crisis' view. See also Sol 
Encel, 'Landscape for Labor', Nation, 25 January 1964.
22. Cairns expressed such a view at a Labor seminar in Lome, 
Victoria ('Dr. Cairns Critical of Labor Policy', Age, 25 
October 1965 ) .
23. See also 'Overdue Insight on ALP', Australian, 7 December 
1965; 'Curing the Ills of the Labor Party', Age, 7 
December 1965; 'Labor's Search for Unity', Advertiser, 8 
December 1965.
24. The NSW Branch controllers probably took comfort from 
Wyndham's comment that anyone who criticised this attitude 
was 'immediately dubbed ... a "grouper"'.
25. Here Wyndham invoked British socialists G.D.H. Cole and 
James Keir Hardie.
26. See Table 2, Chapter 1 and the discussion at» the end of 
Chapter 9D.
27. For an interesting comparison with Wyndham's views on 
'socialism' see Bill Hayden's (1968:20) attempt to 
refashion Labor 'socialism' that went beyond the 'rigid 
dogmatist approach' associated with 'the great depression 
complex'. In his pamphlet, the Queensland MHR, who was 
associated with the parliamentary left, sought to chart a 
path through the pitfalls of dogmatism and opportunism. 
Hayden insisted democratic socialists had to work hard 'at 
developing the relevance of their policies in a changing 
modern environment'. He offered his pamphlet as a 
contribution to that project.
28. See also 'Overdue Insight on ALP', Australian, 7 December 
1965 for an endorsement of the speech and the Wyndham 
Report as a blueprint for ALP modernisation.
29. One of his first tasks as federal secretary was to 
produce a pamphlet on the 'unbridgeable gulf' between 
Labor and Communism (Wyndham, 1964).
30. See also 'Cyril the Surgeon', 2 April 1968.
31. His 'modernisation' programme was clearly conceived in 
cautious terms. Wyndham did not challenge Laborist 
taboos, such as the 'White Australia' policy.
32. Calwell (1978:259) suggested blue-collar workers who 
did not vote ALP were 'more despicable' than industrial 
scabs.
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33. An 'Australian Socialist Review' that emerged from CPA 
trauma and falling out over the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 .
34. On the relationship between negative images of 'suburbia' 
and negative images of women in Australian social 
commentary, see Rowse, 1978:208, note 27.
35. Although he was diplomatic enough not to comment on 
Calwell's outbursts. For an earlier, more optimistic 
Calwell's guidelines for Labor post-mortems, which Wyndham 
probably would have appreciated, see 'Calwell Tells Labor 
Not to Bicker', West Australian, 12 February 1959). Then 
Calwell insisted that Labor's difficulties would not be 
remedied by irresponsible criticism of other ALP members, 
party policy or the intelligence of the electorate.
36. By 1980 the ALP's strategic pollster was presenting the 
party with a profile of ignorant, selfish swingers, 
unreceptive to reform politics (Mills, 1986:21-5).
Brugger and Jaensch (1985:105-6) note the contradiction 
between Australian parties' invocation of the rational- 
judgemental electorate and their carefully researched 
attempts to manipulate the 'political consumer' in the 
manner of soap-powder sellers.
37. See the references to this report in Chapter 3B.
38. Grant went on to suggest that Labor had taken advantage of 
its long years in opposition to prepare comprehensive 
policies which reached 'the deepest currents of Australian 
life. Political parties do their best thinking in the 
wilderness'.
39. The references to the 'lethargy', 'listlessness' and 
'somnambulism' of the Menzies Government come from Wyndham 
(1965a). Although Wyndham called on Labor to come to 
terms with 'the era of the technical and skilled 
administrator', he also counselled against the dangers of 
the age of the technocrat becoming the age of the autocrat 
('Wyndham Predicts a Space-Age Labor Party', Australian,
17 November 1965). Wyndham thought popular access to art 
and culture was a new strategic issue for labour movements 
to consider. Much could be learned in this area, he 
suggested, from the cultural activities of Scandinavian 
trade unions.
476
CHAPTER 7
1. For full text, see Appendix I.
2. Ironically, as a Victorian delegate, Wyndham had been one 
of the 'thirty-six faceless men' in March 1963.
3. Although, as von Beyme (1985:171) points out, parties 
'have often shown more concern to acquire members than the 
de-ideologised catch-all parties are often said to have'.
4. The president and secretary of each Branch were usually 
automatically included in the delegation, leaving a 
scramble for the remaining four places.
5. This was his short-term Conference reform programme. In 
the long-term he wanted a Mass Conference with FEC, 
federal union and parliamentary delegates, but further 
investigation of this idea's feasibility was required.
6. One concern of Wyndham's was to increase the FPLP's 
autonomy. He wanted a ban on state Branch 'direction' of 
federal parliament written into the party's constitution.
7. Wyndham told WA conference delegates that no back-street 
delicatessen would organise its finances as carelessly as 
the ALP ('Unity of ... Wings Essential', Fact, 26 November 
1965). Earlier, Wyndham argued that his financial 
proposals were even more important than reorganisation 
(Jonathan Gaul, 'Labor Likely to Defer Decisions on 
Reforms', Canberra Times, 27 May 1965).
8. Wyndham's marginal seat strategy included direct Federal 
Secretariat involvement, consideration of field organisers 
responsible to the Federal Executive and NOPC and more co­
ordinated deployment of Senators and safe seat MHRs in 
marginal campaigns.
9. Without voting rights.
10. Wyndham's strategy for improving the situation of women in 
the party was to facilitate the emergence of LWCOC as an 
internal lobby group. The two LWCOC Conference 
delegateships were specifically reserved for the president 
and the secretary.
11. Wyndham told an Australian national University Labor Club 
meeting Labor had the image of 'an ageing party managed by 
old men' ('Here's How We Can Do It Better', Fact, 23 July 
1964 ) .
12. The Commonwealth Labor Advisory Council provided a forum for 
the federal ALP's parliamentary and organisational 
leadership to consult the ACTU leadership. It had a 
chequered history, meeting infrequently and changing its 
name from time to time (see Lloyd, 1983:239-40 and Crisp, 
1978 : 194-204) .
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13 . In his discussion of provision for federal recognition of 
the ALP in the ACT (then included in the NSW Branch) and the 
Northern Territory (then administered by the Federal 
Executive), Wyndham emphasised that he had never believed it 
was 'a sound approach for the party to advance a principle 
which it does not implement internally'. In principle, the 
ALP favoured greater autonomy for the ACT and the Northern 
Territory.
14. Wyndham thought this was a major reason why Labor branch 
membership was so low. For an interesting discussion of low 
ALP membership at this time, see 'Labor's Malaise at the 
Grass Roots', Australian Financial Review, 28 July 1965.
15. This was also the approach that Race Mathews had been 
arguing for in the Victorian Branch, as we noted in Chapter 
5D (see his 'Our ALP Branch Structure: The Need for a 
Remedy', Fact, 20 August 1964). The assumption was that 
party education and community involvement would increase 
branches' electoral capacities in a changing society.
16. See also 'State Labor Plan to Reorganise - Build Up Branches 
in City, Country', Age, 20 March 1962.
17. The Federal Secretariat did send out regular information 
releases which attempted to serve local branches, FECs, 
unions and individuals.
18. Thus Wyndham had rather low expectations about what 'rank- 
and-file' involvement could contribute to Labor policy- 
formulation. He was much more hopeful about 'rank-and-file' 
involvement in electioneering. 'Enthusiasts' could 
campaign, but policies were left to the 'experts'; although 
the 'enthusiasts' could send some material to Federal 
Conference.
19. Participatory 'rationalistic idealism' valued intra-party 
discussion for its own’ sake and as a contributor to better 
policy-making. Electoral realpolitik feared increased 
discussion and debate might damage the party's 'image' of 
'unity'. See the discussion on 'legitimation' and 
'depoliticisation' (Wolfe, 1977) in political parties in 
Chapter 12C.
20. See especially Chapters 2A, 4D.
21. Aitkin (1977:261-2) argues that given compulsory voting, 
Australian parties have in fact little electoral incentive 
to improve their branch organisation.
22. The 1961 Federal Conference had been the first to base its
deliberations on the work of special policy committees with 
some 'expert' input (Dunstan, 1962). Jupp noted that the 
committees were 'slowly becoming indispensable' (Canberra 
Times, 1 June 1965). The perils of 'amateur' policy-making
were being overcome. On the later emergence of 
contradictions within the new Labor policy 
'professionalism', see Chapter 12B.
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23. We could also note that despite the NOC fiasco, Labor still 
did reasonably well in 1961. See note 31, Chapter 2.
24. If Wyndham's financial reforms worked, penny-pinching 
Branches would not feel they had to send politicians as 
Federal Conference delegates because of their free 
travel entitlements. Such considerations had sometimes 
been relevant in the past.
25. McQueen emphasised that Labor had nearly won in 1961 and 
made its best improvement in Queensland where 'a very real 
and widespread mass organisation was built up over a period 
of eighteen months by a group of about fifty enthusiasts'. 
This group's leadership and electorate-level support were 
electorally crucial. What made the difference in particular 
seats was things like the organisation of postal and 
absentee votes, not media campaigns. McQueen was president 
of Queensland YLA in 1960 (Pascoe, 1979:139). Much of his 
later writing was devoted to demonstrating the deficiencies 
of the ALP from a socialist perspective. One of his major 
themes was the way in which involvement in the ALP led to a 
dissipation of radicalism. McQueen (1972:371) suggested 
that young idealists who joined the ALP to 'create a better 
world' or 'achieve socialism' found their enthusiasm burnt 
up in debates over how many election signs to erect or how 
many how-to-vote cards to print. The machine had an 
insatiable appetite for volunteers, especially when it came 
to fund-raising.
26. See, e.g. 'Pushing the ALP Into the Open', Canberra Times,
26 May 1965. This suggested Wyndham's recommendations would 
affect the party more than a change of leadership.
27. See 'Wyndham Proposals Should Help Labor', West Australian,
27 May 1965; 'Putting Labor's House in Order', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 26 May 1965.
28. The Tasmanian Branch had held its conference in March. 
Queensland conferences were triennial. There was one in 
May, just before the Wyndham Report was ready. WA 
conferences were also usually triennial (Mitchell,
1983:184). There was one in November 1965.
29. See also 'ALP Manifesto Challenges Right Wing Policy', 
Tribune, 9 June 1965.
30. Branch president Charlie Oliver was reported to have told a 
meeting of right-wing union officials that the left would 
bitterly attack the Wyndham Report at the conference.
Adding to the conference plotting and counter-plotting was 
the fact that Labor had just lost government in NSW after 24 
years. In his presidential address to the conference,
Oliver emphasised 'adaptation' to the electorate ('Why We 
Lost', Sun-Herald, 13 June 1965), as he had the year before 
(see Chapter 5B).
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31. It had tried, unsuccessfully, to secure improved 
representation in both 1912 and 1942, but at other times 
opposed Victorian 'de-federalisation' plans. The tenacity 
of Labor federalism, 1901-81, is discussed in Appendix II.
32. This equalled the number of seats in the House of 
Representatives.
33. If delegates were elected by FECs directly, the NSW ruling 
faction could not expect to win more than 60 percent of the 
places. The extant system gave it six 'faceless men' of its 
choice.
34. Fitzgibbon distanced himself from 'extreme right' and 
'extreme left' ('I Hate Extremes, says WWF Head',
Australian, 14 June 1965). An interjector suggested that 
put him in the middle. Fitzgibbon replied: 'No, I am to
the left of the middle'.
35. See also 'A Tale of Two Conferences', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 June 1965.
36. See also John Hurst, 'Labor Left Wing Will Fight Party
Reform', Australian, 17 June 1965.
37. Opposition to the ban on 'unity tickets' was now expressed 
openly rather than by selective enforcement. The ban was 
attacked as an infringement on unionists' civil liberties.
38. This presumed that 'ordinary members' had controlled the 
party in an earlier era - a dubious conjecture, to say the 
least.
39. Secretary of the Bank Officials' Association and federal 
secretary of the Australian Council of Salaried and 
Professional Associations.
40. The Victorian Fabian Society organised a public debate 
between Bob Holt and James Jupp on 16 July 1965, a week 
after the executive had decided Wyndham's reforms were too 
expensive and instructed its Federal Conference delegates to 
oppose many of them.
41. The letter also contained a questionnaire on branch-level 
electoral expenditure.
42. Local branch reform was not a new Mathews theme. See note 
15.
43. Lew Gibson complained Mathews had alienated the Fabian 
Society from the Victorian ALP by printing the Wyndham 
Report, which the federal secretary had marked 'strictly 
confidential' (Fact, 20 May 1966).
44. He was speaking at a Victorian Young Labor meeting.
45. On 22 June (just after the Victorian conference).
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46. Whitlam argued the main reason union officials 'betrayed' 
the party by collaborating in 'unity tickets' was to hang 
on to their jobs. He also suggested that some union 
officials were still living in the 1930s and did not 
realise that bankers and landlords had been tamed in 
Australia and that Australians were not oppressed by Tsars 
or warlords. Such a juxtaposition of 'modern' social 
democracy and 'anachronistic' communism was common among 
Whitlam and his supporters at that time. See the 
discussion of Wyndham (1966b) in Chapter 6C.
47. Such as Mick O'Brien (ARU) and Dick Scott (Boilermakers). 
Scott suggested Whitlam's background as a barrister might 
have explained 'his lack of understanding of the union 
movement'. O'Brien and Scott were both prominent in the 
NSW ALP left.
48. Wyndham himself also conflated his short-term and long­
term proposals when addressing this Conference.
49. Whitlam told delegates that it was the first time for 
fifty years that a bearded man had taken part in ALP 
Federal Conference deliberations (ALP, 1965:256). Dr. 
Keith Crook typified 'the men at the Australian National 
University and the State and provincial universities who 
are able and anxious to help the Labor Party' (see also 
'Labor Call to Brains of Community', Age, 5 August 1965).
50. The Canberra Times had been a consistent champion of the 
Wyndham Report (see, e.g. note 26). Thus it found the 
fate of the report as 'the greatest tragedy' of the 
Conference ('Labor Sticks to its Last', 7 August 1965).
51. The most consistent 'rational radical' group in the ALP in 
this sense emerged later that month when 'the 
Participants' were founded in Victoria, with Jupp as 
secretary. They were the most enthusiastic supporters of 
Whitlam's 'modernisation' programme in the party. This 
form of 'rational radicalism' tended to stress the 
desirability of Labor 'adaptation' to a 'middle-classing' 
Australia.
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CHAPTER 8
1. This was the mechanism that Menzies had used to initiate 
federal involvement in funding (public and private) 
secondary schools. See Hawker, Smith and Weller, 1979:163- 
7.
2. He referred to the Federal Executive as 'this extremist 
group' which breached party policy, humiliated 
parliamentarians and ignored the rank-and-file. It was 
'neither representative nor responsible. It must be 
repudiated'.
3. With a Federal Conference based on delegates from federal 
electorates and federal unions Whitlam was later to maintain 
a preference for a Federal Conference without any statutory 
union representation (see D. Stephens, 1979:388-9).
Stephens notes Whitlam's fondness for the US Democratic 
Convention model (see Oakes and Solomon, 1973:57) and refers 
to Clyde Cameron's belief that Whitlam's later thinking was 
influenced by Austrian Social Democrat leader Bruno Kreisky. 
Recently, Whitlam (1986:85) declared that the 1981 reforms 
(to be discussed in Chapter 12) made national Conference 
'reasonably representative'.
4. Federal president Jim Keeffe boasted that Whitlam was 'dead' 
as far as the party was concerned (Alan Reid, 'Three States 
Unite: "Demand" to Expel Whitlam', Daily Telegraph, 23 
February 1966).
5. Hartley thought it 'deplorable that some people are 
attacking the party from within when issues of vital moment 
are facing the party and, of course, the nation'.
6. For Chamberlain's general views on such matters, see 
Chapter 5D.
7. Calwell had not always been so hostile to reorganisation. 
Just before the Wyndham Report was commissioned, he declared 
his support for overhauling the party (see Chapter 6A). 
Almost a year later (in June 1965 ) , he was elected a  ^
Victorian delegate to Federal Conference. Some wondered 
whether this would lead him to oppose reorganisation (see, 
e.g. Ian Fitchett, ' Calwell's Stunning Action over Unity 
Tickets', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June 1965), but this was 
not put to the test, as the issue did not surface at the 
Federal Conference.
8. See also 'In Bad Shape All Round', Canberra Times,
14 June 1966.
9. Although it did accept Wyndham's financial proposals and 
some of his minor organisational recommendations.
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10. Apparently, many delegates did not vote. Participants' 
secretary James Jupp pointed out that this was the largest 
anti-executive vote on a critical issue affecting intra­
party power relations since 1955 ('Marked Change in 
Atmosphere Noticeable', Canberra Times, 15 June 1966).
11. See Jupp's speech to the Melbourne University Democratic 
Socialist Club, reported in 'ALP "a Shambles" says 
Delegate', Age, 17 June 1966.
12. See also his 'Labor, Trade Unions and MP Links', Fact,
7 April 1966.
13. Fraser chaired the FPLP foreign affairs committee.
14. Around this time, Fraser also issued an apocalyptic warning 
against developments within the ALP that might help produce 
a revolutionary situation in Australia ('Where Stands 
Labor Now?', Canberra Times, 21 February 1966). However, 
when 'state aid' was endorsed, Fraser could stop worrying 
about saving Labor from 'subversion' and start thinking 
about how to win the election.
15. For 1958-63 Results (including state-by-state variation) see
Table 1, Chapter 4. Labor's share of House of 
Representative (first preference) votes in 1966 was as 
follows: NSW - 40.7 percent;.Vic - 35.0 percent; Qld - 42.1
percent; SA - 40.7 percent; WA - 42.8 percent; Tas - 51.6 
percent; Total - 40.0 percent (Mackerras, 1975:225). Labor 
lost nine seats (three in NSW, two in Vic, three in Qld and three in SA) (Mackerras, 1975:253). Labor also lost the NT 
seat, not included in these calculations because the NT MHR 
did not have full voting rights.
16. Calwell told the December 1966 Federal Executive meeting
that Whitlam and AWU leader Tom Dougherty had been 
damagingly 'disloyal' ('Calwell Lashes Out at Whitlam', 
Courier-Mail, 10 December). He was also reported to have
criticised Charlie Oliver. He felt let down by the ACTU and 
the Australian Catholic community had also let him down (the 
latter for not responding to Labor's painful turnaround on 
'state aid'. In this mood, Calwell concluded that the 
Australian electorate was 'selfish' and 'stupid' (Hughes, 
1967:106. See the discussion in Chapter 6D).
17. Cairns recalled Chifley's unyielding words of 1951 about 
Labor having to stand up for what it believed in, a 
quotation that was often drawn on in the wake of electoral 
losses. Victorian Branch president Bill Brown also insisted 
that Labor should not change its policies ('ALP Policies Not 
Rejected Says Official', Canberra Times, 26 December 1966).
18. 'Stocktaking by Labor Party' is a newspaper clipping from 
the M5 Australian Public Affairs Collection, General: 
Commonwealth ALP 1938-1978, Fiche 67, held at the Department 
of Political Science, RSSS, ANU. In this article, Fraser 
deployed the same 1951 Chifley quote about things worth 
fighting for that Cairns had used in his comments.
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19. Fraser noted that 'party specialists' thought that 
Labor's organisation and, particularly, its 
electioneering, were pitifully weak.
20. Fraser thought Labor should organise its own national 
fund-raising to steer clear of dependence on unions 
and business interests.
21. Fraser thought the analogy with trade union solidarity 
was inappropriate in the parliamentary context.
22. Here White was putting forward the original 'Arena 
thesis' on the socialist potential of the new stratum 
of 'the intellectually trained' emerging in Australian 
society (Osmond, 1970:192-8). For more on the 'Arena 
thesis', see Chapter 9D. White was on the editorial 
board of Arena, an independent Melbourne marxist journal.
23. The report was dated 3 February 1967. The FPLP met on 6 
February to choose Calwell's successor (see Chapter 8A).
24. For example, Alan Ramsey and Patrick Nilon, 'The
Party's Over', Australian, 1 December 1963. They saw
the 70 year old Calwell 'as the complete embodiment 
of all that is wrong in the ALP in the year 1966'.
25. The sections were, in order: (a) 'The lack of close
co-operation between the trade union movement and the 
ALP'; (b) 'The failure of the union movement to 
unionise all workers'; (c) 'The need to modernise 
the organisational structure of the Australian Labor 
Party'; (d) 'The method of selecting candidates';
(e) 'Disunity'; (f) 'Lack of effective unity between 
Federal and State PLPs'; (g) 'The effect of
increased state taxes and charges'; (h) 'Education, 
Repatriation and Social Services, Development'; (i) 
'Outside interference'; (j) 'Role of the AWU'; and 
(k) 'Related matters'.
26. See Chapter 4D. In this plan, union representatives 
would have been outnumbered by a combination of FEC 
delegates and a specific parliamentary contingent. 
Whitlam later expressed a preference for a Federal 
Conference without specific provision for specific 
union representation (see D. Stephens, 1979:388-9 who 
noted his admiration for US Democrat and Austrian 
Social Democrat conference structures.
27. Calwell thought that such a reconstructed Conference 
should elect the Federal Executive, which could have 
24 members (including at least one from each state 
and four from the FPLP).
28. But he did not want any 'reversion to the system ... 
so grossly abused in Victoria before the Split', 
which allowed enrolled members of affiliated unions, 
as well as ALP branch members, to participate in 
'rank-and-file' ballots.
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29. In that confrontation, Calwell had been one of the 
government's principal Red-baiting anti-strike orators.
30. Chamberlain (1964:18-9) had earlier outlined a 
distinctively Australian Laborist conception of 
'socialism' when he defined 'socialism' as 'security in 
all its forms at home. The breadwinner working usefully 
in the community and being remunerated at a level which 
will enable him to discharge the responsibilities of 
family life. His wife, divorced from the drudgery of 
housekeeping as she can be with the application of modern 
science. His children well equipped in our schools to 
play their part in the years to come in the maintenance 
and development of a human society based on the principles 
underlying the freedom of the Atlantic Charter'. That was 
what 'democratic socialism' was all about, Chamberlain 
told the 1957 Federal Conference (see O'Meagher, 1983:25).
31. Calwell also recalled a letter from Whitlam to Wyndham which 
alleged some ALP members had given ammunition to the DLP by 
associating with Communists and that Calwell had been 
distressed but too weak to do anything about this.
32. Some FPLP members and some affiliated unions, he argued, 
had not followed party policy, and the AWU's failure to 
support its members' Mt Isa strike had contributed to the 
loss of two seats in Queensland. Calwell was buying into 
factional conflicts here. There had been ALP/AWU conflict 
in Queensland. In NSW, on the other hand, AWU secretary 
Charlie Oliver was ALP president. There was considerable 
internal conflict in the AWU itself.
33. The 'most immediate danger' was the development of a 'stab 
in the back' legend of the kind promoted in Germany after 
World War I.
34. Labor Comment insisted that parties in government were
imprisoned by 'tremendous economic and ideological forces' - 
which greatly restricted their ability to act (i.e. some of 
the Participants accepted the logic of the 'convergence 
thesis' and urged the ALP to 'adapt' accordingly). On 
'convergence' and 'divergence' in Australian party politics, 
see Head and Patience, 1979 and Head, 1985. .
35. They sought a ratio of about 40 percent branches/SECs/ 
parliamentarians to 60 percent affiliated unionists.
36. The Participants' expectation was that such a measure would 
seriously change the nature of the ALP in Victoria and in 
Queensland.
37. See also 'Many Myths in the ALP' and Graham Freudenberg, 
'Swing from Labor Bit Deep' (same issue).
38. A literary journal which proclaimed its democratic temper 
and offensively Australian bias on its masthead.
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39. He had been a research officer for the Australian Council 
of Salaried and Professional Associations (whose 
secretary Barney Williams was the Participants' first president).
40. Which had been published in October 1966 (shortly before the election).
41. Rather than 'who has the legal right to attend'.
42. The Courier-Mail headed its report on Paterson's
article: 'Blast at Labor Organisation - "Effectively
Insane"', 28 December 1966.
43. British Labour PM Harold Wilson was 'a grey individual' 
but had 'a heavy stamp of professional competence'. 
Australian equivalents included Whitlam, Rex Patterson, 
John Menadue and Bob Hawke. They could not make speeches 
with the skill of Calwell nor compete with Cairns 'for 
moral uplift; yet can command the support of an audience 
with an ingrained respect for technical excellence'.
44. His basic argument was that the ALP should be guided by 
technical, 'knowledge' rather than 'the numbers'. This is 
re-examined in the Conclusion (Chapter 16).
45. Resting as it did on 'the numbers', although this was 
complicated by federalism and oligarchy (the latter 
amplified by some of the consequences of union 
affiliation). Thus many party reform plans revolved 
around ways of re-calculating 'the numbers' (e.g. by 
Federal Conference reform).
46. Whitlam's approach was similar. At the height of the 
'witless men' crisis, he suggested the choice was between 
'those who want a broadly-based socialist and radical 
party and petty men who want to reduce it to their 
personal plaything' ('Whitlam Declares Open War on ALP's 
Federal Executive', Canberra Times, 2 February 1966.
James Jupp's preference for the terms 'rational radical' 
and 'instinctive conservative' to the usual talk of 
'right' and 'left' is noted in Chapter 7D).
47. Thus he disputed the line of argument that saw abolition 
of specific SEC representation on the Victorian executive 
as a 'left' gain or the Wyndham Report as a 'right-wing' 
plot. His 'rationalistic-idealist' hope was to carve a 
separate arena for 'pure' organisational debate. For 
earlier attempts by Mathews to engage in such debate, see 
Chapters 5D and 7D.
48. Whitlam and his supporters evaluated ALP organisation in 
terms of 'external' standards of 'middle-class' 
professionalism, whereas Calwell's world was more bound by 
the ALP itself. For more on this 'cosmopolitan'/ 
'parochial' distinction, see Conclusion (Chapter 16).
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49. In a similar vein, Bruce McFarlane had earlier 
argued: 'People who are unfamiliar with the complex
and contradictory trends within the Australian Labor 
Party may find it easy to condemn the "slowness" in 
achieving necessary internal change' ('Settlers for 
Less', Nation, 13 June 1964). McFarlane's sense of 
ALP complexity and contradictoriness (also evident, 
to a degree, in McFarlane, 1968) seemed to desert him 
when he came to propagate the 'Technocratic Laborist' 
thesis (Catley and McFarlane, 1974). For a return to 
more caution, see Catley and McFarlane, 1980 ; 
McFarlane, 1981 and Catley and McFarlane, 1981).
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CHAPTER 9
1. Whitlam was a clear winner on the third count, with 39 
votes against a combined total of 29 for Cairns (15) and 
Crean (14).
2. Chamberlain's argument was that if the Labor structure was 
left more or less alone, Whitlam's criticisms of its 
unrepresentative out-of-date nature would be gleefully 
pounced upon by Labor's opponents in future elections. 
Chamberlain complained that Whitlam constantly derided the 
party structure as 'outmoded, archaic, unrepresentative, a 
horse-and-buggy survival in a sputnik era'. Chamberlain was 
made to apologise for his denigration of Whitlam (which 
could also be gleefully quoted by Labor's opponents).
3. He was addressing a Melbourne Labor Day dinner.
4. He told a Victorian ALP country conference.
5. Labor's moves towards Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, 
under Whitlam, can be interpreted as a process of 
integrating the 'experts' without stimulating 'party 
renewal' at the 'grass roots' level. For further 
exploration of this question see Chapter 12B.
6. Whitlam's deputy Lance Barnard (a Tasmanian) strongly
supported the 'party reform' cause at this conference (in 
Devonport). Barnard emphasised exorcising electoral bogeys 
rather than party renewal. He told delegates that unless 
the ALP was transformed 'we could get less than 30 percent 
of the votes at the next election' (quoted, 'Overhaul ALP, 
Barnard Urges', Examiner, 16 March 1967).
7. Thus the Participants rationalised their support for 'party 
reform' as a way of attracting 'middle class' branch members 
and wooing white collar voters, while Chamberlain 
rationalised his defence of the existing party structure in 
the name of the 'working class'.
8. Whitlam thought it was 'fantastic' that 'a businessman's, 
investor's or employer's party' was the biggest. He 
suggested improved 'rank and file' representation' at the 
state Labor conference would lead to 'a colossal upsurge in 
the branches.
9. It wanted the Victorian executive sacked and Labor 
opposition to the Vietnam War reversed.
10. Hugh Gaitskell's defeat of unilateral nuclear disarmers in 
the British Labour Party was held up as an example for the 
ALP.
11. See also 'Mr. Whitlam's Unity Crusade', 1 June 1967.
12. NSW and Tasmania were the only states prepared to back 
'party reform'.
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13. See also 'Labor Struggles', 10 May 1967.
14. One ACTU official was said to have told Whitlam that the 
ACTU could not afford to seem so closely tied with the ALP.
15. Yet another Whitlam/Chamberlain clash preceded this 
round of conferences. Chamberlain criticised some remarks 
of Barnard on Vietnam. Whitlam counter-attacked, 
insisting that 'the ALP should be based on the rank-and- 
file and not on State bureaucracies' ('Alan Ramsey,
Whitlam Demands Chamberlain Apology', Australian, 9 June 
1967). He added: 'If other State secretaries were as
autocratic and idiosyncratic as Mr Chamberlain, the 
party's membership would be as reduced and frustrated in 
the other States as it is in Western Australia'.
16. Whitlam was 'sparing nothing' in his 'intense lobbying 
campaign' ('The Long Weekend's Challenge for the ALP", 
Australian Financial Review, 9 June 1967.
17. It contains the texts of his speeches to the three 
conferences, plus some additional introductory material.
18. SPLP/'machine’ relations were good in SA. Dunstan 
'cultivated union officials as carefully as he placed 
the indignant cadences in his speech making (McQueen,
1982 :9-). See also Stokes, 1983 .
19. When he was a delegate to the Federal Executive.
20. Incidentally, the introductory material in Towards a 
National Party ... appears to contain the paragraphs 
deleted from Whitlam's speech in SA at Dunstan's bequest 
(Compare Whitlam, 1967b:5 and Freudenberg, 1977:97).
21. See Chapter 7D.
22. NSW and Tasmania tended to support 'reform' because the 
left opposed it, but did not seem committed to 
Whitlam's organisational principle. An advantage for 
Whitlam in the committee format was that it seemed a 
way of keeping the 'party reform' issue alive and 
developing 'rank-and-file' support for the project.
23. Another 15 percent said it was Labor's second major 
weakness. The survey was conducted by the Melbourne 
University Political Science department.
24. In an earlier speech (to the Victorian YLA), Whitlam 
insisted Labor should be a party of 'reform and progress' 
rather than one of 'repeal and protest' ('Labor Must Show 
it is Mending its Ways', Age, 20 March 1967. See note 8).
25. In the same issue, four leading Participants (Harold 
Crouch, Dick McGarvie, John McGinley and Barney Williams) 
painted the dispute between Whitlam and the VCE as one 
between those who believed in using parliamentary power to
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carry out radical reforms and 'those who believe that the 
essential role of Labor is to head a protest movement' 
('Reply to "Victorian Labor"').
26. In each case, a small group commandeered the resources of 
the whole Branch, Whitlam suggested.
27. Whitlam thought it was 'disgraceful' that men who flouted 
the ban on 'unity tickets', organised political strikes in 
defiance of the ACTU and demonstrated against the 
Melbourne THC should sit on an ALP executive.
28 D. Stephens (1979:396) noted Victorian president Bill
Brown's warning against the danger of overshadowing the 
'machine' which represented the 'rank-and-file' whereas 
politicians were 'too sensitive to things other than the 
principles which are supposed to guide us'. See also 
Whitlam, 1967b:10).
29. See 'SA Labor Cheers for Whitlam', Age, 13 June 1967.
30. Although there had been attempts to put it on the agenda 
(see 'No Discussion of Wyndham Plan', Advertiser, 14 June 
1967). A 'party reform' recommendation from Burnside/Ross 
Park sub-branch was one of forty agenda items not 
discussed by the convention.
31. Colbourne rejected an amendment based on an interim .
Wyndham proposal ('State Parties Differ Over Troop 
Policy', Australian, 13 June 1967). Labor Mayor of
Kempsey R. Melville wanted four extra delegates from each 
state (which the Victorians accepted) and the federal 
leader and deputy leader. In support Sutherland shire 
president Arthur Gietzelt said ideas for wider 'rank-and- 
file' representation were unrealistic.
32. Signed by representatives of the Hairdressers, the 
Plasterers, the Printing and Kindred Industries Union, 
the Miscellaneous Workers, the WWF and the Meat Workers.
33. See also Fred Wells, 'NSW - Next Ten Years in the 
Balance', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1967. Further, 
see 'How Representative is the Labor Party?', Socialist 
and Industrial Labor, April 1967.
34. It also looked back to the Split to discern the lesson 
that the smaller states had saved the Labor movement in 
1955 ('Labor's Future', May 1967).
35. See 'Breakthrough for Whitlam', Canberra Times, 10 July 
1967 .
36. Wyndham also addressed the conference, reminding delegates 
his proposals were not dogmatic, but simply a basis for 
discussion ('Let Us Unite - Wyndham', Australian, 8 July 
1967.
37. Webb was regarded as being on the left in the FPLP.
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38. On a show of hands (72-58) and on a card vote (420-397).
39. On parliamentary representation, the Executive supported 
only allowing the leader and deputy leader to attend and 
speak at federal party meetings.
40. The third motion wanted (a) an age limit and (b) special 
education services for federal parliamentary candidates.
41. Kim Beazley (WA) was absent. He had sent an-apology.
42. So would an NT delegate, making for a 47-delegate 
Conference. There would be a 17-member Executive (which 
would also have an NT delegate).
43. The Canberra Times thought Whitlam had been defeated, but
not completely: '... a man who steers for Northern
Territory and finds Tasmania instead may still have 
achieved something though not a triumph of navigation' 
('After So Much Labour', 2 August 1967).
44. See Allan Barnes and Geoffrey Barker, 'Whitlam is Planning 
New Attack', Age, 2 August 1967; Jonathan Gaul, 'Labor 
Lifts "Faceless" Label', Canberra Times, 8 August 1967). 
Lance Barnard, who was a strong supporter of 'party 
reform' for electoral reasons (see note 6), also argued 
that Adelaide represented a giant step forward for the 
party. It did not foreclose further reform ('Labor Enters 
a New Era - Faceless Men Are Now Unmasked', Mercury, 2 
August 196 7) .
45. See also 'Close the Ranks' (same issue).
46. New issues and new styles of activism were emerging in 
Australian society which were resistant to the 'top-down' 
approach of the 'numbers' game in the Labor 'machine' 
(Houseman, 1971:218. See also McGregor, 1966:271-2).
47. Although he was said to deplore the secrecy of the 
Victorian executive (Theophanus, 1980:292).
48. The transition from the 'Chifley doctrine of security' to 
the 'Whitlam doctrine of equality' (Whitlam, 1975) 
involved complex changes in Labor conceptions of 
'equality'. In some ways the old Laborist concept of 
'mateship' had elements of egalitarianism that were now 
being eroded by meritocratic concerns, but that 'mateship' 
had always been flawed by its racism and its sexism, which 
were now being addressed.
49. As Beilharz (1985:104-5) points out, the expanding 
Australian 'new middle class' was likely to see itself as 
a bearer of 'rationality' and 'the common good'. Class 
analysis of the 'middle class' has always proved elusive. 
We might want to distinguish between an executive 'service 
class' and a mass of de-skilled white-collar workers 
(Goldthorpe, 1982; Abercrombie and Urry, 1983).
Callinicos (1983) wants to argue that the latter are
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unambiguously 'proletarian', which Abercrombie and Urry 
would see as an over-simplification. Interestingly, 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 was in some ways 
pitched more directly at the 'service class' than at the 
new 'white-collar' mass. We have noted Whitlam's fondness 
for the ideology of 'professionalism' on a number of 
occasions. On that ideology see Clegg et al., 1986:191- 
203. See also Ehenreich and Ehenreich, 1979; Johnson,
1977 and Larson, 1977.
50. Therborn (1980) thought a crisis of 'the system of 1947' 
had begun to mature in the developed capitalist world in 
the late 1960s. The 'system of 1947' had revolved around 
the Cold War, economic boom and mass welfarism. The 
movement against the Vietnam War undermined some of its 
crucial assumptions (see also Therborn, 1968).
51. Although the particular individuals such reforms would 
bring into Federal Conference in the short-term gave 'no 
cause for rejoicing'.
52. Connell thought communication within the ALP was hampered 
by anachronistic procedures (e.g. the practice of reading 
the correspondence at branch meetings).
53. Connell drew on Katz and Lazerfield's 'two-step' model of 
communication. See also Gustafson, 1976:17-8.
54. This was so, Connell (1968a:12) argued, whatever their 
factional allegiance. Given the left's claims about 
developing the party as a 'mass movement' this was a 
serious criticism. Hudson (1968:22-3) argued that the 
left-wing Victorian executive was doomed unless it 
reconstructed itself. Otherwise, it ran the risk 'of 
eventual defeat by more efficient bureaucrats who can 
beat it at the same game'. Its only hope was to build 
a mass base, deliberately stimulating the branches and 
encouraging debate. In 1970, the Victorian executive 
was sacked by Federal Executive intervention (see 
Chapter 13A).
55. Altman argued that, with their emphasis on 'de-
federalisation', Whitlam, Wyndham and Connell were only 
bringing the ALP up to date with the 1940s and its 
expansion of Commonwealth power. For a very different 
critique of Connell see maverick left-wing NSW MLA George 
Petersen's (1968:8) dismissal of 'organisational tinkering 
from above'. Petersen argued that 'grass-roots' 
campaigning and TV politicking were incompatible.
Instead of elitist 'party reform' projects, he suggested 
Labor should rededicate itself to 'socialism'.
56. This could make for dramatic changes in individual 
commentators. Compare Horne, 1964 and Horne, 1980. 
Interestingly, Horne (1980:157) noted that 'Whitlam 
seemed more in touch with 'new management procedures than 
did Liberal politicians'.
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57. This thesis was radically revised when the Arena writers 
began to argue that the 'intellectually trained' were 
being incorporated into new projects of social domination 
under the aegis of the Whitlam administration (Rowse,
1982 . See Sharp, 1973 and 1974).. Perhaps both the 
optimistic and pessimistic Arena theses could be 
criticised for under-estimating the heterogenous social 
and political locations of 'intellectuals'. Brym (1980) 
strongly emphasises this heterogeneity. So, in his own 
way, does Gouldner (1979) in his presentation of 'the 
intellectuals' as a 'flawed' universal class with both 
elitist and emancipatory characteristics.
58. See Chapter 7D. In his analysis of the 1969 Federal 
Conference, Henry Mayer detected a similar clash between 
(still) rising 'young intellectuals' and 'old and 
brainless figures' who remained strong in the party
('Labor Pains that May at Last Lead to Real Political 
Rebirth', Australian, 7 August 1969). Mayer counselled 
the 'young intellectuals' to be patient. Their new 
policies were hardly understood and were no electoral 
panacea, however worthwhile. With persistence, after 'a 
long and tough road, we'd have a party modelled somewhat 
on the Scandinavian Social Democrats'.
59. See the outline of Australian Social Democracy,. Mark 1 
in Table 3, Chapter 1.
60. See the discussion of this episode in Chapter 13B.
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CHAPTER 10
1. Since his departure from the Communist Party in 1956, 
Turner had been interested in the development of a 
distinctively Australian socialist strategy. See the 
essays collected in Turner, 1982.
2. Nevertheless, Humphrey McQueen predicted that by 1978 a 
lot of Labor people would be 'sprouting Strettonisms 
without realising their source' ('Where Stretton Fears to 
Tread', Nation Review, 29 October 1976). McQueen felt 
that Stretton's reform project, although more serious than 
anything envisaged by Whitlam, was flawed by an under­
estimation of the strength of the forces committed to the 
defence of class rule in Australia.
3. Labor frontbencher Mick Young commented that during the 
first two Fraser years Labor people complacently assumed
'that somehow by divine right' voters would return them to 
office ('Labor Has to Face the Facts', Australian, 24 
December 1977; quoted Catley and McFarlane, 1980:309, 
note 112).
4. See Bob Carr, 'The ALP Must Now Stress a Capacity for Real 
Economic Management', 10 February 1978 and Joe Thompson, 
'It's Time for the ALP to Listen to the Moderates', 7 
February 1978. Carr, who was then the NSW Labor Council 
education officer, also contributed to the Sydney Morning 
Herald's post-election analysis ('Where Does Labor Go', 19 
December 1977). He went on to be a Bulletin journalist, 
before becoming a state MP (being elected leader of the 
opposition after Labor's defeat in 1988). Thompson was an 
official of the Vehicle Builders' Union. For an 
endorsement of Carr's self-styled 'social democratic 
critique' from a political scientist, who was not noted 
for being sympathetic to the ALP, see Patrick O'Brien, 
'Labor Must Forget the Myths and Face Facts', Australian,- 
27 February 1978. The Australian was an interesting 
location for Labor debate. The paper had been so hostile 
to the Whitlam Government in 1975 that its journalists 
went on strike in protest against its bias (see Elliot, 
1978:221-2).
5. Labor regained government in NSW in 1976, after having 
been in opposition since 1965. The 'Wran model', so 
influential in ALP electoral realpolitik in this period, 
is discussed in detail in Chaples et al., 1974.
6. Their assessment of cultural attitudes was shared by some 
Nation Review contributors, who disagreed with their 
conclusions. Political scientist Lex Watson described the 
Australian electorate 'even when poor' as 'irretrievably 
bourgeois and selfish' ('What Chance for the Left', 22 
December 1977).
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7. She thought they could be a leavening influence in the 
party and in the community who could make it possible for 
'a sound Labor party' to form a government 'acceptable to 
the electorate on a long-term basis'. To attract this 
group, Labor needed 'a positive programme of education, 
participation and active involvement'. She wanted Labor 
to win 'the young, better educated, more hopedul, more 
aware' before 'the weight of the suburban mortgage deadens 
their mind and reduces their spirits'. For a similar 
argument about the importance of cultural change and Labor 
responsiveness to 'new social movement' concerns, see 
Denis Altman,'Signposts in the Gloom', Nation Review, 5 
January 1978.
8. By this time Cairns, who had been deputy Prime Minister
in 1975, until the 'loans affair' brought about his demise 
(see Sexton, 1979) had become disillusioned with 
parliamentary politics (although he remained an MHR 
until December 1977), and was heavily involved in 
'counter-cultural' activities, such as 'Down to Earth' 
festivals (see Altman, 1980:115).
9. The ambiguous 'reform euphoria' of the earlier 1970s had 
clearly given way to an emphasis on 'sound economic 
management' in Helmut Schmidt's 'modelt Deutschland' (see 
Braunthal, 1983:155-6, 263 and 298; Markovits, 1986:94-6).
10. The last was produced in 1984. As Labor became more 
successful electorally, its theoretical output declined 
drastically.
11. In June 1978 (again held in Brisbane).
12. Which explored a wide range of issues and was strongly 
influenced by the 'political economy' critique of 
conventional economics.
13. Young called on Labor to go beyond opinion poll populism. 
There was a political generation emerging that was afraid • 
to make decisions 'before we unleash the wrath of the 
pollsters' (see also similar quotation from Young in 
Mills, 1986:43).
14. Later in 1980, Theophanus became MHR for Burke, after 
deposing the incumbent in a preselection contest.
15. Connell's preface, dated 11 November 1975, brought his 
sociological analysis and political agenda together.
Partly as a consequence of Connell's work, a number of 
writers began to invoke casual references to Gramsci as 
well as the term 'hegemony' in their interpretations of 
what had gone for Labor since 1975. The 1960s 'New 
Critics', Horne (1981) and McGregor (1983) seem to have 
been radicalised by the events of 1975, particularly 
Horne, who was moving from a more conservative position. 
See also references to 'hegemony' in Wilenski (1983). 
Casual deployment of 'hegemony' analysis could lead to 
'dominant values' being seen as the main obstacle to Labor 
progress in a rather simplistic manner.
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16. In his 1978 T.J. Ryan Memorial Lecture in Brisbane.
17. But he was now cool on the idea of federal union 
representation at National Conference (see Bruce Wilson, 
'Whitlam Speaks Out', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 
1978. See also note 3, Chapter 8.
18. Arguing that a party seeking to 'serve' the community had 
to 'evolve' with the community (Peter Bowers and Ian 
Frykberg, 'Hayden Pledges to Review Labor's Aims', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 23 December 1977). Hayden was sympathetic 
to the West German Social Democratic model (Michelle 
Grattan, 'The Hayden Philosophy', Age, 9 January 1978).
19. Here he invoked the example of the Austrian Social 
Democratic Party (on which see Sully, 1982).
20. See Malcolm Colless, 'Hayden Call to Revamp Labor', 
Australian, 23 December 1977.
21. Deputy Senate leader John Button suggested that having a 
non-charismatic leader gave the party a great opportunity 
to think about philosophy and organisation (Michelle 
Grattan, 'John Button - The Life and Soul of the Party', 
Age, 16 April 1979), Button described Hayden as 'a 
desirable social democratic figure' who was 'not about 
monuments' (quoted, Bob Carr, 'A Reformer Right on the 
Button', Bulletin, 27 June 1978. See also Allan Ashbolt, 
'Why Whitlam Should Go Too', New Statesman, 22 July’1977).
22. For some, the decline of Australian Social Democracy,
Mark 1 led to a confused nostalgia for an older 
Laborism (see McQueen, 1982:210).
23. See David Kemp, 'The Secret Ingredient in Fraser's 
Success', National Times, 16 January 1978. The title 
was not Kemp's.
24. The main arguments are prefigured in Kemp, 1977. See 
also Kemp, 1975.
25. ALP president Bob Hawke called for a special National 
Executive meeting ('A Time for Critical Analysis', Labor 
Star, 16 December 1977). The Victorian Branch argued 
that, at all levels, Labor had to analyse what was 
happening in Australian society and find ways of getting 
its policies and arguments 'across, understood and 
supported by the electorate'.
26. Young had been part-time federal secretary, 1969-73, 
before becoming a federal parliamentarian. He replaced 
Wyndham in controversial circumstances (see Reid, 
1971:261-3; Freudenberg, 1977:151-2 and Oakes, 1973:184- 
86) and worked out of Adelaide. Despite the closure of 
the Federal Secretariat, professionalised campaigning 
reached new heights under Young. 1972 was Labor's first 
nationally co-ordinated campaign (see Oakes and Solomon, 
1973:100). Young could take much of the credit (Blewett,
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1973c:9-11). The campaign used survey research carefully 
and the media calculatedly (see Blewett, 1973c; Braund, 
1973. See also Mills, 1986:95). Indeed, Labor's 'It's 
Time' campaign, promoted by the Hansen-Rubensohn-Erikson 
agency was voted 'the outstanding marketing promotion of 
the year' by the Marketing Communications Executives 
Association ('Labor's Campaign an Award Winner',
Australian, 22 March 1973). Young (1986) himself insists 
that there was a lot more to Labor's campaign than slick 
advertising. The full-time Federal Secretariat was re­
opened in 1973, with David Combe (SA) as federal 
secretary. Young had seen his part-time position as an 
interim arrangement and thought Labor could learn from the 
organisational thoroughness of the West German Social 
Democratic Party (David Solomon, '$lm Scheme for Labor 
HQ’, Canberra Times, 13 March 1972). After the 1975 
defeat, Young called for 'a "think-tank" of our most 
brilliant people, looking at least ten years ahead' (Jane 
Cunningham, 'More Prophesies from South Australia', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 14 January 1976).
27. The meeting also discussed Combe's report complaining that 
there had been no party discussion on the policy speech 
and that the parliamentary leadership had been cavalier 
towards the organisation. Hayden rejected the idea of a 
party organisation representative at Caucus meetings 
(Michelle Grattan, 'Combe Report Under Attack', Age, -18 
January 19 78 ) .
28. Ryan suspected the National Executive meeting would 
'produce much less' (see also Bruce O'Meagher, 'What's 
Wrong with the ALP?', Lobby, November-December 1978).
29. See also Ian Frykberg, 'ALP's Poll Dissection All Huff 'n 
Puff', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 January 1978. In reply, 
Combe (1978:15) was adamant that the NCI was more than a 
predictable 'easy-way-out of a difficult situation' for a 
party of inveterate 'resolutionaries' (see also Bob Carr, 
'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 
June 1978). For comments on the ritual nature of earlier 
Labor post-mortems, see Chapters 3A and 4A.
30. See Chapter 7A.
31. The union official was Joe Thompson (see note 4).
32. Along with probing policy dilemmas raised by 'the apparent 
fading of the grandiose programmes of Whitlamism'
(Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Gets Down to the Business of 
Adjusting to the Times', Age, 21 January 1978). Grattan 
believed that although post-mortem committees were 
generally rather ritualistic entities, the NCI had 
possibilities.
33. Milton went on to suggest that the terms of reference were 
drawn up by people, who feared that 'the bold enunciation 
of socialist policy' would 'deny them the government 
corridors of power'. They wanted to tailor party policies
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to voter aspirations 'fed by false hopes and the promise 
of elusive rewards by the advertising moguls'.
34. In 1977 the suggestion of dropping the 'socialisation 
objective' had been floated on the National Executive, 
apparently with the support of Bob Hawke and David Combe 
(see Button, 1981:18 and Tim Herat, 'ALP Left Takes a 
Mauling', Australian, 6 June 1978).
35. The NSW Labor left paper Challenge noted that moves to 
water down or remove the party's 'socialisation objective' 
were usually promoted in terms of 'modernising' the party 
('Challenge for Labor', February 1978). Challenge also 
worried that emergent myths about the 'natural 
conservatism' of the Australian electorate could paralyse 
Labor thought (see also 'What the Election Means',
Tribune, 13 December 1977).
36. He had been FPLP deputy leader (December 1975-December 
1977) and, before that, Minister for Urban and 
Regional Development.
37. See also 'Uren Slams Conservative Propaganda', Challenge, 
February 1978.
38. A striking Australian example was the 'green bans' imposed 
by the Builders Labourers' Federation in Sydney in 
alliance with resident action groups in the early 1970s. 
See, Jakubowicz, 1984.
39. S. Berger (1979:45-6) sees the French Socialist Party of 
the 1970s as 'a partial success story alongside a 
catalogue of missed opportunities' in the general failure 
of left parties to connect with 'new interests' and 'new 
emergent values' in West European electorates. (See also 
Bell and Criddle, 1984:252). However, even in the French 
case, relations with 'new social movements' were 
ambiguous. The French left's response to feminism was 
uneven (S. Berger, 1979:46) and the peace/anti-nuclear 
movement was weak in France and its cause was not embraced 
by the Socialist Party (Hirst, 1985:180, note 2. See also 
D. Johnstone, 1984).
40. Because it 'necessarily involved playing down completely 
the transformative dimension of social democracy'. In 
terms of Wolfe's (1977) concepts, as utilised in Chapter 
12C, this involved a managerial preference for membership 
'de-politicisation' over 'legitimation' to party 
activists. This was particularly so with the 'modell 
Deutschland' (see note 9) and led to the rise of the 
German Green party (see Papadakis, 1984). Sassoon 
(1986:24-5) documents considerable re-evaluation of the
'mode11 Deutschland' approach by the West German Social 
Democrats in the 1980s.
41. The quote is from Hayden's Chamberlain Memorial Lecture, 
University of WA, 2 March 1979. See also 'ALP Needs 
Theorists: Hayden', Canberra Times, 17 March 1979.
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42. Combe added that these experts might not all be ALP 
members.
43. See also Whitlam's (1978:17-9) criticisms of the 
Queensland Branch.
44. Queensland suggested a committee made up of represent­
atives of each Branch.
45. It had issued a hard-hitting statement after the 
election, saying voters were disillusioned with the 
'... mistaken tactics, bad strategies and elitism of 
the parliamentary ALP' (Malcolm Colless, 'Union Blasts 
Labor for Poll Defeat', Australian, 13 February 1978).
46. Button chaired the NCI sub-committee on party 
organisation. The other major sub-committee (which 
examined social trends) was chaired by Blewett.
47. Invoking his former Adelaide University colleague,
Hugh Stretton (1976a) in the process. Blewett 
regarded this book as 'the most powerful, persuasive 
and passionate weapon offered to democratic socialism 
in a generation' (quoted, John Langmore, 'Domestic 
Aid: Stretton's Vision of Social Justice', Age Monthly 
Review, April 1988). On ' Strettonism' and the ALP in 
the late 1970s, see note 2. Langmore adds that 
Stretton's book 'influenced Labor's preparation for 
government in the late '70s'. The ALP-ACTU Accord 
'was inspired by Stretton's recommendation for an 
incomes policy'. Stretton's radicalism, however, was 
not easily contained within the framework of 
Australian Labor Managerialism. See Stretton's (1987) 
critique of the Hawke Labor Government.
48. Bob Carr was interviewed on the same Four Corners 
programme, which looked at the Kemp thesis.
49. Later, Blewett (1982:49) argued that Australian neo­
conservatism had some successes during the Fraser 
regime, partly because Labor 'offered no clear 
philosophical alternative'. This was fairly vaguely 
argued. Its policy implications were not 
explored,although some dissatisfaction with social 
democratic capitulation to the nostrums of 'sound 
economic management' was indicated (see also Blewett, 
1983). Earlier, Blewett (1973a:360) suggested Labor 
should see its parliamentary opponents as 'the front 
men for powerful forces long nourished by the 
conservative hegemony and sustained by a capitalist 
and conformist culture'. It was the latter 'subtle, 
pervasive and dangerous' forces that posed 'the real 
threat to Labor'. This sort of argument won 
widespread support within the ALP, in the wake of the 
events of 11 November 1975 (see note 15).
50. Which included 'an Anglo-Saxon distrust of theory' and 
a 'stubborn pragmatism' which often degenerated into 
opportunism and crude anti-communism. By gutting
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'democratic socialism' of 'vision and idealism',
Whitlam's 'new revisionism' reinforced this older 
Laborist pragmatism.
51. One of the problems with Catley and McFarlane's (1974) 
category is its failure to dis-aggregate 'Technocratic 
Laborism', of which there were a number of versions. 
Blewett had been radicalised by his participation in 
protests against the Vietnam War (see Robert Milliken,
'The Man in the Medicare Hot Seat', National Times, 1 
April 1983).
52. Blewett saw 'participatory democracy' as the Victorian 
Socialist Left's 'most interesting contribution to 
socialist thought'.
53. He was involved in an unsuccessful move to increase branch 
participation in preselection in 1974 (Eric Franklin, 
'Conference of Challenge', Advertiser, 22 June
1974). Franklin commented that although academics had 
done much to lift Labor's horizon their judgement was not 
wholly trusted because they were 'regarded as theorists 
rather than down-to-earth practical men'. A premature 
realpolitik epitaph for the NCI?
54. The strength of egalitarian sentiment (i.e. white, male 
egalitarian sentiment), the weakness of 'civil society' 
and the state's regulatory role in Australian 'marsupial 
capitalism' (Brugger and Jaensch, 1985:76) are all 
important in this context.
55. On 'initiative' and 'resistance' see Mayer, 1956, 1966a
and 1969a; Rawson, 1964b, 1968 and 1969; Goot, 1969 and 
Head, 1985.
56. Emy's (1974) 'diffusion' model of an Australian 
political culture dominated by 'producer groups' relies on 
a similar analysis (see also Miller, 1954:52-7 and 110-8; 
Collins, 1985 ) .
57. In his Boyer Lectures, Encel (1971:7) explored 'the 
conversion of Australia from a society dominated by its 
rural hinterland to an affluent, urban, industrial 
country'.
58. Modernisation theory's functionalist sociologism made 
explicit what was implicit in much political science 
analysis of 'modern', an-ideological, catch-all electoral 
competition.
59. See his account of 'the managerial style of political 
discourse' as a consequence of the 'information society' 
(Encel, 1984b:6).
60. Furthermore, Encel's fascination with Daniel Bell's 
arguments about the 'end of ideology' and the 'post­
industrial society' was always tinged with criticism 
(see Encel, 1981) .
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61. Contrasting 'The Decade of Decision' ( 1939-49)' with 'The 
Politics of Irresponsibility' which followed. Here he 
switches from determinist, 'adaptation' analysis to a 
voluntarist emphasis on the strategy of political leaders 
and their bureaucratic advisers.
62. Encel (1964b:25) thought the federal policy committees 
functioned particularly poorly, being ill-equipped for
. technocratic politics. He had served on the education 
committee (ALP, 1963:8). Encel's support for Whitlam's 
drive to rationalise ALP policy formulation helped bring 
him into direct conflict with Calwellian Labor (see Encel, 
1978a:53-5), with Calwell abusing him, under cover of 
parliamentary privilege in his farewell speech to the 
House of Representatives (on 11 October 1972).
63. Osmond praised Encel's analysis of nationalism, 
imperialism, racism and militarism in Australia. Encel 
(1970:208) thought 1960s protest movements stimulated a 
new public role for Australian intellectuals.
64. Much earlier, Encel (1962b:8) argued for party reform 
so Labor could counter 'the growing concentration of 
economic power' in Australia (see also Encel, 1970:318- 
415) .
65. Which could be described as 'the crisis of Cold War 
Liberalism' (Simms, 1982:119-21. See also my discussion, 
note 50, Chapter 9).
66. Therborn (1980:15-6) notes that while the socio-political 
crisis of the 1960s favoured the labour movement and the 
political left, the economic crisis which followed in the 
1970s led to 'division, passivity and demoralisation'.
67. cf Theophanus, 1980:125-6 on the 'rationality-crisis of
the state'.
68. Like Blewett, Encel could be described as a radical 
'technocratic Laborist'. Both were sympathetic to
'Strettonism'. See note 47.
69. See Michelle Grattan, 'John Button: Life and Soul of the 
Party', Age, 16 April 1979.
70. He was, after all, deputy leader in the Senate (and 
therefore an ex officio Federal Executive member) and a 
high profile shadow minister.
71. Before that, he had been on the 'Jordan ticket' in 1964 
(see note 22, Chapter 5).
72. This was after control of the Victorian Branch had been 
radically altered by federal intervention in 1970-71 
(discussed in Chapter 13A).
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73. See John Button, 'The Awful Truth about Politics in the 
1950s', Labor Comment, January/February 1968 and 
'Migrants: Votes to Work For', August/September 1967).
See also Button, 1986:38-9.
74. He decried what he called a 'Play it again, Sam' mood.
75. Similar lessons from the Whitlam years were drawn by 
Gareth Evans (1986:171-5) who argued they showed Labor 
could not govern successfully without being primarily 
preoccupied with economic management, closely co-operating 
with the ACTU and giving careful consideration to the 
machinery of government.
76. Which themselves were changing with the dissolution of 
previously accepted 'Keynesian' verities (see Hughes,
1980; Whitwell, 1986).
77. Murray (1976:36) criticised Labor politicians for their 
remoteness from management processes, finance and 
administration. For another early statement of 'Labor 
Managerialism', see Helmer, 1976.
78. For earlier Participant endorsement of the 'convergence 
thesis', see note 35, Chapter 8.
*
79. As Tracy (1983) documents in the British case.
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CHAPTER 11
1. Although submissions were not always easy to distinguish 
from other contributions (letters, papers etc.).
2. These included calls for a Labor newspaper. 'Media bias'
was a sore point for Labor at this time. Richie Gun 
(defeated candidate for Kingston, SA) suggested Australian 
papers were 'as objective and reliable as Pravda and 
Isvestia' (Submission 230. See also Elliott, 1978). The 
NCI thought 'media bias' was real, but felt a Labor paper 
would be bound to fail (ALP, 1979:7). Labor could 
approach the mainstream media more professionally and 
could make better use of its own media outlets (mainly 
radio stations). A national Labor newspaper was an old 
Labor dream (see Crisp, 1978:81-97). In 1976 the National 
Executive considered a plan for a Labor Media Investments 
Fund and a national newspaper (see Garry O'Neill, 'ALP 
Plans Newspaper - Officials Study Media Investment Fund', 
Australian, 13 August 1976; Michelle Grattan, 'Labor
Studies "Super" Plan to Enter Media', Age, 13 August 1976).
3. Frontbenchers contradicted each other. Whitlam canvassed a 
payroll tax that had not been discussed within the party 
(see Butler, 1979:12-3; Weller, 1979:61-3).
4. For outline of 'garbage can' model of organisations, see 
Cohen et al. (1972). My application of the model to the 
NCI draws on Olsen's (1976) analysis of reorganisation in 
universities and March and Olsen's (1983) study of formal 
attempts to reorganise the US federal bureaucracy. D. 
Stephens (1979) pioneered the application of 'garbage can' 
analysis to the ALP.
5. See Chapter 1.
6. Some also considered whether Australia had a comprador 
class .
7. An NCI member, albeit an inactive one (see Encel, 1979:1).
8. Programmes which had precious little to do with 'socialism', 
Ducker implied (see also Carr, nd).
9. Thus it was reluctant to co-operate. We could recall 
Wyndham's difficulties extracting information from the 
states in 1964-5.
10. This was largely because of the NSW right's union strength 
(see Rawson, 1981:13), which Ducker personified. A 
section of the NSW left wanted more branch representation 
at state conference (about 50 percent instead of about 40 
percent). Some submissions reflected this (see also 
Rod Cavalier, letters to Sydney Morning Herald, 22 
September and 1 October 1979; John Carson, 'A Case for 
Ending the Union Nexus', Challenge, January 1980). The
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dominant view on the Steering Committee, itself heavily 
influenced by the left unions in the ALP, accepted the 
status quo on this question (see Tom Uren, letter to 
Sydney Morning Herald, 29 September 1979. See also '60:40 
and Class Ideology' (BWIU letter), Challenge, February
1981 and Renfrey Clark, 'Reply to Rod Cavalier: Why
Unions Must Control the Labor Party', Direct Action, 25 
October 1979.
11. Different conflicts, debates, power plays and factional 
situations in the two Branches provided different 
contexts. Submissions varied accordingly.
12. See especially the contributions from Peter Beattie and 
Denis Murphy (Submissions 11 and 275). Beattie appended 
proposals from the 'Queensland ALP Reform Committee', a 
body formed in late 1977. Murphy, an historian, noted 
that Queensland branch membership was at its lowest since 
1932. When the 'new regime' emerged in Queensland,
Beattie became secretary and Murphy president. In defence 
of the 'old guard', C. Nolan (Electrical Trades Union) 
alleged the reformers were subverting the 'worker need' 
base of the ALP (Submission 200).
13. See also Bob Carr, 'Hayden's Power Base Turns Left', 
Bulletin, 14 July 1981.
14. Although John Button (an ex officio National Executive 
member) took a prominent part in the NCI. See Chapter 
10C.
15. Jaensch (1983:113) explains this concept. Allan (1980) 
makes interesting use of it to examine the Victorian 
ALP in the 1960s.
16. This mechanism enabled parliamentarians to escape the 
obligations of Caucus solidarity expected in the party.
It was used during legislation on homosexuality as well 
as abortion.
17. Submissions 88-91 likewise found their way to the NCI from 
the in-tray of Senator Geoff McLaren (SA). Submission 117 
began life as a letter to Senator Jean Melzer.
00rH See
217,
submissions
261.
16, in 46, 92, 94, 105, 108, 111, 141,
19. See Submissions 21, 46, 83, 110, 111 , 112, 118, 185, 191,
256, 261 and 285. Intra-party submissions did not 
question the principle of union affiliation, although some 
quibbled with the ratio of union to branch delegates at 
state conferences.
20. Multi-culturalism was a distinct challenge to old Laborist 
'mono-cultural' assumptions, but ethnic politics took many 
forms. Defence of ethnic identity could be linked to 
conservative as well as radical politics (see Turner,
1987 :82-4 ) .
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21. Submission 66.
22. Submission 176.
23. Submission 179. CAMP was a gay rights group.
24. Submission 243. See note 19.
25. Submission 273.
26. Submissions 189 and 252.
27. The NCI was also contacted by opponents of 
'permissiveness' (Submissions 109, 121, 136; the first 
from a WA 'Christian Action in Government' Senate 
candidate), complainants about 'vocal minority groups'
(14, 302) and racists nostalgic for 'White Australia' (27, 
86, 190). These submissions did not link into internal 
ALP debates in the way that the 'new social movement' ones 
did. Invitations to the 'general public' to send 
submissions were always likely to appeal to the odd crank 
or two.
28. See, e.g. 'Beliefs of the ALP', Canberra Times, 12 June 
1978 .
29. But the NCI wanted to be able to claim it was listening to 
'the community' as well as to ALP members.
30. In general, relying on written submissions as a guide to 
decisions can lead to bias in favour of the educated, the 
articulate and the 'middle-class' (see Sjoberg et al.,
1966 ) .
31. Keon-Cohen was writing on behalf of the Annandale (Sydney) 
branch Labor and the Electorate Committee, set up in 
response to the NCI.
32. A Social Studies lecturer at Mount Gravatt College of 
Advanced Education.
33. A side-effect of this was that West German political 
scientists were provided with considerable information on 
topics such as the 'middle classing' of the SPD; 
information which could only be arrived at through 
considerably more laborious routes for parties such as the 
British Labour Party (see Hindess, 1971 and 1982b;
Whiteley, 1983) and the ALP (see Ward, 1987, a study based 
on an analysis of occupational data recorded on Victorian 
ALP membership tickets). Von Beyme (1985:170) suggests 
that party analysis of its own membership has become 
increasingly important in western democracies generally in 
recent times. However, the trend seems to have taken on 
much more in some countries than in others.
34. See also Hayden, 1980:241.
35. See, e.g. note 2, Chapter 9.
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36. So 'the impression of wisdom being delivered from on 
high' could be avoided.
37. Which were also touched on in DP 5 and DP 10.
38. Amongst those opposed to Hawke's pre-publication amendment
were Harry Hauenschild (Queensland 'old guard') and Jim 
Roulston (Victorian Left), (Michael Gordon, 'Labor to Tell 
What's Wrong', Age, 10 April 1979). Peter Bowers thought
the opposition to publication was based more on anti-media 
than anti-reform sentiment ('Change Comes Slowly to a 
Factional and Volatile ALP', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 
April 1979). Other commentators were more alarmist (e.g. 
Malcolm Colless, 'Labor Throws Proposals for Major Reform 
into Limbo', Australian, 10 April 1979.
39. One Executive member admitted he would not like to play a
tape of the discussion to an ALP women's group (Michelle 
Grattan, 'A Shock to the Labor System', Age, 11 April
1979 ) .
40. The 'new social movements' and the continuing 
transformation of the ALP and, above all, the changed 
economic circumstances all contributed to the broadening 
of Labor debate in the decade 1967-1977. The decline of 
Cold War 'anti-communism' also helped reduce Labor 
intellectual rigidity.
41. At least in relation to liaison with 'new social 
movements'. The NCI did not make any recommendations on 
'socialism' or economic policy which were seen as being 
beyond its brief, although DP 6 had made some suggestions 
that were consistent with Australian Social Democracy,
Mark 2 assumptions (see Chapter 15A).
42. See the discussion of Korpi and Shalev (1979) in Chapter 
6B.
43. See Don Aitkin, 'The Subtle Problems that Labor's Experts 
Have Missed', National Times, 11 June 1978. Some would 
argue the history of Labor in the 1980s bears this out.
44. Labor was thoroughly embroiled in 'the Australian form of 
government' (Lucy, 1985. See also Encel, 1960 and Emy, 
1974 on Labor and the Australian political ethos).
Labor's stubborn federalism illustrated this (see, e.g. 
Whitlam, 1957; Wildavsky, 1961).
45. Anderson (1966) argued for a 'hegemonic' British Labour
Party and advocated a concomitant socialist strategy for 
British civil society. Castles (1978) notes the extent to 
which the Swedish Social Democrats have implanted a 
'social democratic image' of society and changed the 
nature of Swedish 'common sense' in the process. Anderson 
(1961a, 1961b) thought the Swedish Social Democrats fell
short of the sort of 'hegemonic' party he was advocating.
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CHAPTER 12
1. See, e.g. May Pillinger (Roseville, NSW), contribution 
to 'Where Does the Left Go from Here?', Nation Review,
9 February 1978.
2. See Table 3, Chapter 11.
3. Differences between 'traditionalists' and 'trendies' in
the ALP were often seen as reflections of differences 
between 'working class' and 'middle-class' identities. 
However, Ward's (1983) survey of Victorian branch 
secretaries found ideological differences could not be 
pinned down to 'class' background (see also Pervan and 
Mitchell, 1979:153). A 'middle-classing' of the ALP had 
taken place (compare Wilson, nd and Hughes, 1969:39 with 
Hay, 1979:116-7, Ward, 1983, Ward, 1987). Whether this 
accounted for a new branch militancy was more doubtful. 
'Middle-class' party members may have easier access to 
certain politically relevant resources (such as 
education). We could remember Michels' (1962) argument 
that the masses' lack of education was a major reason why 
the party chiefs could lead them astray (see also 
Bottomore, 1984:131-2, 184). However, 'middle-class'
party members do not have any automatic proclivity to 
'participatory' politics. In a number of social 
democratic parties in the 1970s the branch membership did 
become more assertive as it became more 'middle-class'
(see Hine, 1986 : 269). See also Rustin, 1981 and Whiteley, 
1983:44-5 on the British Labour Party and Braunthal, 
1983:47-52 and Kolinsky (1984:84) on the West German 
Social Democrats. In explaining this assertiveness, we 
have to note the political context in which it arose. 
Rather than being a simple consequence of 'middle­
classness' , it can be traced to the impact of the '1968 
generation' of radicals on social democratic parties, at a 
time when their old policy formulae were being eroded by 
'stagflation' and the challenge from a 'new right' 
championing of 'free market' alternatives to bureaucratic 
statism (see Therborn, 1981).
4. Johns, a National Secretariat employee, embraced a strong 
version of the class reductionist argument about cultural 
conflict in the ALP. He suggested many blue-collar 
workers were in need of 're-education' within the ALP, 
which could not afford to reinforce and reproduce the 
authoritarian attitudes they brought into the party from 
workplace and family experiences (Johns, 1983:124).
5. In my characterisation of 'participatory-critical' and 
'passive loyalist' orientations to membership activity, I 
have drawn on Hine, 1986 :269; Whiteley, 1983 :44-5 ; 
Braunthal, 1983:47-52 and Kolinsky, 1984:84. They all 
note the increase in 'participatory-critical' membership 
pressure within social democratic parties such as the 
British Labour Party and the West German Social Democratic
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Party. They contrast this assertiveness with an earlier 
more passive concept of party membership revolving around 
election campaigns. 'Passive loyalists' trusted their 
leaders. Between elections 'passive loyalist' branches 
tended to be dormant.
6. Blackburn North branch lamented that the party structure 
fell short of what one might hope for from Labor's 
'great theme' of 'comradeship and fraternal involvement'.
7. Interestingly one union submission wanted branches and 
electorate councils to be given 'a more purposeful role' 
(Submission 3, AMWSU). The new assertiveness in the 
branch sector had some union support. Branch rights 
sentiment did not generally lead to an attack on union 
affiliation and its impact on ALP organisation 
(although see note 10, Chapter 11).
8. See Submissions 72 and 222, Springwood-Falconbridge 
and Nelson Bay branches, both NSW.
9. See, e.g. Submissions 258 and 299 from Greensborough 
branch, Vic and East Sydney branch, NSW. Drummoyne 
branch (NSW) wanted similar FEC access to the national 
policy committees (Submission 242). For full text of 
Wyndham Report, see Appendix I.
10. Tom Uren thought they should be circulated nine to 
twelve months prior to Conference.
11. See Submissions 129, 134, 145 and 299 from Werriwa FEC 
(NSW), Seaford Pines branch (Vic), Tuggeranong branch 
(ACT) and East Sydney branch (NSW).
12. As a further boost to the 'lay' party, Manly wanted 
paid party officials to be ineligible for election to 
the National Executive. Greensborough branch (Vic) 
suggested the national policy committees should have 
paid research staff (Submission 259).
13. On the Australia Party, see Kemp (1975:153-9) who saw its 
'participatory' structure as an attraction to 'the 
disaffected technocracy'. Don Chipp's Australian 
Democrats, founded in 1977, had more electoral impact, 
securing a parliamentary foothold (in the Senate), which 
had eluded the Australia Party. Its 'small-1' liberal 
stance included an opening to some 'new social movement' 
concerns (especially environmentalism), but on the major 
economic issues, it sometimes seemed more worried by 'big' 
unions than by 'big' business (see Edwards, 1985).
14. Lithgow left the mechanics of membership consultation open 
(Submission 154). There could be postal ballots or ones 
organised through the branches. The Hills District Branch 
(also NSW) wanted regular membership opinion polls 
(Submission 163).
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15. Olsen (1976) emphasises that institutional reorganisation 
programmes often generate a 'participation ideology' as 
they are being formulated, yet this is often followed by 
indifference to the new participation opportunities they 
institutionalise. He suggests the right to participate 
seems more valued than participation itself. Furthermore, 
the right to participate often serves as a 'garbage can' 
for a host of intra-organisational antagonisms and 
resentments.
16. Bain did not envisage the branches becoming 'umbrella 
social action groups'. They could however respond more to 
'issues of concern to residents'.
17. See, e.g. Submission 166, Randwick North branch, NSW. 
However, most seats were 'safe' for one of the three 
major parties and the battle for 'marginal' seats rested 
mainly on national factors.
18. For example, Progress Associations, Parents and Citizens 
Associations. Many ALP members would have been already 
involved in such bodies as individuals. Research, 
however, suggests that Liberal Party members were more 
likely than ALP members to be involved in established 
'community' organisations (Walker, 1976:51-2; Rawson,
1958 :51-2 . See also Robertson, 1965 : 16 and Aimer, 1973).
19. If approached sensitively and subtly. See Submissions 144 
and 206, Belconnen Branch (ACT and Hotham FEA (Vic.).
20. See, e.g. Submission 135, Oatley branch, NSW.
21. Wentworth FEC (NSW) thought branches could produce local 
field research packages (Submission 257, prepared by a 
special sub-committee).
22. Because of the ways in which it implied that Labor should 
be transformed by 'new social movement' practices.
23. Horne (1981:128) later noted the lack of 'any active 
community base' for the ALP and Australian unions was a 
major point of contrast between the Australian and Swedish 
labour movements. He thought this was an area where the 
Australians could learn from the successful Swedes. Scase 
(1977:72) made a similar comparison between the British 
and Swedish labour movements. There were many voluntary 
associations directly related to the Swedish labour 
movement. Britain lacked 'a similar set of institutions', 
which developed out of the labour movement and were 
'salient to the non-work lifestyles of manual workers.
Most Swedish communities had their folkets hus (people's 
house) which offered a range of social, educational and 
recreational facilities,(Scase, 1977:53. See also Esping-
Andersen, 1985:19-20; Linton, 1985). In the 1960s, Horne 
had invoked Australian 'suburbia' against what he saw as 
an authoritarian labour movement (Rowse, 1978:208-9, 
214-7). By the late 1970s, he was celebrating the social
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democratic potential of Australian 'suburbia' (as had 
Stretton, 1976a before him). Interestingly, Horne's 
fellow 'New Critic' from the 1960s, Craig McGregor 
(1966:196), had argued back then that the ALP, dominated 
by unions had 'failed to build up the widespread community 
support at local level which has helped give overseas 
Social Democratic parties a wide social base'. Rowse 
(1978) makes some pertinent points about the conservative- 
populist logic in the 1960s 'New Critic' literature, but 
his own class essentialism leads him to dismiss all talk 
of 'community' as a bourgeois trap, a diversion from the 
class struggle. This is particularly noticeable in his 
dismissal of Stretton's work (Rowse, 1978:263). 
Interestingly, reflection on 'new social movements' seems 
to have modified Rowse's (1985) stance, while 
radicalising, in different ways, Horne (1981) and McGregor 
( 1983 ) .
24. See also Aitkin, 1982:283.
25. Mathews thought the prospects for constitutional reform 
were remote. The concern with 'missed opportunities' for 
party reform was an old Mathews theme, which had recurred 
in his 1960s endeavours within the Victorian Branch, which 
had brought him into such conflict with the state 
executive (see Chapters 5D, 7D and 8D. However, by 1977 
he believed that tidying up the branches was no longer 
enough, although he still put a high premium on it. Labor 
had to develop a new radicalism. This attitude seems to 
have been partly a product of despair. Mathews returned 
to a more conventional stance as Labor's electoral 
position improved. He later went on to effusively 
celebrate Labor Managerialism ('The Gradualists', Lobby, 
Spring 1984. See also Mathews, 1981).
26. Every year 'dissatisfaction with the tedium and lack of 
political content' of ALP branch life led to new members 
disappearing fairly quickly, as well as long-term members 
dropping out.
27. This was similar to the NCI analysis, although the NCI 
emphasised the electoral importance of a 'mass party' ALP 
(ALP, 1979:2). Wilenski (1980b:412) thought the NCI 
recommendations did little more than 'scratch the surface 
of the problem'.
28. We have already noted Labor intellectuals' fondness for 
'the dominant ideology thesis' as an explanation for the 
party's woes in 1975 and afterwards (see note 15, Chapter 
10). For a critique of the theoretical foundations of 
'the dominant ideology thesis', see Abercrombie, Hill and 
Turner, 1980. Ironically partisan ALP versions of the 
'dominant ideology' analysis reproduce much of Kemp's 
(1980) argument about a conservative Australian consensus. 
The idealist emphasis on 'values' as a source of social 
stability downplays the significance of organisation and 
political struggle (see Chamberlain, 1983 and Mann, 1970).
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29 . See also Wilenski, 1981:37; Macintyre, 1976. Australian 
parties had become little more than 'nurseries, electoral 
agents and policy advisers of politicians' (Parker,
1980:19; quoted, Wilenski, 1981:37). Earlier Emy (1974) 
had seen the eclipse of party and the centrality of 
sectoral interests as defining features of the Australian 
polity. Wilenski did not specify which 'great parties of 
the European left', Labor could learn from. He was an 
admirer of the Swedish Social Democrats (see Wilenski, 
1983). In terms a lively 'party culture', there were 
lessons to be learned from the Italian Communist Party, 
lessons which Rustin (1981) and Hobsbawm (1982) drew for 
the British Labour Party. Hine (1977) suggested the 
Italian Communist Party had some 'social democratic' 
characteristics, despite its problems in presenting itself 
as a potential party of government. Pierson (1986:87-128) 
draws interesting comparisons between Swedish Social 
Democracy and Italian Communism. On the ALP right, Carr 
(nd) invoked the West German Social Democratic Party. It 
had traditions of membership mobilisation, but had 
decisively broken with those traditions at Bad Godesberg 
in 1959. In the 1970s, an emphasis on 'economic 
management' left little room for membership mobilisation 
(Markovits, 1986:96. See also Braunthal, 1983).
30. It dated this divorce to the February 1975 Federal 
Conference. Henty FEA (Vic) complained that the Whitlam 
Government listened to academic and journalistic advisers 
rather than the Labor 'rank and file'.
31. Uren suggested 'politicisation' and 'activation' of the 
party membership required the integration of 'analytical 
discussion at FEC level, party education, stronger union 
links and internal bulletins (see also Arthur Gietzelt, 
'What Chance for the Left', Nation Review, 2 March 1978).
32. The submission was entitled 'There is an Alternative'.
The signatories were mainly from the left, but also 
included John Dawkins, Barry Jones and Susan Ryan. See 
also 'Labor MPs Come Out Fighting', Challenge, April 1978.
33. Uren (1978) emphasised that this was something that was 
impressed on him by his experience in the Whitlam 
Government.
34. See also Submissions 171, 250 and 251 from Tom Uren MHR, 
Auburn branch (Vic) and Ballarat FEA (Vic).
35. See the discussion on changes in the NSW left (the 
Steering Committee) in Cavalier (1976).
36. This contrast between passive and plodding political party
routine and 'new social movement' vibrancy is echoed in 
Sassoon's critique of Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) 
in Britain. Passing resolutions to keep themselves busy 
between elections they act only as an internal pressure 
group: 'A resolution is a proposition that someone else
does something or other' (see also Hain, 1981:190-2).
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Sassoon argues that CLPs did not present new or original 
demands, but served as a Discount House recycling demands 
from unions and 'new social movements' (see also Samuel and 
Stedman Jones, 1982:327 and Macpherson, 1987:97-9).
37. As well as 'special interest lobbies' and 'new radical 
movements of urban protest and direct action'. See also N. 
Young, 1977:Ch 4.
38. As an a priori 'class alliance'. This is further discussed 
in Chapter 15C.
39. See also Vincent Basile, 'State Labor Moves Left', Age, 20 
March 1978.
40. Connell was aligned with the NSW Left. In the 1960s he had 
advocated a 'participatory' version of the Whitlam/
Wyndham project, combined with better use of the media.
See Chapter 9D.
41. Even a 'defensive struggle' seemed a bit adventurous for 
Labor Managerialism. For a more recent analysis, see 
Connell, 1986:33-5.
42. And a rather simplistic two-class model at that (see 
Beilharz, 1985).
43. Held in Sydney.
44. For theoretical exploration of these 'new contradictions' 
see Laclau and Mouffe, 1981 and 1985:160-3; Offe, 1984 
and Lash, 1987.
45. See Hirschman's (1970) classic model of 'exit', 'voice' 
and 'loyalty'. See also Seile and Svasand, 1983:227-8 and 
Whiteley, 1983:44-5.
46. She suggested groups focussing on industry and employment 
art/propaganda, journalism, education, medicine and 
health, law and civil liberties, women, aboriginals, 
uranium. Her list had a 'new social movement' flavour, 
although not exclusively. One could imagine various ways 
of organising intra-party special interest groups.
Compare Braunthal's (1983:137-8) analysis of the situation 
in the West German Social Democratic party (where assoc­
iations were officially established for women, workers and 
the self-employed, alongside the branch structures) with 
Rustin's (1981:39-42) advocacy of 'pluralisation' within 
the British Labour Party as an imaginative alternative to 
that party's organisational status quo.
47 See also Jena Hamilton, 'The Liberal Machine - Have You 
Thought Lately What We Are Up Against', Labor Star, 17 
July 1978.
48. The NCI stressed that 'the interests of certain groups and 
communities' that were vital to Labor's future had secured 
'little or no representation at the National Conference'.
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The most obvious of these are women, the ethnic 
communities and rural electorates' (APSA, 1979:8).
49. See also Stretton, 1976a:73.
50. See also Lucy, 1979:78-9.
51. See Chapter 11A.
52. See also Close, 1972:12-3.
53. For an 'official' NSW Branch attempt to juggle these 
imperatives, see Rod Wise, 'Interesting Branch Meetings', 
Radical, October 1977. Interestingly, it endorsed CPSs 
1-3. Wise was the NSW Branch education and research 
officer.
54. Wolfe thought parties sacrificed internal 'legitimaticn' 
for 'depoliticisation' because of the priority they gave 
to serving 'the state'. As the state served contradictory 
functions, so did the parties which served the state. 
Wolfe's (1978) own analysis of social democracy is rather 
one-dimensional, stressing its integration into the 
capitalist state. Theoretically, however, his notion of 
party schizophrenia is more open-ended and can be 
incorporated into our 'complex arena' model.
55. A distinction between 'genuine' and 'non-genuine' politics 
is central to Wolfe's analysis, but sometimes seems rather 
slippery. Wolfe (1974:148) argued that capitalist 
societies were characterised by 'alienated' politics in 
which the 'totally frivolous' displaced the 'ultimately 
political' (see also Offe, 1972:84-5 and 92; Therborn, 
1978:113, 121). The 'genuine'/'non-genuine' dichotomy 
runs through Wolfe's (1982) analysis of a 'mobilization 
vacuum' in US politics and his (1986) critique of 
'inauthentic democracy'. It is not always clear whether 
Wolfe believes that 'genuine' politics can be achieved 
through party transformation from-within or whether 
parties as we know them are irredeemably enmeshed in 'non- 
genuine' forms of politics. He does, however, seem to 
tend towards the latter view. He calls on citizens to 
'hoard' their political capacities and 'refuse to 
participate in the organized rituals that go under the 
name of politics in late capitalist society' (Wolfe, 
1977:344. See also his critique of voting in Wolfe, 
1986:72). However, there is also his rather ambiguous 
suggestion that 'if a genuinely political party were to be 
created, its role would be unique and consequently its 
tasks could not be derived from existing institutions 
called parties' (Wolfe, 1977:345). Wolfe suggests 
existing parties are confined within the logic of 'the 
capitalist state'. This would lead to scepticism about 
party reform projects. Our 'complex arena' model of party 
activity would see the tension between 'legitimation' and 
'depoliticisation' as a real one within parties (at least 
those with some pretensions towards internal democracy) 
rather than a predictable 'Punch and Judy' puppet-show
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ritual, in which 'legitimation' always seems to get 
clobbered by the forces of pragmatism, electoral 
realpolitik and the capitalist state (as, e.g. Macpherson, 
1977:113-4,seems to suggest). Writers like Wolfe seem to 
write about parties with what Johnston (1986:128) 
describes as the 'evangelistic criteria' of a 'totalistic 
conception of politics' (see also Buci-Glucksmann,
1983:24). Behind these criteria lurk the Holy Grail of a 
notion of 'genuine' politics. The search for such a Holy 
Grail can be abandoned, while retaining the notion of 
tension between 'legitimation' and 'depoliticisation' as a 
concept guiding an analysis of parties as 'complex 
arenas'.
56. To use the phrase put forward in Jim Bulpitt's (1976) 
discussion of British local parties (as quoted, Ware, 
1979:88). Such a culture was integral to the Labor 
'deferential loyalism' described earlier in this chapter.
57. On the contradictory orientations towards 'civil society' 
and 'the state' embodied within competitive parties, see 
Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987:192 and Wolfe, 1986:64). This 
distinction helps us to understand the tensions which 
occur between parties in their 'rational-efficient' mode 
and the occasions when they find themselves concerned with 
'party democracy' (as noted by Wright, see Chapter 1A).
For an earlier analysis of the ALP that relies on a 
similar contrast, see Houseman, 1971. There the party as 
'electoral machine' is regularly contrasted with the party 
as 'movement'. See Chapters 5C and 9D.
58. Ware (1979:81,123) suggests that identification with 
particular ideologies and restricting participation in the 
nomination of candidates to party members only tend to 
'close' parties from issue-oriented activists. However, 
the relationship between social democratic parties and 
'new social movements' suggests that such activists have 
ways of influencing parties, whatever their structure. An 
openness to new currents in 'civil society' can occur 
without the institutional mechanism of the US-style 
'primary' (see Held, 1987:298).
59. See DP 1 Responses 11 and 69 from B. Keon-Cohen and Bronte 
branch, both NSW. See also John Birch, 'National 
Conference - A Background', Challenge, October 1978).
60. See DP 1 Responses 3, 23, 41 an,d 70 from Casuarina branch, 
NT; Dandenong branch; Alexandra-Eldon branch and Kew 
branch. The latter three were all from Victoria.
61. Not all the responses were numbered.
62. President, WA branch, 1959-76, state opposition leader, 
1976-78 (Mitchell, 1983:174).
63. See Table 7, Chapter 11. When DP 1 came out, the NCI 
still had novelty value.
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64. Branches felt more competent discussing their own 
operations than their hypothetical role in a reformed 
National Conference.
65. Randwick North branch (NSW) told the committee that, 
following its examination of DP 3, it had completely 
changed the format of its meetings (DP 3 Response.
See also DP 3, Response, Sutherland branch, NSW).
Randwick North also hoped to get involved in local 
community organisations.
66. See also DP 3, Response, Watsonia branch, Vic.).
67. Wentworthville objected to the DPs being released to 
the media months before they reached branches.
68. Without adequate research, generalisations about the 
branches were unreliable. The ALP's 'problem' here was 
similar to that of the British Labour Party where 'nothing 
at all' was known about 'how far the organisational charts 
mapped in various sets of model rules' corresponded to 
actual behaviour (Race, 1971:7). A lot of very basic 
research was needed. It could point to the ways things 
were going in the membership, who joined and why, etc.
(Race, 1971:10). See also note 31, Chapter 11).
*
69. As had the notion of membership ballots on policy matters.
70. That is why it is not listed in Table 3, Chapter 11.
71. See also Submissions 177, 232, 233, 266, 278 and 290 from 
Belmont branch, Vic; Cobar branch, NSW; Bald Hills 
branch, Qld; Blackburn North branch, Vic; Henty FEA, Vic 
and Macarthur FEC, NSW.
72. Hine's (1982) analysis of parties in Western Europe sees a 
correlation between measures aimed at party 
democratisation and a subsequent increase in factionalism.
73. The new National Executive sub-committee was to monitor 
membership and affiliation trends, take charge of 
recruitment and party education programmes and foster 
debate. It was not asked to take up the research tasks 
foregone by the NCI, although monitoring membership and 
affiliation trends could lead it in that direction.
74. Although Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2's project of 
Labor/'new social movement' liaison did register some 
significant successes, this was within a context where 
Labor Managerialism was becoming the party's dominant 
orientation. See Chapter 14C. Australian Social 
Democracy Mark 2's other distinguishing feature, its new 
Labor-socialist critique of the 'mixed economy' failed to 
make much impact on Labor economic policy. See Chapter
15 A .
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CHAPTER 13
1. The National Executive referred the NCI's call for a 
handbook on political education for the branches onto the 
National Campaign Committee ('Decisions of National 
Executive relating to Committee of Inquiry 
Recommendations', Radical, May 1979); a body with a 
distinctly short-term electoral focus (Lloyd, 1983:241).
2. Only the idiosyncratic ACT Branch endorsed it. In the 
ACT, only 13 percent of unionists were members of unions 
affiliated to the ALP (Warhurst, 1983:259), by far the 
lowest percentage for any Branch.
3. For critical discussion of this notion see F. Parkin, 
1982:105-8; Therborn, 1978:143.
4. See Beetham, 1974:111; F. Parkin, 1982:106; Mommsen,
1981.
5. Rather than being 'plucked from the air' in some 
'exercise by committee'.
6. Whereas Button suggested 'it might be a very good thing' 
if it was not known who would control a reformed 
Conference. The party should assume 'some good will and 
good faith' in its membership. Button's membership of a 
minority faction enabled him to cast a sceptical eye on 
the power games of the major factions. See Chapter 10C.
7. 25 in the McMullan plan, 50 in the Combe plan.
8. The McMullan proposals gave NSW 15 delegates; Vic, 13; 
Qld, 10; SA, eight; WA, eight; Tas, seven; ACT, one 
and NT, one (ALP Conference Documents, 1981). The 
corresponding Hogg figures were: NSW, 35; Vic, 29; Qld, 
21; SA, 16; WA, 16; Tas, 13; ACT, five and NT, four. 
Both assumed additional delegates would be allotted 
according to the number of federal electorates in each 
state/territory. By my calculations the figure for the 
ACT should have been four rather than five in the Hogg 
plan. Perhaps the ACT was being compensated for not 
having a parliamentary leader. Combe favoured an 
allocation according to fees paid to the National 
Executive. Using membership figures from Warhurst 
(1983:258-9) this would have given NSW, 26 delegates;
Vic, 18; Qld, 13; SA, 13; WA, 10; Tas, seven; ACT, one 
and NT, one. When added to the eleven parliamentary 
leaders (retained in all proposals) and the AYL delegate 
(retained by McMullan and Combe), this would have made a 
99-delegate Conference, as there are problems with the 
mathematics of the plan for a 100-delegate Conference on 
this basis. Delegates found such problems with the 
formula they eventually agreed on: a 100-delegate 
Conference based on the number of federal electorates in 
each state/territory. This yielded a 99-delegate 
Conference in which NSW had 23 delegates; Vic, 19; Qld, 
14; SA, 10; WA, 10; Tas, eight; ACT, two and NT, one.
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9. Which one delegate described as 'a marriage of the worst 
propositions' (Bill Landeryou, ALP Transcript, 1981:209).
10. The Victorian suggestion specifically allowed for 
proportional representation and built-in provision for 
women and other 'representative sectors' (ALP 
Conference Documents, 1981).
11. The NCI plan reserved places for 27 parliamentarians (the 
FPLP executive and the SPLP leaders) in a Conference of 
310 delegates (8.71 percent) and specifically barred 
federal parliamentarians from representing FECs (see Table 
2, Chapter 12). If the latter was to be fair, the ACT 
Branch argued, there should be a further delegation of 
FPLP backbenchers, directly elected by Caucus (ALP 
Conference Documents, 1981).
12. It was the largest union in the country, affiliated to
every ALP Branch except the ACT. It wanted a Conference 
with 89 delegates: 12 from each state, two from each
territory, two from AYL and the 11 parliamentary leaders 
(ALP Conference Documents, 1981).
13. The union movement was 'about as remote' from national 
Conference 'as the royal wedding tomorrow night'.
14. Guaranteed representation for these groups would force 
Branches to amend their own operations (see also Bob'Hogg, 
ALP Transcript, 1981:199).
15. Here he mentioned the Catholic Church, the Masonic Lodge 
and BHP.
16. Hogg noted that many semi-skilled, unskilled and 
process workers were alienated from their union leader­
ship and from the ALP.
17. The NCI did, however, suggest that the national secretary 
be entitled to attend FPLP executive meetings (ALP, 
1979:47). This was rejected by the National Executive
(Radical, May 1979). Bill Hayden had earlier rejected the 
proposal, when David Combe advocated it, in the wake of 
the 1977 defeat (see note 27, Chapter 10). The National 
Executive was wary of infringing on FPLP autonomy 
(Michelle Grattan, 'A Shock to the Labor System', Age, 11 
April 1979). Historically, the Federal Executive had 
often shielded the FPLP from the Branches (Wildavsky,
1961; Rawson, 1954:380). Bill Hayden and the National 
Executive rejected the Combe/NCI view that much of Labor's 
problems in government (1972-75) 'could have been avoided 
if there had been some sort of structural liaison between 
the PLP and the party itself' (David Combe, quoted, 
Michelle Grattan, 'Dash of Realism to Oil Labor's Works', 
Age, 26 April 1977).
18. He said he could not see how moving from one sixth of one 
percent of total membership to one third of one percent
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made representation more democratic (ALP Transcript, 
1981:204).
19. Just before the NCI proposals were considered by the 
National Executive, some ALP sources predicted they could 
lead 'to a concentration of the centre-right factions in 
NSW, Victoria and the ACTU into the dominant force within 
the party' (Malcolm Colless, 'Major Revamp Urged for 
Labor', Australian, 4 April 1979). Such a coalition 
underpinned the Labor Managerialist Hawke ascendancy. It 
was cobbled together in 1982-83 (see Kelly, 1984).
20. From the NCI; Garland, Button, Hayden, Hawke and Young were 
also Conference delegates. Conference did not experience 
the same 'attention vacuum' from the latter three that the 
committee did. Garland's NCI Report co-authors (Blewett, 
Forward and Encel) were not delegates.
21. Richardson's argument echoed the response of one National 
Executive member, who dismissed the NCI proposals on the 
grounds that it was better to look for 'expertise than 
just someone from every electorate (quoted, Stuart Simson, 
'Labor's Long Term Gamble', National Times, 21 April
1979 ) .
22. Hogg's proposal was defeated 33-16.
23. Encel suggested the fossil's grey matter was distributed 
in tiny pockets across its huge frame, an image derived 
from Eggleston (1953:75. See also Encel, 1962a:175, note 
1 and 1964b:24). This imagery had obvious appeal for 
those who wanted to argue Labor had failed to 'adapt' 
adequately to changes in Australian society.
24. We have already noted similarities between Encel's 
'operative concept' of the Australian state and Emy's 
'diffusion' model of a 'producer group' dominated polity 
(note 56, Chapter 10). Both saw older sectoralisms being 
replaced by a more 'modern' and a more 'rational' 
politics. In his depiction of ALP 'irrationality', Emy 
(1974:407, note 5) too drew on Eggleston (1953). For more 
on Eggleston, a more-or-less unique Australian Liberal 
intellectual, see Osmond, 1985.
25. In a similar vein, Clyde Cameron dismissed NSW objections
to having PR imposed on their Branch: 'You have a good
case, Peter, but logic doesn't count here. I've done a 
deal so I have to vote against you, and so do others in 
the deal' (Allan Barnes, 'Cameron's Deal Fixed the 
Machine', Age, 17 April 1971).
26. Ranney had been a member of the Democratic Party's
McGovern-Fraser Commission on Party Reform, which led to 
considerable change, with a higher rate of implementation 
than is usual in such exercises. Schafer (1983) 
chronicles the episode in impressive detail (see also 
Crotty, 1978; Polsby, 1983).
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27. As noted by Dunstan (1964). Dunstan's defence of the ALP 
structure is discussed in Chapter 9B. Advantages of long­
standing Labor arrangements are also noted by D. Stephens
(1979 ) .
28. One NCI member told Peter Bowers that state secretaries 
were like chameleons and suggested that if the committee 
created a climate for reform and 'rank-and-file' pressure 
supported reform, party officials would quickly blend in 
with a new environment ('Change Comes Slowly to a 
Factional and Volatile ALP', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 
April 1979). This exaggerated the impact 'rank-and-file' 
feeling could have on state secretaries, but it did point 
to the way in which changing structures of meaning could 
affect 'numbers' calculations.
29. See Lloyd, 1983:236-7.
30. The key figure was Clyde Cameron, who had formed an 
alliance with Whitlam. This meant Chamberlain's old 
coalition could be broken up. The SA Branch (through 
Cameron and part-time federal secretary Mick Young) 
presented itself as a centrist alternative to the 
Victorian left and the NSW right. Intervention rhetoric 
suggested the SA 'consensus' model might be exported to 
the eastern states.
31. The SA view was that different views could be accommodated
by 'consensus', without formal factional representation. 
Queensland ALP secretary Tom Burns, whose damning report 
on malpractices in the NSW Branch played an important part 
in justifying intervention there, told an advocate of PR 
in NSW: 'We wouldn't have a bar of that in Queensland'
(quoted, 'A Not So Rosy Labor Garden', Sunday Review, 23 
July 1971). His Queensland 'machine' colleague Jack 
Egerton said: 'I don't care what you do with PR voting, 
as long as you keep it south of the border'. At the time, 
however, some commentators discerned a reform mood within 
the ALP that might mean intervention would be quickly 
followed by more thoroughgoing Labor reorganisation (see 
Ken Randall, 'Labor's Newest Wing', Australian, 19 April
1971). This scenario did not come to pass.
32. Earlier, many commentators had heralded the 1969
Conference (with the bloc of parliamentary leaders making 
its first appearance) as the harbinger of a new post- 
factional ALP. See Alan Reid, 'How to Win the Election 
After Next', Bulletin, 7 August 1969; Allan Barnes, 'Old 
Guard Put in the Shade', Age, 4 August 1969. See also 
Oakes and Solomon, 1973:20-1. Labor's gains in the 
federal election later in 1969 brought a new intake into 
the FPLP, which, it was argued, was 'de-factionalised' as 
a result of this influx (see, e.g. Max Walsh, 'Men to 
Watch in "New" Labor Party', Sun-Herald, 31 May 1970). 
Shortly before intervention, David Solomon contrasted the 
'de-factionalised' FPLP with the authoritarian factional 
control manifest in the NSW and Victorian 'machines' 
('Whitlam and Labor Unity', Australian, 15 July 1970).
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33. Hartley began to appreciate the new legitimacy factions 
could claim (see 'Labor's Image More Youthful - Hartley', 
Age, 28 June 1971). Those sponsoring intervention had a 
rather different perspective, apparently wanting the 
appearance of balance without strongly organised factions 
(see 'Fed Sec Calls for an End to Factions', Labor Times, 
April 1971).
34. Right-wing 'heavy' Brian Harradine had been expelled by 
the National Executive in 1975. In the same year all five 
federal seats had been lost (Bass first in a devastating 
by-election). The Rules Committee report sought to ward 
off the possibility of Federal Executive intervention.
Its adoption marked the beginning of a period of 'broad 
left' hegemony in the Branch 'machine'.
35. This was the argument NSW delegates John Docker and Peter 
Westerway had deployed unsuccessfully on the Federal 
Executive in 1970-71 (Kenneth Randall, 'New Rules Give 
More Power to Labor Left', Australian, 16 April 1971). 
State secretary Westerway emphasised the party-managerial 
difficulties of having assistant secretaries from rival 
factions (John Stubbs, 'NSW Executive to Retain its 
Control', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 1971).
Cameron's reply (quoted, note 25) indicated his own 
ambivalence about PR, which he saw as a necessary part of 
the 'deal' he had put together rather than something 
intrinsically desirable.
36. NSW's objections to PR in Queensland rested on a fear that 
this would reduce 'moderate ballast' and strengthen the 
left on the National Executive and at National Conference 
(see Bob Carr, 'Why Ducker is Quitting', Bulletin, 11 
September 1979 and his 'Hayden's Power Base Turns Left', 
Bulletin, 14 July 1981. See also Lucy, 1985:342).
37. Attempts to reduce the 'card vote', while maintaining 
consensus, were proving difficult (Stokes, 1983). The 
'machine' was being challenged by a new organised left 
grouping, the Labor Socialist Committee. At the Special 
Conference, SA delegates argued the 'uniqueness' of its 
'consensus' approach rendered PR unnecessary (see John 
Bannon, ALP Transcript, 1981:162).
38. At the pre-Conference National Executive, left delegates 
sought to defer changing the Conference structure until 
all delegates had been elected by PR ('ALP Seeks to 
Modernise, Strengthen', Australian Financial Review, 27 
July 1981).
39. From Dave Evans, proxy delegate for Ron Davies, WA 
opposition leader.
40. He argued the alternative formula would entrench 'state 
rivalism'.
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41. Of all unionists in NSW, 71 percent belonged to affiliated 
unions, compared to 59 percent in Victoria (Warhurst, 
1983:259). NSW had 20,000 branch members, 0.6 percent of 
the electorate (Warhurst, 1983:258). Victoria had 13,000, 
0.5 percent of the electorate.
42. See also John Green, ALP Transcript, 1981:258.
43. As Chris Schacht (ALP Transcript, 1981:256) had argued.
44. Four right-wing unions were re-admitted to the Victorian 
Branch in 1985 only following threatened National 
Executive intervention (see Anson, 1984).
45. Only 34 percent of Tasmanian unionists were in affiliated 
unions (Warhurst, 1983:259). Dis-affiliations had 
followed the expulsions of Harradine and some of his 
associates.
46. For further discussion on this point, see note 12,
Chapter 16.
47. See also Mick Young, ALP Transcript, 1979:646.
48. On these grounds the Steering Committee opposed NSW head 
office's proposal to centralise membership on 
computerised rolls (see Jan Burnswoods, 'Members' and 
Branches' Rights to be Taken Away', Challenge,
April 1983 ) .
49. SA had 8,050 branch members, 0.9 percent of the 
electorate (Warhurst, 1983:258). About the same 
percentage of unionists belonged to affiliated unions as 
in Victoria (Warhurst, 1983:259).
50. See also Paul Keating, ALP Transcript, 1981:256; Graham
Richardson, ALP Transcript, 1981:261. Keating suggested 
federation was a conspiracy against NSW. He also attacked 
Hogg's use of NCI rhetoric, in terms that resembled 
comments made by Bob McMullan in an earlier debate (see 
note 18). Keating noted that there were thousands of 
members in NSW and Victoria, who would never be 
represented at National Conference (ALP Transcript, ■ 
1981:257): 'Let's understand that and let's not find any
pious logic in delegate Hogg's amendment.
51. A direct line to the FECs was in the National 
Secretariat's institutional interest. In 1965 when he 
advocated increasing state delegations from six to ten as 
part of his interim Conference reform plan, Wyndham wanted 
one place in each delegation reserved for a representative 
of the branches (see Chapter 7A and Appendix I). In 1976 
assistant national secretary Ken Bennett (later an NCI 
member) revived and expanded some of Wyndham's ideas, 
including his long-term aspiration for a Mass Conference 
(Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Cannot Afford to Act Like a 
Loser', Age, 4 October 1976).
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52. Combe argued that such direct representation could help 
branches and FECs focus more directly on policy matters 
(ALP Transcript, 1981:257).
53. He emphasised that the NCI had never considered postal 
ballotting. Some submissions, however, did advocate 
direct membership ballots on policy matters (see 
Chapter 12A).
54. Young seems to have believed that postal ballotting was an 
NCI idea. After Young's speech Button, in a point of 
order, got Combe to point out that his reformulated 
proposal included no reference to postal ballotting. This 
bid to salvage some recognition for the principle of 
direct representation was unsuccessful.
55. I have not included the 1984 figures in Table 4 because 
the candidates' biographies in the 1984 Conference 
documents are incomplete. 21 percent were federal 
parliamentarians, 23 percent state parliamentarians and 
5 percent party officials. Union officials and 'other' 
delegates were not always distinguishable but union 
representation seems to have increased (to about 26 
percent) and branch representation decreased (to about 
24 percent).
56. The 1955 Conference formalised the Split and began a 
period of 'lay' domination, which coincided with electoral 
failure. The afterglow of wartime Labor government 
experience, which allowed a parliamentary majority in 1951 
(Rawson, 1966c:31), lingered in 1953 (53 percent delegates 
parliamentarians, 1951:61 percent). For details 1900-51 
see Crisp, 1978:315.
57. The increase in parliamentary representation in 1969 was 
largely a consequence of the 1967 decision to give 
automatic Conference representation to federal and state 
parliamentary leaders. If we discount this leaders' bloc, 
we find that 42 percent of the remaining delegates were 
parliamentarians. The comparable figures for subsequent 
Conferences (calculated from same sources as Table 5) 
were 1971:41 percent; 1973:41 percent; 1975:49 percent; 
1977:36 percent; 1979:31 percent; 1981:38 percent; 1982:35 
percent and 1984:37 percent.
58. In 1982, a majority of the branch sector delegates were 
women (17 out of 30). The 1981 figure was 5 out of 11.
59. Table 6 also seems to suggest that Bob Hogg's fear of FEC 
representation being dominated by 'middle-class' ALP 
members was well-grounded. See also Hutchison, 1982:8 
(she includes proxy delegates). May-Louise O'Callaghan 
('ALP Sheds its Blue Singlet', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 
July 1986) reports similar findings from a study of recent 
trends in the social composition of ALP National Conference 
delegates by Barry Jones (whom she describes as the party's 
'unofficial sociologist'. In 1986, Jones was Minister for 
Science and Technology in the Hawke Government).
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60. 'Rank-and-file' delegates one year could resurface as 
parliamentarians another year. In both 1979 and 1981, 
endorsed parliamentary candidates combined with those who 
had some local government experience made up a majority of 
'rank-and-file' delegates (see Table 7). Two 1979 
delegates were elected to federal parliament within months 
(Ros Kelly, ACT and John Coates, Tasmania. Coates was a 
former MHR and Kelly had been an ACT MHA). Shortly after 
the 1982 Conference two 'rank-and-file' delegates became 
federal MPs (both male) and two more became state MPs 
(both female). Former Tasmanian MHA John Green was a 
'rank-and-file' delegate in 1981 and 1982. Another 
Tasmanian, Dick Adams, was a state parliamentarian in 
1981, a 'rank-and-file' delegate in 1982 and a union 
official in 1984.
61. The Young Labor delegate and three from Queensland, where 
the 'old guard' had been deposed a year earlier.
62. Five NSW; three Vic; four Qld; one each from SA, WA and 
Tas; and the Young Labor delegate.
63. All but three (one from Victoria and two from Queensland).
64. Including Queensland president Denis Murphy and vice- 
president Joy Ardill.
65. There were 11 in 1981, 21 in 1982.
66. Paul Keating had been a Municipal and Shire Council 
Employees industrial officer before becoming a federal MP 
and SA Premier John Bannon was once an AWU industrial 
advocate. Bannon also served as an adviser to federal 
minister Clyde Cameron (former SA 'machine' leader and AWU 
official) and assistant director of the SA Department
of Labor and Industry (appointed by the state Labor 
government). He became a state MP in 1977, a minister in 
1978, opposition leader in 1979 and Premier in 1982. On 
the peripatetic career patterns of Labor 'information 
specialists', see Encel, 1984b.
67. In 1984 Hamish Linacre (Queensland Teachers Union) and 
Alan Evans (secretary, Tasmanian Public Service 
Association) were delegates.
68. Pauline Papworth (Liquor Trades, Victoria); Jenny Acton 
(ACTU industrial officer (Victoria); Clare Hall (ATMOEA, 
Queensland) and Jeannette O'Keeffe (Cleaning, Security 
and Allied Employees, WA).
69. In 1979 there were only three delegates from outside the
capital cities: Tim Thorne (Launceston, Tas) and the
state leaders from Queensland and SA, Ed Casey and Des 
Corcoran, whose electorates were in provincial Mackay and 
rural Millicent respectively. In 1981 this had been 
reduced to two: Casey and Joy Ardill (Gold Coast, Qld).
In 1982 there were ten such delegates: Casey and Ardill
again, Michael Reynolds (city councillor, Townsville,
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Qld), Margot Paterson (Tasmanian farmer), Bob Collins (NT 
parliamentary leader, who represented outback Arnhem Land) 
plus a NSW quintet (union official Steve Harker and 
teacher Margaret Bowman from Newcastle; sales 
representative Maria Bottomley from the north coast and 
two rural politicians, state minister Terry Sheahan and 
federal candidate David Simmonds).
70. Nearly half the parliamentary delegates and more than 
two-thirds of the 'lay' delegates in 1982 were first-time 
full delegates.
71. 60 percent of the new delegates were union officials and 
'rank-and-file' representatives.
72. As Bill Hartley, a survivor from 1967, pointedly reminded 
delegates (ALP Transcript, 1981:202). The only other 
survivors from the Adelaide Conference were Hartley's 
Victorian factional comrade George Crawford and Col 
Jamieson (WA).
73. The AMWSU had put similar arguments to the NCI 
(Submission 3. See also Submissions 171 and 194 from Tom 
Uren and NSW Labor Women's Committee respectively, 
discussed in Chapter 12A).
74. See Chapter 12B.
75. Garland's suggestion that every single one of 'some 400 
submissions' reflected this climate was rather hyperbolic. 
'Rank-and-file rights' was the major intra-party theme, 
but the submissions were extremely diverse.
76. Tasmania's inability to contribute to the pooled 
travelling expenses meant that it had gone virtually 
unrepresented on the policy committees (see John Green,
ALP Transcript, 1981:273).
77. Adding only an amendment that this should be reviewed in 
1982. The issue was not discussed at the 1982 Conference 
(but see the reference to it in ALP Transcript, 1982:707-8).
78. Up to 1981, only state Branches, unions affiliated in all 
states and groups like Australian Young Labor were 
entitled to add to and/or amend national policy committee 
recommendations. Delegates could also move amendments and 
resolutions from the Conference floor. The Metal Workers 
succeeded in enabling unions affiliated in three states 
and FECs to submit Conference agenda items. They also got 
access to National Executive for unions affiliated in 
three states but such access for FECs was rejected.
79. For full text of 'socialisation objective', see Appendix 
III.
80. Uren saw protests against the Springbok rugby tour in New 
Zealand as the sort of community action he had in mind 
(ALP Transcript, 1981:105). However, the reference was
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vague enough to encompass CPS 2 projects as well, despite 
Combe's complaint that it was framed too narrowly (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:105).
81. ALP branch activity was considerably decentralised. 
Administrative approaches varied from state to state. The 
lack of a reference to community action had not stopped 
ALP members from taking part in Vietnam Moratorium 
marches! State Branch attitudes on such participation 
varied considerably.
82. For my approach to parties as articulations of arenas, I
draw considerably on the work of Hindess (1982a:507-8; 
1983:13, 92-3, 101, 106-7 and 182). On the operations of
decision-making arenas within organisations, see also 
Feldman and March, 1981:177ff.
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CHAPTER 14
1. We have already noted Jim Cairns' role in the Vietnam 
Moratorium demonstrations (Chapter 10B).
2. See Chapter 9D.
3. Jupp suggests that the retirement of Whitlam (in 1978) and 
Dunstan (in 1979) marked the ALP's reversion 'to its 
previous attitudes' at a time 'when general support for 
the new radicals was also declining'. Specific radical 
movements were, however, consolidating their support.
That consolidation had its impact on Labor debates. See 
Paul Malone, 'Recalling Gough through Rose-Coloured 
Glasses', Canberra Times, 6 December 1986).
4. Altman (1980:112) argued that Labor/'new social movement' 
rapprochement was dependent on 'a victory for what might 
loosely be termed the progressive forces in the ALP over 
the conservative wing, often led by Catholics and/or union 
bureaucrats'. See also C. Johnston, 1982.
5. Belmont branch argued Labor had to recognise that world 
economic growth could not be maintained.
6. The submission argued branch and FEC delegations to state 
and federal conferences should include 'at least, say, 50 
percent members of affiliated unions, 25 percent women, 10 
percent first generation immigrants (non-rural 
electorates), 10 percent farmers and farm employees (rural 
electorates), one Aboriginal'. This plan for the 
'structured dissemination of power' assumed away the 
problem of how socially representative the extant ALP 
membership actually was, although the submission noted 
that many 'working class' pe*ople’"were put off ALP 
branches, seeing them as 'academic' or 'trendy' debating 
societies.
7. Reid was an old antagonist of the Labor left. See note 
14, Chapter 4.
8. For example, within Altman's 'moderate reformer' category.
9. See also Buci-Glucksmann, 1983:25; Heller, 1985:13,38; 
Offe, 1987:27. Przeworski (1985, 106, note 2) presents
a more sceptical picture of the possibilities of a social 
democratic/'new social movement' alliance. Olofssohn 
(1988) also treats claims about 'new social movement' 
potential cautiously.
10. Two submissions defending Labor's anti-uranium policy 
are included in this category rather than under a 
separate 'peace' label.
11. See also Submission 215, University of Melbourne, ALP
Club and Submission 47, F. Timmermans, Fitzroy branch, Vic.
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12. See, e.g. Submissions 69, 132 and 155 from Eltham branch, 
Vic; Seaford Pines branch, Vic and Narrabeen-Pittwater 
branch, NSW. See also Submission 213, individual members, 
Hughes Labor Women, NSW. The importance of Labor 
defending women's right to work was stressed (Submissions 
167 and 222, Lawson and Nelson Bay branches, both NSW).
On the other hand, some party members accepted the view 
that support for 'permissiveness' under Whitlam lost Labor 
support (Submissions 267 and 283; Mrs. M. Mather, 
Newcastle, NSW and Mrs. P. Rutherford, WA), but this line 
was not endorsed by branches or FECs.
13. See, e.g. Submissions 69, 133, 155 from Eltham branch,
Vic; Oatley branch, NSW; Narrabeen-Pittwater branch,
NSW and George's River SEC, NSW.
14. We have already seen criticism of male domination at 
branch level from Drummoyne branch, NSW and Berwick 
branch, Vic. See also Submissions 166 and 305 from 
Randwick North and Springwood-Faulconbridge branches, NSW 
and Submission 241, Anne Field and Ros Kelly, ACT.
15. See Macintyre, 1985:58; Castles, 1985:76 and 82.
16. Emphasising addresses by ALP 'celebrities' at daytime 
functions and local charity projects by ALP branches. 
Kooyong FEA believed Australian women were characterised 
by 'conservatism, apathy and unquestioning acceptance of 
their social role’.
17. Even individual 'new social movements' are characterised 
by considerable internal diversity. See Doyle, 1987 on 
Australian environmentalism.
18. The Whitlam Government had also sponsored the 
controversial Women and Politics Conference in Canberra in 
1975, as an International Women's Year Project. The 
conference explored women's political roles as voters and 
party members, in unions and in the bureaucracy, in lobby 
groups and as people affected by government policy and/or 
seeking government support (Office of Women's Affairs,
1977:vii).
19. The NCI looked at Labor and the ethnic communities in DP 
10, which did not endorse 'demographic representation' but 
recommended continuing with 'ethnic branches', where 
suitable. The published set of DPs included an appendix 
on Aboriginal land rights. The NCI did not look into ALP 
responses to environmentalism, the peace movement or gay 
liberation.
20. Rural-dwellers are difficult to conceptualise in 'new 
social movement' terms. The NCI criterion in such matters 
was whether groups seemed reluctant to support the Labor 
Party rather than whether they had formed 'new social 
movements' or not.
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21. Thus it had dismissed ethnic 'demographic representation' 
before DP 10 was released, although Italo-Australians for 
Labor had drawn the committee's attention to the specific 
under-representation of I'talo-Australians (Submission170 ) .
22. Warhurst (1983:265) suggests a figure of 30 percent.
23. ' In 1978 there were no Labor women in the House of
Representatives. At the 1977 National Conference, only two 
delegates (out of 49) were women. In the states, on 
average only about 11 percent of conference delegates were women (APSA, 1979:31).
24. Similar action could be taken at state elections.
25. We should note that DP 4 listed ancillary measures as 
necessary complements to affirmative action. These 
included the printing of given names on intra-party ballot 
papers and a membership campaign aimed specifically at 
women. Furthermore, meetings should be scheduled 
carefully and have child care facilities (APSA, 1979:33).
26. This had been noted in an earlier draft of DP 4 (NCI 
Documents).
27. Ryan was no slouch herself when it came to 'getting the 
numbers' (see Juddery, 1983:217; Clarke and White, 
1983:82-3). The ACT Branch had no full-time 'machine' and 
few affiliated unions (see note 2, Chapter 13 and Ryan, 
1979 :25 ) .
28. Although, as Bacchi (1984:13) points out, while the NCI 
reached out to the women's movement, it was careful not to 
offend the family woman. The NCI reminded the ALP it had 
to acknowledge 'a responsibility to working people, their 
dependents and those unable to work or choosing a career 
as homemaker'.
29. She was commenting on a draft of DP 4.
30. The Victorian public office selection committee relegated 
her to the difficult No. 3 spot on the Senate ticket. She 
had lost the support of her Centre Unity faction. Her 
involvement in 'new social movement' politics, especially 
feminism and the anti-uranium movement, had put her 
offside with factional 'heavies' (see Sawer, 1981:245). 
Following her demotion, a unique plebiscite was convened, 
which duly endorsed her and was duly disregarded (see 
Sawer and Simms, 1984:140ff). Eventually a special 
conference was called to reaffirm the original ticket.
31. See also Responses 9, 14 and 18 from Barossa branch, SA; 
Dandenong branch, Vic; and Hughes FEC, NSW.
32. Federal candidate, Corangamite.
33. State candidate, Barwon.
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34. As well as endorsing affirmative action and ancillary 
measures, the Report urged the National Secretariat to 
organise women's forums and to research women's voting 
patterns (ALP, 1979:12).
35. See Chapter 11B.
36. There was no 1978 National Labor Women's Organisation 
conference because not enough states were willing to send 
delegations (Moore, 1985:36). In some states, the old 
Labor Women's Organisations had been eschewed by feminists 
who preferred direct participation in the party's 
mainstream (Warhurst, 1983:262). Labor Women's 
Organisations in Victoria and Tasmania were disbanded and 
replaced by status of women policy committees.
37. Changes in NSW were evident as far back as 1970 (see 
Allan, 1977:14).
38. She was added to the National Campaign Committee in 1981.I
39. Here Ryan was criticising Labor's 1980 election policy.
In general she shared the Whitlamist assumption that 
proper understanding and presentation of 'the facts' was 
the key to social change. Certain myths were a major 
obstacle to women's advancement in the ALP (R/an,
1979:23), but the data were limited and the 'machine' 
refused 'to examine rationally' the data that did exist.
40. It had one representative from each state and territory 
women's committee. Barbara Wiese (SA) represented the 
working party at the National Executive meetings in April 
and June. See also 'Male-Run Structure of ALP 
"Iniquitous"', Canberra Times, 2 June 1981 (on Wiese's 
views) and Anne Summers, 'Labor Women Face ACTU 
Opposition', National Times, 8 February 1981 (on the 
NLWC).
41. See the discussion in 'National Women's Conference',
Lobby, February 1981.
42. Young argued the ALP was not responsible for the 
composition of union delegations at Labor conferences (ALP 
Transcript, 1981:192. See also Manfred Cross, ALP 
Transcript 1981:180). Jan Burnswoods emphasised that 
women were unionists too and rejected the 'most 
unfortunate' and 'quite untrue' dichotomy between unions 
and women (ALP Transcript, 1981:184. See also Anne 
Warner, ALP Transcript, 1981:186). Women activists 
pursued affirmative action agendas and other feminist 
concerns within the union movement (see Caswell, 1986).
43. See note 22.
44. Richardson suggested he would relish drawing up such a 
list, but that it might create 'an awful lot of trouble'.
45. See note 25.
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46 . See Mick Young, ALP Transcript, 1981:277. The NCI had 
recommended guaranteed representation for women on the 
policy committees. Another NCI suggestion accepted by 
Conference was the appointment of a national women’s co­
ordinator (a move proposed by Mick Young).
47. Combe saw contradictions between the way some delegates 
argued strongly in principle for 30 percent affirmative 
action on the National Executive, but, when the particular 
form of Executive expansion they favoured (a 30-delegate 
Executive) was unsuccessful, opposed any expansion, and 
thus any affirmative action there. Combe and Bill Hayden 
had pushed for a 25-delegate Executive, but this was 
unacceptable to the left. Thus prominent left-wing women 
like Jan Burnswoods, Joan Coxsedge and Barbara Robson 
voted to retain the status quo at the National Executive 
level ('Conference Backstabber', Lobby, August 1981.
'Backstabber' was a regular Lobby column. See also Moore, 
1985:42). For the NCI, National Executive reform was 
complementary to National Conference reform (ALP, 1979:27- 
33), although it canvassed the merits of the latter more 
thoroughly (e.g. in DP 1).
48. Although the debates also provided opportunities for male 
party 'heavies' like Mick Young, Manfred Cross (Qld), 
Graham Richardson and David Combe to argue in realpolitik 
terms against what they dismissed as impracticable forms 
and degrees of affirmative action.
49. Wiese was president of the SA Branch, which had rejected a 
mandatory affirmative action programme. Hunt argued 
affirmative action was only a transitional measure until 
it would no longer be necessary to distinguish delegates 
on the basis of gender (ALP Transcript, 1981:189). Such a 
process would require reforms in education, health and 
employment and the general breakdown of sexist attitudes.
50. This particular form of symbolic politics had also 
occurred in the 1979 abortion debate at the 1979 
Conference (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1981:20). In 
that debate delegates challenging the 'conscience vote' 
cited DP 4 (see Joan Coxsedge and Margaret Duckett, ALP 
Transcript, 1979:659 and 668). After the Special 
Conference, Button (1981:20) suggested that if the use of 
proxies was extended, union delegates could debate 
industrial relations, ethnic delegates could discuss 
immigration etc. The party might end up 'much closer to a 
system of direct representation of interest groups which 
the Committee of Inquiry proposals catered for than anyone 
suspects'.
51. There was potential tension between arguing for 
affirmative action so gender-based insights on peace, 
social policy etc. could be articulated and arguing that 
affirmative action was necessary so gender differences 
would eventually become irrelevant.
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52. Barbara Robson (ALP Transcript, 1981:281) also pointed to 
the French Socialist Party as an affirmative action 
exemplar for the ALP. On the French Socialist Party and 
'new social movements', see note 39, Chapter 10.
53. See also Jan Burnswoods and Sandra Nori, 'Women Get a 
Foot in the Door', Challenge, August 1981. For a more 
sceptical view, see White, 1981.
54. Ranney (1972:208-9) points out that advocates of party 
reform are often confounded by the implementation of their 
proposals. He suggests party reform is an area where 
unintended consequences loom large.
55. Appointed in 1983.
56. John Button (1981:19) wondered whether women had changed 
numbers in the rule book at the expense of changing 
attitudes. This misses the point. The process of 
changing attitudes in a party is a political one 
registered constantly in rules, platforms and the 
composition of the party elite.
57. See Therborn, 1978:238 on co-optation as 'a contradictory 
phenomenon'.
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CHAPTER 15
1. See Marc Robinson and John Quiggin, 'Where's Labor Going 
Now?', Nation Review, 1 September 1978.
2. The objective reflected a syndicalist vision which was 
only half-heartedly accepted in 1921 and officially 
abandoned in 1927. There are good accounts of the 
adoption of the objective in Turner, 1979 and Farrell,
1981.
3. Crisp argued that the 'rationalistic' aspirations embodied 
in the objective and the platform sketched out Labor's 
notions of 'steps towards social perfection'. The party's 
practical politics however owed more to the 'empirical 
temper' of its parliamentarians.
4. See Bill Hayden's arguments, ALP Transcript, 1979:
See also Bob Carr, 'Labor Emerges from Gough's Long 
Shadow', Bulletin, 31 July 1979).
5. Such views were generally pursued outside the party (see, 
e.g. Kuhn, 1982), but they were occasionally echoed in 
some left Labor rhetoric.
6. Some Victorian submissions touched on economic policy 
debates, but in a rather indirect way (see Submissions 51,
76 and 187, 268: Victorian Branch Socialist Education 
Committee, Balwyn branch, Kooyong FEA. See also 
Submissions 153, 250 and 251: Port Melbourne branch,
Auburn branch and Ballarat FEA.
7. Lane Cove branch warned against Labor tailoring its 
policies to the mood of 'a largely ignorant and non- 
informed electorate' (Submission 261).
8. Some submissions saw no contradiction between a renewed 
Labor 'socialism' and electoral Realpolitik. Cobar branch 
(NSW) called for 'a calm and rational articulation of 
Labor radicalism' (Submission 232), which could 
simultaneously honour traditional ideology and educate the 
electorate. This rather ambiguous formulation emphasised 
style rather than substance. In a similar vein Oatley 
branch and George's River SEC (NSW) saw 'intelligent 
radicalism', as practised by Neville Wran and Don Dunstan 
as the way forward for Labor (Submissions 215 and 274). 
However, there are problems in assimilating the 'Dunstan 
model' and the 'Wran model' to each other in this way, let 
alone the suggestion that either was particularly 
radical. If Dunstan represented the swan song of 
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, Wran heralded the new 
Labor Managerialist era.
9. Brassall branch (Qld) suggested a Labor plan for 'limited 
socialism', whatever that might be, so that the party could 
'challenge consumer capitalism' with a 'rekindled vision'
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(Submission 271). See also Submissions 240 and 261, Petrie 
and Wandal branches (Qld).
10. See also Jaensch, 1983:187.
11. See also Jones, 1985:122-53. Jones thought the ALP should 
pay more attention to the political issues involved in 
'new technology' and 'post-industrial' development. He 
offered a version of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, 
which brought such issues to the fore. This had little 
impact on party strategists. As one manifestation of 
'post-industrialism' in Australian society, Jones studied 
the changing social composition of the ALP National 
Conference (see note 59, Chapter 13). In the 1960s, he 
had been a prominent advocate of Labor 'modernisation'
(see Chapters 5D, 8A).
12. This made for parallels between 'Post-Keynesian' political 
economy and certain sociological theories of inflation 
(e.g. Goldthorpe, 1978).
13. See also Hine, 1986:266-7.
14. In 1974, Harcourt had been associated with the 'Adelaide 
plan'. This advocated incomes policy as a way of avoiding 
a descent into contractionary policies, which were being 
presented as the only available anti-inflationary strategy 
(B. Hughes, 1980:89-90). In its 1975 Hayden budget, the 
Labor Government clearly rejected 'Adelaide plan' ideas.
See also Harcourt, 1974.
15. Holland (1975:40) envisaged a socialist 'social contract' 
in Britain involving new public ownership of strategic, 
major firms, industrial democracy and 'planning 
agreements'.
16. See also Graham Dunkley's account of Harcourt's speech to 
the inaugural National Conference of Labor Economists 
('Meeting of Economists: The Brisbane Conference', Labor 
Star, 13 July 1977).
17. See also Harcourt, 1974:526. DP 6 aimed not only for full 
employment in itself but also for a 'socially desirable' 
pattern of (goods and services) production (APSA,
1979:53). Policy prescriptions derived from 'Post- 
Keynesian' theory are further outlined in Harcourt and 
Kerr, 1980 and Harcourt, 1982a - the latter provided me 
with a title for this chapter. 'Post-Keynesian' theory is 
discussed in Harcourt, 1982b.
18. By this he meant household-based economic activity. He 
saw a nexus between capital redistribution and a revived 
'domestic' sector.
19. On Stretton and the ALP see also notes 2 and 47,
Chapter 10.
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20 . Willis (1979:5) insisted that a viable prices and incomes 
policy would have to have a genuinely redistributive 
element. He told the 1978 Conference of Labor Economists 
that perhaps it was time to move from the 'secondary 
redistribution' of incomes through taxation and improved 
infrastructure as favoured by Whitlam to 'primary 
redistribution' which directly addressed inequalities in 
economic power and wealth (Russell Barton, 'Redistribute 
Wealth, Labor Told', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 1978; 
Warwick Bracken, 'Future Options for Labor Government', 
Canberra Times, 1 July 1978). P.P. McGuinness thought 
there was some support on the Labor front bench for a 
combination of 'right-wing' policies on inflation and 
'left-wing' policies on other economic issues ('Hayden's 
Flair Begins to Show', Australian Financial Review, 4 July 
1978).
21. See, e.g. speeches by Paul Keating and Mick Young, CPD, 
House of Representatives, 12 October 1978. The WA 
opposition leader, Ron Davies, said that DP 6 was a
'thought-starter' with no official standing and earlier 
DPs 'had not met with a great deal of enthusiasm within 
the ALP' (quoted, 'Davies Ridicules Nationalisation', West 
Australian, 6 October 1968. But see also E.A. Barker, 
'Davies Modifies Tough Stance', West Australian, 7 October 
1978 ) .
22. In particular, Blewett was replying to 'An Unreal 
Proposal', Canberra Times, 16 October 1978.
23. See also Gay Davidson, 'Report Author Criticises Press', 
Canberra Times, 14 April 1979.
24. See Table 7, Chapter 11.
25. The AMWSU rejected DP 6's endorsement of incomes policy 
(DP 6, Response). Its omission of industrial democracy 
was also noted (DP 6, Response 9, John Quiggin et al.,
ACT; DP 6, Response, Hugh Saddler et al., ACT). On the 
other hand, fully 20 percent of the responses wanted no 
new public ownership measures at all. V. Grant and M.
O 'Riordan (NSW) said they were against nationalisation and 
for 'Neville Wran appeal'.
26. Particularly in relation to public sector management, 
methods of socialisation and the co-ordination of a 're­
mixed' economy. See also Jim Groves, 'Economic Issues:
An Introduction', Challenge, December 1978).
27. Yet the 'Treasury line' had frustrated the Whitlam 
Government. See Hawker et al., 1979:165-7 and Etzioni- 
Halevy, 1983:213-9. For more general background on the 
institutional and intellectual characteristics of the 
'Treasury line', see Whitwell's (1986) historical account. 
For some post-1975 Labor thought on forms of institutional 
reorganisation that would challenge the 'Treasury line' 
see Langmore, 1976 (as discussed in Singleton, 1985). At 
the 1977 Conference of Labor Economists, Harcourt insisted
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that Labor would have to redesign public service economic 
advice structures, to overcome the 'Treasury line' (Graham 
Dunkley, Labor Star, 13 July 1977). In 1979, however, the 
ALP National Conference rejected the idea of a Department 
of Economic Planning (Oakes, 1979:19-20. See also ALP Transcript, 1979).
28. Following the defeat of the Chifley Government's bank 
nationalisation plans in the High Court. Love (1984) sees 
the ill-fated proposal as an illustration of the 
limitations of Labor 'socialism'. Connell (1977) sees its 
defeat as an example of successful 'ruling class 
mobilisation'.
29. The new objective, the National Executive draft and the 
formulation presented by Gareth Evans in 1978 are 
reproduced in Appendix III.
30. This followed seven years of Labor using the Blackburn 
Declaration to defuse Cold War attacks on Labor
'socialism'.
31. See 'Left Gains in SA Labor', Tribune, 24 June 1981;
Peter Ward, 'Left Foot Forward', Australian, 9 June 1981; 
'Rhetoric Exceeded Substance - Hurford', Advertiser,
9 June 1981; 'Labor Policy Stands, Softer Line Policy Move 
Fails', West Australian, 6 April 1981. The successful 
amendments were moved by Chris White (Miscellaneous 
Workers' Union research officer) in SA and W. Latta (ex- 
TLC president) in WA.
32. The front benchers were Young, Hawke, John Dawkins (WA) 
and Arthur Gietzelt (NSW). The other member was Manfred 
Cross (Qld). Gietzelt was the only leftist, although 
Dawkins had also been a signatory to 'There is an 
Alternative' (Submission 170 to the NCI, see note 32, 
Chapter 12). See also 'Hayden at Labor Seminar', Canberra 
Times, 1 June 1981.
33. Deduced from Rod Wise, Australian Financial Review,
28 July 1981; Peter Baldwin, Challenge, 28 August 1981; 
Lloyd, 1983:245.
34. Political scientist Brian Galligan (1981b) commented that 
Evans was so keen to distance himself from Marxism that he 
overlooked economic inequality. Evans (1981) later added 
'social co-operation' to his set of core 'democratic 
socialist' values. For earlier statements, see Evans,
1976 and Turner, 1976:19-20. Evans' 1978 text (reproduced 
in Appendix III) was derived from a draft prepared for the 
National Executive by Ian Turner in 1977 (Evans,
1980:178). In the 1960s, Cyril Wyndham had presented 
Labor 'socialism' as a matter of humanitarian ideals, 
rather than economic doctrine (see Chapter 6C). See also 
Hayden, 1968; Dunstan, 1976; Mathews, 1981).
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35. Evans (1976:8) acknowledged that the Whitlam programme 
served as his 'democratic socialist' model. It was 
'coherent enough, meaty enough and consistent enough with 
the proud traditions of the past to justify the label 
"socialism”. It's a pity Mr. Whitlam himself didn't much 
like the word'.
36. See, e.g. Peter Milton, 'The Socialist Objective', Labor 
Star, June 1981. Interestingly, however, the CPA paper, 
Tribune, was quite muted in its criticisms of Evans' 
draft. Roger Coates agreed that socialism was about 
'values' as well as economic relations, but thought Evans 
failed to connect the two satisfactorily ('ALP to Review 
Socialist Objective', 25 February 1981).
37. Despite a similar resolution having been passed in 
Victoria in June 1979 (see Peter Baldwin, 'Victorian 
Conference - Left Gains', Challenge, August 1979). The 
NLWC was more successful in getting official Labor 
rejection of 'exploitation in the home' built into the new 
obj ective.
38. For an earlier example of Hartley's vagueness on the 
policy content of the 'socialism' he espoused, see Andrew 
Clark, 'Tame Labor Leaves the Left in Disarray: Cairns is 
the Fallen Idol', National Times, 24 February 1975.
39. See also AMWSU, 1977 and 1979; Crough and Wheelwright, 
1982. See the critique by Bryan, 1983.
40. Uren conceded that wherever capital was involved there was 
exploitation, but saw the trans-nationals as the 'real 
enemy', against whom Labor could help assemble a populist 
coalition including small farmers, small business and 
'national capitalists'(whoever they may be; see the 
critique of this notion in Bryan, 1983).
41. Holland toured Australia in 1977.
42. See also Cottrell, 1984:164-4; Rustin, 1985:189.
43. See also Andrew Theophanus, ALP Transcript, 1981:74.
-N.
44. Wran wanted to revive the old Labor distinction between 
the objective and the 'fighting platform'.
45. See also Paul Keating and Denis Murphy, ALP Transcript, 
1981:70 and 87.
46. Button noted that it was the Waterside Workers' Federation 
that scuttled the Whitlam Government's plans for the 
stevedoring industry, Labor's only real attempt to 
nationalise anything since 1949 (see also Button, 1987).
47. Bob Hawke argued that a Labor government would be 
constitutionally unable 'to go any further down the road 
than the commitment ... contained in the executive 
resolution' (ALP Transcript, 1981:76).
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48. See Marc Robinson, ALP Transcript, 1981:90.
49. Interestingly, this reference is deleted from the 
official transcript.
50. He suggested the term 'socialisation' contained its own 
qualifications.
51. The theoretical rationale for 'economic democracy' as a 
socialist strategy is explored in Himmelstand et al.,
1981.
52. Heller was not endorsing the Swedish approach. She 
wanted a socialism centred on radical participatory 
democracy.
53. Pierson (1986:123), however, sees the proposal as 'a 
technical (and dirigiste) strategy for changes in formal 
ownership without any idea of how this is to articulate 
with a mass movement for socialism'. This is a valid 
and important criticism and Pierson (1986:124) concedes 
the 'ingenuity' of the Meidner Plan. Implementation
'of even an attenuated version' would place Sweden 
'indisputably in the van of European social 
democracy'. For a recent critical survey of the very 
attenuated implementation record, see Pontusson, 1988.
54. A later interest in Swedish Social Democracy came to be 
associated with arguments justifying the ALP-ACTU Accord 
of 1983, but the focus here tended to be on trade-offs 
between wage restraint and expansionist policies, rather 
than moves towards 'economic democracy'. The mild 
expansionary approach of the first Hawke Government 
budgets was later abandoned in the context of a collapse 
in Australian terms of trade (see Stilwell, 1986). 
Government enthusiasm for 'deregulation' also tended to 
clash with Accord expectations (see Stretton, 1987).
See also ACTU/TDC, 1987 and J. Mathews, 1988.
55. A 'Citizens for Democracy' movement called for a new 
Constitution. See Encel, Horne and Thompson, 1977.
56. The 1979 National Conference endorsed calls for a people's 
constitutional convention (Oakes, 1979:10).
57. Bob Carr (nd:10) saw constitutional reform as a major 
priority for a 'social democratic' ALP. In passing, he 
described the Meidner Plan as 'the most interesting 
socialisation proposal' but he generally wanted to 
distance the ALP from 'socialism' (see also Carr, 1986).
58. This rested on a concept of property as 'a bundle of 
rights', which could be challenged in a variety of ways, 
rather than simply head-on through nationalisation (see 
J Stephens, 1979:25). The idea had a long pedigree in 
Swedish social democracy (Esping-Andersen, 1985:23. See 
also Adler-Karlsson, 1969).
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59. Tribune correspondent Mark Taft commented that the debate 
was 'unsatisfactory' and misleading (Labor Debates Its 
Aims and Changes Its Structure', 5 August 1981). Those 
defending the National Executive draft 'didn't mean what 
they said'. Those who attacked it 'didn't say what they 
meant'. The strategic dimension was ignored (see also 
Marc Robinson, ALP Transcript, 1981:90-1).
60. The negative and derived (i.e. above all 'not-left')
identity the ALP right adopted for itself has parallels 
with Negt's (1983:60) observation of the way German 
social democracy 'gains its identity through self- 
separation from more radical positions on its left'.
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CONCLUSION
1. The venerable history of some Labor party reform ideas 
is noted in Appendix II.
2. Whitlam believed that only when the facts had been 
ascertained and details determined on branch 
membership, union affiliation and finance could 
specific new Federal Conference formats be considered.
3. Following the 1958 election defeat, Fitzpatrick 
thought it was time for Labor to 'take stock' of the 
'great and complex' problems it faced ('Capitalist 
Social Revolution Poses Problems for Labor', Brian 
Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, February 1959). See 
Chapter 2C.
4. An intelligent response to changing circumstances, 
Fitzpatrick believed, did not entail the abandonment 
of Labor radicalism. 'Modernisation' arguments were 
generally advanced by the Labor right, while the left 
dug its heels in defending party 'tradition'. 
Fitzpatrick was one of the few articulators of a left- 
wing politics of 'modernisation' within the ALP, 
although see also the arguments of E.L. Wheelwright 
(Chapter 2C) and Doug White (Chapter 8B). For 
critiques of Labor left abstention from the politics 
of party 'modernisation', see Hudson, 1968 (Chapter 
8D) and Houseman, 1971 (Chapter 9D).
5. Somewhat ambivalently, Whitlam saw great industrial as 
well as political opportunities associated with white- 
collar growth ('Whitlam Woos White Collar Workers', 
Australian, 13 March 1967). Generally, he argued that 
ALP exploitation of the political opportunities 
required going beyond the traditional Labor approach 
of being a 'labour movement' party.
6. The latter was of more interest to Whitlam, Isaacs and 
Jones than it was to Oliver.
7. The Scoresby committee focussed on the development of
an ALP membership adequate 'in number and quality for 
effective political operation' (letter, Australian, 1
December 1965). See Chapter 7D. Mathews' ideas on 
Labor branches are also examined in Chapter 5D and 
Chapter 12B.
8. However, it was under the aegis of Chamberlain that 
the national policy committees were established in the 
early 1960s (see Dunstan, 1962 and 1964).
9. See note 2, Chapter 1.
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10 . The WA exercise seemed mainly concerned with 
denouncing decisions taken in NSW, and while a 
committee was set up in Victoria, it never issued a 
report (see Chapters 3B and 5C).
11. For details on the socio-economic composition of the 
ALP branch membership, see Ward, 1983 and 1987.
12. D. Stephens (1979) notes the by-passing of the more 
established party channels. He contrasts the party 
machine channel (conferences and executives), which 
could easily become clogged by electorally damaging 
disputes, which reopened old ideological wounds, with 
the policy committee channel, where 'Whitlam and 
others worked relatively quietly to put together 
shopping lists for a Labor government' (D. Stephens, 
1987:168). 'Minders' were important in this second 
channel (see Walter, 1986). The second thoughts of 
some 'minders' are looked at in Chapter 12B. The 
second channel had emerged before Whitlam became 
leader (see note 8). Jupp (1965a:15-6) noted that, 
although there were problems with policies in areas 
such as education and social services, Labor's general 
economic policies were 'much more coherent. For many 
years now they have been formulated at the Federal 
level by consultation between economists and 
politicians away from the ill-informed and faction- 
ridden atmosphere of the mass machine'.
13. For more recent treatment of this issue, see McMullan, 
1988.
14. This self-congratulatory picture of NSW 'machine 
culture' was somewhat tarnished by that party's heavy 
state election defeat in March 1988 . During the 
election campaign, Max Walsh suggested that NSW Labor 
machine culture 'had the effect of repelling the 
social activists and reformers who have embraced Labor 
traditionally', thereby contributing to increased 
support for Independents ('The March of Independents 
towards an Unstable Government', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 1 February 1988. See also Jack Waterford, 
'Labor Loses Its Capacity to Inspire Even Its Own', 
Canberra Times, 20 March 1988). The theme of 'rank- 
and-file alienation' figured very prominently in the 
post-mortem on the NSW defeat. It was evident in many 
submissions to the party's official Commission of 
Review (John Della Bosca, 'March 19th and the ALP 
Commission of Review', Labor Times 2 (2), September 
1988 ) .
15. This was true of Hawke, Ducker and Young. Hayden 
wanted to reform the Queensland Branch. See Chapter 
11 A.
16. See note 48, Chapter 1.
540
17. See Frank Moorhouse, 'It's Siege and Hysteria Out 
There', Bulletin, 18 May 1974 and 'The Last Election', 
Bulletin, 13 December 1975.
18. See Chapter 3A. Calwell had his own criticisms of the 
party structure, but he did not shout them from the 
rooftops (Chapter 8C).
19. There are some similarities between White's argument 
and Gouldner's (1979) theses about the 'culture of 
critical discourse'. Gouldner, however, puts more 
stress on the elitist, self-interested and ideological 
aspects of 'professional' concepts of 'rational' 
argumentation (see also the references in note 43, 
Chapter 9).
20. The important federal intervention in 1970-71 had been 
a response to specific problems, particularly in 
Victoria, with NSW thrown in to maintain apparent 
factional even-handedness and minimise disruption.
21. See Lindblom, 1959; March and Olsen, 1983. Wyndham 
was aware of this. He saw little point in proposing 
'a beautiful structure that exists merely for the 
purpose of being admired' ('ALP "New Look" Talks 
Called', Age, 7 August 1965).
22. See also O'Meagher, 1983a.
23. These possibilities worked themselves out through 
increasingly disciplined and nationally co-ordinated 
factions at a time when Labor Managerialism was on the 
ascendant (see Chapters 14C and 15C).
24. For further misdating of the 'faceless men' episode to 
1966, see Jaensch, 1989:25 and 151. Jaensch (1989:93 
and 107) also presents the 1981 Special Conference 
debate on the 'socialisation objective' as taking 
place in 1982 and mistakenly presents proportional 
representation of states based on total party 
membership in each state as the National Conference 
format preferred by the NCI.
25. See note 55, Chapter 12.
26. Panebianco (1988:31) suggests that the particular kind 
of 'participation' that party leaders prefer is one 
which leaves them the widest possible freedom of 
movement.
27. We may find a search for scapegoats, demands for 
increased intra-party democracy and promises to stick 
to party principles more determinedly next time in 
social democratic post-mortems after a spell in 
government (Coates, 1986:421; Keane, 1988:129).
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28. Panebianco (1988:242) himself sees change as a matter 
of deliberate choice within the party's dominant 
coalition, but 'influenced by bounded rationality and 
anonymous pressures ... which interact with the 
choices to produce both desired innovations and 
counter-intuitive effects'. He prefers theories which 
stress changes in intra-organisational alliances over 
approaches derived from evolutionist sociology (i.e. 
'adaptation' models) but sees change occurring when 
organisational crisis makes for the intersection of 
'external' factors with 'internal' developments, which 
have undermined the position of the previous dominant 
coalition (Panebianco, 1988:239-61).
29. ALAC and its predecessors, which went back to 1938, 
generally 'performed a relatively perfunctory role, 
with neither side seeming anxious to exploit its 
potential for coordination of the industrial and 
political wings of the labour movement' (Lloyd, 
1983:240). In 1979, ALAC was 'put on a much more 
organised basis' (Willis, 1979:6) and began to discuss 
'the possibility of putting together an equitable co­
operative prices and incomes policy'. See also 
Stilwell, 1986:10.
30. See Catley and McFarland, 1981:200.
31. Howe and Howe (1984:163) comment that the expansion of 
white-collar unionism in the 1970s 'did not lead to 
any general re-evaluation of the party's strategy 
based on the "embourgoisement" decline of class 
consciousness analysis'.
32. Panebianco (1988) moves in this direction, but not 
entirely successfully (see note 29, Chapter 1).
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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT 7
AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY 
PARTY RE-ORGANISATION
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY
A: FEDERAL CONFERENCE
I - DIRECT REPRESENTATION
1: Although personally favouring a Federal Conference
comprising direct representation from Federal electorates and 
Federal Unions, with the sparsity of information available on 
such basic matters as (i) local finances and membership, and 
(ii) actual membership and degree of authority of Federal 
Trade Unions, I could not objectively assess the 
practicability of the scheme.
2: Without the complete co-operation of State Branches
in making private information available on individual 
membership and finances, and the assistance of trade union 
organisations, no one can state with accuracy if the scheme 
could work.
3: After very careful consideration, I believe it is
necessary to invoke the full authority of the Federal 
Conference to obtain the requisite information and to permit a 
detailed study of all the implications of such a change.
4: Accordingly, I recommend:
R:1 "That the Federal Conference instruct the
National Organising and Planning Committee to 
report to the Federal Executive on the 
desirability and practicability or re­
organising the future Föderal Conferences on 
the basis of representation from (i) Federal 
Trade Unions; (ii) Federal Electorate Party 
organisations; (iii) State Executives; and (iv) 
Federal Parliamentarians."
II. PROPOSED CHANGES 
A: STATE REPRESENTATION
5: As the Federal Conference is the supreme governing
body of the Party, and its decisions are binding upon all 
sections, it should be as representative of the Party as 
possible. At present its composition is too small and 
restrictive to allow for all the Sections to be adequately 
represented.
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6: Although based on the Senate system of
representation, the Party did not follow the Chifley's 
government action in 1948 by increasing the size of the State 
delegations. I believe that to raise the size of delegations 
from six to ten would be to the advantage of both the States 
and the Party as a whole. The work of a Federal Conference 
will in the future become heavier. Policy committees 
functioning throughout the year will be submitting very 
detailed reports to Conference for consideration. The more 
representatives, therefore, the Conference of key people within 
the States, the sounder will be any ultimate finding.
7: The present number of six is too limited. All
States would like to send more leading personnel to the 
Federal body but cannot do so because of the small number 
permitted. Most States now automatically include the State 
President and State Secretary on their delegations, which 
immediately reduces the number of other places to four. When 
one considers the wealth of talent that is available within 
the Party structure, four delegates from each State to the 
National Conference is far from adequate.
8: Although it is outside the jurisdiction of the
Federal Executive to recommend who should be included on such 
delegations, I would hope that States in any increased 
delegation would make room for at least one Federal 
Parliamentarian, one State Parliamentarian and one 
representative of the Party Federal electorate councils.
I accordingly recommend:-
R:2 "That as from 1966 the size of State
delegations be increased from six to ten."
Bj________PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION
9: The question of Parliamentary representation is one
which has raised a great deal of controversy within the Party, 
not just recently, but throughout the years of the Party 
existence. In the years immediately following the formation 
of the Federal Party, Parliamentarians were well represented 
on the Conference and the Leader of the Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Party was invariably a delegate from his home State.
J.C. Watson attended the 1900, 1902, 1905, 1908 and 
1912 Conferences, the first three being held during his time 
of Federal Leadership.
A. Fisher attended the 1905, 1908, 1912 and 1915 
Conferences, all except the first when he was Federal Leader.
The 1918 Conference resolved to admit Mr. Frank G. 
Tudor, then Parliamentary Leader, with the right to 
participate in all discussions but not to vote (Official 
report, page 2).
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A similar decision was taken at the 1919 Conference 
(Official Report, page 21).
Matthew Charlton (1922-8) did not attend any 
Conference, whereas J.H. Scullin (1928-35) attended all 
Federal Conferences held during his period of Leadership as a 
delegate from the Victorian Branch.
John Curtin (1935-45) was a delegate from the West 
Australian Branch to all Federal Conferences held during the 
term of his Leadership.
Therefore, of the 24 Conferences held between 1900 
and 1943, the Federal Leader was in attendance either as a 
full delegate or by invitation of the Conference at 19 of 
them.
10: I hold the opinion very strongly that the
Parliamentary Leaders should attend the Conference in their 
own right and not have to depend on an election in the State 
Conferences.
Once a Leader has been duly elected by the Caucus, 
for all sense and purposes he becomes the Leader of the 
Australian Labor Party.
11: As the Parliamentary Leaders serve the Party as a
whole, they should not have to run the risk of possible defeat 
in State Elections for Annual Conference delegates.
If the Leaders are expected to represent the Party 
as a whole, then they should be afforded direct access to the 
Federal Conference in their own right.
Therefore, I recommend:
R:3 "That the Leader of the Parliamentary 
Labor Party; the Deputy Leader of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party; the Leader of 
the Party in the Senate and the Deputy 
Leader of the Party in Senate shall be 
automatically delegates to the Federal 
Conference with full voting rights."
12: There is a great merit in the proposal that Members
of the Parliamentary Labor Party should be given the right to 
attend Conference in an ex-officio capacity and be granted the 
right to speak but not to vote. However, this can only 
operate efficiently and without infringing upon the rights of 
other delegates if the Conference is a large one. When the 
Conference is comparatively small, the position could become 
completely unworkable. What is undoubtedly required and what 
would be of great value is the expert knowledge of the key 
people in the Caucus. The knowledge that these people possess 
would be of benefit to the ordinary delegates to Conference 
who have neither the time nor the facilities to equip 
themselves with a detailed knowledge of every subject with 
which they have to deal during a Federal Conference.
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The Parliamentary Labor Party has now adopted the 
'shadow cabinet' principle. A logical step is for the Federal 
Conference to have the benefit of the advice of 'shadow 
ministers' readily at hand.
I, therefore, recommend that:-
R:4 "Members of the 'shadow cabinet' of the
Parliamentary Party be afforded ex-officio 
status at Federal Conference with the 
right to speak but not to vote."
Cs________ STATE PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS
13: The relationship of the State Parliamentary Leaders
to the Federal bodies has to be considered in a different light 
from that of the Federal Leader and his colleagues. Strictly 
speaking the State Executives have primary jurisdiction over 
the respective State Parliamentary Parties, although in fact 
the Federal Conference could exercise immediate jurisdiction 
over them if it so desired. However, from all available 
records, it would seem that only once has the Federal Executive 
gone over the head of a state Executive and dealt directly with 
a State Parliamentary Party and that was as recent as 1963 in 
connection with New South Wales.
Up to that point, the Federal Executive had 
scrupulously followed the practice, even in its dealings with 
members of the Federal parliamentary Labor Party, of usually 
working through the respective State Executives.
14: The position of the State Parliamentary Parties
should not, however, be dismissed as having no relationship or 
bearing upon the functioning of the Federal bodies. On the 
contrary, they are a key unit within the party structure, and 
should be considered as such.
15: With the Commonwealth exercising greater powers than
hitherto thought possible or necessary, and with the strong 
probability that this tendency will be accentuated rather than 
lessened, the need for the very closest possible co-operation 
between State and Federal bodies is imperative. This applies 
with special significance to the Labor Party, more than other 
Parties, although all suffer from this dichotomy of power.
The Labor Party must function on the basis of the 
closest possible co-operation between all of its sections and 
units, not the domination of all by one.
16: State Leaders play a key role in the public arena of
politics. Their presence at Federal Conferences, in their own 
right, would be of very great value in debates and in the 
harmonious functioning of the Party. The Federal Conference is 
the supreme policy making body of the Party, and its decisions 
are binding upon all units and sections. It is logical, 
therefore, that if the decisions of the Conference are to be 
carried out effectively, then the leading people in each State
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responsible for ultimately implementing those decisions should 
participate in the making of those decisions.
I, therefore, recommend that:-
R:5 "The Leader of each State Parliamentary 
Labor Party be automatically a full 
delegate to the Federal Conference."
D. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION
17: The importance of the women's vote in elections is
now recognised as a decisive factor. In the section on Women's 
Organisation, I deal with the subject in more detail. Here to 
enhance the status of the Labor Women's Organising Committee I 
recommend:-
R:6 "That the President and Secretary of the
Federal Labor Women's Organising Committee 
be automatically full delegates to the 
Federal Conference."
E. ANNUAL CONFERENCES
18: When the Party was founded, the Federal Conference
met every three years. Later this was changed to every two 
years. Now the time has arrived to provide for annual 
Conferences.
19: Any political party must keep abreast with changing
times. Policy which is made today may well become outmoded 
tomorrow, either because of changing circumstances or through 
the legislative action of Government. This applies 
particularly in the field of international affairs and defence. 
Events move so rapidly that it is practically impossible to lay 
down anything other than a broad set of principles. Too much 
detail, as is now found in the foreign affairs platform, makes 
the risk of dating greater. As a result, confusion can arise 
to the detriment of the Party.
20: The Federal Executive has no power to change policy.
This is a sound principle and one which should be adhered to. 
But it inhibits the approach of the Party and its operation 
when circumstances that motivated a particular item policy 
change dramatically or disappear from the political scene.
21: If the Party is to keep abreast of events, then its
highest policy making body must meet at least once a year.
This does not necessarily mean that every item of policy will 
be gone over year after year. With policy committees now 
functioning between Conferences, the party's policy is becoming 
much more orderly and sensible. What it would mean is that at 
every Conference more time could be spent on important matters 
which merit attention. At the moment, the Conference is faced 
with the task of catching up with two years work.
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I, therefore, recommend:-
R:7 "That commencing with 1966, the Federal 
Conference shall meet annually."
Fj________ DIRECT ACCESS OF FEDERAL ASSEMBLIES AND FEDERAL
UNIONS
22: Under present procedure, Federal trade unions and
Federal Party organisations have no direct access to either the 
Federal Conference or the Federal Executive, except in special 
circumstances. All material for either body must come through 
the respective State Branches and be endorsed by the State 
Conferences or State Executives.
A complaint made by all Federal Party organisations 
is that insufficient attention is paid to them in the States, 
the emphasis being laid upon State Parliamentary elections.
This is wrong. Probably, the election of a Federal Labor 
government is more important than anything else. State 
Governments complain that their powers are being undermined by 
the Federal authority and that the taxing power leaves them at 
the mercy or otherwise of the Commonwealth Government. Thus it 
must be of primary concern to every section of the Party to 
work for the election of a Labor Government in the Federal 
sphere.
23: Federal electorate authorities are treated as
Cinderellas at the moment. Their fund raising activities are 
given very little priority and one finds all too often that 
much more time is devoted to financing a local government by- 
election than to a Federal campaign. Some Party campaign 
committees covering local government have bulging bank balances 
while Federal Campaign Committees have hardly anything at all.
24: The status of the Federal Party organisations must be
raised and one way to do this is to give them direct access by 
means of communication with the Federal Conference and Federal 
Executive. At least they will know that their views are being 
laid before the highest policy making bodies of the Party.
25: This procedure will not cut across the rights of the
State Executive or State Conferences nor will it cause them any 
embarrassment. It could save the State Executives 
embarrassment or difficulties and assist them rather than 
hinder them. In any case, the final decision remains with the 
Federal Executive or Conference upon which the States are 
directly represented.
26: A similar facility should also be accorded to Federal
trade unions. At the present time, Federal Unions can only 
have direct access when a matter of discipline is involved.
This builds up in the minds of delegates to Federal Unions that 
the Federal Party Executive and/or Conference is a ’grudge' 
body. Under present procedure, a Federal Union wishing to 
place an item on the Agenda of the Federal party Conference 
would have to arrange for one of its State Branches to submit
549
it through the appropriate State Executive. If one State Party 
Executive refuses to endorse the proposition for transmission 
to the Party Executive or Conference at Federal level, this 
causes discontent within that Union. In any case, the 
procedure is unwieldy and unnecessary.
27: A limit should be put on the resolutions to be
submitted by a Union of Federal Party organisation. If they 
are given free access without restriction, the Agenda would 
soon become cluttered up with motions that should not be there. 
I have always felt that insufficient attention is given by 
local branches and Party units to the Agenda items they submit 
for State Conferences. Too often the merits of the case are 
not debated but the item is simply sent on to the next highest 
Party unit because there is no restriction on the number of 
items that may be submitted.
28: If Federal Unions and Federal Party organisations are
to be given access then they must treat this privilege with 
great care and consideration.
29: Furthermore, the items to be submitted must be of a
Federal character and strictly related to Federal policy. No 
one wants to see a Federal Conference Agenda cluttered up with 
the petty grievances of members affecting the location of a 
public convenience on the corner of a street I
I accordingly recommend:-
R:8 "That as from 1966 Federal Trade Union
organisations and Federal Electorate Party 
organisations be permitted to submit no more 
than three items for inclusion on the Federal 
Conference Agenda, provided that these 
resolutions are confined to matters of Federal 
policy; and further that the organisations 
mentioned may have direct communication with the 
Federal Executive."
B: FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
(a ) Composition
30: The Federal Executive was established by the 1918
Federal Conference and has remained at two delegates from each 
State for nearly fifty years. For reasons I have already 
advanced in recommending an increase in the size of Conference 
delegations, I believe an increase in the size of the Federal 
Executive is long overdue.
The work that the Federal Executive has to handle has 
grown. Delegates are being asked to spend more time on Federal 
matters than ever before. Since 1961, Standing Policy 
Committees have been established and are presided over by a 
Member of the Executive. The establishment of the Federal
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Secretariat has also added to the work of the Federal 
Executive.
Thus a greater amount of work is being undertaken by 
a group of men already carrying a heavy load in their 
respective States.
31: Meetings of the Federal Executive should also be held
more often than at present. One of the weaknesses in our 
Federal Structure has been that meetings of the Executive had 
been sufficiently infrequent to make them a subject of 
notoriety when they do meet. If they met regularly and often 
they would become an accepted feature in political life. More 
frequent meetings would also mean less time away from home 
States and duties for the delegates attending.
32: The position of the Leader and Deputy Leader of the
Federal parliamentary Labor Party I have already covered, and 
there is no need for me to repeat the arguments for their 
inclusion on the Federal Executive here.
I accordingly recommend that:-
R:9 (a) The Federal Executive shall consist of:-
(i) Three delegates from each State 
Branch;
(ii) The Leader of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party;
(iii) The Deputy Leader of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party;
(iv) The President, ex-officio, unless 
he is otherwise appointed a 
delegate.
(v) The General Secretary with the 
full rights of a delegate except 
that of voting;
(b) The Federal Executive shall meet at least 
every two months."
(b ) Party Officers
33: Insufficient attention has been given to the question
of Party finances at the Federal level. I deal with this 
subject in much more detail under the appropriate heading.
At this point, I recommend that:-
R:10 "The Federal Executive shall elect each 
year a person to fill the office of 
Treasurer of the Party.
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The position will, of course, be honorary 
but it is a post of sufficient importance 
to be established forthwith."
(c ) High Policy Committee
34: Under direction of the 1961 Federal Conference, the
Federal Executive was empowered to establish Standing Policy 
Committees. This was a great advance in the Party's machinery 
for formulating policy.
35: There is, however, a serious weakness, namely, there
is no Committee charged with the task of looking at the 
Platform and policy as a whole. In some instances, Sections of 
the Platform could not justify a separate committee to be set 
up just to consider it. Nor would it fit appropriately within 
the jurisdiction of any existing committee. Consequently some 
proposals remain on the Platform which should have been struck 
out long ago. Such a situation weakens the value of the 
Platform as a whole and tends to hold the Party up to ridicule 
and the allegation that it is rigid and inflexible.
36: There are also occasions when the Parliamentary Party
or the Party organisation has to make some pronouncement on a 
subject which is not covered by the Party Platform. In the 
past, the issue has either been let slip until it is too late 
or someone makes a statement which does not meet with the 
approval of the rest of the Party and a public controversy 
breaks out.
37: The two situations I have outlined could be met by
the establishment of a High Policy Committee comprising the 
Officers of the Federal Executive and the Officers of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party. Naturally, the committee could not 
make policy but it would be able to review the problem in the 
light of circumstances then prevailing. It would be of 
sufficiently authorative a character to give sufficient weight 
to the guidance it offered.
I accordingly recommend:-
R:ll "That the Officers of the Party together 
with the Officers of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party shall 
constitute a High Policy Committee 
which shall keep under constant 
consideration the existing Platform 
and Policy of the Party and advise the 
Federal Executive, Federal Conference 
or appropriate Standing Committee on 
any matter which in its opinion needs 
review by the Executive, Conference or 
Standing Committee. The Committee 
shall meet as and when required to 
consider matters which may affect Party 
policy and are likely to become the 
subject of public debate and about which
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there is some doubt as to the Party's 
attitude. No decision of the Committee 
can be considered binding until it has 
been endorsed by the Executive or the 
Conference."
C: PARTY DISCIPLINE
38: Where self-discipline is exercised and there is a
high degree of loyalty to the Party, the exercise of machinery 
discipline arises on very rare occasions.
39: Because of the Federal nature of the Party, very
often a dispute which could be settled quickly and with a 
minimum of public controversy drags out over many months. Thus 
when it comes before the Federal Executive for determination, 
it is revived in the public mind, and the whole process of 
public dispute is gone through again. This time lag also acts 
unfairly against an accused person, who is sometimes left in 
doubt as to his position for many months. This is contrary to 
all forms of democratic justice - or it should be.
40: The only rule at present covering the powers of the
Federal Executive and/or Federal Conference is 7(c) (vi) and
the present wording has itself caused confusion. By breaking 
the present rule into the three sections suggested below, there 
should be no doubt as to its meaning.
I recommend that Rule 7(c)(vi) be rephrased as
follows:-
R:12 "(i) The federal Executive shall hear appeals
from any affiliated organisation or 
individual member on the decision of 
any State Conference or State Executive 
where leave to appeal is granted to the 
appellant(s) by the State Executive or 
State Conference concerned.
(ii) The Federal Executive shall be competent 
to hear and decide appeals on the 
decision of any State Conference or 
State Executive on any matter affecting 
the Federal Labor Platform or Federal 
Policy or the attitude of any members 
of the ALP thereto.
(iii) The Federal Executive shall hear and
decide any appeal from any candidate for 
Federal Elections whose approval or 
endorsement as a candidate has been 
withheld or unduly delayed for any cause 
which, in the opinion of the Federal 
Executive affects the Federal Labor Platform 
or Federal policy or the attitude of any 
member(s) of the Party thereto.
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41: Many of the delays in disciplinary matters created in
the past were due to the absence of a full-time Federal 
Secretary. Now that both are in existence, there is no reason 
why what should have been done in the past is not now operated.
42: Where a State Branch has to act to implement the
decisions of the Federal Executive and/or Federal Conference 
when an organisation or individual has breached a Federal rule, 
the Federal Secretary of the Party should be brought into 
immediate consultation. As the Chief Executive and 
Administrative Officer of the Federal bodies, he should be 
intimately concerned with the hearings and evidence from the 
very beginning to ensure that the decisions of the Federal 
Executive and Federal Conference are carried out and not 
themselves breached or abrogated.
I accordingly make the following recommendation:-
R:13 "That where the powers of the Federal Executive 
and/or Federal Conference are likely to be 
invoked in matters concerning Party discipline, 
the General Secretary of the Party shall 
immediately consult with the State Branch 
concerned and recommend a course of action to 
the Officers or Executive of the State Branch 
affected. He shall forthwith notify all 
members of the Federal Executive of his.action 
and recommendation and seek a postal ballot on 
his decision. If the vote upholds his • 
recommendation, it shall become operative as if 
it were a decision of the Federal Executive 
taken at a duly constituted meeting but an 
adverse vote shall stay the implementation of 
the recommendation until such time as the 
Federal Executive meets to review the matter.
In using any powers granted under this section, 
the Rules and Constitution of a State Branch, 
State Executive,.Federal Executive and Federal 
Conference shall in no way be impinged.
In exercising his powers under this Rule, 
the General Secretary of the Party shall be 
empowered to take whatever action he deems 
necessary to protect the rights of the 
Federal Executive and Federal Conference.
D: THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENTARY LABOR PARTY
(a) Position in the Structure
43: The position of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party
and its members is an invidious one. Although in theory the 
controlling body is the Federal Executive and Federal 
Conference, in practice the members of the FPLP serve two 
masters - the Federal bodies and the State bodies. Because the 
States control the selections final and effective influence
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resides with them. There is the safeguard that a member whose 
pre-selection or endorsement has been withheld or unduly 
delayed can appeal to the Federal Executive. But this does not 
surmount the problem of divided responsibility.
44: There is a growing tendency within the Party to view
the Parliamentarian as something apart. Once he is elected to 
Parliament he becomes, in the eyes of some, something different 
to the ordinary rank-and-file member or the Party official. He 
is distrusted and viewed with suspicion. On the other hand, 
some Parliamentarians consider themselves superior beings with 
special rights and claim that they owe allegiance to the people 
who selected them and not the Party. Both extreme views are to 
be deplored.
45: Without the Parliamentarian, the Party would be
ineffective and futile. Without the Party, the Parliamentarian 
would never be elected to Parliament. Co-operation is the 
essence in any democratic party, not coercion. The 
Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary wings of the Party need 
each other and there must be the highest degree of mutual 
respect and trust.
46: To clarify the position of the Federal Parliamentary
Labor party, I recommend that the various decisions of the 
Federal Conference be included in the Constitution of the Party 
in the following form:
R:14 " (i) No state Executive may direct
members of the Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Party in regard to matters 
affecting the Federal Platform or 
policy or upon legislation before 
the Parliament or any matters the 
subject of consideration by the 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party.
(ii) The power of direction, advice
and/or guidance is reserved for the 
Federal Conference and, between 
Conferences, the Federal Executive.
(iii) No State Branch shall approach the 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party 
except through the Federal 
Secretary who will report to the 
Federal Executive on any action 
taken."
(b ) Powers of Discipline
47: It is only on rare occasions that a Member misbehaves
and it is necessary to invoke the disciplinary powers of the 
Federal Executive and/or Conference. On such occasions, as 
these however, the Party should not be tardy to protect its 
integrity nor slow in exercising its powers. It should not be 
forgotten that when a single Member acts irrationally or
irresponsibly, the whole Party can be brought into disrepute. 
(The Party is currently paying for such an act which took place 
nearly seven years ago.)
48: Again self-discipline is the best form of discipline.
But if the members will not or cannot behave in a responsible 
manner, then someone else must. As the body charged with 
administering the whole Party, the Federal Executive must be 
concerned with the feelings of the ordinary branch member 
without whom this Party could never survive. What the highest 
official or public representative of the Party does, affects 
the rank-and-file member. It can enthuse him; it can depress 
him; it can drive him out of the Party.
49: I think it is timely that the Federal Parliamentary
Labor Party should again be reminded by the Federal Conference 
that they are expected to exercise a greater amount of self- 
discipline than they have done hitherto. They should also be 
reminded that if they will not control themselves, then the 
Federal Executive will invoke its authority to control them.
50: The 1955 Conference decision went a long way to
clarifying the position, but it had the weakness that a Member 
of the Federal parliamentary Labor Party who breached 
discipline was to be reported to the State Executive concerned 
and not the Federal Executive. This decision should* be amended 
as follows:-
R:15 "That where a Member of the Federal
Parliamentary Labor Party offends against the 
Party or acts in breach of a Caucus decision, 
he shall first be warned by the Caucus 
Executive and if the offense continues, he 
shall be reported forthwith to the Federal 
Secretary of the Party who shall (a) 
immediately advise the Members of the Federal 
Executive; (b) notify the State Executive 
concerned; (c) interview the Leader and member 
concerned."
(c) Condition of Candidature
51: I strongly believe that conditions for candidature in
the Federal Parliament should be uniform, and no State should 
have the power to insert a rule or condition which does not 
operate elsewhere. The candidates are standing for the same 
position whether they live in Queensland or West Australia.
The States have uniform conditions for the State candidatures 
and they do not differentiate between electorates within that 
State.
It seems to be quite illogical and to a degree unjust 
that certain conditions should be imposed in one State without 
due regard being given to the position in others.
51a: At the present time, some States are operating an age
limit; others are not. Unless there is uniformity, a candidate
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or member living in, say Albury, could find himself forced to 
retire at 65, provided the State decided to enact such a rule, 
while his colleague in Wodonga could go on to 95. If there is 
to be an age limit, it should be uniform and not 
discriminatory.
52: The same reasoning applies to a lesser extent to the
levies paid by Federal Parliamentarians to their respective 
State Branches. Why should one member be compelled to pay a 
levy or x per cent, while another pays x- or x+ per cent and 
yet another pays none?
For these reasons, I recommend that a new Rule be
added:-
R:16 "That the Federal Executive shall be 
entitled to review any decision of a 
State Conference and/or State Executive 
which affects the conditions of 
candidature for the Federal Parliament.”
53: The Membership Qualifications for pre-selection, as
laid down in State Rules, are:- South Australia, Victoria and 
Tasmania two years; West Australia, New South Wales and 
Queensland three years.
There seems no logical reason why a member in Albury 
has to wait three years before being- eligible for pre-selection 
while his colleague in Wodonga waits two years.
I accordingly recommend that:-
R:17 "State Branches be advised that the
Membership requirement for Federal pre­
selection shall be two years.”
54: Methods of pre-selection vary greatly in each State,
although only two adhere to the pre-selection ballot.
No attempt has been made to lay down uniform 
regulations for pre-selections. To disturb the position now 
with pre-selections about to commence for the next Federal 
Elections, would cause confusion. It is, however, time that 
the whole position was reviewed and I recommend that:-
R:18 "The Federal Conference be requested to 
instruct the NOPC to investigate the 
present methods of pre-selection with a 
view to preparing a uniform method."
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E: THE COMMONWEALTH TERRITORIES
55: Within the present structure, the Northern Territory
is directly under the control of the Federal Executive while 
the ACT is an integral part of the New South Wales Branch.
56: The Party advocates full autonomy for both
Territories and I have never believed that it is a sound 
approach for the Party to advance a principle which it does not 
implement internally. Obviously there are considerable 
differences between the ACT and the Northern Territory.
57: The ACT does have an advantage in that it is part of a
larger unit and has representation to the New South Wales State 
Conference, but in fact, this means very little when it comes 
to the internal problems of the territory. The New South Wales 
Government has no jurisdiction within the ACT and any 
resolutions adopted by the New South Wales State Conference are 
pious expressions of sympathy or support. At the same time, 
the ACT Branches do enjoy privileges denied the Northern 
Territory.
I recommend:-
R:19 " (i) That the Branches in the Northern
Territory be permitted to form a 
Territory Executive which shall 
enjoy the status of a State 
Executive with respect to the 
internal administration and 
organisation of the Party in the 
Territory. Further, the Federal 
Executive shall approve a set of 
rules for the Territory Executive 
which shall enjoy the status of a 
State Executive with respect to 
the internal administration and 
organisation of the Party in the 
Territory. Further the Federal 
Executive shall approve a set of 
rules for the Territory Executive 
which shall have the right to submit 
items to the Federal Conference and 
Executive, and which shall be 
entitled to appoint one delegate to 
Federal Conference.
(ii) That the Branches in the ACT be removed 
from the jurisdiction of the New 
South Wales Branch and be formed into 
a Territory Executive with the status 
of a State Executive with respect to 
the internal administration and 
organisation of the Party in the 
Territory. Further that the Federal 
Executive shall approve a set of 
rules for the Territory Executive which
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shall have the right to submit items to 
the Federal Conference and Executive, 
and which shall be entitled to appoint 
one delegate to Federal Conference.
F: LABOR WOMEN'S ORGANISATION
58: The Federal Labor Women's Organisation is at present
a rather insipid body. Its powers are limited and when it 
takes decisions, no one takes any notice of them.
59: Either the Party should have an effective women's
organisation which is allowed to play a useful and influential 
role, or it should have none.
The Party dare not ignore the women's vote in future 
elections. Therefore, steps must be taken to improve the 
standing of the Labor Women's Organisation.
I, therefore, recommend that:-
R : 20 (i) The Labor Women's Organisation 
Executive be recognised as the 
Standing Policy Committee on 
Women's Affairs.
(ii) That the Secretary of the Labor
Women's Organisation Executive be 
granted an Advisory Seat on the 
Federal Executive of the Party 
with the right to participate in 
discussions but not to vote.
(iii) That the Labor Women's Organisation 
Executive shall be asked to 
nominate a woman to serve on each 
Policy Standing Committee.”
G: YOUTH ORGANISATION
60: The problems in forming a Young Peoples' Association
at a Federal level are as difficult as they are at a State 
level. Young people cannot be considered a homogeneous group. 
Like any other section of the community, they act and think 
according to their circumstances or position.
61: The attitude that young people adopt towards the
Party depends on the behaviour of the Party itself. If the 
Party is intolerable of their views and opinions, they will 
treat the Party with scorn and contempt.
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62: But they cannot be ignored. By the tine of the 1969
Election, 1,500,000 voters will be under 27. None of these 
people will be able to recall the Chifley Labor Government!
The basic work in attracting young people must still be done in 
the States. Nevertheless, the Federal Bodies could be assisted 
by advice and I recommend:
R:21 "That a Youth Advisory Committee of six
members under the age of 25 be established 
to advise the Conference and Executive on 
all matters affecting young people."
H: FINANCES
63: Finance is the most vital matter with which the Party
must concern itself. Everyone recognises this fact. How to 
overcome is the problem. The following recommendations are 
designed to put the Party on a sound financial basis:-
R:22 "(a) That the Federal Officers together with
the Federal Leader and the Deputy 
Leader constitute a Finance Committee 
over which the Treasurer shall preside.
(b) The Committee shall be charged with the 
task of raising ordinary and special 
funds for the development and 
expansion of the Party and for the 
conduct of elections.
(c) An immediate appeal for 50,000 pounds 
be launched to provide a base for the 
Party's operation.
(d ) _ A bank order system be instituted
through which members, friends and 
supporters can donate regularly to 
Party funds.
(e) A scheme be launched to obtain 2,000 
members who will collect from 20 other 
people a minimum of 1/- per week thus 
raising 100,000 pounds a year which 
will enable the Party at both State and 
Federal levels to function effectively."
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MEMBERSHIPI:
64: The individual Party membership is appalling. Our
membership in relation to our vote is less than one percent! 
Some electorates have a pitiful handful of devoted stalwarts to 
keep the Party alive. As electorate vote grows, so our 
membership lessens. An increase in membership means increased 
revenue.
The following recommendations are made in this 
connection:-
R:23 "(a) That 1966 be declared Membership Year
with a target 100,000 individual 
members (l/20th of the Party's popular 
support).
(b) The NOPC to prepare a detailed
programme to attract members including:
(i) special television and radio 
programmes;
(ii) the production of special
pamphlets and other publications;
(iii) the organising of special rallies; 
meetings and conferences 
throughout the Commonwealth;
(iv) special articles by leading Party 
members for reproduction in 
Union Journals;
(v) the organisation of special
functions designed to appeal to 
professional and other social 
groups."
J: LOCAL BRANCH ORGANISATION
65: One reason for poor individual membership is that the
Party does little to encourage people to join. New methods are 
being employed in some States but they are the exception to the 
general rule.
66: Too many branches meet in ill-lit, shabby and
depressing surroundings. Too much time is wasted on routine 
matters. Standing Orders are so restrictive and so slavishly 
followed that a strong heart is needed to remain. Too many 
chairmen and too many secretaries are ill-equipped to run 
meetings. This is not their fault but the fault of the Party 
in that it has never provided training for them.
561
The local branch is the Party's first line of defence 
and attack. The organisational and electoral success of the 
Party depends in the final analysis on the members of those 
branches. Related to this is the question of Party education.
I make the following recommendations:-
R : 24 "(a) To encourage effective branch
meetings. State Branches be requested 
to review their rules and Standing 
Orders to provide for streamlining 
of business.
(b) That to train Party members in the 
duties and functions of branch 
presidents, secretaries, treasurers, 
etc., and in election organisations, 
special day, weekend and week schools 
be organised.
(c) Such schools to be arranged on local, 
regional, State and Federal basis.
(d) Similar schools be arranged on the 
history, aims, ideals and policy of 
the Party.
(e) That at Federal level, Summer Schools 
of a week's duration be arranged to 
embrace courses on organisation and 
policy.
(f) To assist Party members to attend such 
schools, State Branches and trade 
unions be urged to award scholarships.
(g) As a further aid to improving the 
efficiency and standard of the Party,
a National Labor Correspondence College 
be established to conduct partial 
courses for Party members.
(h) A regular publication be issued on 
organisational matters.
(i) Regular decision notes to be circulated 
to all units to stimulate discussion
on the aims, objectives and policy of 
the Party.
(j) Local branches to be encouraged to 
organise their own evening schools on 
the above topics.
(k) Federal Party organisation to be 
encouraged to arrange schools on an 
electoral basis.
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K: ELECTORAL ORGANISATION
67: The Party's electoral organisation needs complete
renovation. To effect some improvement, the recommendations 
with respect to Party Branches will assist. The following 
recommendations take the process of improvement a stage 
further:-
R:25 "(a) Candidates to be selected at least two
years before an election.
(b) Candidates and key Party personnel to 
be trained at both State and Federal 
levels in the techniques of 
television, radio and public speaking.
(c) Publicity for an election to continue 
throughout the years between an 
election.
(d) Publicity be prepared to aim at 
special members of the Community.
(e) That a television and broadcasting 
station be established for training, 
filming and recording purposes.
(f) That regular radio programmes be prepared 
Federally for replay on Labor Stations
in the respective States.
(g) That immediate concentration on marginal 
electorates be undertaken and for this 
purpose the Federal Secretariat to have 
direct contact with the Federal Party 
organisation in those electorates.
(h) To ensure that the maximum benefit is 
gained from the use of leading personnel, 
itineraries for the Parliamentary 
leaders shall be arranged by the 
Federal Secretary in consultation with 
the State Secretary concerned.
(i) That urgent consideration be given to 
the employment of field organisers in 
marginal electorates under the control 
of the Federal Executive and the NOPC.
(j) That a handbook on the organisation and 
conduct of elections be prepared for use 
by all sections of the Party.
(k) That in conjunction with the State 
Branches, Senators be allocated to cover 
marginal electorates.
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( 1 ) That members in the House of 
Representatives in safe seats be 
allocated to a specific marginal 
electorate to service the local 
branches in the House and to 'shadow' 
the sitting member.
(m) To ensure that all Members participate 
in the marginal electorates campaign 
and that no single member is penalised, 
a fund be established to meet the 
accommodation, travelling and other 
expenses of members and Senators 
affected by (k) and (1). The details 
of the fund to be mutually agreed between 
the NOPC and the Caucus Executive."
L: TRADE UNIONS
68: The position of the industrial trade unions has been
changing dramatically in recent years. The advent of strong, 
militant 'white-collar' associations reflects the changing 
character of society. The ACTU and the AWU have recognised the 
simple fact in their collaboration with ACSPA and the High 
Council of the Public Service Associations. Regrettably, the 
Party has been slow to recognise the existence of such a 
powerful and influential force.
69: Concurrent with the growth of the 'white-collar'
associations, there has been a falling off in the support of 
the Party from the industrial unions.
For too long the Party has assumed that it is 
receiving the support of the unionists, and, therefore, 
insufficient attention has been paid to what was really 
happening. Trade union journals are read by their members and 
too many of them continually carry implicit or open attacks on 
the 'right-wing' or 'left-wing' of the Party, depending on the 
political complexion of key people on the Union Executives. We 
should not, therefore, be surprised if at election time, the 
union member re-acts against the Party he is supposed to 
support.
70: The Party itself alienates many unionists by assuming
that they think in the same way as they did twenty years ago. 
References to the 'workers', the 'working class' and the 
'underprivileged' are just so much meaningless and sometimes 
offensive jargon in modern society. A glance at the Taxation 
Commission Reports shows that not all the cars, all the boats 
and all the holiday homes are owned by "the bosses". In any 
case, many of the underprivileged are not organised or eligible 
to be organised in Unions.
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71: Thus the task that faces the Party is twofold; (a) to
gain the support of the professional associates; and (b) to 
consolidate its support in the individual unions.
Therefore, the following recommendations are made;-
>
R:26 "(a) An approach to be made by the CLAC 
to the ACSPA to join that body in 
a mutually agreed status.
(b) State Branches be encouraged to seek 
the closest possible contact with 
professional associations.
(c) That the Federal Executive establish a 
Consultative Committee consisting of 
members of professional and salaried 
associates.
(d) A special campaign be commenced to 
inform all trade unionists of the 
advantages of affiliation with the 
Party.
(e) Trade Unions be reminded that affiliation 
with the Party demands support for the 
policies of the Party and that advocacy 
of policies of other Parties will not
be tolerated.
M; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
72: The recent decisions of the Executive to seek
affiliation with the Socialist International and to co-operate 
in the formation of an Asian Regional Organisation have done 
much to end the Party's isolation in international affairs. 
More needs to be done and I recommend:-
R:27 "(a) That with affiliation to the
International, steps be taken to 
secure a seat on the Bureau.
(b) With the need for closer relationship 
with New Zealand closer contact be 
established with the New Zealand 
Labour Party by the exchange of 
delegations to Party Conferences and 
the establishment of a Liaison 
Committee.
(c) That to gain a first hand knowledge of 
Asian affairs, arrangements be made 
for the exchange of delegations.
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(d) That when leading members of the Party 
are touring overseas, they advise the 
Federal Secretary who will arrange 
contact with Labour Parties in the 
countries they are visiting.
(e) Upon the return of members from overseas, 
whenever possible, arrangements shall be 
made for him to address meetings of 
Party members.
(f) The Federal Executive to explore the 
possibility of inviting Asian socialists 
to Australia to be trained in Party and 
electoral organisation.
(g) That a system be devised in co-operation 
with Asian parties whereby local 
branches could 'adopt' or link with a 
similar unit overseas and assist in
the provision of necessary requisites, 
etc.
(h) That to set an example, the Federal 
Executive itself adopt an orphanage 
and that the International Refugee 
Organisation be requested to nominate 
such an orphanage.
(i) That every assistance be given to the 
development of a Party in New Guinea."
N: FEDERAL SECRETARIAT
73: The expansion of the Federal Secretariat to provide
for an Administrative Assistant, a Press and Publicity Officer 
and a Research Officer with appropriate clerical staff must be 
considered as the finances become available.
0: STANDARDISATION
74: To achieve a great degree of uniformity and assist in
the removal of confusion, I recommend:-
R:28 "That State Branches be requested to revise 
their Rules to include the following:-
(i) Standard Membership and Affiliation 
Fees;
(ii) Membership Ticket expiry as to 31st 
December;
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(iii) Minimum age for admission to membership 
16 with full rights;
(iv) Maximum age for youth organisations,
25. "
P; SUPERANNUATION SCHEME
75: To provide Party officials and staff with the
conditions enjoyed by many of the members they serve; I 
recommend:-
R:29 "That a National Superannuation Scheme 
be established to embrace all officers 
and staff willing to join."
CYRIL S. WYNDHAM, 
General Secretary
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APPENDIX II 
What1s New?
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Conference reform, the NCI's favoured 'solution' to
the 'problem' of 'intra-party alienation' was not a new idea. 
Encel (1979a:2) tells us that he and his fellow-NCI members:
... were, of course, aware that ours was only the 
latest in a long series of attempts to reform the 
party structure. One of the papers considered by 
the committee was the 'Wyndham report' ... whose 
proposals for party reorganisation bore a 
considerable resemblance to our own recommendations.
The 'factional and historical factors' the NCI found so 'hard
to shift' (as Wyndham had in the previous decade) had 'moulded
the party in the last 90 years' (Weller, 1983:60).
Presenting the NCI proposals to the Special 
Conference, John Button reminded delegates how venerable and
tradition-bound the Conference procedures were by comparing
*
them to the original Australian Constitutional Conventions:
... if Alfred Deakin and Mervyn (sic) Bourne 
Higgins and Sir George Reid walked in here today 
in this atmosphere, they would feel totally 
familiar except for the television lights. They 
would look at the delegations around the room like 
seven football teams and they would each move to 
their seats - Alfred Deakin to Gareth Evans' seat 
and Sir George Reid to Tom Uren's seat and so on - 
and they would be perfectly familiar in this 
atmosphere, the way we are today (ALP Transcript,
1981:141).
Whatever about its constitutional reform aspirations, 
federalism has been thoroughly ingrained into ALP organisation 
(Wildavsky, 1961; Galligan, 1981a. See also Overacker, 
1949:691-2; Holmes and Sharman, 1977:102-116 and Lucy, 1985: 
47-64 and 338-53 ) .
Certainly, had any delegates from the 1912 Federal 
Conference resurrected themselves, they would have had little 
difficulty understanding the issues at stake in the 
reorganisation debate at the 1981 Special Conference:
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In 1912, Conference had before it a serious 
proposal to jettison equal State representation 
at Federal Conference in favour of a sliding- 
scale based on population (Crisp, 1978:31).
NSW delegate J.C. Watson (who had been Labor's first Prime
Minister) thought each federal electorate body should be
entitled to send one delegate to 'Inter-State Conference' as it
was then known. The Labor leagues in the electorates had a
high profile in the party then. The affiliated unions did not
come to the fore until the dramatic upheaval over conscription
in 1916-17 (see Childe, 1923). Watson complained:
Under the present system, the smallest State,
Tasmania, had as many representatives as the 
largest, New South Wales ... I don't approve of 
it. It's not democratic and it's no use saying 
that it is. I am not bound to the system 
outlined in my motion but I do hope that the 
larger States will be given a larger share of 
representation in a conference such as this 
(quoted, Crisp, 1978:33).
Watson would not have been bemused by the 1981 debate. He
could have moved over to Paul Keating's or Graham Richardson's
chair. Not being particularly tied to the terms of his
proposal in 1912, he would have understood why they preferred a
different Conference enlargement formula in 1981, based on
membership rather than population. Victorian delegate John
Barnes favoured Conference enlargement on a membership basis.
A South Australian delegate, E.A. Roberts, opposed Watson's
line of argument completely:
Were they to get in the thin edge of the wedge 
they might have the whole of Australia ruled from the 
south-east corner of it. They have not yet so 
permeated the mind of the people of Australia as 
to make it one country in the eyes of its 
inhabitants. There is still a State feeling (quoted, 
Crisp, 1978:33).
Had E.A. Roberts reappeared in 1981, he could have 
taken Mick Young's seat. He would also have appreciated Bob
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Hogg's argument in favour of protecting:
... the smaller states to a degree that our 
political interests are covered in that, when we have 
a national conference - if we had it directly on 
FEA's for example - it would be a big cities 
Conference. It would be dominated by Melbourne 
and dominated by Sydney combined (ALP Transcript,1981 : 198 ) .
In 1912 cost was another objection to enlargement. This issue 
also re-surfaced in 1981. Several delegates spoke in favour of 
cost reduction measures:
Surely we can find a cheaper venue; surely we can 
forget about impressing some diplomats or 
ambassadors ... Let us remember in this party that 
there are many members ... who are quite willing 
to meet in less impressive temples ... and who are 
even prepared to be billeted ... (ALP Transcript,
1981:165. See also John Green and Peter Duncan,
ALP Transcript:1981:166-7 and 168-9 respectively).
The surroundings of the Southern Cross Hotel might have
surprised our resurrected 1912 delegates, as might the
accommodation provided for delegates. Things were a bit
different in the early days (Crisp, 1978:80).
In 1912, there was a compromise amendment from 
Queensland delegate Thomas Givens for Conference enlargement on 
basis of population (one delegate for every 150,000 of 
population) combined with a minimum of six delegates for each 
state. This would have given NSW eleven, Victoria nine and the 
rest six each. It was only defeated by one vote. A further 
amendment with a membership formula was defeated more heavily. 
Conference agreed to look into the matter again in three years 
time. 'De-federalisation 1 proposals were duly rejected in
1915, as they were in 1919, 1921, 1924 and 1936.
Only in 1919 was there a serious debate. The push 
this time was coming from Victoria (see Rawson, 1954:41). 
Victoria had a plan for completely re-structuring both
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Conference and Executive in proportion to population. The new
Conference would only have 29 delegates: NSW ten, Victoria
eight, Queensland four, SA three and WA and Tasmania two each).
This was not on the cards. One Queensland delegate said it was
1 bushranging' (ALP, 1921:20). However another Queensland
delegate, E.G. Theodore, indicated a willingness to consider
some change, if not the Victorian plan:
Certainly we might have arrived at a stage in our 
development when it would be wise to give 
possibly greater representation to the more 
populous states, but it should not be done alone 
the lines which had been foreshadowed (ALP, 1919:21).
By this stage the Victorian plan had been withdrawn in favour
of an amendment from J.C. Willcock (WA) favouring a 30-delegate
Conference 'de-federalised' on a membership basis. On
Theodore's suggestion a Conference committee was set up to come
back with another proposal. This allowed for each state to be
represented by one delegate for every 10,000 members (or part
thereof), with a maximum of eight and a minimum of four for
each state). This would have given NSW eight delegates,
Victoria seven, Queensland six and the others four each).
Although the committee seemed reasonably representative, this
was unacceptable to the Conference as a whole. The brief
debate involved a clash between labor's constitutional
aspirations and internal federal realpolitik similar to that
which recurred about sixty years later over the NCI proposals.
In reply to an interjection about whether he believed in 'one-
vote-one-value', J. Jelley (SA) said:
Generally speaking I do, but I hardly think it 
should be made applicable in connection with the 
supreme governing body of the Federal 
organisation, and the history of Labor's progress 
since the inception of the Commonwealth bears out 
that view (ALP, 1921:54).
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A. Clementson (WA) commented:
One-vote-one-value was beautiful in theory, but 
it did not always work out in practice.
In the 1930s the Depression and the Lang secession 
took centre stage and there was little time or inclination to 
consider changing the Conference structure which had settled in 
a federal mould. Even in the early debates the argument that 
existing arrangements should not be disturbed was as common as 
cries against 'centralisation*.
However:
The New South Wales Branch was no sooner 
effectively united and happily back in the 
bosom of the Party (1941-42) than it 
produced the most revolutionary of all proposals 
before Conference to reorganise the Party's 
constitution. It called for an All-Australian 
Labor Party Conference to decide on the basis 
of reorganisation (Crisp, 1978:45).
This was pursued at the 1942 Federal Conference. NSW thought
the special constitutional conference should be elected along
the new lines it was proposing with:
... one delegate from each Federal Electorate, 
elected by the rank and file, together with one 
representative from each Federal Union affiliated 
to the Party (quoted, Crisp, 1978:45).
Such a suggestion resembles the NCI plan (although, nearly
forty years later, the NCI allowed for weighted federal union
representation, whereas the NSW proposal in 1954 favoured
smaller federal unions in much the same way as the traditional
federal format favoured a small state like Tasmania). The idea
of a special constitutional conference, elected along
reconstructed lines, was an interesting one, which was not
revived by the NCI. In 1942, the idea of FEC representation
was hardly new but the suggestion of federal union delegates:
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... was ... quite novel. The impact even of the first 
part of the proposal in 1942, after forty years of 
equal State representation, was almost certainly more 
revolutionary than Watson's proposal in days when 
there was still a fluidity and incompleteness about 
the Party's constitutional arrangements (Crisp, 1978:45).
The NSW plan was quickly dismissed in 1942. 'De-
federalisation1 was not taken up again until the 1960s. In the
wake of the 1954-55 Split, there was an alliance between
Victoria and some of the smaller states. Victoria opposed talk
of 1de-federalisation' in the 60s. The two largest states had
rarely been interested in 'de-federalisation' at the same time.
Victorian delegates opposed Watson's proposal in 1912, although
some of them favoured an alternative membership-based formula.
In 1919, there was some NSW opposition to the Victorian push
for 'de-federalisation' (see ALP, 1919:21).
An enlarged Conference was not the only idea
considered in the 1977-81 period that had a long history in the
party. Some ideas dismissed by the NCI had been given
considerable thought earlier on. Back in 1918, the ALP tried
to hold a membership ballot across Australia to decide:
... whether the Party should cease its support 
for recruiting campaigns unless the allies proposed 
to Germany the ending of the war on 'the basis of 
no annexations and no indemnities'. This was the 
first and last time that an attempt was made to 
ascertain rank and file opinion on a particular 
issue (Rawson, 1954:39. See also Crisp, 1978:37).
Tasmania and SA did not co-operate, the war came to an end
anyway and the attempt was unsuccessful. The idea of a
Commonwealth Government newspaper was raised at the 1902
Federal Conference and the idea of a Labor newspaper was a
Labor dream with a long history (Crisp, 1978 *31 )• 'Educating
the Electorate' was another old Labor theme and the 1921
wording was the focal point in the 1981 'socialisation
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objective' debate. The NCI's recommendation that the National 
Secretary should sit in on FPLP Executive meetings was as 
unsuccessful as the attempt of Tasmanian delegate E. Dwyer Gray 
at the 1916 Federal Conference to empower the Federal Executive 
(then only one year old) to be represented at federal Caucus 
meetings and supply confidential reports to each state 
executive.
During the 1981 affirmative action debate Barbara
Weise (SA) excavated some party history:
... this is not the first time that this issue has 
been debated by a national conference of the Labor 
Party. The debate first took place in 1936 when 
the National Labor Women's Organisation at the 
time put forward a proposition for proportional 
representation for women. In 1942, they put 
forward a proposition for six out of twelve 
delegates to the national executive to be women.
That, too, was defeated.
The Party in the late 1920's started looking 
seriously at women in the community because, with 
the introduction of compulsory voting in 1925, 
suddenly women became terribly important to the 
Labor Party and this led to the formation of the 
first National Labor Women's Organisation. As 
we know, between that time and until very 
recently, women ceased to be very important within 
the forums of the Party ... (ALP.Transcript, 1981:182.
See Crisp, 1978:73-5).
Back in 1921 Mrs. Dwyer (NSW) was unsuccessful with her 
proposal that each state should include one woman in their 
delegation (Crisp, 1978:39). 'Affirmative action' (although 
not under that name) had been canvassed before 1978. What 
distinguished this subject in 1981 was not that it had been 
raised much earlier in the party's history but that, unlike 
other proposals of which the same could be said, it was now 
accepted. In diluted form so was 'de-federalisation'. 
Incremental adaptation is something that takes time to work 
itself out:
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Any specific major reorganization project is 
likely to fail, but persistent repetition of 
similar ideas and similar arguments over a 
relatively long period of time appears to make 
some difference. Persistence both increases 
the likelihood that a proposal will be current at 
an opportune time and creates a diffuse climate 
of availability and legitimacy for it (March 
and Olsen, 1983:288).
It is likely that the idea of a directly elected 'Mass 
Conference' will re-surface the next time the ALP has to 
conduct a federal post-mortem ritual.
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APPENDIX III
'Socialisation Objective' Formulations
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ALP Objective : Before 1981 Conference
Objective
The Australian Labor Party's objective is to achieve -
The democratic socialisation of industry, production, 
distribution and exchange - to the extent necessary to 
eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in those 
fields - in accordance with the principles of action, methods 
and progressive reforms set out in this Platform.
Interpretation of Democratic Socialism
The Australian Labor Party believes that -
Democratic socialisation is the utilisation of the economic 
assets of the State in the interests of citizens, and that man 
is greater than the machines he uses or the environment in 
which he lives.
Scientific and technological advancement shall serve the 
interests of all and not be the exclusive right of the few.
The economic aims of social ownership or social control are 
full employment, higher production, a rising standard of living 
and social security; and seeks to secure through democratic 
socialism -
a. social justice and economic security;
b. freedom of speech, education, assembly, 
organisation and religion;
c. the right of the development of the human 
personality protected from arbitrary invasion 
by the State;
d. free election under universal, adult and secret 
franchise, with government by the majority, with 
recognition for the rights of minorities; and,
e. the rule of law to be the right of all.
Principles of Action
The Australian Labor Party believes that its Objective will be 
achieved by means of -
Constitutional action through the State and Australian 
Parliaments, municipal and other statutory authorities.
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National planning of the economic, social and cultural 
development of Australia.
Cultivation of Labor ideals and principles, such as 
implementation of human rights, correction of injustice, help 
for the under-privileged, building Australian nationhood and 
abhorrence of war.
Promotion of the spirit of community service and of the 
acceptance of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.
Co-operative activities involving training of workers and other 
producers in the duties and responsibilities of management and 
where necessary subsidising such activities.
Source: Challenge, June 1981.
Evans draft
Statement of Objectives
The fundamental objective of the Australian Labor Party is the 
realisation of a society founded upon the principles and values 
of democratic socialism - a society built upon liberty, 
equality and democracy, in which everyone may freely 
participate in the shaping and control of the institutions and 
relations which determine their lives.
To this end, the Australian Labor Party stands for:
1. Control by democratic process, including where necessary 
social ownership, of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange.
2. Ownership and control of Australian Resources by the 
Australian people.
3. Social responsibility for the abolition of poverty, the 
achievement of economic security and decent living 
standards for all, and the achievement of greater real 
equality in the distribution of income and wealth.
4. Social justice and equality of respect for every member of 
society, regardless of sex, creed, race, national origin, 
citizenship, age or economic status.
5. Equality of access to education, housing, health and 
welfare services, cultural and leisure activities, and the 
law.
6. Reform of the Australian Constitution so as to ensure that 
Australia's political institutions reflect the will of the 
majority of Australian citizens and the existence of 
Australia as an independent nation.
7. Recognition and protection of fundamental political and 
civil rights, including in particular freedom of 
expression, assembly, association, conscience and 
religion, the right to privacy, and the protection of the 
individual from oppression by the state.
8. Recognition and encouragement of diversity of cultural 
expression as the basis of Australian nationhood, 
including in particular recognition of the right of Aust-
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ralian Aborigines to preserve and develop their culture on 
the basis of ownership of their traditional lands.
9. Safeguarding the rights of future generations through 
the conservation of resources and of the natural and 
historical environment.
10. Maintenance of world peace through an independent
Australian position in world affairs, the right of all 
nations to self-determination and independence, regional 
and international agreements for arms control, economic 
and social aid to the developing nations, and resolution 
of international conflicts through the United Nations.
Source: Evans, 1980b:78-9.
National Executive draft
Objective
The Australian Labor Party is a democratic socialist party, and 
has the objective of the democratic socialisation of industry, 
distribution and exchange to the extent necessary to eliminate 
exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields.
To achieve the political and social values inherent in this 
Objective, the Australian Labor Party stands for:
1. Redistribution of political and economic power so that all 
members of society have the opportunity to participate in 
the shaping and control of the institutions and 
relationships which determine their lives.
2. Establishment and development of public enterprises based 
upon federal, state and other forms of social ownership, 
in appropriate sections of the economy.
3. Democratic control and strategic social ownership of 
national resources, for the benefit of all Australians.
*
4. Maintenance of support for a competitive and non- 
monopolistic private sector controlled and owned by 
Australians operating within clear social guidelines and 
obj ectives.
5. The right to own private property.
6. The development of a democratic communications system as 
an integral part of a free society, in which all citizens 
shall have opportunity for free access.
7. Monitoring introduction of new technology to ensure that 
the needs of labour and society as a whole are taken into 
consideration, as well as the requirements of competitive 
industry and consumer demand.
8. Application of democracy in industry to increase 
opportunities for people to work in satisfying, healthy 
and humane conditions, and to participate in the decision 
making processes affecting them.
9. Equal access and rights to employment, education, 
information, technology, housing, health and welfare 
services, cultural and leisure activities, and the law.
10. Security of the family.
11. Abolition of poverty.
12. The achievement of greater equality in distribution of 
income, wealth and opportunity.
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13. Elimination of discrimination and exploitation on grounds 
of class, sex, race, religion, national origin, 
citizenship, age, disability, regional location or 
economic or household status.
14. The right of Australian Aboriginals and Islanders to 
preserve and develop their culture, through self 
determination and the granting of land rights.
15. Recognition and encouragement of a diversity of cultural 
expression and lifestyles within the Australian community.
16. Recognition and protection of fundamental political 
rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, conscience and religion; the right to 
privacy and protection of the individual from oppression 
by the state; and democratic reform of the Australian 
legal system.
17. The proper management of our resources and the environ­
ment to safeguard the rights of present and future 
generations.
18. Reform of the Australian Constitution and other 
political institutions so as to ensure that they reflect 
the will of the majority of Australian citizens* and the 
existence of Australia as an independent nation.
19. Maintenance of world peace; and independent Australian 
position in world affairs, on recognition of the right of 
all nations to self-determination and independence; 
regional and international agreements for arms control and 
disarmament; the provision of economic and social aid to 
developing nations; a commitment to resolve international 
conflicts through the United Nations; and a recognition 
of the inalienable right of all people to liberty, 
equality, democracy and social justice.
20. Commitment to and participation in the international 
democratic socialist movement as represented by the 
Socialist International.
21. Recognition of the right of citizens to work for 
progressive changes, consistent with the broad principles 
of democratic socialism.
This is followed by the text of the existing sections, C and D,
of the Preamble, which relate to membership and policy
formulation.
Source; Challenge, June 1981.
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ALP Objective : After 1981 Conference
BASIC PRINCIPLES
A ORIGINS
The Australian Labor Party had its origins in:
. the aspirations of the Australian people for a decent, 
secure, dignified and constructive way of life;
. the recognition by the trade union movement of the 
necessity for a political voice to take forward the 
struggle of the working class against the excesses, 
injustices and inequalities of capitalism; and
. the commitment by the Australian people to the creation 
of an independent, free and enlightened Australia.
B OBJECTIVES
The Australian Labor Party is a democratic socialist party and 
has the objective of the democratic socialisation of industry, 
production, distribution and exchange, to the extent necessary 
to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in 
these fields.
To achieve the political and social values of equality, 
democracy, liberty and social co-operation inherent in this 
objective, the Australian Labor Party stands for:
1. Redistribution of. political and economic power so that all 
members of society have the opportunity to participate in 
the shaping and control of the institutions and 
relationships which determine their lives.
2. Establishment and development of public enterprises based 
upon federal, State and other forms of social ownership, 
in appropriate sectors of the economy.
3. Democratic control and strategic social ownership of 
Australian natural resources for the benefit of all 
Australians.
4. Maintenance of and support for a competitive non-
monopolistic private sector, including small business 
and farming, controlled and owned by Australians, 
operating within clear social guidelines and objectives.
5. The right to own private property.
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6. Recognition and encouragement of the right of labour to 
organise for the protection and advancement of its 
interests.
7. The application of democracy in industry to increase the 
opportunities for people to work in satisfying, healthy 
and humane conditions, and to participate in and 
increase their control over the decision-making 
processes affecting them.
8. The promotion of socially appropriate technology and 
the monitoring of its introduction to ensure that 
the needs and interests of labour, as well as the 
requirements of competitive industry and consumer 
demand, are taken into consideration.
9. The restoration and maintenance of full employment.
10. The abolition of poverty, and the achievement of greater 
equality in the distribution of income, wealth and 
opportunity.
11. Social justice and equality for individuals, the family 
and all social units, and the elimination of 
exploitation in the home.
12. Equal access and rights to employment, education, 
information, technology, housing, health and welfare 
services, cultural and leisure activities and the law.
13. Reform of the Australian Constitution and other political 
institutions to ensure that they reflect the will of the 
majority of Australian citizens and the existence of 
Australia as an independent republic.
14. Recognition and protection of fundamental political 
and civil rights, including freedom of expression, the 
press, assembly, association, conscience and religion; 
the right to privacy; the protection of the individual 
from oppression by the state; and democratic reform of 
the Australian legal system.
15. The development of a democratic communications 
system, as an integral part of a free society, to which 
all citizens have opportunities for free access.
16. Elimination of discrimination and exploitation on the 
grounds of class, race, sex, sexuality, religion, 
political affiliation, national origin, citizenship, 
age, disability, regional location, or economic or 
household status.
17. Recognition of the prior ownership of Australian land by 
Aborigines and Islanders, recognition of their special and 
essential relationship with the land as the basis of their 
culture, and a commitment to the return of established 
traditional lands to the ownership of Aboriginal and 
Islander communities.
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18. Recognition and encouragement of diversity of cultural 
expression and lifestyle within the Australian community.
19. The proper management of Australian resources and 
protection of the environment, whether created by people 
or nature, to safeguard the rights of present and future 
generations.
20. Maintenance of world peace; an independent Australian 
position in world affairs; the recognition of the right 
of all nations to self-determination and independence; 
regional and international agreement for arms control and 
disarmament; the provision of economic and social aid to 
developing nations; a commitment to resolve international 
conflicts through the United Nations; and a recognition 
of the inalienable right of all people to liberty, 
equality, democracy and social justice.
21. Commitment to and participation in the international 
democratic socialist movement as represented by the 
Socialist International.
22. Recognition of the right of citizens to work for 
progressive changes consistent with the broad principles 
of democratic socialism.
C PRINCIPLES OF ACTION
The Australian Labor Party believes that the task of building 
democratic socialism is a co-operative process which requires:
1. constitutional action through the Australian and 
State Parliaments, municipal and other statutory 
authorities;
2. union action; and
3. ongoing action by organised community groups.
D MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANISATION
. Membership of the Australian Labor Party is open to all 
residents of Australia who are prepared to accept 
its objectives and who have associations with no 
other political party.
. Australian Labor Party Policy is made by National 
Conferences comprising the national and State 
parliamentary leadership of the Party, together with 
elected delegates from all States, the Australian 
Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and 
Australian Young Labor.
586
Party policy within the States and Territories is framed 
by conferences of delegates elected by constituent 
branches and affiliated unions.
Policy within the Australian Labor Party is not made by 
directives from the leadership, but by resolutions orig­
inating from branches, affiliated unions and individual 
party members.
Source: Reeves and Evans, 1982:187-190.
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